

DÆDALUS

IN PRAISE OF BOOKS

Pearl K. Bell
Edmund Burke III
Bernard Cazes
Kurt W. Forster
Ernest Gellner
Spiro Kostof
Shirley Robin Letwin
Frank E. Manuel
J. Hillis Miller
Edward W. Said
Tony Tanner
Heinrich von Staden
Henri Zerner

Winter 1976

\$2.95

JOURNAL

of

the

AMERICAN ACADEMY

of ARTS and SCIENCES



Winter 1976: In Praise of Books
Issued as Vol. 105, No. 1, of the Proceedings of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Stephen R. Graubard, Editor of the Academy and of Daedalus; Geno A. Ballotti, Managing Editor; Margaret B. Ševčenko, Manuscripts Editor; Margaret E. Canty and Linda Rubel, Editorial Associates; Ethel G. Anderson, Research Associate; Ruth Taylor, Subscription Fulfillment Manager.

Board of Editors

Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, William Bouwsma, Asa Briggs, Paul Freund, Northrop Frye, Clifford Geertz, Gerald Holton, Peter L. Kapitza, Gyorgy Kepes, Charles P. Kindleberger, Salvador E. Luria, Arnaldo Momigliano, Talcott Parsons, Gardner C. Quarton, Judith N. Sbaklar, †Lionel Trilling, Eric Weil. †Deceased

Editorial office: Daedalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 7 Linden Street, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

Subscription Office: All subscriptions and single copy orders and change of address information should be addressed to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 165 Allandale Street, Jamaica Plain Station, Boston, Massachusetts 02130.

Subscriptions: Daedalus is published quarterly. Subscription rate: \$10.00 one year; \$15.00 two years.

Published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Printed in the United States of America. Printing Office: 2901 Byrdbill Road, Richmond, Virginia. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 12-30299. Second-class postage paid at Boston, Massachusetts, and at additional mailing offices. Copyright © 1976 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

DÆDALUS

Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

VOLUME 105

of the Proceedings of the Academy

1976

BOARD OF EDITORS

Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, William Bouwsma, Asa Briggs, Paul Freund, Northrop Frye, Clifford Geertz, Gerald Holton, Peter L. Kapitza, Gyorgy Kepes, Charles P. Kindleberger, Salvador E. Luria, Arnaldo Momigliano, Talcott Parsons, Gardner C. Quaron, Judith N. Shklar, Eric Weil

Stephen R. Graubard, *Editor of the Academy and of Daedalus*; Geno A. Ballotti, *Managing Editor*; Margaret B. Ševčenko, *Manuscripts Editor*

Editorial Associate: Margaret E. Canty

EDITORIAL OFFICE: *Daedalus*, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 7 Linden Street, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

SUBSCRIPTION OFFICE: All subscription and single copy orders and change of address information should be addressed to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 165 Allandale Street, Jamaica Plain Station, Boston, Massachusetts 02130.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: *Daedalus* is published quarterly. Subscription rate in the United States, \$10.00 one year; \$15.00 two years.

Published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Printed in the United States of America. Printing Office: 2901 Byrdbill Road, Richmond, Virginia. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 12-30299. Second-class postage paid at Boston, Massachusetts, and at additional mailing office. Copyright © 1976 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

CONTENTS OF DAEDALUS, VOLUME 105, 1976

No. 1, Winter 1976, "In Praise of Books"

v *Preface*

SHIRLEY ROBIN LETWIN	1	<i>Hobbes and Christianity</i>
TONY TANNER	23	<i>Julie and "La Maison Paternelle": Another Look at Rousseau's La Nouvelle Héloïse</i>
BERNARD CAZES	47	<i>Condorcet's True Paradox, or The Liberal Transformed into Social Engineer</i>
FRANK E. MANUEL	59	<i>In Memoriam: Critique of the Gotha Program, 1875-1975</i>
HEINRICH VON STADEN	79	<i>Nietzsche and Marx on Greek Art and Literature: Case Studies in Reception</i>
J. HILLIS MILLER	97	<i>Walter Pater: A Partial Portrait</i>
PEARL K. BELL	115	<i>Edmund Wilson's Axel's Castle</i>
EDMUND BURKE III	127	<i>Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth</i>
ERNEST GELLNER	137	<i>The Sociology of Robert Montagne (1893-1954)</i>
EDWARD W. SAID	151	<i>Raymond Schwab and the Romance of Ideas</i>
KURT W. FORSTER	169	<i>Aby Warburg's History of Art: Collective Memory and the Social Mediation of Images</i>
HENRI ZERNER	177	<i>Aloïs Riegl: Art, Value, and Historicism</i>
SPIRO KOSTOF	189	<i>Architecture, You and Him: The Mark of Sigfried Giedion</i>

No. 2, Spring 1976, "Adulthood"

v *Preface*

ERIK H. ERIKSON	1	<i>Reflections on Dr. Borg's Life Cycle</i>
HERANT A. KATCHADOURIAN	29	<i>Medical Perspectives on Adulthood</i>
ROBERT N. BELLAH	57	<i>To Kill and Survive or To Die and Become: The Active Life and the Contemplative Life as Ways of Being Adult</i>
WILLIAM J. BOUWSMA	77	<i>Christian Adulthood</i>
IRA M. LAPIDUS	93	<i>Adulthood in Islam: Religious Maturity in the Islamic Tradition</i>
TU WEI-MING	109	<i>The Confucian Perception of Adulthood</i>
THOMAS P. ROHLEN	125	<i>The Promise of Adulthood in Japanese Spiritualism</i>
SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH and LLOYD I. RUDOLPH	145	<i>Rajput Adulthood: Reflections on the Amar Singh Diary</i>
MARTIN E. MALIA	169	<i>Adulthood Refracted: Russia and Leo Tolstoi</i>

ADVISORY COMMITTEE:

Robert N. Bellah, William J. Bouwsma, Erik H. Erikson, Joan Erikson, John C. Flanagan, Robert J. Glaser, Joseph Goldstein, Gerald Holton, Winthrop D. Jordan, Herant A. Katchadourian, Ira M. Lapidus, Jing Lyman, Eleanor E. Maccoby, Martin E. Malia, Bernice Neugarten, Thomas P. Rohlen, Lloyd I. Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Neil Smelser, Wallace Stegner, Tu Wei-ming.

No. 3, Summer 1976, "Edward Gibbon and the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire"

v *Preface*

vi *Bibliographical Note*

- DAVID P. JORDAN 1 *Edward Gibbon: The Historian of the Roman Empire*
- MARTINE WATSON
BROWNLEY 13 *Gibbon: The Formation of Mind and Character*
- JOHN CLIVE 27 *Gibbon's Humor*
- ROBERT SHACKLETON 37 *The Impact of French Literature on Gibbon*
- GIUSEPPE GIARRIZZO 49 *Toward the Decline and Fall: Gibbon's Other Historical Interests*
- G. W. BOWERSOCK 63 *Gibbon on Civil War and Rebellion in the Decline of the Roman Empire*
- PETER BROWN 73 *Gibbon's Views on Culture and Society in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries*
- BERNARD LEWIS 89 *Gibbon on Muhammad*
- STEVEN RUNCIMAN 103 *Gibbon and Byzantium*
- OWEN CHADWICK 111 *Gibbon and the Church Historians*
- ARNALDO MOMIGLIANO 125 *Gibbon from an Italian Point of View*
- PETER BURKE 137 *Tradition and Experience: The Idea of Decline from Bruni to Gibbon*
- J. G. A. POCOCK 153 *Between Machiavelli and Hume: Gibbon as Civic Humanist and Philosophical Historian*
- STEPHEN R. GRAUBARD 171 *Edward Gibbon: Contraria Sunt Complementa*
- JEAN STAROBINSKI 189 *From the Decline of Erudition to the Decline of Nations: Gibbon's Response to French Thought*

- FRANÇOIS FURET 209 *Civilization and Barbarism in Gibbon's History*
- FRANCIS HASKELL 217 *Gibbon and the History of Art*
- FRANK E. MANUEL 231 *Edward Gibbon: Historien-Philosophe*
- REUBEN A. BROWER 247 *With Gibbon in Puerto Rico*

ADVISORY COMMITTEE:

Bernard Bailyn, G. W. Bowersock, †Reuben A. Brower, Peter Brown, Martine Watson Brownley, Peter Burke, Owen Chadwick, John Clive, François Furet, Giuseppe Giarrizzo, Myron P. Gilmore, Walter Goffart, Francis Haskell, David Herlihy, David P. Jordan, Bernard Lewis, Frank E. Manuel, Arnaldo Momigliano, J. G. A. Pocock, Steven Runciman, Robert Shackleton, Jean Starobinski.

†deceased

No. 4, Fall 1976, "American Civilization: New Perspectives"

v *Preface*

WINTHROP D. JORDAN	1	<i>Searching for Adulthood in America</i>
TAMARA K. HAREVEN	13	<i>The Last Stage: Historical Adulthood and Old Age</i>
ROBERT COLES	29	<i>Work and Self-Respect</i>
WALLACE STEGNER	39	<i>The Writer and the Concept of Adulthood</i>
KENNETH S. LYNN	49	<i>Adulthood in American Literature</i>
ROGER ROSENBLATT	61	<i>Growing Up on Television</i>
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN	69	<i>On Being Adult and Being An Adult in Secular Law</i>
WILLARD HURST	89	<i>Consensus and Conflict in Twentieth-Century Public Policy</i>
GERHARD CASPER	103	<i>Social Differences and the Franchise</i>
NATHAN GLAZER	115	<i>Liberty, Equality, Fraternity—and Ethnicity</i>
BARRY D. KARL	129	<i>Philanthropy, Policy Planning, and the Bureaucratization of the Democratic Ideal</i>
HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR.	151	<i>The Right of Revolution</i>

ADVISORY COMMITTEE:

Robert N. Bellah, William J. Bouwsma, Gerhard Casper, Robert Coles, Erik H. Erikson, Joan Erikson, John C. Flanagan, Robert J. Glaser, Nathan Glazer, Joseph Goldstein, Tamara K. Hareven, Gerald Holton, Willard Hurst, Winthrop D. Jordan, Barry D. Karl, Herant A. Katchadourian, Ira M. Lapidus, Jing Lyman, Kenneth S. Lynn, Eleanor E. Maccoby, Martin E. Malia, Harvey C. Mansfield, Bernice Neugarten, Thomas P. Rohlen, Roger Rosenblatt, Lloyd I. Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Neil Smelser, Wallace Stegner, Tu Wei-ming.

Index of Authors, DAEDALUS, Volume 105, 1976

- Bell, Pearl K., 115 (*Winter*)
 Bellah, Robert N., 57 (*Spring*)
 Bouwsma, William J., 77 (*Spring*)
 Bowersock, G. W., 63 (*Summer*)
 Brower, Reuben A., 247 (*Summer*)
 Brown, Peter, 73 (*Summer*)
 Brownley, Martine Watson, 13 (*Summer*)
 Burke, Edmund III, 127 (*Winter*)
 Burke, Peter, 137 (*Summer*)
- Casper, Gerhard, 103 (*Fall*)
 Cazes, Bernard, 47 (*Winter*)
 Chadwick, Owen, 111 (*Summer*)
 Clive, John, 27 (*Summer*)
 Coles, Robert, 29 (*Fall*)
- Erikson, Erik H., 1 (*Spring*)
- Forster, Kurt W., 169 (*Winter*)
 Furet, François, 209 (*Summer*)
- Gellner, Ernest, 137 (*Winter*)
 Giarrizzo, Giuseppe, 49 (*Summer*)
 Glazer, Nathan, 115 (*Fall*)
 Goldstein, Joseph, 69 (*Fall*)
 Graubard, Stephen R., 171 (*Summer*)
- Hareven, Tamara K., 13 (*Fall*)
 Haskell, Francis, 217 (*Summer*)
 Hurst, Willard, 89 (*Fall*)
- Jordan, David P., 1 (*Summer*)
 Jordan, Winthrop D., 1 (*Fall*)
- Karl, Barry D., 129 (*Fall*)
 Katchadourian, Herant A., 29 (*Spring*)
 Kostof, Spiro, 189 (*Winter*)
- Lapidus, Ira M., 93 (*Spring*)
 Letwin, Shirley Robin, 1 (*Winter*)
 Lewis, Bernard, 89 (*Summer*)
 Lynn, Kenneth S., 49 (*Fall*)
- Malia, Martin E., 169 (*Spring*)
 Mansfield, Harvey C., Jr., 151 (*Fall*)
 Manuel, Frank E., 59 (*Winter*);
 231 (*Summer*)
 Miller, J. Hillis, 97 (*Winter*)
 Momigliano, Arnaldo, 125 (*Summer*)
- Pocock, J. G. A., 153 (*Summer*)
- Rohlen, Thomas P., 125 (*Spring*)
 Rosenblatt, Roger, 61 (*Fall*)
 Rudolph, Lloyd I., 145 (*Spring*)
 Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber, 145 (*Spring*)
 Runciman, Steven, 103 (*Summer*)
- Said, Edward W., 151 (*Winter*)
 Shackleton, Robert, 37 (*Summer*)
 Starobinski, Jean, 189 (*Summer*)
 Stegner, Wallace, 39 (*Fall*)
- Tanner, Tony, 23 (*Winter*)
 Tu Wei-ming, 109 (*Spring*)
- Von Staden, Heinrich, 79 (*Winter*)
- Zerner, Henri, 177 (*Winter*)

In Praise of Books



DÆDALUS

Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

In Praise of Books

v *Preface*


SHIRLEY ROBIN LETWIN	1	<i>Hobbes and Christianity</i>
TONY TANNER	23	<i>Julie and "La Maison Paternelle": Another Look at Rousseau's La Nouvelle Héloïse</i>
BERNARD CAZES	47	<i>Condorcet's True Paradox, or The Liberal Transformed into Social Engineer</i>
FRANK E. MANUEL	59	<i>In Memoriam: Critique of the Gotha Program, 1875-1975</i>
HEINRICH VON STADEN	79	<i>Nietzsche and Marx on Greek Art and Literature: Case Studies in Reception</i>
J. HILLIS MILLER	97	<i>Walter Pater: A Partial Portrait</i>
PEARL K. BELL	115	<i>Edmund Wilson's Axel's Castle</i>
EDMUND BURKE III	127	<i>Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth</i>
ERNEST GELLNER	137	<i>The Sociology of Robert Montagne (1893-1954)</i>

EDWARD W. SAID	151	<i>Raymond Schwab and the Romance of Ideas</i>
KURT W. FORSTER	169	<i>Aby Warburg's History of Art: Collective Memory and the Social Mediation of Images</i>
HENRI ZERNER	177	<i>Alois Riegl: Art, Value, and Historicism</i>
SPIRO KOSTOF	189	<i>Architecture, You and Him: The Mark of Sigfried Giedion</i>



WINTER 1976: IN PRAISE OF BOOKS

Issued as Vol. 105, No. 1 of the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences



Preface to the Issue “In Praise of Books”

IN THE WINTER OF 1974, *Daedalus* published an issue entitled *Twentieth-Century Classics Revisited*. At the time, in introducing the issue, I wrote the following:

When the editors of *Daedalus* began to consider the possibility of publishing critical reviews on twentieth-century classics, we were agreed on one essential point: our purpose was neither to establish a library of great modern books nor to found a committee charged with debating the relative merits of specific works. To choose among individual titles, admitting some and rejecting others, seemed a pointless exercise. Our ambitions were of another kind; we believed that it would be interesting to invite scholars in a wide variety of disciplines to write on *any* twentieth-century work that they believed merited reappraisal. In our original letter of invitation, we explained that our purpose was to stimulate discussion of “books that are frequently mentioned and sometimes read, that have been in print for two, three, or more decades, and have now acquired a certain life of their own.” . . . The commissioning letter went on to say: “Our hope is that we could be able to include books that have a certain ‘permanence of vision,’ that are meaningful to readers, even when they are recognized to have certain limitations. We do not intend that all the works should be ‘great books’; there may be some advantage in reviewing some that are highly controversial, thought to be insightful by some and unacceptable by others. We are interested in how the reputations of books are made, and why it is possible for them to enjoy several lives, some scarcely anticipated or acknowledged at the time they are first published.”

The reception of the issue was overwhelmingly favorable; indeed, many wrote to suggest that we consider publishing issues of this kind periodically. Some recommended that in the future we ask authors to write only about “neglected” works. Others hoped that we might extend our purview to include books published before the twentieth century. Remarks of this type encouraged us to plan this second issue, which we have called, appropriately enough, “In Praise of Books.” Because our earlier volume included a substantial number of reviews of works in history and the social sciences, we looked this time for authors who would be more sympathetic to reviewing in the fields of art history and criticism, literature and literary criticism, and political and social theory. We explicitly refrained from asking our authors to make the kind of distinction that John Ruskin made when he claimed that “all books are divisible into two classes; the books of the hour, and the books of all time.” We were not suggesting to our contributors that they select works only from the second category.

In the end, however, a fair number of those who agreed to write chose works that would be characterized as “classics” by almost any definition. What is most remarkable about the essays on Hobbes, Rousseau, Condorcet, Marx, and Nietzsche that we print in this volume is that each offers a view of the work that is somewhat unconventional, often dwelling on themes that have been generally neglected. These books have had many lives. Whether it is Shirley Robin Letwin talking about the “profound radicalism of Hobbes’s enterprise” and his essentially Christian outlook—a point of view not shared by many who have written on Hobbes—or Tony Tanner seeing Rousseau’s *La Nouvelle Héloïse* as a work that first developed the idea that the “bourgeois family would not work,” precisely because it creates not the communication that is coveted, but a profound and all-pervasive isolation, these—and many others—

are new insights into those ancient texts. Bernard Cazes, in insisting that the distance between Condorcet and Marx is not as profound as the adherents of either pretend, anticipates a view more fully developed by Frank Manuel, who reminds us of the extent to which Marx, who so prided himself on his “scientific socialism” and so disparaged the “utopian socialism” of others, was in fact one of their principal pupils. Manuel says:

Isaac Newton framed no hypothesis and Karl Marx wrote no utopias; that was the official stance. But in neither case was the position in fact maintained. If one does not restrict oneself narrowly to the phraseology of the *Critique*’s banderole and assimilates to it Marx’s related pronouncements, the full dimensions of his utopian dream come into view. Though he never wrote dull utopian stories, he encapsulated his utopia in a series of succinct, memorable phrases that in our time have exerted an especial fascination over vast numbers of intellectuals. Their mere recitation over and over again is hypnotic, like certain rhythms of popular music; one begins to feel as if one were already living in that paradisaical state.

Heinrich von Staden, concerned with the affinities between Marx and Nietzsche—all too rarely acknowledged—seeks to relate both to the Romantic texts that they disparaged but whose ideas insinuated themselves in their own writings. This group of essays offers more than a “revised view” of the meaning of certain classic works. It raises many questions about the “influences” that operated on these theorists, and why these have been so frequently ignored.

J. Hillis Miller, writing on Walter Pater, one of the incontestably great English critics of the nineteenth century, and Pearl K. Bell, writing on Edmund Wilson, thought by many to be the greatest American critic in this century, are also concerned with “influence,” in this instance the influence of the literary critic on others. Miller’s interest is precisely in Pater’s diverse progeny, but also in the more mysterious issue of why “lines of influence go by leaps and swerves, with gaps and deviations.” Pearl Bell seeks to explain why and how Edmund Wilson “unlocked the mysteries of modernist writing for the common reader.” The works of both Pater and Wilson need to be read on many levels; they reveal “meanings” that have not often been detected.

It is much too early to know what the ultimate influence of a work like Frantz Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth* will prove to be. It is not too early to say that it has been extensively translated, widely read, and is, as Edmund Burke III suggests, a book that has served to create a new “climate of opinion” in the world. Few twentieth-century works can claim that distinction.

Robert Montagne’s *Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc* is a very different sort of book. As Ernest Gellner explains, its title alone has contributed to its obscurity; the title, we are told, does not begin to do justice to the subject it treats. To make matters worse, the book has never been translated from the original French and is now out of print. Yet Gellner argues that it is a work that deserves to be read, and he clearly views it as a “neglected classic.” Edward Said, in writing about Raymond Schwab’s *La Renaissance Orientale*, makes a comparable claim for that work. Again, the book is scarcely known except among a very few in a quite restricted field; never translated from the French, it is, however, happily still in print. Edward Said argues that it deserves to be more widely read.

Art history and art criticism have thrived in the twentieth century. The impressive

contributions of a number of major scholars, mostly European, transformed a field that had been an avocation for a few into a serious area of intellectual inquiry. We are only beginning now to appreciate the full extent of the remarkable outburst of energy that occurred in this area in the last decades of the nineteenth century and that continued on through the difficult years when Hitler ruled the continent of Europe and so many were forced to seek refuge in the United States and the United Kingdom. Aby Warburg's name, perpetuated in the institution established in Hamburg and later moved to London, deserves to be remembered also as a historian of art and indeed, according to Kurt Forster, as a historian of culture. Forster argues that the limited size of Warburg's published work does not begin to express the measure of Warburg's influence on others. With Alois Riegl, who died in 1905, we have, according to Henri Zerner, "a collection of ideas without a completely systematic order . . . a number of radical and often puzzling texts." Again, what is remarkable is that these ideas have had a profound influence on others, particularly in the field of theory. Spiro Kostof, in writing about Sigfried Giedion, starts by quoting from Giedion's own defense of Riegl. Giedion had written: "Nothing is more embarrassing today than when small-minded people, taking advantage of the fact that they have been born later in time, venture to criticize those who first opened up paths along which we are now treading." Kostof argues that Giedion came to his views as a result neither of his technical training in Vienna nor of his art historical studies under Wölfflin, but that they derived "from the revolutionary artists of his youth who shattered the static, monodirectional conception of space prevalent till then."

Books are mysteries: mysterious in how they come to be written; mysterious in the influence that they can exert. This issue of *Daedalus* testifies to the truth of both these propositions.

A great debt is owed to the Ford Foundation for making this volume possible.

S.R.G.

SHIRLEY ROBIN LETWIN

Hobbes and Christianity

IT HAS BEEN A LONG TIME since political philosophy was taught as part of theology. Most political philosophers now prefer to dwell in a limbo of rights and methodologies where no one talks about God. And they are disposed to trace their emancipation to Hobbes. Nevertheless, there is something to be learned from reconsidering Hobbes's relation to Christianity, not only about Hobbes but even about our current pre-occupations.

That Hobbes's thought has an important connection with Christianity has been established by Michael Oakeshott's classic essays. He has placed Hobbes's understanding of reason and civil association, for all its novelty, in a tradition of Christian thought that runs from St. Augustine through late medieval Scholasticism. But this connection makes certain features of Hobbes's writing more puzzling. Why should *Leviathan* have been so thoroughly larded with slurs on Aristotle and the Schoolmen, and the universities as their stronghold, that the philosophy sometimes appears to be an excuse for the insults?

It is generally believed that the predominance of Aristotle and Scholasticism in the universities was all but gone well before Hobbes wrote. Rashdall tells us that "when the conflagration excited by Luther began to reach the English universities, it found the flames already kindled by the bible-readings of Tyndale in Magdalene Hall and of the Cambridge men both in their own university and in Cardinal College at Oxford."¹ Lutheran doctrines were being openly discussed, and those who were not entranced by Luther were definitely averse to Scholasticism. Sir Thomas More advised Oxford to pay less attention to theological intricacies and more to Scripture. When Colet set up the new school of St. Paul's, he excluded logic and disputation from the curriculum. A visitor to Oxford in 1535 found the undergraduates burning copies of Duns Scotus' treatises in the marketplace.² Although as late as 1636 scholars were still obliged by the Laudian statutes to recognize that Aristotle's "authority is paramount" and universities tried to enforce public observance, doubts about Aristotle were openly expressed as early as the middle of the sixteenth century. At Corpus Christi, Oxford, John Rainolds questioned Aristotle's conclusions about the *summum bonum* and declared that some of his principles were contrary to Christian faith. At Cambridge, the heterodoxy of Gabriel Harvey became notorious enough to subject him to charges of being a "patron of paradox and a main defender of strange opinions." Both Harvey and Rai-

nolds admired the Parisian master of arts, Peter Ramus, who had “defended the thesis that everything Aristotle said was false.” By the end of the sixteenth century, Ramus’ book on logic and many of his other works regularly appeared in the private libraries of scholars and fellows, and Cambridge came to be regarded on the Continent as the center for the study of Ramist logic. In 1638, two years after the Laudian statutes prescribed Aristotle, John Wilkins, the warden of Wadham College and a bishop, published a book showing that Aristotle’s opinions were both erroneous and dangerous. The scientists assigned Lucretius as a standard reading, and an atomistic physics was in vogue.³

In short, there seems to be good support for the view of Hobbes’s contemporary, Dr. Seth Ward, the Savilian Professor at Oxford, who was both a clergyman and a scientist, that there was nothing new in *Leviathan*. Hobbes’s theory of sense, Ward said, was being taught in the universities well before *Leviathan* appeared; Hobbes’s objections to the influence of Aristotle and the Schoolmen had long been irrelevant; indeed the only distinction of “the great Malmesburian Philosopher” was his ambition to have “Aristotelity” replaced by “Hobbeity” and to be adored as the Stagyrte once was.⁴

Just as curious as Hobbes’s animosity to Aristotle and the universities is the hostility to Hobbes among Christians. Despite his affinities with the late Scholastics, despite the fact that more than half of *Leviathan* is devoted to Christianity and the rest is full of God and Scripture, his contemporaries were certain that Hobbes meant to destroy Christianity. Clarendon declared that “no man who is thoroughly a Hobbit can be a good Christian” and that “a good Christian can hardly hear Hobbes’s name without saying of his prayers” in order to exorcise the evil of Hobbes’s “loose and licentious reflections upon piety and religion. . . .”⁵ Bishop Bramhall of Derry, afterwards Archbishop of Armagh, pronounced *Leviathan* a “foul beast” that “hath such an ‘haut goust’ that Christians have no stomach for it here, and I suppose their appetites will be no more carnall at the Resurrection.” The gist of Bramhall’s attack in *The Catching of the Leviathan* is summed up in the subtitle of his pamphlet:

Demonstrating out of Mr. Hobbs his own Works, That no man who is thoroughly an Hobbit, can be a good Christian, or a Good Commonwealth man, or reconcile himself to himself. Because his Principles are not only destructive to all Religion but to all Societies; extinguishing the Relation between Prince and Subject, Parent and Child, Master and Servant, Husband and Wife; and abound with palpable contradictions.

Nor have later readers, even when they have been atheists, been less disposed to regard Hobbes as an enemy of Christianity.

Paradoxical though it may seem, Hobbes’s reputation for atheism, as well as his antagonism to Aristotle, the Schoolmen, and the universities, along with oddities in his argument, all arise from his Christian outlook. Whether the impulse for Hobbes’s philosophy sprang from theological preoccupations and just how he arrived at the different aspects of his philosophy belong to his personal history. What is clear from his writing is that his argument rests on a theological insight overlooked by his Protestant contemporaries and successors as well as by his Scholastic predecessors. Hobbes recognized

that the Christian understanding of the universe, which the Reformation had helped to disengage more sharply from its pagan accretions—an understanding which also underlies modern science—required a new conception of rationality.

Whereas his predecessors had struggled to reconcile Christian revelation with ancient philosophy or else gave up philosophy, Hobbes jettisoned all such attempts at reconciliation and yet retained both philosophy and Christianity. In repudiating natural theology, even in its attenuated late Scholastic form, as wholly incompatible with a Christian understanding of the relation between man and God, Hobbes was of course at one with Luther. Indeed the homage paid by Hobbes to Aristotle and the Schoolmen echoes Luther's references to Aristotle as that "stinking philosopher," that "blind pagan," that "clown of the High Schools," and to the Scholastics as "ungodly men" who "presumed to ascend into heaven by their own righteousness and to bring from thence a truth which has originated among us on earth."⁶ But Hobbes went beyond a repudiation of natural theology. He saw that what had made natural theology plausible, and even obligatory, to reflective Christians was a pagan understanding of reason. And he undertook to replace it with one more suitable to Christianity.

Unfortunately the metaphysical crudity of Hobbes's alternative to the ancient understanding of reason has distracted readers from noticing the questions that he pursued. He meticulously explored the consequences—for morality and civil association, as well as for philosophy and theology—of denying the conception of rationality developed by ancient philosophers. He ruthlessly made it clear that the consolations afforded by ancient Reason could not be accepted by Christians. These consolations, however, were still cherished by Hobbes's contemporaries, as they still are today even by scientists and others who think of themselves as supremely modern. That is why Hobbes found it necessary to attack Aristotle and the universities, why he has been taken for an atheist both in his day and ours, why readers indifferent to Christianity have constructed him into characters as diverse as a natural-law theorist and a materialistic determinist.⁷

But, on the other hand, Hobbes's exploration of what a Christian understanding of the universe implies about human reason explains also why he is rightly recognized as the first expositor of modern individualism and of civil association and as anything but a defender of arbitrary absolute government. Nevertheless, it is true, besides, that Hobbes contributed heavily—though not in the manner commonly supposed—to the destruction of both individualism and civil association.

The profound radicalism of Hobbes's enterprise can be seen only by contrasting the conception of the universe that he opposed with his own. It was a conception derived from Plato and Aristotle. They invested it with subtleties that are difficult to grasp even by the most attentive readers; on many vital points, they disagreed with one another; and their ancient and medieval followers invented a host of variations. But throughout all the intricacies, disputes, and emendations, what remains steady is the image of the universe as a rational whole organized by an eternal intelligence. Though this intelligence was called God, he was not supposed to have created the universe but only to have endowed it with order. In other words, the God of Plato and Aristotle is a demiurge. Precisely how this order should be understood—whether the ideas that God

imposed had an existence independent of their embodiment in matter, how the ordering ideas are related to one another or to the world of concrete things, whether matter could exist apart from form, and many other such questions—was debated. But all those who learned their philosophy directly or indirectly from Plato or Aristotle agreed that the cosmos is a unity made by a single ordering, rational principle.

This image of the world gave men a way of understanding the strange combination of change and continuity in human experience, the fact that human beings grow old and die and yet can recognize themselves and others as enduring beings. At the same time it explained the peculiar capacity of man to ask and answer such questions. For according to the Platonic-Aristotelian picture, man is not merely subject to the cosmic ordering principle, as all things are, but actively shares in it. There is a bit of the intelligence or divinity that had shaped the universe in each man. And this divine spark in man constitutes his rationality. Reasoning, then, is understood as the power of understanding the ordering principle of the universe.

It follows that man is a compound of the rational ordering principle that rules the universe with the stuff or matter on which God imposed form. This way of describing a human being as an amalgam of matter and form could explain the affinity of man with both brutes and God. It also, however, opened a host of questions about the precise character and relation between form and matter to which the answers were as various as the writers. But despite all their differences, pagan philosophers agreed that man is a compound of divinity and animality, of reason and passion. This meant that the human soul has higher and lower parts reflecting the cosmic hierarchy. To the degree that reason rules in his soul, a man can free his spirit from encumbering matter and ascend to divinity.

This image of the human soul is at the heart of European morality, and it still informs our moral vocabulary. Morality has consequently been understood as a struggle between reason and passion, and the difficulties of pursuing virtue have been attributed to the tension between man's capacity to rise to divinity and the inclinations that pull him downward toward brutishness. But the ancient philosophers emphasized the resources that man has at his disposal in this struggle. If he exercises his reason, he can know not only that there is order in the universe, but what it is and why. For his participation in the rational cosmic order makes accessible to man first principles—that is, universal necessary truths—that can provide a secure foundation for all his thinking. He can know that throughout there is a ruling and a ruled element, that order consists in the proper subordination of the lower elements, and that the higher and naturally ruling element is spiritual and rational, which gives him a non-human, eternal, universal criterion for what is better and worse.

This happy liaison between man and the universe was destroyed by the discovery of the Judeo-Christian God. For he is not a rational principle, a first cause who imposes order on matter that already exists. Instead he is the Creator of all that is. When Moses wondered what to call God, he did not retire into metaphysical reflection. He had to ask: "Lo, I shall go to the children of Israel, and say to them: The God of your fathers hath sent me to you. If they should say to me: What is His name? What shall I say to them? God said to Moses: I AM WHO AM. He said: Thus shalt thou say to

the children of Israel: HE WHO IS, hath sent me to you" (Exodus 3.13-14). And so the Jews called their god Yahweh, because Yahweh means "He who is."

The universe presided over by this Creator is radically different from the ancient universe. There is no longer a unity ordered by a single rational principle. God the Creator is not an intelligible eternal system of ideas underlying the apparent diversity in the world of concrete existence. Instead the universe is divided into two wholly separate kinds of being, the world of concrete, contingent being, which men inhabit, confronting another, alien world of infinite being. This infinite being is utterly free of contingency or limitation; it is pure being and the source of all being.

The totally altered relationship with the universe deprived men of the resources with which ancient philosophers endowed them. In the Christian view, the human being is not supposed to participate in the divine ordering principle of the universe. For he is not thought of as the product of matter being informed by God's thoughts. According to Scripture, man was created by God out of nothing, and not according to any pattern, but as God in his infinite power willed. Nor is there a link between God and man like that between a child and his father as the pagans believed. For a Creator does not generate men. The reason of man cannot, then, in any way penetrate the ideas of God. As God the Creator is not an intelligible principle, the reason of man cannot be a fragment of divinity. Instead reason is reduced to a property of man. Since human beings cannot reconstruct the thoughts or purposes of God, they are cut off from understanding the eternal reality behind the ever changing world of human experience.

The Old Testament dwells unambiguously on the chasm between man and God. But Christianity introduced a new preoccupation with the communion between God and man, and Christian theology grew out of efforts to explain the character of this communion. The task was complicated by the reliance of Christian philosophers on pagan concepts, of which the most fundamental and troublesome was the idea of a soul. It was an irresistible concept because it provided a fully developed explanation both of the distinction between man and brute and of communication between man and God. But as it rested on the pagan understanding of the universe, it raised awkward questions for Christians about the relation between body and soul. If they are indissolubly united, then the dissolution of one means the dissolution of the whole, from which it follows that the soul is not immortal, as Christians were supposed to believe. If the compound is of a looser sort, it becomes difficult to account for its stability. And if the soul is wholly emancipated from association with the body, then the soul loses its individuality and becomes one with the spirit of the universe, or God.

There was no escape from these difficulties because in taking over the concept of the soul, Christian philosophers accepted an understanding of rationality that postulated an identity between the human and the divine intellect, and implied that the distinct existence of human beings is a temporary, undesirable separation from God that could be overcome. Christians who took up these suggestions were denounced for heresy. The Manichean heresy consisted in believing that human life is wholly an evil and salvation is to be achieved by becoming one with God; the Averroists concluded that the human intellect is a unitary reality distinct from any human beings. Such doctrines were of course at odds with the Christian conception of a human being as a unique

immortal soul and of a God who is the Creator of all that is, who loves men enough to die for them.

Nor were these the only difficulties. If men could understand the eternal pattern of the universe, this appeared to imply that God willed what was good rather than that a thing was good because he willed it. But then God would seem to be conforming to a given order and to lose the character of an omnipotent creator. It was difficult, moreover, to reconcile all of Scripture, which presented the readiness of a father to kill his son as a virtue, with the conclusions of natural reason. There were unfortunate implications, too, for the authority of the church—for if reason could discover eternal truth, the authority of the church seemed to be unnecessary. Every attempt to escape one of these difficulties exacerbated or introduced others. Because Christians could neither abandon the idea of the soul nor disengage it from its pagan connotations, the history of European philosophy before the Reformation may be read as the history of attempts to develop an understanding of man in the manner of pagan philosophers without falling into the pagan understanding of the universe.

These attempts end with the so-called Nominalist denial of Realism. And the innovations introduced by the Nominalists have an affinity with some of Hobbes's ideas. But the difference between them and Hobbes is therefore all the more revealing. Although they denied the Realist position on universals, the Nominalists were not skeptics but good Aristotelians as well as good Christians. The orthodox doctrine until the thirteenth century had been Augustinian. The dispute about universals was part of the attack on Augustinianism that began to take shape with Abelard in the eleventh century, and runs through Aquinas as well as Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. It was the last stage in the effort to reconcile Christianity with pagan philosophy.

The opponents of Realism denied not the reality of universals, but the way in which this reality was understood by the Realists. Their dispute was parallel to the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle about whether the Forms had an independent existence. Whereas the Platonist and Augustinian views totally divorced the world perceived by the senses from the spiritual realm, the Aristotelian view described the human intellect as an active power to abstract universals from sense perceptions, which bound human reason to ordinary human experience. Nevertheless the medieval, just as the ancient, Aristotelians assumed that human reason could reach behind the world that men perceive and intuit eternal truth. They were opposing what they regarded as a disposition to assimilate human to divine reason.

The novelties that Duns Scotus and Ockham introduced were inspired by a special concern with giving better recognition to the individuality of human beings and the omnipotence of God. It is a concern intrinsic to all Christian philosophy. But when it became central, as it did with Scotus and Ockham, it made the alliance between Christianity and ancient philosophy more precarious. The tenacity with which Scotus and Ockham clung to the ancient ideas and their difficulties in staying with them make it easier to understand Hobbes's vehemence about Aristotle and the Schoolmen.

Duns Scotus still spoke of man in Aristotelian fashion as a compound of matter and form. But he reconstructed the Aristotelian account to produce what he regarded as a balance between Plato and Averroes. He drew on the Augustinian tradition for a con-

ception of matter as positive stuff created by the divine will, which accorded better with the doctrine of creation. He attributed the diversity of creatures to the successive imposition of a multiplicity of forms, the highest form capable of union with corporeal matter being the human soul. Besides, he introduced a form of individuality, *haecceitas*, which made the individual as such intelligible. He could then insist that there can be direct, intuitive knowledge of individual reality, and that a man is not just a soul, but a unity of soul and body. This meant, of course, that Aquinas' awkward attempt to accommodate the Christian doctrine of immortality by making the soul a self-sufficient form had to be rejected. Instead Duns maintained that immortality could not be "proved," and could only be known through faith.

One of the consequences of the intricate Scotist metaphysics was to narrow the province of natural theology. This did not, however, prevent his theology from coming into direct conflict with Scripture on questions of ethics. As there are hardly enough scattered discussions of ethics to fill one of his twenty-six volumes, both the loyalty to Aristotle and the anomalies are all the more impressive. All his refinements on Aristotelian metaphysics could not help Duns to produce more than a weird blend of Aristotelianism with stories from the Old Testament and precepts from the Gospels.

He kept the Aristotelian notion of a judgment of "right reason" in conformity with first principles apprehended—not created—by the human intellect. He distinguished the power to apprehend the first principles of morality, which he called *synderesis*, from *conscientia*, the faculty of interpreting moral principles in concrete cases. He said that the purpose of civil society is to assist men in conforming to the moral law given by reason and prior to civil society. For he is at one with Aristotle in believing that truth is obtained by moving from intuited, necessary first principles to demonstrated conclusions. And he retained the Thomist view that the "active" intellect abstracts a universal immanent in things from concrete perceptions. Nevertheless, he rejected the Thomist harmony between faith and reason in ethics as in metaphysics. He denied that the commands of the Decalogue could be derived from self-evident rational principles. He insisted that God's command to Abraham could not be justified philosophically. But as he could not weld all these denials into coherence with the rest, his ethics is full of contradictions.

The modifications on Aristotelianism introduced by Ockham reduced the domain of rational knowledge further. But still the conception of rationality remained unchanged. Ockham's celebrated "razor" did not eliminate the mind's capacity to abstract from its perceptions a non-human reality. Rather, the "razor" cut out the complicated Thomist, and Scotist, apparatus for describing this process—distinctions between active and passive intellect and intelligible species, between phantasms and forms. The effect of Ockham's revision is to tighten rather than destroy the link between the human mind and a cosmic rational order. In this respect Ockham moved Christian metaphysics back to Augustine.

God's ideas remain in the picture, although they are ideas not of species or essences but of particular things, and many implications of pagan cosmology are denied. Ockham described what is common to God and his creatures not as "being" but as "structure." He said, as Hume did much later, that just because we find fire and burning

together, we cannot assume that the fire causes the burning. But however close he came to denying that there is an intelligible eternal pattern for things, he never reduced universals to sounds. He insisted that though our spoken words are artificial signs, they represent natural concepts arising from the interaction of the intellect and nature. Even when he spoke of a universal concept as a fiction, he emphasized that universals are not therefore fictitious because they truly represent something discovered by intuitive or abstractive cognition. For he kept the ancient notion of scientific knowledge as consisting of propositions obtained by demonstration from necessarily true first principles.

The affinity between the Scholastics who are misnamed Nominalists and Hobbes springs from their emphasis on the tension between pagan cosmology and belief in the Christian God. But Hobbes's ideas constitute a sharp break with theirs because the Nominalists were not, after all, disciples of Roscellinus of Compiègne, the eleventh-century Scholastic who said that universals were just noises and genuinely denied that they reflected an intelligible reality. When John of Salisbury reported on the intellectual life of his contemporaries in the twelfth century, he found that the views of Roscellinus had not long outlived their exponent. To modern readers who are indifferent to the niceties of Scholastic metaphysics the distinction between the views of Roscellinus and Ockham may seem trivial. To anyone concerned with Christian theology, as Hobbes was, the difference was crucial. Hobbes grossly misread Aristotle in many passages. But he could tell a friend from an enemy, and for his purposes Ockham was as Aristotelian as the rest. Ockham's argument that an omnipotent God could produce diverse, even contradictory, effects led him to insist that the human world is therefore wholly and intrinsically contingent and not just partially so, as Plato and Aristotle had argued. This brought Ockham very close to repudiating pagan cosmology. But Ockham, as all the other Scholastics, still retained the ancient view that if the mind could not come to rest on an eternal, non-human reality, the power of reasoning would disappear.⁸ The connection between this view of reason and the problems with which Christian philosophers had struggled, which had been missed by the Scholastics, was made by Hobbes.

The difficulties that had dogged Christian theology sprang from the conception of man as a composite of divinity and animality. The only escape was to describe rationality in wholly different terms, giving it a uniquely human character, not a quasi-divine one. This is what Hobbes set out to do. He invented a new understanding of rationality that totally freed the Christian understanding of the universe from the pagan legacy. He believed that, unless this was done, Christians would persist in the heretical delusion that they had a key to the ruling principles of the universe, for this is what the pagan conception of rationality implied. This delusion was at the root of social disorder because it sanctioned claims to possess final truth. And as the claims all appealed to right reason and were all illusory, no man could see any obligation to give way:

And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other mens reason but

their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it.⁹

What was needed was an understanding of rationality that could explain the predicament of a creature who could ask questions about the order of the universe and produce a variety of answers, but who was irrevocably denied any ultimate truth.

Since Hobbes did nothing less than deny all the most cherished beliefs of the Christian world, it is hardly surprising that his contemporaries should have found *Leviathan* "as full of damnable opinions as a toad is of poison."¹⁰ For Christians had learned to equate a reverence for religion and morality with a belief in the duality between matter and spirit, in man's composite nature and in God as a pure "spiritual" or "incorporeal substance." This is what Hobbes denounced as Aristotelianism and Scholasticism.

Though he was a Christian and a Protestant, Hobbes felt obliged to reject what his fellow Christians regarded as orthodox belief. In this respect he was doing what others, such as Aquinas, had done before him. What makes it difficult to grasp the theological character of Hobbes's dissent is that the orthodoxy he challenged was no longer explicit nor even self-consciously believed. Hobbes's contemporaries were as unaware as we are today that the conception of virtue as the rule of reason over passion, the belief in a natural foundation for justice, and the conviction that a ruler must not violate the "moral law" (what today we describe as "human rights") was connected with a theological doctrine based on a pagan metaphysics. Yet this understanding of man permeated all institutions and all religious, moral, and political thought, even though many people were devoted to the new science and had contempt for Aristotle and the Schoolmen.

Because Hobbes was intent on denying this composite character that pagan cosmology gave to man, he repudiated the distinction between spirit and matter. He was a "materialist," not in the sense of believing that matter was the ultimate stuff of the universe, but because he refused to divide the universe between matter and spirit, or indeed to speculate on what it was made of. Once this distinction was removed, God could no longer be described as spiritual or incorporeal, nor was there any need to do so. Such terms belonged to the rejected pagan vocabulary.

"The word 'incorporeal,' " Hobbes told Bishop Bramhall, "is not to be found in Scripture." The Bishop insisted that God is "incorporeal" because he "trusted to his Aristotelian and Scholastic learning" and "made no use of Scripture." Nor would Hobbes acknowledge that man had a soul which has higher and lower parts. Of course he believed that "a man is rational," he assured the Bishop. But it does not "therefore follow that reason is a part of the man." The Bishop had been deceived by Aristotle, who told him

... that "a rational living creature" is the definition of a man, and the definition of a man was his essence; and therefore the Bishop and other Schoolmen, from this that the word rational is a part of these words, "man is a rational living creature" concluded that the essence of man was a part of the man, and a rational man the same thing with a rational soul.

Instead of making meaningless speeches about souls and rational essences, Hobbes preferred to talk of a "person" which "signifies an intelligent substance, that acteth any thing in his own or another's name or by his own or another's authority."¹¹ Throughout such polemics, Hobbes was asserting that a Christian was obliged to regard a man as an individual substance and not as a dislocated fragment of divinity.

The theology that Hobbes proposed to substitute for the pagan one was radically new. It was a frightening view of human life, and it introduced a new kind of difficulty. For Hobbes found the concepts with which to construct his theology in the new natural science. This has nothing to do with his adoption of the so-called "resolutive-compositive method," which was hardly an innovation. It was described, in almost the same words as Hobbes uses, in the third paragraph of the *Politics*, where Aristotle says that he will proceed

... according to our normal method of analysis. Just as, in all other fields, a compound should be analyzed until we reach its simple and uncompounded elements (or, in other words, the smallest atoms of the whole which it constitutes), so we must also consider analytically the elements of which a polis is composed.

No doubt the scientists in Padua did the same, as all reasonable men always have, and perhaps they made a fuss over their "method," but Hobbes did not need Padua to teach him this commonplace.

What is more likely to have impressed Hobbes in the new empirical science is its metaphysical postulate. This was, indeed, very different from that of the ancient and Scholastic philosophers. The new science postulated that matter had an order of its own which could accordingly be disclosed to the senses. Therefore scientists could discover the order in matter by observation and experiment. More generally, this meant that men could discover an order in the universe without presuming to share in Divine Reason, simply by exercising their purely human faculties.

Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo—the founders of the new science—did not attempt to explain the features of the solar system by deducing them from their purpose given by the cosmic order, as ancient and medieval scientists had done. What they were proposing to explain was not a closed, hierarchically ordered system, but rather what Nicholas of Cusa described as a universe "of which the center is everywhere and the circumference nowhere." This indefinite and even infinite universe was, the new scientists assumed, held together by laws of motion that could be described mathematically. For the new science, motion was then a kind of being, a stable and indestructible kind of being, and the laws of motion were understood to describe the permanent character of this being. It was a kind of being that could be penetrated by knowledge based on the senses. For Galileo, the book of nature was written in circles, triangles, and squares. Later, for Boyle, it was written in "corpuscular characters." But all agreed that the book of nature was, as Boyle said, "a well-contriv'd romance" in which every part was connected to every other, and the good reader had only to observe closely the syntax to discover the structure. In short, the new nature studied by the scientists was not Plato's "living body" brought to life by God; nature had come to be seen instead as a mechanism in which motion was caused by the impact of one part on another.¹²

In reading the book of nature, the scientist was not presuming to read the mind of God but simply observing, through his senses, the character of what God had made. The new science was a wholly modest enterprise. It did not study the order of being, but phenomena. And phenomena were what could be measured. The science could be made perfect without denying that God's purpose remained inscrutable. Here, then, we have a truly Christian nature, created by God, and in no way partaking of his divinity, yet nevertheless knowable.

Hobbes proposed to read men in the same manner as Copernicus had read the stars. The nature that Hobbes studied was the nature of the scientists, not the Nature of the ancient or medieval philosophers. It was not the rational order of the universe, but the phenomena that a man could observe. The laws of nature that Hobbes proposed to discover described that manner in which God's creatures operated, the conditions of their existence, not the purpose for which they were created. Such laws are discovered by reflecting on the thoughts and behavior of oneself and other men, not by intuiting God's ideas, reasons, or purposes. Understanding of this sort does not presume to be god-like by escaping or deprecating sense perception in favor of "higher" intuitions. It therefore carries no suggestion that men are of the same nature as God, and it is the kind of knowledge to which a Christian may properly aspire.

The new idea of nature enabled Hobbes to renounce any talk of invisible things such as led to those "insignificant sounds . . . coyned by Schoole-men and pusled Philosophers."¹³ He would have none of that Scholastic nonsense about thoughts being blown into a man from nowhere. Thought had to come from somewhere. It could only come from an external body. An external body, by pressing on our organs of sense, produces in us motions, and these are our sense impressions or images. The image may stay after the stimulus that produced it has gone and we may combine the images retained—that is imagination. We may recollect such images of decayed sense impressions, and that is memory. The memory of many things is experience. When one thought succeeds another to produce a train of thought, that is mental discourse. And when a train of thought is put into motion by some desire or aversion, it is a regulated train of thought. A train of thought designed to hunt out "the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause" is the faculty of invention, which is what the Latins called *sagacitas*.¹⁴ Thus Hobbes accounted for all the activities traditionally described as "rational" without departing from the new nature.

Having shown that there can be no thought where "we have not formerly had sense," he had made it clear that thought of anything that is "infinite" is impossible. To say that something is infinite is only to indicate that "we are not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named. . . ." The name of God, then, is used "not to make us conceive him" but "that we may honour him." For God is "*Incomprehensible*; and his greatnesse and power are unconceivable." Thus the Christian God could be described without presumption. Any talk of entities other than God that do not exist in some time or place and have some determinate magnitude is, Hobbes assures us, nothing but absurd speech, "taken upon credit (without any signification at all) from deceived Philosophers and deceived, or deceiving Schoole-men."¹⁵ There is no limit to

the absurd consequences of such “insignificant Trainees of strange and barbarous words.”¹⁶ Hobbes leaves Luther far behind when he says:

... scarce any thing can be more absurdly said in naturall Philosophy, than that which now is called *Aristotles Metaphysiques*; nor more repugnant to Government, than much of that hee hath said in his *Politiques*; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his *Ethiques*.¹⁷

Though Hobbes supposed that what distinguished his account of thought from that of his predecessors was his assertion that all thought originates in the senses, on this score, Hobbes, Aquinas, and Aristotle are entirely agreed. The disagreement is over what happens when the mind moves from sense perceptions to ideas. Because Hobbes denied that men are part of a spiritually ordered hierarchy of being, which their possession of *nous* enables them to apprehend, he concluded that men can only assign names to their particular perceptions. When they assign one name to “divers particular things,” men invent a universal. But there is “nothing in the world Universall but Names; for the things named, are every one of them Individuall and Singular.”¹⁸

A new understanding of truth necessarily followed from the new conception of rationality. In the old model, truth consisted in discovering the order of things in Nature. According to Hobbes’s view, truth consists in the right ordering of the names invented by men, and all exactitude depends on using names with precision. Men could no longer aspire to what Plato and Aristotle understood as scientific knowledge, which was produced by demonstration from the first principles intuited by *nous*. Therefore reasoning could only be the addition and subtraction of names, and what is called a syllogism is but the summing up of collections of names, all of which have been invented by men.

Two momentous consequences follow from substituting Hobbes’s account of thought for the ancient one. The world no longer consists of naturally given classes that can be discovered; instead it becomes a welter of particulars. Each man’s perception of these particulars will depend on the objects that happen to impinge on his senses. As a result, every man’s head may be full of totally different thoughts. If men are to speak to one another, they can only do so by agreeing to assign certain names to certain particulars. Their agreement can rest on nothing but the will to make it. For reason can *discover* nothing; it is rather a power of invention. There is no natural given basis for this invention. Consequently there is no ground in nature for any agreement among men. And yet all discourse depends on an agreement to use words in the same way.

Secondly, as the thought of man is entirely directed by desires and aversions provoked by a sensation, immediate or imagined, what goes on in a human consciousness is concerned solely with recognizing something to be pleasurable or painful, and with taking action to acquire or avoid it. The passions are nothing but motions to or from some object. The passions, then, are not the contamination of man by brutish matter. They are simply the desires and aversions that constitute a human consciousness. Reason does not direct the passions; it is not a superior ordering principle, but merely a computer employed by the passions.

To reflect this new view of passion and reason, all the terms central to moral vocabulary had to be redefined. For their established meanings belonged to the Aristotelian view of man. Thus Hobbes meticulously provides a new moral dictionary. He

defines 'good' as the object of desire and 'evil' as the object of hate or aversion, 'pleasure' and 'displeasure' as effects of the appearance of good or evil. All other words denote an opinion of the likelihood of attaining pleasure or avoiding pain: desire that seems likely to be satisfied is 'hope,' and the absence of such likelihood, 'despair.' Fear of things that will cause little pain is 'pusillanimity.' Contempt of such "little helps and hindrances" is 'magnanimity,' and magnanimity in the face of death is 'fortitude.' The pleasure of imagining one's own power to get what one wants is 'glory'; if grounded upon past experience, it is 'confidence,' if a delusion, it is 'vaine-glorie.'¹⁹

The upshot is an account of the moral life that treats man as a "rational substance," not as a fragile compound of divinity and animality. Hobbes has described a being who has a distinct character of his own and is in no danger of being mistaken for an imitation of God, or of aspiring to be one. The "canting" of Schoolmen is clearly exposed as "absurdity" because it rests on names that "signifie nothing."²⁰ Heretical talk about the "natures" or "essences" of things can no longer be confused with reasoning. For reasoning, Hobbes has made it plain, gives us conclusions not about the nature of things. It only discovers connections between names in accordance with the conventions about their meanings that we have made and accepted.

The human predicament thus takes on a wholly new character. It no longer consists in the difficulty of learning to discover and conform to the first principles of things. It arises rather out of recognizing that there is no "utmost aim" or "greatest good," such as "is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers." Consequently, there is no natural limit to a man's desires. Everything attained may suggest another object to be desired. So long as a man lives, his sense and imagination cannot stand still. Therefore desire is endless. Nor is there any natural criterion for what is good and bad; what is good is what a man finds desirable; and every man may find something different desirable. There is no idea of a good life or of the perfection of human nature given by nature. In the nature of men we can find nothing but a desire for "felicity" which is "a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later."²¹

If these endlessly moved and moving creatures live among other such beings, they are bound to discover in one another either impediments or means to their ceaseless search for satisfaction. Even if they do not regard one another as enemies, if they wish only to speak together, there is nothing that can decide for them what signification sounds will have. If they wish to act together, they have no standard by which to choose between a better and worse course of action. They could escape from this predicament if they could all recognize someone whose word they would obey. But there is no reason in nature why they should follow or listen to one man rather than another. For no man is so manifestly superior in either power or intellect or in any other respect that it would be inconceivable for others to try to supplant him. So long as no human being appears to be as a god among men, no one can by nature be acknowledged to have dominion over the others. The equality of men is at the root of the natural disorder of human life.

In short, Hobbes shows that if man had nothing but his own reason to guide him, if that reason is understood to belong to a creature of the Judeo-Christian God, man

would be doomed to wander aimlessly in a totally mysterious universe wherever his restless imagination might take him. There is no reason why each man's thoughts should not wholly and permanently differ from every other man's. And this is independent of the fact that each man may see the next as either a means or a threat to his own satisfactions. The natural estrangement of men from one another comes from the fact that each is a unique rational substance, shut up within the walls of his own consciousness; his senses are his only natural access to the world, where he consequently lives in a welter of particulars. His reason is not a power of discovery; it gives man no insight into a cosmic order or a universal truth whose dominion all men must acknowledge. For human reason can do nothing but invent names and make connections between them.

These men may believe in God, but their faith cannot of itself enable them to live together. Hobbes repeatedly reminds us that, although God may speak to any man, other men cannot know that he has done so. They may choose to believe it, as the Jews did with Moses and the Christians do with Jesus. But such acquiescence must rest on a will to believe. The words in Scripture, as elsewhere, can have an indisputable meaning only when the men using them have agreed on what meaning they will have. This was an implication of rejecting the pagan view that Luther had not seen. He had called reason "the Devil's Whore," and yet, at a crucial moment in his life, he had said that he would be persuaded either by the testimony of Scripture or by evident reason. Hobbes denied that reason was ever "evident" or that the testimony of Scripture was unambiguous unless all men agreed to accept the same interpretation. Thus, wherever we look, if we can act or think in common with other men, it is because we have arrived at an agreement for which there is no foundation in nature:

And therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever.²²

The moral of Hobbes's account of reason is that if men would agree on anything, they must come to do so without the help of any natural pattern, standard, criterion, sanction, or model. They must invent their agreement and accept that agreement without any hope of finding a cosmic sanction for it. Such is the disconcerting conclusion that Hobbes reaches from a strictly Christian understanding of the universe, thoroughly purged of pagan Reason.

But if reason cannot intuit any natural hierarchy of goods, it can understand its own character. As this character is created by God, what reason discovers about the predicament of man and the way out of it may be understood as a command of God. It is not, however, strictly speaking a command because it does not direct anyone to do anything. It describes how things are in this world created by God, and is in this sense both a law of nature and a "command" of God. But it is hardly the sort of "command" that Hobbes's Anglican contemporaries, who still unwittingly believed in a pagan God, liked to invoke as a sanction for their conduct. For the "command" that Hobbes discovered is a highly abstract truth—that any order in the human world must rest on

a will to agree, and that such a willingness implies a readiness to let someone decide disputes.

To engage in any discourse, to take any common action, men are obliged to obey someone whose will can impose unity on the natural diversity. But they can distinguish, Hobbes pointed out, between decisions made by someone whose right to decide they recognize and commands issued by someone who compels them to obey by force. And this distinction is what Hobbes offers as a way out of the predicament of creatures who are each unique and yet want to associate with one another. Men can live together without subjecting themselves to the arbitrary dominion of another. For though their association is necessarily based on a command of will rather than reason, they are not enslaved when they have chosen to oblige themselves to obey.

If men choose to recognize another's right to decide for them, they "authorize" him to do so, that is, give him the right to speak for them. Having authorized him to decide, they are then obliged by their own action to accept his decision even when they dislike it. Otherwise they convict themselves of self-contradiction. And where self-contradiction is not renounced, steadiness in thought or action becomes impossible. That does not prevent anyone from finding authorized decisions obnoxious. It prohibits only the conclusion that no one can be obliged to obey what he finds distasteful.

The second part of *Leviathan* is accordingly devoted to exploring the difference between decisions made by force and decisions made by an authorized maker. The identity of Hobbes's sovereign is not that of a wielder of overwhelming power, though he has that; what gives him the character of a sovereign is his authority to make rules, to interpret and enforce them. What we normally describe as an "absolute" ruler, that is, a ruler who governs largely by arbitrary fiat or decree and is not bound by the rules he makes, is not at all Hobbes's sovereign.

When Hobbes says that "the name of Tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor lesse, than the name of Soveragnty," he is, as usual, combating the rhetoric of his time. He goes on to say that the name "tyranny" is used to discredit any government found to be displeasing.²³ It is in any case clear that Hobbes's sovereign cannot be a tyrant because of what Hobbes says about the state of nature. The arbitrariness of a true tyrant makes him incapable of establishing what Hobbes calls "peace." For peace is not just the absence of physical combat; it is a condition in which men can have stable expectations. But men subject to the ever changing, arbitrary decrees of a tyrant suffer from the same insecurity as men in Hobbes's "state of nature." The war of each against all is a state of affairs in which a man cannot know from one day to the next what is his own, what will be demanded of him, who will assert his supremacy over him. This can be done by physical force; but it can equally well be done by a government understood to be a forum of competing interests whose power to get their own way is not curbed by law, but makes law. Thus a tyranny offers no escape from the state of nature; it is only one of the forms that this state may take. The succession of assassinations, purges, *coups*, and revolutions that have distinguished the reign of tyrants from Pisistratus to Stalin is accurately described by Hobbes's war of each against all.

Leviathan contains the most forceful and profound argument ever made against tyranny of any kind. Hobbes has made it clear that what matters most for ensuring

that men may live without fear is not who makes the laws, or how, or whether we like the laws, but whether there are stable rules which no one is allowed to break. He replaces the state of nature not with an absolute ruler but with the rule of law. His elaborate and extensive discussion of law, which is regularly ignored, is designed to establish ways of distinguishing between rules made, interpreted, and enforced by an authorized officer of the sovereign and rules that are not so authorized and that therefore no one is obliged to obey. We may find fault with Hobbes's manner of making this distinction; but a concern with distinguishing the character of authorized decisions is at the center of his discussion of the commonwealth. Hobbes is not arguing against the man who refuses to be subject to the arbitrary dominion of another. That is the man whom Hobbes would save from being imposed upon by the man who will obey only what he finds congenial. Hobbes tells us that we must distinguish between the authority and the desirability of a law, and that, unless we do so, we will live in chaos.

Hobbes's achievement consists in making it plain that, if we reject the ancient rationalism, any order in human life must rest on authority. But in recognizing this to be Hobbes's achievement, we can also come to appreciate why, in his day and in ours, readers wedded to the ancient rationalism, whether they are Christian or atheist, should regard him as an "absolutist," a defender of arbitrary power. For if, as Hobbes tells us, all of civilization rests on the readiness of men to submit to authority in one form or another, there is an ineradicable element of arbitrariness in human life. If there are no cosmic underpinnings for what we consider to be true or good, then the ideas by which we order our thought and conduct are fundamentally arbitrary in the sense that they can never be ultimately justified by reference to a universal, necessary truth that all rational beings are obliged by reason to accept. Our only alternative to chaos, intellectual and social, is the will to accept the word of someone. That word may be given in many different fashions; the "someone" may be a highly intricate institution or set of procedures and ideas developed long ago over many years. But we must, if we are to avoid barbarism, agree to accept certain decisions. And though we may justify decisions in any number of ways, we cannot find an ultimate rational sanction for what we accept that no man can rationally dispute.

At the base of all our ideas, then, if we push them to their foundations, lies a "decision" that cannot be justified. In this sense, acceptance of someone's "arbitrary" word is the foundation of civil peace. In other words, men cannot live together at all unless "the buck stops" somewhere. This stopping point is what Hobbes portrays as the "sovereign." He is absolute, whether he is a king, or an elected assembly, or a procedure, in the sense that the "sovereign" is what we recognize as the last resort in our disputes.

Hobbes was not advocating changes in the moral practice of his time. He was not attempting to reduce morality to prudence. Nor did he deny that men may or should love one another. He tells us that, though God may have commanded us to love one another, our recognition of that injunction and our readiness to obey it are a consequence, not the foundation, of civilization. Hobbes is talking about the metaphysical basis for morality. He is saying that, as in a Christian view there can be no cosmic foundation for our morality, it must have been invented by men. Hobbes is presenting a theological doctrine that denies any foundation in Nature for human truth. And he uses an image to convey his meaning.

Hobbes's state of nature is designed to show that at the base of all our ideas of true and false, right and wrong, there is nothing but what human beings have invented and a readiness to accept such inventions. The estrangement of men from the universe is not caused by the egoism of men. It is because men are so estranged that they are by nature egoistic, which means that without civilization men can know only their own wants. This is what Hobbes puts before us so vividly in the war of each against all. But he makes the same point less dramatically when he says toward the end of *Leviathan*: "For in the condition of men that have no other Law but their own Appetites, there can be no generall Rule of Good, and Evill Actions."²⁴ Indeed, Hobbes might also have made his point, though hardly with equal effect, by reversing his picture of the state of nature. For the predicament that he describes might arise just as easily among men of unending timidity, each always giving way to the next, with no way of deciding when the yielding has to stop. The results of such unlimited self-sacrifice would be similarly chaotic and destructive.

But, though Hobbes's diagnosis of the human predicament cannot be faulted, some of the ideas that he introduced in the course of presenting it so forcefully have encouraged confusion and new difficulties. The most obvious defect in his argument arises from his image of the state of nature. It is the defect that Hume found so offensive and set out to remedy in his alternative account of justice. Hobbes's use of the state of nature seems to rule out the possibility that our ideas of morality and justice and the institutions that reflect and implement them are the unintended consequences of what many men did and said in the past. It suggests that whatever order men create they must make self-consciously and deliberately. In other words, Hobbes makes no place for the historical growth of institutions and ideas. Because he does not concern himself with the manner in which human inventions become established, he tells us no more about their peculiar character than about their development. He does not consider the stability and impersonality acquired by the historically grounded morality and institutions that men invent. He therefore does not explain that, though they are metaphysically arbitrary, human inventions have an objectivity of their own which can serve as a foundation and guide for thought and action in the same fashion as the ancient Nature was supposed to do. This justifies, in part, Clarendon's charge that Hobbes's "too preemp-tory adhering to some Philosophical Notions, and even Rules of Geometry, . . . misled him in the investigation of Policy" and produced a "theorem of government" that is "academic and unreal."²⁵ But remedying this shortcoming is compatible with accepting Hobbes's account of authority.

There is, however, another defect in Hobbes's account that seriously obstructs his argument. After all, Hobbes was not perfectly emancipated from the ancient view. He consequently produced a conception of rationality that is radically defective. The most obvious symptoms of this fault are Hobbes's identification of all reasoning with demonstrative reasoning and his claim to have produced an indisputable moral truth by demonstration. But as he had jettisoned the ancient conception of the universe, which had made such a demonstration possible, the premises for such an argument were no longer available to him. He therefore could not avoid an incoherence in his argument.

Hobbes attempted to derive all of his conclusions demonstratively from a fundamental law of nature. By presenting it as a "general rule found out by reason," he

assimilated his law of nature to the ancient one which had provided a foundation for an argument such as he proposed to make. But a law of nature may be a law of reason in two different senses. The modern, scientific law of nature is discerned by reason *in* the working of the passions. The ancient law of nature is prescribed by reason *to* the passions.

Insofar as Hobbes was describing what men were like, the modern laws of nature, analogous to the laws of the new natural science, could serve his purpose. But he wished to do more—to prescribe what men should do. In order to show the way out of the predicament he had described, Hobbes moved from laws of nature in the modern sense to laws of nature in the ancient sense. This shift has inspired the disputes about whether Hobbes's laws of nature are moral or prudential. In fact they are all scientific laws in the sense that they state universal truths about the nature of men. But Hobbes sometimes speaks of them in the modern sense, as universally *operative*, and at other times in the ancient sense, as universally *valid*. He was able to do so, however, only because he exploited the ambiguity in the meaning of laws of nature which, if taken in the modern sense, describe men, but in the ancient sense prescribe how they ought to behave. The ambiguity is hidden in the concept of "self-preservation." In one sense, self-preservation is the end of the necessary operations of the passions described by modern natural laws, and as such it cannot be a "chosen" end. But self-preservation also appears in Hobbes's argument as the "final cause" or purpose of men's actions, which makes it an end that men can recognize and choose or fail to fulfill. Because Hobbes's argument rests on laws of nature, it appears to be a continuous demonstration. In fact the argument is broken by a shift from the modern to the ancient meaning of laws of nature.

Hobbes fell into this incoherence just because he did not, as some readers suppose, hold a "mechanistic, deterministic view" of man. This is the most flagrant of all the nonsense about Hobbes. Few philosophers have taken more trouble to establish that a man's humanity consists in his capacity to create, recognize, and choose among alternatives. That a man is a creature who deliberates, Hobbes believed and said as firmly as Aristotle did. "No action of a man," Hobbes said, "can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden because it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not."²⁶ Hobbes insisted on defining liberty narrowly, as the absence of physical impediments, because every other sort of impediment depended on how men chose to think about their circumstances and therefore made any other definition of liberty ambiguous. Impediments may take away, Hobbes said, "part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him." Thus Hobbes's narrow definition of liberty is required by the freedom of men to think as they choose.²⁷

His emphasis on the necessity in men's actions similarly underscores the rationality of men. For by "necessity" Hobbes meant the reasons that explain how a man's behavior is connected to the rest of his thought. Hobbes insisted on this "necessity" because a rational being is not for him a jumble of mindless reactions, but a creature who can reason coherently and choose his responses accordingly. It was essential for

him to describe this coherence as “necessity” in order to complete his theology. He emphasized that the “necessity” in human thought, that is, all the connections in a man’s ideas, were completely known to God, but only to God. In this way Hobbes solved the old theological problem of reconciling the capacity of men to deliberate and choose among alternatives with the omniscience of God.²⁸ Apart from the clearly unmechanical character of Hobbes’s “necessity,” it is hardly likely that he intended to deny that men were free to make and select alternatives, because without such a capacity the predicament that he describes would not arise. Nor would the way out of the predicament that he proposes be conceivable. For it rests on the ability of men to choose to endow another man with the character of an authorized maker of decisions. Hobbes’s men are not robots because Hobbes’s God is neither a mechanical force nor a system of necessary ideas but the Judeo-Christian Creator of all that is.

What makes the gross misinterpretation of Hobbes as a determinist seem plausible is that the nature to which he appealed is the mechanical nature of the new natural scientist. Insofar as he appealed to this nature, he described men as if they were mechanisms moved by the impact of one part on another. His “mechanistic” psychology made it possible for Hobbes to detach men from God as he believed a Christian should. But his reliance on the scientists’ nature made it impossible for Hobbes to account for the difference between men and planets, even though he clearly recognized such a difference.

By reducing the ancient Reason to “reasoning,” Hobbes established that a human consciousness is separate, particular, and concrete, that is, a unique individual consciousness. But he achieved this result simply by removing the ancient *nous* from the scene without putting another conception of rationality in its place. The “reasoning” left over is a calculating, not an organizing, principle. And it cannot account for a consciousness such as Hobbes attributed to human beings who could authorize and recognize authority, and order their lives in accordance with authorized rules.

Attentive readers have by now collected many passages which make it obvious that Hobbes did not take all men to be insatiable bundles of desires and aversions. Certainly he did not see such a man in Sidney Godolphin, whom he honored in his dedication of *Leviathan*, and again toward the end of the book, as one of those gallant men of great minds who are motivated by contempt of doing what is dishonorable, not by fear. But what Hobbes described as “reasoning” cannot order a consciousness into a character such as Hobbes recognized in Sidney Godolphin.

Nor, for that matter, could Hobbes account for his own philosophy. He makes an attempt to do so by including among the passions one called “curiosity,” which he describes as “a singular passion,” “a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall Pleasure.”²⁹ But curiosity is a passion quite unlike the others, not readily assimilated to them, and the possibility of satisfying it is not accounted for by Hobbes’s psychology.

For though Hobbes did not think of men as either machines or greedy cowards, nor expect or want others to do so, his new psychology endowed men with a capacity to ask only a limited range of questions—whether they should give way, make or forego

claims. Of that other aspect of morality, which was paramount for the ancients, of how to understand oneself and to organize one's thoughts, the "reasoning" man described by Hobbes could know nothing.

In his endeavor to purge the pagan elements from our conception of rationality, Hobbes thus fathered the conception of man, which in one form or another now dominates the civilized world, as a cunning animal for whom philosophy is no longer an adventure in understanding, but a defense of interests that is called an "ideology." Such cunning animals can neither display nor see individuality. In this fashion, Hobbes invited readers to misinterpret his enterprise and bequeathed to us a philosophy of individualism that has no room for individuality. He failed to provide a way for understanding how men could become individuals possessed of the personalities and characters that could, he assumes, inhabit, understand, and value his commonwealth.

But if Hobbes did not succeed in giving a satisfactory account of human rationality, he did fully expose the consequences of abandoning the ancient conception of it. Though Bacon and Descartes, with whom Hobbes has been linked, also revised the traditional understanding of man, they kept the basic idea that man is an amalgam of divine reason and brutish passions. And the philosophies that descend from them, whether "positivist" or "rationalist," have consequently retained, though implicitly and confusedly, the ancient notion of Nature. The one true heir of Hobbes is Hume. And in the seventeenth century, only Hobbes clearly and self-consciously rejected the ancient Nature and, with it, the belief that men had access to necessary, universal truth that could order their lives. Moreover, Hobbes did not merely destroy old comforts. He did not leave us with Nietzsche's terrifying apocalyptic vision of a life emptied of all meaning. Nor did he endorse anything like the Existentialists' insistence on the arbitrariness of all our acts and utterances. Hobbes's passion was spent on telling us that civilization, though made wholly by human beings, is the source of meaning and that it rests ultimately on a capacity to understand the idea of authority.

REFERENCES

¹H. Rashdall in *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, ed. F. M. Powicke (Oxford, 1942), III, p. 271.

²M. H. Carré, *Phases of Thought in England* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 174 and 186.

³M. H. Curtis, *Oxford and Cambridge in Transition* (Oxford, 1959), pp. 250-53, 240-41.

⁴J. Bowle, *Hobbes and His Critics* (London, 1951), p. 75.

⁵Lord Clarendon, *A Brief View and Survey of the Dangerous and Pernicious Errors to Church and State in Mr. Hobbes's Book Entitled Leviathan* (Oxford, 1676), p. 274.

⁶Cf. Martin Luther, *Early Theological Works*, ed. J. Atkinson (Library of Christian Classics), especially "Disputation Against Scholastic Theology," Nos. 41 and 44.

⁷H. Warrender, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligations* (Oxford, 1957); J. W. N. Watkins, *Hobbes System of Ideas* (London, 1965); Leo Strauss, in *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Oxford, 1936), argues that Hobbes rejected classical morality and that he was the first to do so. Strauss later revised his view to make Machiavelli the first "modern" moralist. But Strauss takes a very different view of what was involved in Hobbes's rejection and accordingly reaches very different conclusions.

⁸This interpretation of the Nominalists is supported by the following authors: E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot* (Paris, 1952); C. R. S. Harris, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford, 1927), 2 vols.; P. Boehner, *Ockham* (Nelson,

1957); L. Baudry, ed., *Le Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae attribué à G. d'Occam* (Paris, 1936); M. H. Carré, *Realists and Nominalists* (Oxford, 1946). None of these writers, however, addresses himself pointedly to the question of how rationality is understood, and therefore the emphasis of all of them falls more on the metaphysical divisions. Gilson, in his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London, 1955), says that the expressions "nominalists" and "realists" were used in the twelfth century, but that there were few nominalists in the thirteenth. Thomists and Scotists were "lumped together and made up the class of the 'realists' or partisans of the 'ancient way' in philosophy and theology . . ." (p. 499). The disciples of Ockham were called nominalists or terminists. Gilson, unlike the other writers, says that Ockham totally denied the reality behind universals. He bases this, however, on what Ockham says about natural theology rather than on universals directly. But this is not equivalent to denying an Aristotelian conception of rationality as based on an intuition into the ultimate cosmic reality. And Gilson seems to recognize this when he describes Ockham's doctrine as "paving the way for," that is to say, not being identical with, modern empiricism. Moreover, Gilson says that Ockham's revision of Aristotle was designed to eliminate his "philosophical necessitarianism" (p. 498) and that the "nominalists or terminists were also called the 'moderns' not because they intended to abandon Aristotle but because they were following a new way in interpreting it" (p. 499).

⁹Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651, reprinted Oxford, 1947), p. 33.

¹⁰John Whitehall, *Behemoth Arraigned*, quoted in J. Bowle, *Hobbes and His Critics* (London, 1951), p. 37.

¹¹W. Molesworth, *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes* (1839-45), IV, pp. 305, 303, 310.

¹²Cf. A. Koyré, *Newtonian Studies* (London, 1965).

¹³Hobbes's *Leviathan*, p. 30.

¹⁴P. 20.

¹⁵P. 23.

¹⁶P. 535.

¹⁷P. 522.

¹⁸P. 26.

¹⁹Cf. Chapter 6.

²⁰P. 36.

²¹P. 75.

²²P. 33.

²³P. 551.

²⁴P. 531.

²⁵Lord Clarendon, *op. cit.*, last paragraph. For a further discussion of the difficulties of Hobbes's geometric method, see S. R. Letwin, "Hume: Inventor of a New Task for Philosophy," *Political Theory*, May, 1975.

²⁶Molesworth, *op. cit.*, IV, 272. Cf. also *Leviathan*, p. 234.

²⁷*Leviathan*, p. 99.

²⁸P. 162.

²⁹P. 44.

TONY TANNER

Julie and “La Maison Paternelle”: Another Look at Rousseau’s *La Nouvelle Héloïse*

For in the state of the families, which was extremely poor in language, the fathers alone have spoken and given commands to their children and *famuli*, who, under the terrors of patriarchal rule . . . must have executed the commands in silence and with blind obsequiousness.

Vico, *The New Science*

IF, AS IS MY IMPRESSION, not many people actually read through Rousseau’s *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, one reason might be that, in a sense, we have all read it hundreds of times even before picking up the actual text. If we do not have some vague second-hand, or hundredth-hand, sense of the story of Julie and her tutor, Saint-Preux, and the setting—the two young lovers so chastely passionate who are not allowed to marry, the house in the beautiful setting at the foot of the Alps near Lake Geneva, the enforced separations and anguished letters, the calm reunion when youthful passion has been transformed into a mature affection and sincere piety—we will still have read so many other books that have been influenced indirectly by the modes of feeling which Rousseau outlined and indulged in his book that, in turning to this one, we may wonder a little at the enormous impact of this recorded series of specious and self-induced intensities and often quite interminable lexical dalliances with almost decontextualized emotion—feeling feeling itself feel, as it were. Yet a somewhat more careful reading reveals a rather different book, a book that not only bespeaks some kind of imminent crisis in the particular family structure on which Western society was based, but carries within it a sense of doom concerning the very emotions and institutions that the book strives to celebrate. There is, of course, a similar sense of the problematics of the family in *Clarissa*, and it is well known how much Rousseau admired that work. But Rousseau, in apparently working for a happier ending, if anything reveals—no matter how implicitly or unintentionally—potentially more ominous signs of things amiss. It is almost as if, on the eve of what we roughly think of as the great period of the consolidation and domination of the bourgeois class and its growing belief in the myth of its own “perenniality” (Sartre’s word), Rousseau wrote a book that had a manifest content of “*l’amour*” in all its more piercing, poignant, and plangent forms, and a latent content that said the bourgeois family would not work. But let me turn to some details from the book.

The first embrace between Julie and Saint-Preux takes place in a charming

“arbor” (*bosquet*) in a grove that lies close to Clarens, the house in which Julie lives. She herself selects the spot and prepares him with a tantalizing hint which mingles topographic specificity with promisory vagueness and ordained constraints.

Among the natural arbors which make up this charming place, there is one more charming than the rest, with which I am most delighted and in which, for that reason, I am reserving a little surprise for my friend . . . I must warn you that we shall not go together into the arbor without the inseparable cousin [*l'inseparable cousine*].¹

The choice of an arbor for a secret rendezvous is appropriate enough, but I want to note that the spot which will be the location of their unlegalized sexual embrace is very near the house that Julie, effectively, will never leave—the house of her father. The insistence on having the *inséparable cousine* (Claire) present when she is to give Saint-Preux his “surprise” is indicative of Julie’s wish somehow to combine intra-familial love with extra-familial passion: the cousin, as “cousin,” is to be a mediator between filial devotion and female sexuality, between the father and the lover, between what is in the home and what is not in the home. As cousin she stands exactly in relation to Julie’s family (in the restricted sense of parents and their children) as the arbor does to the house: that is to say, not actually inside it, but not totally outside it either, not completely unconnected and foreign. Arbors (and related topographical phenomena) play a frequent role in the long iconological history of that topographical “middle-ground” between culture and wild nature where the two may meet, and for Julie it is clear that her cousin represents a relational middle ground which she herself hopes to be able to maintain between daughter and lover. Of course it proves to be impossible; but the desire and attempt to keep everyone and everything together, connected, related, unsundered and inseparable, literally in one place, as well as emotionally, mentally, and even, at times, perceptually indistinguishable and merged, is the dominant drive in Julie’s existence. She eventually wants to internalize the external, as it were, and “enhouse” the unhoused elements of existence. It represents a dream of *total* harmony, of complete incorporation and domestication which at the same time wishes to maintain that it is totally *natural*; as if to maintain that nature *is* culture and culture nature (not a relationship but an identity).

The relationship of this complex and impossible dream to the developments in the thought of the Enlightenment is too obvious to need any comment. But in terms of sexual/familial relationships such a dream can lead to strange displacements or confusions. *La Nouvelle Héloïse* is indeed a novel about love above all else, but the most powerful love relationship is between Julie and her father. Saint-Preux is an adopted child. The novel sedulously avoids adultery, but it is marked by all-pervasive feelings of incest (emotional and mental incest of course, though in one extraordinary episode it is almost as if the father brutally “rapes” Julie). By comparison, the most physical action of Saint-Preux to appear in the text is a feverishly excited manual exploration of Julie’s clothes and underwear (in her absence), in an equally extraordinary incident of quite astonishing prurience. Julie’s dream is, in certain important ways, a dream of total incest. The ultimate utter failure and collapse of this dream are a crucial prelude to many of the great novels—often novels concerning adultery—that were to follow it.

What apparently happens in the arbor on that first occasion is that the “inseparable cousin” first asks Saint-Preux for a kiss with a contradictory air of what one might call droll imploring (*d’un air plaisamment suppliant*), and a “cousinly” embrace ensues. It is now Julie’s turn (it is all rather like the kissing games played at children’s parties, as if Julie wants to defuse sexuality by infantilizing it), and she bestows a distinctly un-cousinly kiss on the understandably “surprised” Saint-Preux. She then returns to the arms of the inseparable cousin and proceeds to faint. It is small wonder that Saint-Preux registers a certain degree of mystification in the scene (*sans rien comprendre à ce mystère*), and we may adjudge it a considerable understatement when he subsequently refers to “the test of the arbor” (*l’épreuve du bosquet*). He is immediately afterward ordered by Julie to leave the house and travel which, being the bemused compliant figure that he is, he promptly does. Shortly thereafter he refers to the “delirium” of the arbor (*ce délire qu’il éprouva dans le bosquet*). At this point Julie falls hysterically ill and Saint-Preux is summoned back, and in the very next letter Julie tells the absent Claire that the moment of “crisis” has arrived and begs her to return to her (*la crise est venue*). From the next letter we infer that she has capitulated sexually to Saint-Preux—it can only have been in the arbor and only because the inseparable cousin had become separate. Julie has yet to learn that there is no such thing as an inseparable person since separation is not a function, but a condition, of individual existence.

Just as it was Julie who made the appointment for the initial embrace in the arbor, so she decrees their next venue—a remote chalet in the country near the source of the Veveys. (I will note here that Saint-Preux is never allowed to initiate any meeting, decide on any venue, fix on any abode. His life is entirely shaped and directed by others, starting with Julie. In innumerable ways he is constantly being reminded of the complete helplessness of his social position, his entire dependency on others for just about everything, including his identity. There is one strange letter from Julie in which she upbraids him, at some considerable length, for indulging in what we infer to have been obscene language and perhaps swearing. There are also reports in other letters of outbursts of anger which are clearly tantrums. These are symptoms of the frustration of a child who is deliberately not being allowed to grow up.) This is how she outlines their proposed meeting at the chalet. Having described the setting, she refers to the remote village which “sometimes is used as a shelter for hunters but should only serve as a refuge for lovers” (*qui sert quelquefois de repaire aux chasseurs, et ne devait servir que d’asile aux amants*). We can notice here a sign of that strategy of accommodation by rebaptism which in various ways comes to dominate the novel (i.e., she renames the *repaire aux chasseurs* as *asile aux amants*; the significance of transforming a space connected with hunting into one dedicated to loving will not go unnoticed). Julie continues:

At the invitation of Monsieur d’Orbe, Claire has already persuaded her papa to go with some friends to hunt for two or three days in that area and to take along the inseparable cousins. The inseparables have others, as you know only too well. The one, representing the master of the house, will naturally do the honours of it; the other with less ceremony will do those of a humble chalet for his Julie, and this chalet sanctified by love, will be for them the temple of Cnidus.

Monsieur d'Orbe is the accepted suitor of Claire and is to be her husband. Thus he may represent "the master of the house," i.e., her father. This is the one position which Saint-Preux is never to be allowed to occupy; at most he will be a child of the house, never the master—never, that is, the father's representative.

Saint-Preux can only do the illusory honors of the chalet, and necessarily with less *éclat* than the appointed representative of the master of the house, since one aspect of his helpless position is that he is permitted almost zero access to social *éclat* of any substantial kind. He can hardly shine, because he can hardly show—hardly, in fact, appear at all. Thus, the lovers are thrown back on private, temporary improvisations, making chivalric courts out of bourgeois bedrooms and temples out of chalets. Since these "transformations" have no social validation, they must necessarily be entirely provisional and ephemeral. Building on nothing, Saint-Preux and Julie can only build nothing, and it is hardly surprising that one of Saint-Preux's torments is that he lives for a series of discontinuous and randomly spaced ecstatic moments (*instants*) separated by voids of tedious intervals (*ennuyeux intervalles*). He is not permitted to experience anything additive or cumulative. Since he and Julie are not permitted to be coadunate in any socially recognized way, he is constantly falling into or being pushed into mere apartness—the other side of the house, the other side of the world—from which he is occasionally, unpredictably, and on perpetually changing terms not of his making, summoned back. It is almost as if, outside the "house of the master," time loses its continuity and relatedness. Because of his excluded position, Saint-Preux's experience is deprived of its *durée*; when he is allowed in, it is for the most part an illusory inclusion—a momentary contact in an improvised frame.

As it transpires, there are always factors preventing Julie from meeting Saint-Preux in the proposed chalet—one might say that it turns out to be too far from home. But, she writes to the understandably somewhat desperate Saint-Preux, it should surely be possible to create "a chalet in the town" (*un chalet à la ville*). The phrase points to the paradoxical strategy to which they have to have recourse. In general it implies that the unlegalized lovers must establish their own fantasy spaces (chalets) inside the socialized space within which they have to live. It is as though there were no genuine "outside" left for them, a worrying phenomenon which was increasingly to attract the attention of nineteenth-century writers. Inside these temporary private "chalets" the unsanctioned sexual embrace may be enjoyed without any disturbance of—or departure from—the existing society. And the place that Julie decrees will serve as a "chalet in the town" could hardly be more revealing, for it is nowhere less than the house of the father—*la maison paternelle*.

In the letter in which Julie explains the layout of the house and just when and where Saint-Preux should come to her, she is at considerable pains to stress the danger of the proposed encounter—more so than the bliss it may promise.

No, my sweet friend, no, we shall not leave this short life without having tasted happiness for an instant. But yet remember that this instant is surrounded by the horrors of death; that to come is to be subjected to a thousand hazards, to stay is dangerous, to leave is extremely perilous. . . . Let us not deceive ourselves. I know my father too well to doubt that I might see him stab you to the heart immediately with his own hand, if indeed he did not begin with me; for surely I

should not be spared, and do you think that I should expose you to this danger if I were not sure of sharing it? Still, remember that it is not a matter of depending on your courage. You must not think of it and I even forbid you quite expressly to carry any weapon for your defense, not even your sword. Besides, it would be perfectly useless to you, for if we are surprised, my plan is to throw myself into your arms, to grasp you strongly in mine, and thus to receive the deadly blow so that we may be parted no more, happier at the moment of my death than I was in my life.

The length of the quotation is necessary to reveal the main source of Julie's emotional excitement. Even a casual glance at the letter would give one the sense that it is hardly calculated to encourage the summoned lover; but a more careful reading reveals that the summons amounts to an emasculation. He is to bring *no* weapons—not even his sword. All those hazards and horrors and dangers she refers to pertain to one thing; they are the aura or atmosphere of the *maison paternelle*—the terrible presence of the father. And it is clear that Julie's imagination is fixed much more on the “sword” of the father than of her lover. Her fantasies center on seeing her father stab the unarmed lover (no question of the father not having *his* sword to hand); then, it becomes clear, the root fantasy is of being herself stabbed by her father. That is the dreaded/desired penetration. Saint-Preux is invited into her bed, not so much to satisfy her love for him as to indulge her imagination of the aroused and irresistible father.

If this seems excessive, let me go on to justify my contention that the most physical contact or encounter actually described in the book is not between Julie and Saint-Preux but between Julie and her father. The extraordinary letter in which Saint-Preux describes his waiting moments in Julie's room prior to her arrival reveals him in the posture of a feverish fetishist. Quite apart from the awkwardness inherent in the epistolary mode, the letter conveys the excitement of a man who derives his sensual satisfactions from associations. Since to all intents and purposes he has been forbidden to have direct access to the body of Julie, as he is summoned in swordless secrecy, it is hardly surprising that his feelings should have been displaced from the person, whom he constantly sees but is as constantly debarred from, to her accessories. So it is that he seems to be deriving his most sexual excitement from rummaging through her clothes which he itemizes almost while fingering them. “All the parts of your scattered dress present to my ardent imagination those of your body they conceal.” (*Toutes les parties de ton habillement éparses présentent à mon ardente imagination celles de toi-même qu'elles recèlent.*) The excitement mounts until he is passionately kissing the whalebone of her corset which has taken the imprint of her breasts. At this stage he is clearly on the point of involuntary orgasm or masturbation. Then—and we should not attribute this to the exigencies and constraints of the epistolary mode—he seeks relief in writing. “What good fortune to have found ink and paper! I am expressing my feelings in order to temper their excess; I moderate my ecstasy by describing it.” (*Quel bonheur d'avoir trouvé de l'encre et du papier! J'exprime ce que je sens pour en tempérer l'excès; je donne le change à mes transports en les décrivant.*)

To a modern reader this moment is comic indeed; but in fact it has far-reaching reverberations. Saint-Preux is indeed forced away from the body of the loved other and into writing, an inherently solitary activity. *Donner le change* is effectively to ‘side-

track' or 'put off,' as when putting dogs on the wrong scent, and for Saint-Preux to state that he is putting his emotions on the wrong scent or track by describing them gives us a clear picture of his position and behavior, which clarifies not only his position in Julie's room at that particular moment, but his position in the whole society throughout the book. He epitomizes the man who is forced to deflect and pervert his feelings into writings—hence, among other things, the extraordinarily long and often seemingly semantically depleted letters he writes. They are a kind of onanism, and for him, it is clear, there are many times when what matters is not *what* he is writing but *that* he is writing. It is almost all he is permitted to do by the rules that determine all the relationships in the society in which he lives. As the moment approaches for Julie's arrival, Saint-Preux seems almost on the verge of impotence. He thinks he hears a noise and immediately wonders whether it is Julie's cruel father (*ton barbare père*), as well he might after her encouraging letter, and then as the door opens and he actually sees her—*c'est elle! c'est elle!*—he would seem to be about to collapse, indeed to be collapsing to the degree that collapsing is compatible with letter-writing. "My heart, my feeble heart succumbs to so many agitations!" (*Mon coeur, mon faible coeur, tu succombes à tant d'agitations!*) In all seriousness, a reader might very well wonder whether that feebleness was not impairing other organs as well. And the feebleness of the lover is in direct correlation to the power of the father.

I do not think that it is any spirit of disappointed prurience that causes me to maintain that after the conclusion of this letter there is no *sense* of any real sexual connection and experience between Saint-Preux and Julie. It is, indeed, almost as if it never happened. What very certainly does happen, and it takes on a vivid position in the text, is the father's attack on Julie, and their subsequent embrace. Again I must quote at length since, among the hundreds of thousands of words exchanged by the lovers in letters, this is the one brute act that asserts a total dominance over the inferior power of the word. The episode takes place shortly after Lord Bomston, the English aristocrat, has offered to bestow a fortune and an estate on Saint-Preux, thereby hoping to qualify him as an acceptable suitor in Julie's father's eyes. The father dismisses the idea with angry contempt, for reasons to which I shall return; but as a result of all the rational persuasion which people are bringing to bear on him—what, after all, *can* he have against the marriage after Lord Bomston's offer?—his irrational anger mounts until he falls on his daughter and spills his rage on the person at whom it has really been aimed all along.

At that moment, my father, who thought he felt a reproach in these words and whose fury awaited only a pretext, flew upon your poor friend. For the first time in my life I received a blow; nor was that all, but giving himself up to his fit of passion with a violence equal to the effort he was making, he beat me mercilessly, although my mother had thrown herself between us, covered me with her body, and received some of the blows which were intended for me. In shrinking back to avoid them, I stumbled, I fell, and my head struck the leg of a table which caused it to bleed.

The attack could hardly have been more sexual, albeit specific inadmissible incestuous lust has been translated, or distorted, into violent anger which is permitted to the father

simply because he is the father. The fact that at one point he is hitting Julie and her mother indifferently adds to the clarity of just what kind of passional energy he is releasing. Psychoanalysts refer to the figure of the mother and father copulating as “the combined object” in the eyes of the child. Here the wife and daughter form another “combined object” in the eyes of the father—eyes dazed with lustful anger, angry lust. And it is only when he has, as it were, drawn blood that the father’s orgasmic eruption is over, and “the triumph of anger” finished (*Ici finit le triomphe de la colère*).

There follows the reconciliation. Before describing it, Julie discusses “paternal dignity” (*la dignité paternelle*) and makes the assertion that “a father’s heart feels that it is made to pardon and not to have need of being pardoned.” (*Le coeur d’un père sent qu’il est fait pour pardonner, et non pour avoir besoin de pardon.*) All this points to the fact that for this family/society, all power, both to punish and to pardon, flows in one direction—from the father, not to him. In this way he directly and indirectly controls, one might say owns, the permissible reciprocities of all those in any way connected to him. What has Saint-Preux to offer that can compete with this power? The answer, or one answer, would have to be “words” or more generally the pleasures and persuasions of language. But the father has no need of language: he can just reach out and take what he wants. Thus Julie’s account of the scene after the climax—a scene pervaded with a distinctly post-coital silence and exhaustion—continues. The father does not speak to her (*il ne me parla point*), but after dinner as Julie and her parents are gathering round the fire this is what happens.

I was going to get a chair in order to put myself between them, when, laying hold of my dress and drawing me to him without saying anything, he placed me on his knees. All this was done so suddenly and by a kind of quite involuntary impulse he was almost regretful the moment afterwards. . . . I do not know what false shame prevented those paternal arms from giving themselves up to these sweet embraces. A certain gravity which he dared not abandon, a certain confusion which he dared not overcome put between the father and his daughter this charming embarrassment that modesty and passion cause in lovers. . . . I saw, I felt all this, my angel, and could no longer hold back the tenderness which was overcoming me. I pretended to slip; to prevent myself, I threw an arm around my father’s neck. I laid my face close to his venerable cheek, and in an instant it was covered with my kisses and bathed with my tears. I knew by those which rolled from his eyes that he himself was relieved of a great sorrow. My mother shared our rapture. Only sweet and peaceful innocence was wanting in my heart to make this natural scene the most delightful moment of my life.

I want to stress again that nothing remotely comparable in physical contact is ever evoked as occurring between Julie and Saint-Preux. More than that, we may note from her ecstatic description of this “moment” that by a potentially perverse inversion of roles, it is no longer the father who is an interfering obstacle between the daughter and lover, but rather the lover who, by his violation of the girl’s “innocence,” is the source of a contaminating self-reproach in the otherwise blissful relationship between the daughter and the father. With the beaming mother looking on, this truly does offer a spectacle or scene that is pervaded with latent—and not so latent—incestuous feelings. (I am not so foolish or out of the world as to imagine that there is really no such thing as a family quarrel and a joyful reconciliation but only transformed incestuous to-

ings and fro-ings; but here the physical detailing is so excitedly minute in a way that is so absent from Julie's letters to Saint-Preux that it seems to me permissible to perceive the scene and the attendant emotions it aroused in terms of barely controlled incest.) Julie revealingly goes on to add:

For myself, as I told him, I should think myself only too happy to be beaten every day for this reward, and there was no treatment so harsh that a single caress from him could not efface it from my heart.

After this, what chance has Saint-Preux? He may be her lover, but more importantly he is not, and cannot replace, her father. The lover's words are powerless beside the father's arms (*bras paternels*). Julie herself notes that a "revolution has taken place within me" and asks Claire a key question:

It seems to me that I look with more regret upon the happy time when I lived tranquil and content in the bosom of my family, and that I feel the weight of my fault increase along with that of the blessings it has caused me to lose. Tell me, cruel one! Tell me if you dare, is the time of love gone, no longer to return?

The answer to this question in one very real sense is "yes," and from this point, with no matter what delays, hesitations, and resistances, Julie turns her passionate energies towards re-achieving a kind of total family structure or situation that will reproduce in extended form the happy family circle which Saint-Preux so imperfectly penetrated and for a brief time almost broke.

There are two more points concerning this remarkable letter that I wish to make, and by way of explaining the detail into which I have gone concerning this one letter (Letter LXIII in the first part), I should perhaps say that I regard it as the single most important letter in the whole book. After what is effectively a decisive capitulation to the will and orders of the father (it is on this occasion that he names the husband she will marry), Julie indulges in some of her earlier feelings for Saint-Preux, asking Claire to tell him not to despair or give up hope (though on what he could conceivably base any hope it is hard to see), and reiterating an earlier belief that Heaven made them for one another:

Yes, yes, I am sure of it; we are destined to be united. . . . Is not such assurance firmly rooted in our hearts? Do we not feel that they are inseparable and that we no longer have but one between us?

Julie calls Claire her "inseparable"; from Saint-Preux she feels "indivisible"; and her dreams, fantasies, and aspirations all tend to the one article of faith that all the people she loves or cares for are "destined to be united": *le bosquet, le chalet à la ville*, and her cousin's habitation are, as it were, somehow to be reclaimed and, after necessary purifications or modifications, to be brought together and contained in *la maison paternelle*. But the father is, among other things, he who separates. In the Oedipal situation, it is he who separates the mother from the child, thus standing as the obstacular presence that prevents the child from returning to a state of blissful unseparated oneness with the

mother, which is, they say, a primal desire and fantasy. In this particular case we may say that it is the father who separates Julie from the desired sexual partner and lover. But more than that, it is the father who institutes and introduces all those divisions and separations and distances which the child has both to negotiate and to employ as he grows up and out and into the world—spatial (who and what goes where), legal (who and what may and may not be related, as Julie's father at the same time names her husband and bans her lover), and linguistic (the source of the names and the namings of people and things).²

Thus the father, as a presence, is the source of all those separations and divisions which ultimately derive from the prohibition of an incestuous return to undifferentiated oneness with the mother. Julie's dream of total union is a projection into the future of a totally regressive urge. What she has to learn, though she resists it in every way she can, is that the world is a place of separations and divisions. Or, to put it another way, you may curl up in the arms and on the lap of the father for ecstatic moments, but you cannot do it forever.

The second point concerns the postscript. Its very delegation to that subsidiary area of the letter is itself significant since in this way it is, as it were, separated from the otherwise blissful aspects of the paternal beating and embrace. I shall quote it in full.

P.S. After I had written my letter, I went into my mother's room and there became so ill that I was compelled to return to my bed. I even perceived . . . I fear . . . ah, my dear! I quite fear that my fall yesterday may have some consequence more disastrous than I had thought. Thus all is finished for me; all my hopes abandon me at once.

Although pregnancy is never mentioned and this shy allusive hinting is a deliberate kind of mystification, one does not have to read too hard between the lines, or rather along the dots, to infer that Julie has suffered some kind of miscarriage. This is borne out by a letter shortly afterwards.

Thus it is clear that in his assault on his daughter the father also killed the prospective child she would have had from her lover. It is as though such is his power and his anger that he can reach into the latent future and eradicate a life that has already been engendered. In this way he effectively cancels the fertility of the lover, annuls the potency of his inseminations, and leaves him and his life sterile. Saint-Preux is quite right to claim that his *bonheur* has disappeared like a dream leaving no earthly monument, for the one unmistakably concrete evidence and fruit of his union with Julie has been blotted out. In this way such physicality as their relationship enjoyed is rendered effectively nonexistent. The father has attacked that, to him unacceptable, reality and rendered it unreal—as though it had never *been* real. The father can also reach into the past and eliminate a sexuality concerning his family which had neither his sanction nor his licence. Such a father is indeed close to the awesome figure dominating the primal horde in Freud's vision of the powers of the primitive father.

All this might seem to be attributing too much to the father, but the effects of his presence in this book (and the differing degrees of the father's absence in later works) are so crucial that a fairly careful consideration of his role and power is justifiable. The

references to the father are not literally innumerable, but they are so plentiful as to give the impression of recurring constantly. They range from references to his body—*le sein d'un père, le cou de mon père, les bras paternels, la main de son père*—to descriptions of his temperament and will—*l'inflexible sévérité de mon père, les préjugés de ton père, le volonté de mon père, le discours de mon père, la violence de ton père, ton inflexible père, la dignité paternelle, des violences d'un père emporté, la vanité d'un père barbare, la défense de mon père, l'esprit de votre père, l'amour paternel, les volontés d'un père, la tyrannie de votre père, la complaisance de mon père* (a good humor or obligingness of a somewhat debatable kind since the condition of its existence is that the will of the father be obeyed in all things. It would be “abused” if Julie left the *maison paternelle* because then, of course, he would have to go, too, in the event the world comes to Clarens, not the other way around). And after Julie’s death, there is *la douleur d'un père infortuné*. Recurrently this violent, barbarous, tyrant becomes rather litanously *le meilleur des pères* and, after her marriage to Wolmar, Julie refers with grateful compliancy to *la bonne intention des pères* (good intentions which, she says, are guided by Heaven). And, although he says very little (in effect he says only two things—Julie will not marry “that man”—he refuses even to name Saint-Preux—and “Julie will marry Wolmar”), there is above, or behind, everything *la parole du père: la parole de cet homme inflexible est irrévocable*. Not the words (Saint-Preux, we may say, has the words, particularly the written words), but the Word. The Word as spoken by the father is irrational, arbitrary, prejudiced, but it is inflexible, irrevocable, absolute. It is also, in Foucault’s terms, *la parole dont la forme première est celle de la contrainte*. Julie’s most powerful experience of *la parole du père* is as an interdiction, a prohibition—*la défense du père*.

In this context, let us consider a little more closely the grounds of his utter rejection of Saint-Preux. An early hint, perhaps, occurs when we learn in a letter from Julie that her father is very content with her skill in everything “except heraldry, which he thinks I have neglected.” Inasmuch as the study of heraldry involves the tracing and recording of genealogies, it is devoted to a respect for the position, power, and prestige of long lines of the fathers and the names of the fathers; it also means a recognition of the *symbols* of that position and power—armorial bearings, coats of arms, and the like. As an object of study it has no use beyond that, no application to other aspects of life and learning; it involves no knowledge of history, and has no educative potential. It is really a kind of fetishism, involving a prolonged and respectful meditation on the titles and trappings of the fathers.

Another hint, a stronger and more obvious one, is given when we learn that Julie’s father once killed a friend in a duel and, some years later, lost his only son, which he saw as a punishment for the deed. The paragraph is remarkable, for again it evokes very vividly the physical power, the blood-letting barbarity of the father, and I will quote it at length.

You know that my father had the misfortune in his youth to kill a man in a duel. This man was a friend; they fought reluctantly, compelled by an absurd point of honour. The fatal blow which deprived one of his life robbed the other of his peace of mind forever. Since that time, painful remorse has never left his heart. Often we hear him cry and lament in private; he thinks he still

can feel the blade thrust by his cruel hand into his friend's heart. In his nightmares he sees the pale and bloody body. Trembling he gazes upon the mortal wound; he would like to staunch the flowing blood; terror seizes him; he cries out: the frightful corpse does not cease pursuing him.

That this is in a letter to Saint-Preux can hardly make him more sure of himself in his suit for Julie. But the key observation concerning the duel is that they were "compelled by an absurd point of honour" (*l'insensé point d'honneur les y contraignit*). *Insensé* is mad, insane, literally without sense. The code behind this kind of point of honor—the content is not specified and is irrelevant—is irrational, arbitrary, and prejudiced, but (and by the same token) it is inflexible, irrevocable, absolute—that is to say, it is exactly similar to the Word of the father as I have just described it. And its imperative asserts itself in the rent body and flowing blood of a friend, just as the imperative of the Word of the father expresses itself in the beaten body and flowing blood of a daughter. The Code and the Word are absolute *because* they are irrational, and vice versa. Their authority cannot be questioned because they cannot be questioned. Their power does not have to be sanctioned, because theirs is the sanctified, and sanctifying power. The orders, edicts, and constraints of these powers can only be obeyed. The only alternative is to deny, destroy, or abandon the Code—and the father.

But let me return to Julie's father's rejection of Saint-Preux. Lord Bomston has not only offered to give Saint-Preux money and property; he has also attacked the pointless irrationality of Julie's father's attachment to the idea of a noble title as being indispensable in any potential husband for Julie. Thus Bomston, the cool, rational Englishman:

Nobility? an empty prerogative in a country where it is more injurious than useful. But he [i.e., Saint-Preux] has nobility even so, do not doubt it, not written in ink on old parchment but engraved on his heart in indelible characters. In short, if you prefer reason to prejudice, and if you love your daughter better than your titles, you will give her to him.

This argument carries a multiple sting for, in addition to putting the father in the position of valuing his titles more than his daughter and esteeming an ink-and-parchment nobility more than a nobility of the heart, it attacks the substance of his own title. Here I will simply quote from the note provided by Judith McDowell as a gloss on the first point Bomston makes in the passage quoted above concerning the "empty prerogative" of the nobility of Julie's father. Daniel Mornet gives the following explanation for this remark: "Berne had conquered the Vaud region, after which all the Vaud nobility had been excluded from public office; since there was little commerce or industry in which they cared to engage, they were reduced to a life of idleness or expatriation." In other words, Julie's father's noble title is *only* a title, no longer referring to or connoting some kind of service or function in the land as, Lord Bomston points out, titles of nobility usually do. This only serves to sharpen the focus on the *total* irrationality of the father's ferocious attachment to his name.

Here is part of his answer, or rather reaction, since Bomston's points are unanswerable.

What! My Lord . . . can an honourable man like yourself even think that the last surviving

branch of an illustrious family might lose or degrade its name by taking that of a nobody [*d'un quidam*], without a home and reduced to living on charity?

Since Bomston has just offered to bestow a home and money on Saint-Preux, the father's last two objections about him do nothing except reveal the father's wild impenetrability as he flails around trying to produce "reasons" for that which has no reasons, and, so far as he is concerned, requires none. For him it all comes down to the opposition *nom/quidam*. *Quidam* is precisely 'some person,' an unnamed individual, or as Harrap's dictionary puts it, 'Person (name unknown).' Julie's father refuses to recognize Saint-Preux as having what he would recognize as a name. Of course he does have one (just about—you can read a very long way into the book without finding what it is: his letters are always *À Julie* or *Réponse* and so on), but it is one which the father effectively nullifies by his withholding of ratification. He is forced into the ontological category of quidamity (the word exists) 'person (name unknown).' Against that, the father upholds the name of the family, which is of course *le nom du père*; not this or that name in particular (indeed, to be honest I cannot recall whether we ever learn his name as opposed to his title *Baron*). The father's unarticulated dread is two-fold: of a daughter taken over by a *quidam*; of a world taken over by *quidams*, which would render his name, his role, his being, all equally meaningless.³

Once married to Monsieur de Wolmar, Julie wants Saint-Preux to assume "a submissive and compliant manner with my father" (*un air soumis et complaisant avec mon père*) and in the move toward consensus and what I want to call ensembli-zation, which dominates the later parts of the book, even he comes round to respecting and admiring the father, despite what he rather nicely calls *la bizarrerie de ses préjugés*. Bizarre indeed they are, and it is perhaps more than a happy accident that the etymology of that word not only involves the Italian *bizzarro*, 'angry,' but may also involve the Basque *bizarra*, 'beard,' thus suggesting a particular kind of male choler as well as the more general sense of the odd, singular, or whimsically strange. The father's prejudices are bizarre, but, as I have had occasion to stress, they are totally binding even on the father himself as well as on those within his jurisdiction. Julie, in her most distraught moment of conflicting urges and imperatives, attempts a kind of psychic fragmentation whereby she will let love dispose of her heart but allow her father to dispose of her hand. "Let a father enslaved by his promise and jealous of a vain title dispose of my hand as he has pledged; let love alone dispose of my heart." Julie has complained that she is enslaved by her father; he in turn is enslaved by his own word (*esclavé de sa parole*). Thus the father is both the source and the slave of the Word. And there is a very important aspect of this double relationship he has to the Word. It is often noted in the book that Julie's father is blind, as well as irrational, given to foolish ideas and to a general *bizarrerie* in his prejudices; there are references to his not knowing what is going on. It is as though he has the most power but sees the least. And this is not attributable to what he is by temperament so much as *where* he is by role. That place, to use a phrase from Lacan, entails blindness (*cette place comportait l'aveuglement*).

This comes from Lacan's famous "Séminaire sur 'la Lettre volée'" from which I wish to quote one more paragraph:

Rex et augur, the legendary, archaic quality of the words seems to resound only to impress us with the absurdity of applying them to a man. And the figures of history, for some time now, hardly encourage us to do so. It is not natural for man to bear alone the weight of the highest of signifiers. And the place he occupies as soon as he dons it may equally be apt to become the symbol of the most outrageous imbecility. Let us say that the King here is invested with the equivocation natural to the sacred, with the imbecility which prizes none other than the subject.⁴

In the world of this book, Julie's father occupies that role described by Lacan as bearing the "highest of signifiers" (*du plus haut des signifiants*), and we may well feel, as most of the figures in the book do, that over the central issue he displays what at the time seems to be "outrageous imbecility," just that imbecility characterized by Lacan as involved with being the supreme authority.

In all this, Rousseau's book is focusing on something quite extraordinarily crucial in the history of Western society. The Word of the father is, we have noted, bizarre but binding, not because of what it says but because of where it comes from. The father is the ultimate sanction, the absolute "referential" in Lefebvre's sense of the term, the fixed point beyond rationality, from which flows power, to which can only flow obedience; the figure speaking a language of pure command and taboo, the source of nomination (*le nom du père*) and prohibition (*le "non" du père*). Because of the father and his inflexible command and irrevocable world, it seems as if the established institutions are secure and can endure; the momentary fissures of passion are blocked, and marriage, the family, and the whole way of life connected with these institutions as practiced in that society are celebrated as achieving an ideal of incorporative harmony and functioning with serene efficiency. The father makes the contracts, and the contracts hold. But, as we have noted, the Word of the father is even here in a very imperiled condition. His family name and title are becoming meaningless, based on functions, distinctions, and differences that were ceasing to exist. If the apparently "full" word of the father is listened to carefully and discovered to be in fact an "empty" word—what then?⁵ What becomes of all the dependence structures and binding contracts—not only between parents and children, husbands and wives, but also between words and meanings, signs and things?

With the nineteenth century, despite those grim images of the cruel authoritarian father such as Thomas Arnold—and indeed during the eighteenth century as well, from around the time of Rousseau's novel (1761; but of course such phenomena have no date of origin)—we are entering a period in which the Word of the father and all that it implies (as outlined above) starts to come into question, and if it may be said that the Word in varying ways ceases to "enslave," it must also be added that it comes to be a problem to establish just what, if anything, it can bind or hold together at all. (It would be a matter for a separate study to consider the figure of the father in nineteenth-century fiction, but as random examples of the weakened figure of the father we can readily think of those comatose, ailing, or absent fathers in the works of Jane Austen, and remember that Emma Bovary's father enters literature with a broken leg, and look ahead to the veritable child-father in *The Golden Bowl*.) Instead of the *nom du père* there is a growing sense of the "*non*" *du père*, not in the sense of the paternal prohibition, but rather implying the absence of the father, or the father as absence. It is in this

sense that Foucault uses the phrase in his essay concerning Hölderlin, already mentioned in a footnote, in which he also refers to the phenomenon of *l'absence ravageante du père*, that father who, at the decisive moment in Julie's life, was so "ravagingly" present for one last display of that blind, awesome power and fury that was perhaps in part provoked by a sense that that power was being in some indiscernible way undermined, and by the as yet unconscious dawning of a unformulable apprehension that it was on the verge of an irreversible decline.

For a long time it seems as though Julie feels torn between having to choose between "lover or father." But there is never any real chance of her abandoning the father for the lover. This is made very clear when Lord Bomston offers what would appear to be a perfect solution for the two lovers. Having attempted in vain to argue against the irrational prejudices of her father, and in vain having offered to make Saint-Preux both propertied and wealthy, this inexhaustible source of rational beneficence offers what would seem to be an impossibility—the legitimization of their passion in a new country. It is too obvious to require any emphasis to see that Lord Bomston acts and wishes to act as a father-figure to the two young lovers; what should be noted is that he is trying to compensate for the blind irrationality of the real father by being the incarnation of *rational* paternity. Julie's father works with fists, threats, and interdictions; Lord Bomston with kindness, praise, and facilitations. Thus, he writes to Julie to invite her to join Saint-Preux in England—a very mythical England drawn from an atlas of imagined wish-fulfillments. He writes as a votary of romantic and passionate love rather than familial devotion, and urges Julie to be true to the emotional condition of her heart (*l'état de votre coeur*). Since, he argues, this condition cannot be altered, there is only one thing to do—"you must make it legitimate" (*c'est le rendre légitime*). He then describes a beautiful estate he has in Yorkshire, with a fine old mansion, grounds with a running river, an ample self-supporting economy, peaceful contented inhabitants, and a complete absence of "hateful prejudices" (*l'odieux préjugé*). It is indeed "a happy country" (*cette heureuse contrée*) familiar from pastoral-utopian modes, dream geographies, and golden-age literature since time immemorial. And, he tells Julie, it is all yours. (*Cette terre est à vous, Julie, si vous daignez l'habiter avec lui.*)

It is, one might say, the ultimate invitation to two young lovers, kept apart by parental edict. "Come, unique pattern for true lovers. Come, charming and faithful couple, and take possession of a place made to serve as the refuge of love and of innocence." Whether there is or can be such a place may be said to be a question, or a quest, pervading literature of all ages. The important aspect of it in this context is that it offers not only an ideal setting, subsistence, and so on, but also and most particularly a *legitimization* that had been withheld by the real father. If Julie accepted the invitation she would be acknowledging that there could be an alternative source of legitimization of her relationships to that of her father, and indirectly asserting that not all authority and sanctions come from the father, that there is a space, a law, and a language beyond his jurisdiction. Lord Bomston's final appeal would seem to be irresistible: "The tyranny of an obstinate father will plunge you into the abyss, which you will recognize after your fall . . . you will be sacrificed to the chimerical distinction of rank."

But just at this point Rousseau interrupts with a footnote. "The chimerical distinction of rank! This is an English lord who is speaking in this way! Must not all this be fictitious? Reader, what do you say about it?" This is no place to recapitulate the implications and significance of the familiar device whereby the author enters his own text to point to its fictitiousness. What is notable about this particular interruption or interpolation is that it impugns the credibility of Lord Bomston's offer, rational and indeed very Rousseauistic though his sentiments and beliefs are. What Rousseau is effectively marking with his marginal murmur of incredulity is not the fictitiousness of his work but the essential fictitiousness of Lord Bomston's offer. The "tyranny of the father" is real enough. It is that place of refuge for love and innocence, that *heureuse contrée* beyond all prejudices which is, alas, only a fiction. We readers, don't we think so?

Of course Julie declines the invitation. To Claire she writes that although the idea of "conjugal fidelity" (*la foi conjugale*) fills her with inexpressible delight, she could not be an "ungrateful and unnatural daughter" (*fille ingrate et dénaturée*) particularly in view of the "blind fondness of a doting father and mother" (*l'aveugle tendresse d'un père et d'une mère idolâtres*). To Lord Bomston she writes with lucid gratitude and absolute rejection, concluding with a ringing affirmation of what she knew all along even if she didn't know that she knew it: "I shall never desert my father's house" (*je ne deserterai jamais la maison paternelle*). This declaration is reaffirmed to Saint-Preux many letters later when Julie, making use of a schizophrenic strategy by which she tries to combine the mutually exclusive lover and father, declares that she is his forever (*ta Julie sera toujours tienne*) but will never leave home. "Do not think that to follow you I shall ever abandon my father's house." (*Ne pense point que pour te suivre j'abandonne jamais la maison paternelle*) The *bosquet* and the *chalet* are insubstantial, dream-stuff: ultimate power, authority, and reality reside in, and only in, *la maison paternelle*.

So there Julie stays, and marries the man her father chooses for her. This man, Monsieur de Wolmar, is all too obviously a kind of surrogate for the father, of similar age and with no previous involvements or attachments before the imperative of the father was extended to him and he obeyed "seconding my father's intentions" (*secondant les intentions de mon père*) as Julie revealingly writes to Saint-Preux. At the same time, he is a cool, passionless figure, the incarnation of arid voyeuristic rationality, sexually an entirely negative figure of whom the displaced passionate father could not feel jealous. For Julie he offers a reprieve from love which, she writes to Saint-Preux, so far from being necessary to make a happy marriage, is precisely what opposes or prevents it. "Love is accompanied by a continual uneasiness over jealousy or privation, little suited to marriage, which is a state of enjoyment and peace." (*L'amour est accompagné d'une inquiétude continuelle de jalousie ou de privation, peu convenable au mariage, qui est un état de jouissance et de paix.*) *Jouissance* as we know can refer to the pleasure of orgasm but this is hardly its connotation in Julie's calm rationale for abandoning *l'amour*. The stress is on *paix*, and it would seem that Julie's ambition is to attempt to turn her marriage into a condition of continual rest, or "arrest," in the interests of "peace." But what kind of life is it that is drained of all *inquiétude*? "Death" is quite obviously the abrupt and only completely accurate answer, and what

Julie is searching for could be seen as a kind of death-in-life, a permanent stasis in which everyone has come together and no one need move again. She names her garden—a strange enclosed world of her own making in which nature is not so much domesticated as bourgeois-ified—Elysium, quite aware that it refers to the abode of the blessed after death. And the economy of her household, described at a length inordinate even by Saint-Preux's standards, is organized, routinized, and supervised down to such detail that one feels that in such a place the involuntary, the unpredictable, the "unquiet" would never happen again.

The first letter Julie writes after her marriage (beginning of Book IV) is to her cousin Claire urging that they annul the distinction between their two houses by conflating them, since Claire's husband, another somewhat senior citizen, has recently died. Julie is embarking on her grand dream of rehousing the world in her home, the house of the father. The attempt at ultimate synthesis has begun. And one of her reasons for pressing Claire to join her in her home is worth noting. Something is lacking. Her husband is unresponsive (*il ne répond pas assez à ma fantaisie*), his tenderness is too reasonable (*trop raisonnable*). But Julie can hardly wish for an inrush of unreason since that would be to seek the very *inquiétude* she has chosen to leave behind. She refers to "all these voids" (*tous ces vides*), voids specifically left by her mother's death and the death of Claire's husband, but more generally by the fact that, as her children are too small for the kind of reciprocal love she needs, there is no one on whom she can lavish the full energies of her love and receive love in return. It is this role she wants to be filled by her cousin, the inseparable. Yet clearly the void is hardly one that can be filled by a cousin; indeed it could be said to be an ontological void. But there is no need to go so far to comprehend what Julie is lacking. It is not necessarily Saint-Preux himself, but the passional irregularities, intensities, frictions, and reciprocities which can only be experienced in that *inquiétude continue* which she formally put behind her when she chose to reject him. It would seem that marriage as conceived of by Julie has its privations as well as its peace; perhaps, even, it is its peace which is part of its privation.

Having brought Claire into the house, Julie extends her plans for inclusion. Her husband writes a courteous and generous letter inviting Saint-Preux to come and share their house, and he accepts, content to feel like "the child of the house" (*comme l'enfant de la maison*). The father, temporarily absent because he is involved in a lawsuit (and one may imagine that he was often involved in such eristic errands, given his temperament), rejoins them. Even Lord Bomston is brought in, so that in a very real sense we may say that it is as if they are all there together in *la maison paternelle*, all united, and all so harmonious that Wolmar insists that Saint-Preux should embrace his wife, Julie, while Saint-Preux comes to love and respect the very father who ruined his life. Friction is at degree zero, and reconciliation and homecoming are everywhere. This may seem like a version of the commonplace "they all lived happily ever after" dream. But there is one aspect of this "ensemblizing" drive which is worth special attention. It concerns the move toward indistinguishability on the part of Julie and Claire, particularly as mothers, a move that extends toward their children as well. It entails at times what amounts to an interchangeability of selves, so that the I-Thou disjunction/conjunction is dissolved. Thus Julie:

I feel that I doubly enjoy my little Marcellin's caresses when I see you sharing them. When I embrace your daughter, I imagine I am pressing you to my bosom. We have said a hundred times, as we see our little babies playing together, that our united hearts mix them, and we no longer know to which one of us each of the three belongs.

Saint-Preux, writing about Claire's daughter Henriette, refers to her mothers:

I say her *mothers*, for to see the manner in which they act with her, it is difficult to distinguish the real one, and some strangers who arrived today are or seem to be still in doubt on the matter. In fact, both call her *Henriette* or *my daughter*, indifferently. She calls one mama and the other little mama.

And later he writes to Claire: "You are both more dear to me than ever, but my heart no longer distinguishes between you and does not separate the inseparables." However, this same letter contains an account of a very ominous dream, to which I shall return.

At the conclusion of Book V, Julie effectively suggests that Claire should marry Saint-Preux, and it is hard not to assume that, given their feelings of interchangeability (if not actual identity), this would permit some vicarious indulgence in what might be expected to be the customary sexual embraces that would then legitimately ensue.

Ah cousin! What delight for me to unite forever two hearts so well formed for each other, who have been joined for so long in my own. Let them be even more closely joined in it, if possible. Let there be but one heart for you and me. Yes, my Claire, you will still serve your friend by indulging your love, and I shall be surer of my own sentiments when I shall no longer be able to distinguish between him and you.

The suggestion is firmly declined, but it testifies to an inclination to live in a kind of emotional blur in which her feelings can only be sure of themselves when they are no longer able, or constrained, to distinguish between their objects. From one point of view this desire to establish an inclusive happy-family pile in which, at least emotionally speaking, the various figures—cousin, lover, friend, father—are, as it were, heaped indistinguishably together, is an attempt to realize a dream of total harmony in which all the oppositional elements in human relationships—familial, passionate—have been eliminated and all the different parties can come together to live for ever and ever in peace and concord, never to part again. As Saint-Preux puts it, writing in the optative mood, if he can just see his friend Edward (Lord Bomston) happy, "we will all rejoin each other never to part again" (*nous nous rassemblons tous pour ne nous plus séparer*) though, as he notes in passing, if that state of perfect happiness were achieved, there would not in fact be much else for him to wish for, or to vow to do. Such a vision of human and humane harmony is from this point of view the acme of Enlightenment thought. From another point of view, Julie's dream (shared by others, but originating with her, or with her and Claire) involves an abandoning of distinctions, a loss of a sense of difference, which could be seen to point the way back to that "infamous promiscuity of things and women" which for Vico was the abhorrent state from which civilization had to emerge, that incestuous *ur*-confusion we think of as the primordial reign of chaos and old night. That, at its height, civilization should start to look, albeit obliquely and very indirectly, longingly back to the pre-civilized state from which it

emerged is a phenomenon of some considerable implications. And that this incestuous dream is engendered in, and arguably engendered by, *la maison paternelle*—the paradigm locus of authority in society—is perhaps even more thought-provoking. The father, he-who-separates, produces a daughter who wishes to be she-who-brings-everyone-together-again. The rule of law engenders a dream of indistinguishability. Rousseau lays bare the outlines of a paradox that has more profound implications than he himself, perhaps, could guess.

But for all the aura of loving harmony, all is not quite well at Clarens and in Elysium, and this brings me to Saint-Preux's nightmare, which I mentioned earlier. Saint-Preux has the dream after he has been established in Clarens but is setting out on a journey with Lord Bomston. In the dream he thinks he sees Julie's mother on her deathbed and Julie on her knees beside her, weeping and kissing her hands. Some remarks are exchanged which conclude with the mother saying,

"You will be a mother in your turn. . . ." She could not finish. . . . I tried to raise my eyes and look at her; I saw her no more. In her place I saw Julie. I saw her; I recognized her although her face was covered with a veil. I gave a shriek, I rushed forward to put aside the veil, I could not reach it. I stretched forth my arms, I tormented myself, but I touched nothing. "Friend, be calm," she said to me in a faint voice. "The terrible veil covers me. No hand can put it aside." [He has the dream three times.] Always the mournful sight, always that same appearance of death, always that impenetrable veil eluding my hands and hiding from my eyes the dying person it covered.

One might speculate endlessly, and perhaps fruitlessly, about the interpretation of this dream (how to read dreams *within* fictions is an interesting matter in its own right). But that veil subsumes in very clear symbolic form a great deal; all that has indeed separated Julie from her lover, all that she has allowed to come between them, and all that she has interposed between them herself—the inseparable cousin (at the beginning), the Word of the father, *la maison paternelle*, the *chaîne indissoluble* of her marriage, the rigid and powerful *cortège* in which she is fixed as the mother. All these have meant that when Saint-Preux has attempted to "reach" her, no matter how much he has stretched out his arms and tormented himself, he has always and inevitably (after the very brief and apparently soon regretted affair) touched nothing, because of that veil *redoutable* and *impénétrable*. It is also, of course, the bridal veil which, worryingly enough, has turned into a shroud. So disturbing is the dream that Saint-Preux rushes to wake up Lord Bomston, who delivers the usual scolding ("you are worthless," *vous n'êtes rien*), and then drives Saint-Preux back to Clarens where he can sneak a glimpse of Julie and tear away "that fatal veil which is woven in your mind" (*ce fatal voile tissu dans votre cerveau*). Ashamed as usual, Saint-Preux only pauses to hear the voices of Julie and her cousin coming from Elysium and returns to his travels quite happy, feeling that he has at least done the honor to himself as Edward's friend of "getting the better of a dream" (*de le mettre audessus d'un songe*). But, in a sense, it is the dream that has got the better of him long before he had it, and, in any event, it is the dream that gets the better of them all in a way which I will try to describe in the concluding part of this essay. Claire, in her answering letter in which she urges them both to hurry back to their "little community" (*la petite communauté*),

registers her sense of the ominousness of the dream. “That veil! That veil! . . . There is something indefinably sinister in it which disturbs me each time I think of it.” The implications involve the unfrontable and unthinkable fact of Julie’s death and her disappearing into eternal unreachability.

At one point Monsieur de Wolmar announces his intention to go on a trip which will keep him away for a few days. He asks whether Saint-Preux would like to come with him or stay at Clarens with Julie (as Julie writes to her cousin, her husband seems “determined to drive me to the limit”). Saint-Preux promptly states his preference for remaining, an answer which deeply pleases the perversely rational husband. However, the prospective situation disturbs Julie, and she communicates her anxieties to her cousin, registering her concern about her own latent instabilities.

Whatever you think of yourself, your mind [*âme*] is calm and tranquil, I am sure. Objects present themselves to it such as they are, but mine, ever agitated like a moving wave [*comme une onde agitée*], confounds and disfigures them.

Whether we decide to translate *âme* as ‘soul’ or ‘mind,’ it refers to some absolutely central governing spirit or prime mover, and for Julie to say that hers is constantly agitated *comme une onde agitée* is to reveal an aspect of her character of far-reaching significance. For if she is watery at the center, fluid, labile, potentially “thalassic,” then all the meticulous structuring and architecture of her life, starting with her complete submission to her father/husband (*he’s* not fluid at the center—he is empty, a very different matter) and extending to the meticulous routinizing of life at Clarens, can be seen in another light. To some extent, perhaps a large extent, they may be motivated by a fear of internal dissolution, a kind of passional liquefaction in which she would lose herself and drown. By the time we reach the height of the Romantic era, however we wish to date it, we find many metaphors for yearning to dissolve and merge with the elements, other people, the universe, whatever. The “flow” seems to have lost its terrors and revealed its enrapturing allure. But for Julie it is still a source of worry. Her carefully constructed life may be seen as, in part, a dike erected against the possible flood tides within her, just as her marriage, as she clearly indicated, was not a way of releasing passion but of getting away from it. The problematical relationship (or opposition) between the dissolving liquefactions of passion and the binding structurings of marriage is at the very heart, or *âme*, of the great bourgeois novels of adultery of the nineteenth century.

Claire is not liquid and she writes back promptly with some sensible-seeming advice to Julie. She reminds her that she loved as Héloïse did and that, like her, she is now “pious.” If Julie is worried about being alone with Saint-Preux, then make sure the children are always around and go off for some excursions—boat rides, for instance.

You like boat rides; you deprive yourself of them for the sake of your husband who fears the water and for the children whom you do not wish to hazard on it. Take advantage of the time of this absence to indulge yourself in this amusement, leaving your children in Fanchon’s care [Fanchon Anet is Julie’s closest attendant].

It is revealing indeed that Monsieur de Wolmar is frightened of water, but it is perhaps

not exactly the most prudent possible advice to recommend that the watery-centered Julie go for boat rides with her former lover. Her justification that they will always be under the protection of the boatmen (*sous la protection des bateliers*) seems a little feeble. There are a large number of very important boat rides in the history of the novel, but the figure of the protective boatman is conspicuous by its absence. There may be boatmen but they do not protect. And indeed if the really dangerous “waters” are internal, it is hard to see how they could.

The excursion by boat is duly taken and described by Saint-Preux in a letter which conclude Part Four. It is a trip laden with omen to say the very least—indeed, it is effectively all omen, starting even from the base topography, for Julie’s *house*, Saint-Preux reminds Lord Bomston, is *not far from the lake* (*Vous savez que la maison de Mme. de Wolmar n’est loin du lac*) and she likes being on the *water* (*elle aime les promenades sur l’eau*). This basic house/water topography could hardly appear more naturally than it does in Rousseau’s book; at the same time it could hardly acquire more symbolic implications than it finally does. For Julie, householder and gardener supreme, is doomed to die by water. To select a few of the more notable details from this seminal boat-trip, Saint-Preux steers the boat into the middle of the lake, i.e., as far from the shore as possible; a gale blows up and soon the waves are terrible (*les ondes devinrent terribles*); the frail boat cannot resist them, and it is driven to the opposite shore. There it is impossible at first to find any shelter or a place to land, and Julie is seized with sickness and almost faints at the side of the boat (*Julie saisie du mal de coeur, faible et défaillante au bord du bateau*). Fortunately she is “used to the water” (*Heureusement elle était faite à l’eau*) and this condition does not last long. She then acts as a kind of lacustrine Florence Nightingale and goes around wiping brows and dispensing water and wine. There is just one moment when two planks are opened by a particularly deluging shock and it almost seems as though the boat might indeed founder; the recorded reactions are revealing:

For an instant, two planks being partly opened in an impact which wet us all, she thought the boat broke to pieces, and in an exclamation from this tender mother, I distinctly heard these words: “Oh my children, must I see you no more?” As for myself, whose imagination always exceeds the peril, although I knew the real state of the danger, I expected to see the boat swallowed up at any moment, that affecting beauty struggling in the midst of the waves, and the pallor of death dulling the roses of her cheeks.

Comment on Saint-Preux’s morbid imaginings is redundant (notice he does not imagine trying to *save* her but only watching her drown!), though to the extent that they are perverse it must be admitted that his treatment by society goes some long way to explaining why they should be so (you surely can’t be treated as a *quidam* in a hierarchical society for very long without some perversion of the imagination taking place). On this occasion the boat reaches the shore safely, but his vision of *le bateau englouti* and the lovers (once-lovers, if you will) “drowning” together, is one which in varying forms may be said to have haunted the European imagination for well over a century to come.

Julie herself maintains that their love is not repressed passion but purified passion

and this is the rarity of her relationship to Saint-Preux (*on étouffe de grandes passions; rarement on les épure*). She insists that they have managed to transform *amour* into *amitié* and that as a result they can “spend our life together in fraternal familiarity and peaceful innocence” (*passer les jours ensemble dans la familiarité fraternelle et dans la paix de l’innocence*). Despite the length, or rather perhaps because of the length, at which they reassure and congratulate each other on these purifications and transformations, one registers both their precariousness and their latent perversity—to treat an ex-lover with “fraternal familiarity” because that falls within the bounds of the legitimate is, as I have suggested, to repress adulterous feelings only to allow them to be reinstituted as incestuous ones. It is a situation of uneasy equilibrium which, in effect, can only wait for whatever will precipitate its inevitable disintegration—dangerous waters within or without. In any event, it is once again the external lake that precipitates a crisis, and this time one that is terminal.

On an expedition to the castle of Chillon on the lake, Julie’s young son falls into the water and she runs back like an arrow and throws herself in after him (*part comme un trait, et s’élançe après lui*). The account of the accident is in a letter from Fanchon Anet, the attendant mentioned earlier by Claire:

we had neither servants nor a boat there; it took time to get them out . . . the child is recovered, but the mother . . . the shock, the fall, the condition she was in . . . who knows better than I the dangers of such a fall! . . . She remained unconscious for a very long time. . . . From some orders she has given me, I see that she does not believe she will recover. I am too unhappy; she will not recover. Madame d’Orbe is more altered than she.

And it is that separated inseparable and much changed cousin who informs Saint-Preux of Julie’s death in brusque terms, which are indeed appropriate from someone stunned with grief, but which nevertheless carry something of the tone of a reproach as though it were somehow all his fault, both for loving her and for having the dream about the veil. “It is over. Impudent, unfortunate man, unhappy dreamer! You shall never see her again . . . the veil . . . Julie is no more. . . .” (*C’en est fait, homme imprudent, homme infortuné, malheureux visionnaire! Jamais vous ne la reverrez . . . le voile . . . Julie n’est . . .*). We are given no detail of Saint-Preux’s reaction, but we learn that Claire goes literally out of her mind (*bors de sens*), rolling about the floor, mumbling incoherently and gnawing on the legs of chairs (*mordant les pieds des chaises*), a demonstration of an intensity of grief, indeed of sheer uncontrolled passion, which is scarcely to be matched by any of the other signs of feeling in the entire book—perhaps only by the wild outburst of anger of Julie’s father. It is the grief of the “inseparable” who finds herself truly and irrevocably separate; the response to a forced and final breaking of a bond so close and so deep that it seems to me to bespeak that primordial urge to merge back into intrafamilial oneness that goes under the name of incest. It is with no intention of suggesting any actual sexual perversity that I point out that from the long account of Julie’s dying, written by her husband, it transpires that not only will Claire not leave Julie’s bedroom, but Julie invites her to share her bed (*couche dans mon lit*), while the tired husband is sent away (*l’on me renvoia*).

Saint-Preux is not heard from again, though we gather he is temporarily pros-

trated with grief. But enclosed with Wolmar's letter is a last letter from Julie to Saint-Preux which reveals that there was indeed something wrong with her "project," i.e., her dream of ensemblization.

We must give up our projects. All is changed, my good friend. . . . We dreamed of rejoining each other. *That reunion was not good* [my italics]. It is Heaven's blessing to have prevented it, thereby, without a doubt, preventing misfortune.

This is tantamount to saying that adultery would have been inevitable (and for Julie, of course, death is far preferable to such a dishonor); but more, it is a revocation of the whole dream of union or rather multiple reunion itself. It does not work. As Julie reveals, there was a split between "will" and "feeling" that was permanently there.

This sentiment, nourished despite myself, was involuntary; it has cost my innocence nothing. Everything which was dependent on my will was devoted to my duty. If my heart, which was not dependent on it, was devoted to you, that was my torment and not my crime.

The House of Clarens, then, was built on repression and a secret "torment." No wonder it was bound to fall.

In her last letter, it is clear that Julie is still thinking in terms of some kind of total union of all her loved ones. "Would that I could invent still stronger bonds in order to unite all who are dear to me." But as Claire reveals in the last letter of the book there is no union left, only despairing fragmentation and monadic misery. This letter effectively outlines the fall of the House of Clarens, a fall, to my mind, of inestimable importance for the subsequent history of European literature. She writes to Saint-Preux:

You will see here only grief and sorrow; and perhaps our common affliction will be a solace for your own. In order to be given vent, mine needs you. I alone can neither weep, nor cry out, nor make myself understood. Wolmar understands me but does not respond to me. The sorrow of the unhappy father is buried within himself. . . . My children affect me but are incapable of pitying me. *I am alone amid everyone* [my italics]. [*Je suis seule au milieu de tout le monde.*]

By the end of the letter, which is the end of the book, Claire, writing in a state of distracted discontinuity, reveals her sense of the utter void which has been left by Julie's death and her desire to rejoin her inseparable cousin in the grave as soon as possible.

Perhaps, when I stated earlier that the book was primarily about a love affair between father and daughter, I should have added—and between cousin and cousin. As far as the book is concerned, when Julie dies, Saint-Preux vanishes. But the most moving and significant statement in the whole letter is the one I have italicized. This enormous book is for the greater part concerned with an extensive dream of union whereby the family house can be extended and modified so as to contain everyone (and everything) that Julie loves in different ways within it; a dream of achieving a lasting tranquillity within which varying, and latently oppositional, relationships may be enjoyed in a kind of steady state of constant calm, friction degree zero. In a sense it is a dream of the world itself as one unchanging and contented family. But there is that agitated water . . . unacknowledged sexuality . . . and death. At the end, all the bonds

have snapped: father, husband, cousin, lover, children, thrown back or turned in upon themselves, wandering around in a daze of misery without communication. Instead of the world as family, we have the family as isolation: *Je suis seule au milieu de tout le monde*. There is a glimpse here of that unspeakable solitude at the heart of all relationships which every other page of the book works to transcend or conceal or deny. After the fall of the House of Clarens—which is the paradigm fall of *la maison paternelle*—that glimpse would, in time, be extended into a scrutiny that was to characterize some of the greatest European novels of the nineteenth century.

REFERENCES

¹This and all subsequent passages quoted in English are taken from *La nouvelle Héloïse. Julie; or, The New Eloise: Letters of Two Lovers, Inhabitants of a Small Town at the Foot of the Alps*. Translated and abridged by Judith H. McDowell (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1968).

²This is, of course, a vast subject with a great deal of well-known work written about it. For a felicitous and brief summary of just this one point I have tried to make here, I will quote from an article by Michel Foucault entitled “Le ‘Non’ du Père”: “Melanie Klein puis Lacan ont montré que le père, comme tierce personne dans la situation oedipienne, n’est pas seulement le rival haï et menaçant, mais celui dont la présence limite le rapport illimité de la mère à l’enfant, auquel le fantasme de la dévoration donne la première form angoissée. Le père est alors celui qui sépare, c’est-à-dire qui protège quand, prononçant la Loi, il noue en une expérience majeure l’espace, la règle et le langage. D’un coup sont donnés, la distance tout au long de laquelle se développe la scansion des présences et des absences, la parole dont la forme première est celle de la contrainte, et le rapport enfin du signifiant au signifié à partir duquel va se faire non seulement l’édification du langage mais aussi le rejet et la symbolisation du refoulé.” *Critique*, March, 1962.

³Let me just quote one sentence from Lacan asserting the ancient association between the name of the father and the figure of the law: “C’est dans le *nom du père* qu’il nous faut reconnaître le support de la fonction symbolique qui, depuis l’orée des temps historiques, identifie sa personne à la figure de la loi.” (*Écrits I*, pp. 157-58.)

⁴*Yale French Studies*, No. 48, p. 69.

⁵I am taking these words as they are used by Freud (in *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*, where he writes that words can be taken according as they are “voll” or “leer”) and subsequently Lacan (in “Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage,” where he discusses the “parole vide at parole pleine”).

BERNARD CAZES

Condorcet's True Paradox, or, The Liberal Transformed into Social Engineer

IS CONDORCET WORTH REREADING? If we ask an eighteenth-century specialist this question, the answer is not apt to be encouraging. The most recent yearbook of the *International Directory of Eighteenth-Century Research*¹ includes an index listing the names of those who are the subject of research in progress in the field, from John Adams to Zannovich. In it, we find only six listings for Condorcet, putting him on a footing with Addison, and lagging far behind such giants as Voltaire (152 listings), Diderot (140), Rousseau (121), Swift (78), and Samuel Johnson (67), although at the same time we might also point out that his score, modest as it is, is still twice that of Jefferson or Leibnitz. We might be equally surprised to find, however, that this man, who is to be counted among the most illustrious victims of the Terror² and who was the object of *ad hominem* attacks by Robespierre that left no doubts about the distance that separated him from the radical Montagnard wing,³ has just as frequently been the object of attacks by those who had some bone to pick with the *philosophes*: Abbé Morellet, himself a former *philosophe*, depicted Condorcet in his memoirs as “a partisan mind, cruel, cowardly, bloodthirsty”;⁴ Madame de Staël judged him in these terms: “He is as irreligious as the priests are fanatic, with the same hatred, the same perseverance, and the same appearance of tranquility”;⁵ John Adams had Condorcet and his admiration for men of genius in mind when he exclaimed ironically: “What a pity that this man of genius cannot be king and priest for the whole human race.”⁶ More recently, Albert Camus spoke of “the optimism that supplies the guiding principle for Condorcet’s rhetoric, namely, the official doctrine of progress that he tied to the progress of the state, a state whose official victim he was as well, since the State of the Enlightenment forced him to poison himself.”⁷ But it is without doubt with the German political scientist Erich Voegelin that the revulsion against Condorcet reached its greatest intensity; for him, Condorcet—who had been named an honorary citizen of New Haven in 1784—is quite simply comparable to a Nazi propagandist.⁸

To plead for this man defeated by history is, then, a task whose difficulty is not unlike that encountered by Stephen F. Cohen when he tried to resurrect another great loser in history by demonstrating the truly novel character of Bukharin’s politics. I shall not attempt to use Cohen’s approach,⁹ however, for if the period of the twenties is still sufficiently recent for us to be fascinated by the idea that things might have turned out differently, to repeat the same exercise for the radicalization of the French Revolu-

tion would not be very profitable. On the other hand, if the intellectual stature of Bukharin appears exceptional only by comparison with his colleagues in the Bolshevik party of the time, that of Condorcet needs no foil for us to be impressed, and it is this that I hope to make clear in what follows.

However, we must first be precise about what we are discussing. "To revisit" a twentieth-century classic, whether it leads us to reread it from a different angle or to come to the conclusion that it is irredeemably obsolete, consists in referring to a corpus which may be more or less voluminous, but which can be readily consulted at any point in the discussion. This is not necessarily the case when one deals with the authors of earlier times. Certainly Marx, Darwin, or John Stuart Mill present no problem of access, but one cannot say the same about such European social scientists as Sismondi, Quételet, or Le Play, whose importance was not negligible, but whose works are unobtainable except in editions that are both rare and costly. How can we deal, then, with Condorcet, whose supposedly complete works appeared in 1847-48, but for whom a number of manuscripts are nevertheless still unedited, waiting for an editor willing to undertake an effort similar to that made by the Bibliothèque de la Pleiade for what are obviously much more minor figures—for example, the nineteenth-century pamphleteer Paul-Louis Courier. For the present, we shall simply have to limit our attention to Condorcet's best known work and the only one readily available—namely, the *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*.¹⁰ Since Condorcet survives among us as a forecaster, it is on that point that we shall seek to question him in an effort to understand what he wanted to say and what he has to say to us.

Condorcet, Explorer of the Future

Although its title does not suggest it, the *Esquisse* is devoted entirely to a discussion of the future; its purpose, which is given in the first pages, is to "show, by reasoning and by facts . . . that the perfectibility of man is in reality infinite and that the progress of this perfectibility . . . will last so long as the globe endures upon which nature has cast us forth" (Epoch I). But why has Condorcet chosen to deal with the future in this way, that is, not in fictional and especially not in utopian terms, choosing instead to treat it as a topic suitable for serious discussion and a subject belonging to the realm of human knowledge? Death prevented him from giving us a precise answer to this question, so we are forced to guess at what the reasons might have been. Using the classification that Fred C. Iklé¹¹ established for the various motives that lie behind attempts at predicting the future of society, the one Iklé describes as being prediction for the "spiritual edification" of the reader appears to me unquestionably to be present in the *Esquisse*.

Condorcet, we recall, wrote his work during the fall and winter of 1793, in the house of Madame Vernet on the rue Servandoni, where he had hidden to escape the police. The obstinacy that he showed in keeping to his plan to lay out in detail a distant but dazzling future betrayed his desire to escape from his desperate situation. He himself admitted at the end of the book that the idea that mankind "is marching with a firm and sure step down the road toward truth, virtue, and well being" had been for

the *philosophe* “an asylum into which the memory of his persecutor cannot pursue him.” Starobinski may well ask, “Are we still dealing with scientific conjecture? We have the feeling that we are instead witnessing a kind of flight—of a power to rise above everything—which the will confers almost magically. This hunted man literally escapes into the future.”¹² We are reminded of the case—ininitely less tragic, to be sure—of Machiavelli, whose habit it was to come home and dress up in his most elaborate garb in order to converse in his imagination with the great men of antiquity; in this way he forgot all his troubles by escaping into the past.

But it is doubtful that Condorcet wrote his *Esquisse* just to bolster his courage, particularly since this relatively short book was only a preliminary to a much larger study, of which mere fragments remain. Condorcet was certainly not a manipulator of people, although at the same time he had nothing in common with the ivory-tower intellectual either; we can therefore reasonably hypothesize that his motive for trying to catch a glimpse of the hidden face of reality was that with the help of such forecasting “we can shape the future more to our liking.”¹³

The study of Condorcet as a “futurologist” has, then, to be made in two stages, corresponding to the two activities or functions that must be fulfilled before we can reach a proper balance between regard for the future and the making of a decision: the *exploratory* function (or the invention of the future), which consists in the construction according to preconceived conventions of one or several images of the future, and the *discriminatory* function, which has as its object the utilization of these images of the future to order a set of alternative decisions, from which one then must choose.

The Invention of the Future

Although Condorcet did not explicitly set down the method he followed to compose the picture of the distant future that he gives in Epoch X of the *Esquisse*, it is possible to reconstruct it from references found here and there in the book.

To begin with, there is human action. It is possible to discern what course this action will take because all men have the same utilitarian motives that lead them to seek the same sources of satisfaction: “Since all men who inhabit the same country have more or less the same needs and since they also generally have the same tastes and the same ideas of utility, what has *value* for one of them generally has it for all.”¹⁴

The anthropology upon which Condorcet bases his idea that individual behavior can be foretold is not, however, limited to the view that man is a being motivated only by needs. The *Esquisse* shows him also—although rather briefly—as a “creature with desires” (Bachelard). In Epoch III, for example, we learn that even preliterate agricultural societies were animated by a search for “new ideas and sensations, the prime mover of the progress of the human spirit,” and it is this intellectual curiosity—for which there is no utilitarian explanation—that is the source of that progress in scientific knowledge which is given such a prominent role in the *Esquisse*.

Making the leap from the individual to society—from micro- to macro-sociology—permits us to foresee more or less what humanity will accomplish at any given moment. But to be complete, the act of forecasting must pass from the static to the dynamic, that is, the forecaster must ask what chances the society has for realizing its

potential. Formally, Condorcet's response is simple; it rests on the postulate that physical and social nature are identical and thus subject to the same laws; therefore both are equally predictable. The "general laws, known or unknown, which regulate the phenomena of the universe are regular and constant. Why should this principle be any less true when applied to the development of the intellectual and moral faculties of man than when applied to any of the other operations of nature?" (beginning of Epoch X). By the same token, it becomes legitimate to use observation about the past to determine in advance what will probably happen in the future. "If there is to be a science for predicting the progress of the human race . . . the history of the progress already achieved must be its foundation" (p. 14). "Man . . . can on the basis of past experience predict future events with a great degree of probability" (beginning of Epoch X).

Here we meet the logical difficulty in Condorcet's thought that Auguste Comte rightly perceived, although generally Comte went too far in his criticism. The difficulty is the following: If we must find in the past the light that we are going to use to illuminate the future, it allows us, at best, to anticipate a future progress that will be extremely slow, especially when one considers the millennia that went by before humanity even began to "take off," and, at worse, it entirely excludes the possibility of lasting progress, particularly if we consider the obscurantism—which Condorcet himself castigates continually—of past centuries. "He has on his hands," as Comte¹⁵ says, "a perpetual miracle, for the advance of civilization becomes an effect without a cause."

For Comte, the paradox disappears as soon as we realize that "social organization is always only as perfect as the state of the civilization allows at any given moment." In fact, this state marks the limits to progress that humanity can hope to realize from one period to the next. It follows that at each major stage in its development, it will be able to accomplish only as much as is allowed by what is called in modern economics the "production possibility curve" which corresponds to each stage. Comte's conception of historical development implies, then, that to predict the future correctly, that is, "to proceed to a general determination of the immediate future of society which results from its past," it is necessary to delineate "the social system to which the course of civilization will summon the elite of mankind today."¹⁶

Now this is precisely what Condorcet did in the *Esquisse*. For Epoch X provides us, in fact, with a quite detailed (and, I might add, accurate enough, cf. *infra*) outline of what the probable state of civilization will be among the advanced societies. There is, however, an important difference between his approach and that of Comte. Auguste Comte acted as if he knew the future in advance, since it simply represented the concrete forms of what could already be found in the third major phase of his outline of historical evolution—the "scientific and industrial age" that would follow the "theological and military age" and the "metaphysical and legalistic age." To be sure, Condorcet thought that progress was irreversible—"no doubt this progress [of the perfectibility of man] may be *more or less rapid* [emphasis added] but there will never be any retrogression" (p. 4)—and curiously, the only risk of decline that he envisages was tied to the eventuality—which he eliminates—of a "new Tartar invasion from Asia" (Epoch X).

But the phrase that we italicized above ("more or less rapid") shows in what

way Condorcet differs from the founder of Positivism. For it introduces the idea that the extrapolation from messages transmitted by the past should not be effected mechanically for two diametrically opposed reasons. First, the slowness of the rate at which social change has operated in the past is misleading. One cannot infer from it that the same rate of change will continue into the future, because there was an acceleration starting in the seventeenth century caused by the influence of inventions and discoveries that had occurred since the Renaissance coupled with the spread of enlightenment among an ever larger number of great individuals. (The influence of enlightenment "ceasing any longer to be slow and imperceptible, produced a revolution in the entire mass of certain nations, and gave thereby a secure pledge of the general revolution one day to follow that shall embrace the whole human species," beginning of Epoch IX.)

Second, revolution, which, for Condorcet, was born out of a contradiction between attitudes of mind that had developed imperceptibly and existing forms of government,¹⁷ could come about through two very different processes that would result in equally contrasted futures. In one case the qualitative leap is introduced smoothly "by the perhaps belated wisdom of government" (beginning of Epoch X), while, in the other case, it is provoked by the intransigence of the established powers and is carried out "from below"; it then has to be paid for by what Condorcet calls "transitory evils" (middle of Epoch X)—which, coming from a man in Condorcet's situation, was a nice euphemism—but, on the other hand, it also brings more profound positive effects.

The conceptual model of social change that underlies the *Esquisse* can thus be represented schematically in the following way:

BASIC MOTIVATIONS	+	PRODUCTIVE FORCES	→	ADAPTATIONS OF FORMS OF GOVERNMENT (= REVOLUTION)
Intellectual curiosity		Levels of knowledge and technology		From above: Little human cost but limited (positive) impact
Search for the useful and agreeable		Degree of their diffusion through education		From below: "transitory evils" but substantial (positive) impact

The picture of the future that Condorcet finally comes up with is without doubt the best known and the most spectacular part of the *Esquisse*; thanks to it, the book deserves to be placed among the classics of futurological literature, for, unlike most predictions which turn out to be belied by the facts, the seventeen predictions that Burnham Beckwith¹⁸ has extracted from Epoch X have almost all proved remarkably accurate. Beckwith lists them as follows:

1. The political principles of the French Revolution would spread and inspire reform or revolution in many nations.
2. All European colonies in the Americas would become politically independent.
3. European colonies in Africa and Asia would be freed from exploitation.
4. The nations of Europe would increasingly send doctors, teachers, and other experts, instead of adventurers and missionaries, to backward countries.

5. "Meanwhile everything forecasts the imminent decadence of the great religions of the East. . . ."
6. The laws and customs chiefly responsible for economic and political inequality among men would be radically reformed.
7. Public financial support or social insurance for the needy—especially the aged, widows, and orphans—would be introduced.
8. Education would become public and universal.
9. Scientific research would continue indefinitely to expand human knowledge.
10. More equal opportunities for education would enlarge the scientific community and the scope and number of the sciences.
11. Technology would improve and expand with the sciences.
12. Technological progress in agriculture and industry would support more people on an ever higher standard of living, with less work per person.
13. Women would be given the same legal rights and educational opportunities as men.
14. Wars would be regarded as disasters and would become less and less frequent.
15. "The progress of the sciences ensures the progress of the art of education, which in turn advances that of the sciences."
16. Improvements in medical care, food, housing, labor-saving machinery, and income distribution would lengthen life and improve health.
17. Advances in medical practice would eliminate infectious and hereditary diseases.¹⁹

A detailed examination of all these points would take us too far afield, but it is worth stopping for a moment on the fourteenth prediction, the one relating to wars, for it is that one that incontestably shows Condorcet at his least accurate.

His prognosis was that wars would end by being considered the worst of scourges and crimes, that is, that they would be regarded as irrational and immoral (two terms that are used more or less synonymously by Condorcet and by the *philosophes* generally). The reasons that he gives are, first, that with the disappearance of traditional monarchical regimes, wars of conquest motivated by dynastic considerations would lose their *raison d'être*, and, second, that the confrontations motivated by economic considerations would disappear as each nation, having absorbed the values of the Enlightenment, would begin to see that the unequal distribution of wealth was contrary to its own interests. The underlying method of prediction derives here from the anthropological postulate according to which "Men are partly rational and hedonistic and will therefore eventually adopt nearly all major social reforms that will enhance their welfare";²⁰ and correlatively, it might be added, renounce institutional arrangements that will be harmful to their welfare.

Let us try, if only briefly, to evaluate this prediction. We run up against one difficulty immediately—one that is commonly encountered when dealing with non-quantitative predictions—namely, to understand precisely what the author was predicting. In Condorcet's case there are at least two statements: (1) wars will eventually become extremely rare phenomena; and (2) they will be judged as irrational means to achieve ends and as contrary to morality. The prediction cannot, it seems to me, be verified on a global scale, for the confirmation varies according to the international relationships we are talking about—West-West, East-West, North-South, and South-South—and these must therefore be considered separately.

For the relations that I will refer to as West-West (among the Western countries),

one can say, in 1975, that Condorcet has ended by being correct in the sense that recourse to war as a means of settling conflicts, after having greatly intensified during the last two world wars, appears now, so far as one can foresee, to have been completely excluded. Moreover, public opinion today would regard an armed struggle between two or more Western nations as either absurd or shocking. (This, incidentally, is one of the rare causes for optimism in an epoch that does not generally warrant complacency.) But before giving Condorcet credit for a correct prediction, it must be pointed out that progress toward peace in his view was supposed to result from the disappearance of economic disagreements, while these are in fact far from having disappeared among the Western countries.

So far as relations between East and West are concerned, Condorcet appears to have been correct, if we limit ourselves only, say to the last twenty years. For, in fact, it is generally agreed that the risk of armed conflict has diminished to some degree, at least insofar as the rational and ethical appeal of warfare as a means for East-West conflict-resolution is on the wane (see below, however, for some qualifications to this).

Condorcet's score is considerably lower for relations in the two last categories. While it is true that, with the disappearance of the colonial empires, the occasions for armed conflict between the North and the South (that is, between the developed and the underdeveloped countries) have become much rarer, it is important to add two qualifications (of which the first—and perhaps even the second—can be equally applied to the relations between East and West). First, the examples of Vietnam and Israel suggest that the typical North-South confrontation is still possible, particularly if it is stirred up by, and can serve as a cover for, East-West antagonisms. Second, it is becoming increasingly clear that conflict between military forces in uniform is not the only conceivable form of war; it is now possible to exert just as much pressure on the enemy by acts of terrorism and by the taking of hostages. These new forms of warfare, which a man of the eighteenth century could hardly have anticipated from his own historical experience, appear to be sharply in the ascendance. One also cannot truly say that resorting to war is now generally regarded as irrational and immoral in North-South relations (the Vietnamese war notwithstanding), since it is possible technically and/or ethically to legitimate war provided the opposite camp is regarded either as having grossly abused its power (if it uses, for example, the "oil weapon" in too extreme a manner) or as having stubbornly refused to satisfy so-called legitimate claims (for example, those of the Palestinians).

The last case—that dealing with relations between South and South (in other words, among the countries of the Third World)—finds Condorcet the furthest astray, not only in the number of military conflicts that have actually taken place since 1945, but also in the general attitude of these countries toward war. In the Third World today, war is far from having been devalued on either logical or ethical grounds, at least to the extent that it has in Western nations. The intelligentsia of the latter, incidentally, is curiously ambivalent on this point, for while it vigorously condemns the sale of arms negotiated by the industrial nations in the Third World, it hesitates to judge with the same severity their actual use by the purchasing countries.

To recapitulate, although Condorcet's performance as a forecaster has proved to be

the least brilliant on this point, he was also still very far from having been totally wrong. It can be stated without equivocation that, as he suggested, the risk of war is greatest—and the practical and moral prestige of war is highest—among those countries that are the farthest removed from industrial civilization. Adherence to rational and hedonistic values is therefore not a bad predictor of what the attitudes toward war, and therefore the risks of war, will be (although this predictive capacity has taken a long time to assert itself). Two questions for the future, however, remain unanswered, but to discuss them in depth would take us beyond the strict confines of this article. Will adherence to rational values spread to other cultures, or will it be characteristic only of the Western intellectual tradition? Conversely, will it even continue alive in the West, where it took root three centuries ago, and will it be able effectively to withstand the pressures coming from new armaments, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the new forms of political coercion we mentioned previously?

The Discriminatory Function

While the role of what I call the exploratory function of studies on the future is clear, the discriminatory function requires some explanation. If one explores the distant future, it is usually not out of mere curiosity, but rather in the hope of making decisions that will be “superior” to those which might have been made having taken only the near future into account. Underlying this hope is a certain conception of action that can be summarized in the two following principles: (1) there is always more than one possible solution to a problem; (2) the rank ordering of the possible solutions in terms of their comparative cost-effectiveness varies according to the time span that one uses (if it did not, the pragmatic justification for futurology would disappear).²¹ In short, a future-oriented study is never so useful as when it makes evident the necessity of arbitrating between short- and long-term rationales and when it gives to this necessity a logical and empirical foundation.

It then remains to determine what we mean by a “best” decision, a point that is always obscure in the numerous arguments used in the defense of forward-looking approaches to decision-making. It seems to me that what such an approach provides is additional data concerning potential opportunities and pitfalls that a far-sighted decision-maker will then be able to exploit or avert, as the case may be.

Armed with this embryo of a methodology, we can now ask ourselves how, in Condorcet’s work, the exploration of the future is connected with the conduct of public affairs.

The Social Art of Condorcet

In Condorcet’s conception of the political sphere, we find ideas common to all liberal thinkers combined with elements that are unique to the author of the *Esquisse*. We are scarcely surprised, therefore, to find that in his eyes the State is made for individuals and not the individuals for the State. “Man must be able to use his faculties, dispose of his wealth, and fulfill his needs with complete freedom” (beginning of Epoch IX). This freedom will have only beneficial effects because “by a universal moral law, the efforts

made by each individual on his own behalf minister to the welfare of all" (*ibid.*). The conviction that fundamentally social reality does not harbor any insoluble contradictions pushes even Condorcet to a number of typically utopian declarations, where the most dissimilar values appear to be quite compatible without requiring any trade-offs among them. For example, "nature has indissolubly united the progress of enlightenment with that of liberty, virtue, and respect for the natural rights of man . . . , these genuine goods which were believed to be incompatible [and which] must, on the contrary, become inseparable" (Epoch I); "the happiness [of mankind] is connected with the progress of reason" (*ibid.*). Government has a role to play, to be sure, and this is described at the beginning of Epoch IX in terms very close to those used by Adam Smith, but the similarity only shows that in this respect the *Esquisse* made no important innovations.

The real "paradox of Condorcet" is perhaps not so much the well-known phenomenon that he described in 1785 of the incoherence of decisions taken by the majority,²² as the fact that he proceeded with a normative analysis of public policy that was clearly at odds with his liberal premises. Under the title *Art Social*, we see for the first time in history a genuine attempt at integrating the social sciences into the political process. This attempt is based on what one might call the paradigm of collective action,²³ according to which the interaction between behaviors which may be individually rational in themselves can lead to a result which is worse for all the participants than what they had when they started; or, to put it in Condorcet's words, "Is not mistaken interest the most frequent cause of actions which are contrary to the general welfare?" (Epoch X). The role of the *Art Social* consists precisely in comprehending better this "mistaken interest," for the human mind, unaided by the social sciences, cannot discover it spontaneously. Condorcet's version of liberal politics is a rejection both of the acts of faith required by traditional *laissez-faire* theories in the virtues of the "invisible hand" of the market and of unconditional submission to an enlightened guardian State; in their place, it advocates systematic research to find solutions that will transform the negative-sum game that social life generally is into a positive-sum game.

The originality of the *Esquisse* consists, therefore, in that, in a single work, Condorcet presents us simultaneously with the essential concept of social mathematics (which, as G. G. Granger²⁴ has emphasized, is a "theory of short-term phenomena" that supposes "static limits, fixed structures, and a certain state of equilibrium of human nature") and an attempt at long-term forecasting that rests on an explicit, if not yet very refined, method. But can we say that here there is cross-fertilization between "social art" and the study of the future—or rather that, as often happens, the two approaches exist side by side without ever really interacting? In other words, does referring to views of the distant future provide reasons for deciding between diverse alternatives in a way different from what would have been adopted if one had reasoned only from the perspective of the present or the near future?

Analytically, the relative preference for the future as opposed to the present that underlies any forward-looking approach leads policy-makers to take into consideration less immediate benefits and costs before making a decision. Ideally, the decisions that follow would therefore allow the systematic exploitation of opportunities and avoidance

of threats, both of which would have been simply invisible within a shorter planning horizon. It is necessary, then, to ask whether a systematic reference to the more distant future, so characteristic of the *Esquisse*,²⁵ has really left its mark on the prescriptive aspects of the book, and whether the “social art” of Condorcet is in fact future-oriented.

The relevant clues will obviously be difficult to find in a brief book which does not pretend to be a treatise on policy analysis, but I think that what one does find there allows us to answer the question affirmatively. With respect to *opportunities*, one can cite two examples. The first, and the most obvious, concerns scientific progress. We find in Epoch X, and in a text from the same period significantly entitled “Fragments on Atlantis, or, The Combined Efforts of the Human Species for the Progress of the Sciences,” a true essay on technological forecasting, the results of which might be considered as enlarging the array of possibilities that can be taken into account by a policy maker—which is without a doubt one of the practical objectives of the exploration of the future.

The second example—and an intriguing one—has already been mentioned above. It pertains to the choice between revolution “from above” and “from below,” where Condorcet indicates clearly that in his opinion the first alternative, while providing greater payoffs for the immediate future, has the disadvantage of risking the loss of opportunities that would only become evident later on. We might note in passing that in the twentieth century this kind of argument has been much abused.

As for the threats, Condorcet is, it seems to me, a little more explicit. Two kinds of situations can be considered here: The first includes the threats that are revealed through forecasting, but that are finally disregarded because their occurrence appears to be avoidable thanks to some intervening spontaneous process. An example would be the threat of a complete halt to scientific progress, which could happen if “the number and the complication of the things man already knows absorbed all his powers; further progress [would then] become absolutely impossible” (Epoch X). To this, Condorcet answers that the advancement of theoretical work permits fresh syntheses of existing knowledge, which in turn create opportunities for new breakthroughs. The second kind of situation includes those foreseen threats—for example, that the population will outgrow available resources—that do materialize. Here again solutions are possible: in this case, to develop technical research in the immediate future, thanks to which “more widespread enjoyment can be obtained from less consumption” (Epoch X), and, in the long term, to moderate population growth.

It might be useful to note in passing that Condorcet envisaged in the *Esquisse* only those threats related to the development of more or less impersonal social *processes*; he does not ask himself about possible negative outcomes resulting from long-range *decisions*, although he is perfectly capable, when he discusses the great geographical discoveries (Epoch VIII), of detecting their ambivalent nature. It is possible, perhaps, to see in this omission an indication that Condorcet was more sensitive to the “hidden cost of saying no”²⁶ to industrial or social innovation than he was to the cost of saying yes.

To conclude briefly, I would say that Condorcet embodied in an exemplary manner that alliance between political liberalism and the scientific spirit that was subsequently to have such a remarkable success. The credo which underlies it can be

summarized in one sentence: Once the break with the *ancien régime* has been made, it will become possible for humanity rapidly to advance toward the realization of the great ideals of the Enlightenment, through a combination of social science and orderly politics.²⁷ Curiously, this conviction is also essentially that adopted by Marxist socialism, with one difference (but a big one) that an additional break—this time with the liberal-capitalist order—was an indispensable precondition. Subsequent history has not come up to the expectations either of Condorcet or of Marx, but this has not prevented the two opposing camps that represent their heirs from turning a deaf ear to each other while imperturbably talking at cross-purposes. It will no doubt take a long time before they learn that those fundamental changes after which nothing is as it was before and everything becomes possible are not of this world. The belief in their existence is an example of that residue of metaphysical thought that Condorcet believed was in the process of disappearing, without realizing that he himself was committing the same intellectual error when he imagined that in the future the right public policy would consist in grappling with the basic causes of social evils rather than their effects.²⁸ But if the natural sciences have been able to progress, as we know that they have, it is, among other things, thanks to their recognition of the fact that it is impossible to know the first causes of things. The social sciences and the politics that they inspire might find that they would equally benefit from a Galilean revolution of their own and a renunciation of their claim to have discovered “the *mot de l'énigme* of a civilization.”²⁹

REFERENCES

¹Published in both French and English by the Presses Universitaires de Grenoble (1974), 246 pp. The French title is *Annuaire International des Dix-Huitièmistes*.

²Indirect victim, it is true, since Condorcet died (apparently a natural death and not a suicide, as is often claimed) on March 28, 1794, in the prison at Bourg-la-Reine. He had been arrested by chance at Clamart while he was trying to flee from Paris after having been outlawed along with the Girondists. On the life of Condorcet, see the biography of Janine Bouissounouse, *Condorcet: Le philosophe dans la Révolution* (Paris, 1962).

³See Michel Collinet, “Le monde fermé de la vertu,” *Le Contrat social*, March, 1968.

⁴Roland Mortier, “Les Héritiers des philosophes,” in *Dix-Huitième Siècle*, 6 (special issue on “Enlightenment and Revolution”; Paris, 1974), p. 51.

⁵*Considérations sur les principaux événements de la Révolution Française* (3rd ed., Paris, 1820), II, p. 29.

⁶Cited by Daniel J. Boorstin in *The Americans*, I: *The Colonial Experience* (Penguin paperback ed., 1965), p. 178.

⁷Albert Camus, *L'Homme révolté* (Paris, 1951), p. 240.

⁸Eric Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, ed. John H. Hallowell (Durham, North Carolina, 1975), esp. pp. 127-32.

⁹Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution* (New York, 1973).

¹⁰Paradoxically, a Communist publisher (Editions Sociales, Collection “Les classiques du Peuple”) has provided the only modern edition of the *Esquisse* in French. Gallimard (Collection “Idées”) is preparing a paperback edition, with a preface by the present author. The most recent translation in English is that of June Barraclough, *Sketch for a Historical View on the Progress of the Human Mind*, which was published in London in 1955. Keith M. Baker is preparing an edition for Bobbs-Merrill of the *Selected Writings of Condorcet*.

¹¹Fred C. Iklé, “Can Social Predictions Be Evaluated?” *Daedalus*, Summer, 1967, pp. 736ff.

¹²*L'Invention de la Liberté* (Geneva, 1964), p. 209.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 733.

¹⁴"Tableau général de la science qui a pour objet l'application du calcul aux sciences politiques et morales," cited in Frank Manuel, *The Prophets of Paris*, p. 95. This text is reprinted in Condorcet, *Mathématique et Société* (Paris, 1974), pp. 196-216.

¹⁵*Plan des travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société* (May, 1822), (Paris, 1970), p. 143. This text can also be found in the *Œuvres de Jeunesse* of Auguste Comte (Paris, 1970), where there is also another brief essay by the same author entitled "Sur les travaux politiques de Condorcet" (1819).

¹⁶Auguste Comte, *ibid.*, p. 147.

¹⁷To borrow the formulation of Bruce Mazlish in his chapter on Condorcet, *The Riddle of History* (New York, 1966), p. 88.

¹⁸*The Next 500 Years*, foreword by Daniel Bell (New York, 1967), pp. 6-7. This strange and not very well-known book represents an attempt at the systematic application of Condorcet's ideas on social change, ideas that the author summed up perfectly on p. 37: "In sum, social trends result from major history-making inventions and the growth of knowledge and education, not from social revolutions. The latter may temporarily speed up or slow down such trends, but they do not start or stop or seriously alter them."

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 6-7.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 12.

²¹To my knowledge this key idea has nowhere been expressed more clearly than in the STAR study directed by Bruce Goeller of the Rand Corporation. See L. G. Chesler and B. Goeller, *The STAR Methodology for Short-Haul Transportation*, R-1359 DOT, December, 1973.

²²G. G. Granger, *La Mathématique Sociale de Condorcet* (Paris, 1956) remains the classical work on this subject.

²³R. Boudon, "The Three Basic Paradigms of Macrosociology," in *Theory and Decision*, forthcoming.

²⁴Granger, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

²⁵At the end of Epoch IX, Condorcet recalls that the progress in the standard of living that had been realized in his time grew out of an "industriousness supplemented by the enlightenment of the sciences" that would have been impossible without the victory of Salamis, thanks to which they had been able to cast off "the darkness of Oriental despotism." Likewise, the navigation of ships by the stars was made possible by astronomy, a result of the "discoveries made in the School of Plato."

²⁶Cf. Freeman J. Dyson, "The Hidden Cost of Saying No!" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June, 1975.

²⁷Cf. the articles that Keith M. Baker devoted to this theme, especially "Politics and Social Science in Eighteenth-Century France: The 'Société de 1789'" in J. F. Bosher, ed., *French Government and Society, 1500-1850. Essays in Memory of Alfred Cobban* (London, 1973).

²⁸Thus he criticizes the politics of the Greeks for being inspired by a general principle which consists of "looking toward laws less as a means of making the causes of evil disappear than of destroying their effects by setting the causes against each other" (end of Epoch IV). That this debate remains very much alive today is attested by a recent article written by James Q. Wilson on the mistaken notions about human nature that underlie our solutions to the struggle against crime ("Checking Our Premises on Crime," *The Alternative*, June-July, 1975).

²⁹Franco Venturi, *Utopia and Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1971), p. 16.

FRANK E. MANUEL

In Memoriam: *Critique of the Gotha Program*, 1875-1975

AMONG THE HUNDREDS of disparate pronouncements on human need in modern times, two are curiously linked. The first is from *King Lear*. After the King had been mercilessly nagged by his daughter to dismiss his retainers as serving no *need* for a retired monarch, he roared with rage:

O! reason not the need; our basest beggars
Are in the poorest thing superfluous:
Allow not nature more than nature needs,
Man's life is cheap as beast's. Thou art a lady;
If only to go warm were gorgeous,
Why, nature needs not what thou gorgeous wear'st,
Which scarcely keeps thee warm. But, for true need,—

The other declaration was made by a great admirer of Shakespeare who knew large parts of his plays by heart, the middle-aged Karl Marx, in a letter written to his follower Wilhelm Bracke on May 5, 1875. It was published posthumously in 1891 by Friedrich Engels, who captioned it *Critique of the Gotha Program of the Social Democratic Party*. In our time the aristocratic *Almanach* with which the city of Gotha was long associated has yielded to the *Critique*. The political circumstances that called forth the letter—Marx's attempt to supervise from his exile in London, to control from afar, the compromise draft prepared at Gotha by two hostile branches of the German Party, the Eisenachians (who followed Marx) and the renegade Lasalleans—are by now generally forgotten, and so is Engels' motive in dispatching the letter to Karl Kautsky's journal *Die Neue Zeit*, where it was unceremoniously followed by Max Schippel's article on "Zuckersteuer und Zuckerindustrie."¹ Fundamentally, Marx in 1875 felt that a new party program was supererogatory; the *Manifesto*, cogent and lucid, had been around for popular consumption since 1848, and the publication of another statement of principles was likely to be obfuscatory. Moreover, neither Marx nor Engels had been consulted about the new articles of unification, which had come as a bolt from the blue, and the leaders of the world communist movement were angry. But since the German and international tactical situation demanded Marx's immediate intervention (he was under simultaneous attack from anarchist Bakuninists as well as reformist Lasalleans), the ailing patriarch of the revolution, in despite of his doctor's orders,

laboriously wrote out line-by-line glosses on the draft, and then concluded them with a mock religious "*Dixi et salvavi animam meam.*"

For a time the glosses on the Gotha Program had great prestige in the communist thought of the West because they were quoted as authoritative by Lenin in *State and Revolution* and by other theoreticians whenever party conflicts raised issues of doctrinal purity in the face of "opportunism." Among other things, the *Critique of the Gotha Program* contained a clear-cut passage on the "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat" as the appropriate transitional stage between capitalism and communism.² By now, perhaps, the tactical measures and programmatic criticisms painfully spelled out have become too old for usage even by the most devout European followers of Marx, though the East German official history of the German working-class movement still calls the hallowed text the most important theoretical document of Marxism after the *Communist Manifesto* and *Das Kapital*. It is reported that peasant communes in China discuss the *Critique* in their educational assemblies, and faint echoes of its phraseology can be detected in the new constitution of the People's Republic of China. In that portion of the globe at least, time and space have not diminished the reverence for Marx's utterances, though whether the Chinese analyses of his words bear any kinship to their original meaning is a more difficult question. In the West, the centenary of the *Critique* has not been marked with anything like the festive reconsiderations that accompanied the anniversary of *Das Kapital's* appearance in 1867; but the utopian principles enunciated in Marx's letter to Bracke continue to resound throughout the world. The banderole, inscribed "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs," may be getting a bit frayed with age, but it is still fluttering in the winds of doctrine, belief, and hope. A full version of Marx's utopia was embodied in the paragraphs of the *Critique* where he distinguished for the first time between Phase I of communist society, during which real equality could not yet be instituted because economic and cultural resources were too limited, and Phase II, the higher plane of communism. Here Marx also included one of his very rare descriptions of the future communist world.

Both Marx and Engels on occasion had a word of approval for old utopian socialists and communists as antecedents³—Thomas More, Thomas Müntzer, and the Levellers faithfully reflected the conditions of their times—but what was innocent daydreaming up to about the end of the eighteenth century could not be considered so thereafter, because the later utopians, without any sense of the objective conditions of their society and its historical development, were spinning purely subjective fantasies that distracted the proletariat from its destined political mission. Once Marx and Engels had come onto the world stage, any utopian survivors had to be repudiated, since they had been transcended by scientific socialism. The idea of utopia acquired heavily pejorative overtones in communist theory. As the appointed guardian of true revolutionary consciousness, Marx was obligated to combat every utopian system that raised its empty head—Owenite, Saint-Simonian, Fourierist, Blancian, Proudhonian, Stirnerian, Weitlingian, Bakuninist, Lasalleian, Dühringian, in fact any deviation from the realistic and correct doctrinal position set forth in the writings of Marx and Engels. "Utopian" became an epithet of denigration to be splashed onto any theoretical oppo-

nent. If a roundabout story is credible, Marx became more, rather than less, severe with the utopians as he advanced in years. Georges Sorel in the *Reflections on Violence* reported that, according to the economist Professor Lujo Brentano, Marx wrote the English Positivist Edward Spencer Beesly in 1869: "The man who draws up a programme for the future is a reactionary."⁴

Yet, despite the persistence with which Marx and Engels belabored contemporary utopians, essential parts of the *Critique of the Gotha Program* were the answer to a utopian inquiry that Marx himself had initiated: "What transformation will the nature of the state undergo in a communist society? In other words, what social functions will then remain that are analogous to present-day state functions?" This question could only be answered "scientifically" (*wissenschaftlich*), he declared in the *Critique*,⁵ but some pages back a grand apostrophe had already escaped him and he was caught in the utopian web.

In a higher phase of communist society, when the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor, and with it the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished; when labor is no longer merely a means of life but has become life's principal need; when the productive forces too have increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of shared wealth flow more abundantly—only then will it be possible completely to transcend the narrow horizon of bourgeois right and only then will society be able to inscribe on its banners: From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs [*jeder nach seinen Fähigkeiten, jedem nach seinen Bedürfnissen*]⁶

Implicit in this passage was the quintessential problem of what are and what are not human needs that has always been at the core of utopian thought in the West. The question of need has been analyzed in abstract philosophical terms, as in Plato's *Philebus*, or in concrete physiological terms. Distinctions have been established between need and desire, between authentic and inauthentic needs. The relationship of needs and abilities has been probed. Marx's own interpretation of needs and abilities can perhaps best be established, not in an isolated or autonomous commentary on the brief, laconic phrases of the *Critique*, but in juxtaposition with the views of the French utopian communists and socialists who antedated him and whose followers survived to bedevil him, and in relation to his own views on other occasions. The French utopian tradition about the future of society was the most serious body of utopian thought with which he was confronted. Marx had a way of defining himself by negation, but he did not live by refutation alone, and the encyclopedic and synthesizing mind of this man deeply immersed in the culture of his age managed to assimilate the ideas of his enemies even while he was berating them. A hundred years after it was written, the *Critique of the Gotha Program* can be more effectively illuminated if it is restored to the utopian landscape in which it was originally planted.

I

In the *Manifesto of the Equals*, the primary document of the modern communist utopia, Gracchus Babeuf had given revolutionary content to Morelly's plan for agrarian communism in the *Code de la nature* (1755). Marx was aware from his reading of

Philippe Buonarroti that there had also been a deliberate and momentous decision among the members of Babeuf's Conspiracy of the Equals to reject the equal, private, individual holdings of More's *Utopia* in favor of communally held property as the only feasible way to enforce equality. Equality for Babeuf presupposed a continent—almost ascetic—community, in which shirkers would be severely punished. Absolute equality, immediately proclaimed and instituted, was the paramount human need, not in its vague French Revolutionary sense, which could be twisted in almost any economic or social direction, but in plain terms: One man should not have more of *anything* than another. If there was not enough to go round, the product itself was to be eliminated. This egalitarian communism assumed the virtual replication of needs, desires, and abilities among all citizens, though it made some allowance for children, the feeble, and the elderly. Its intolerance of any distinctions was fierce. To be equal, not to suffer the humiliation of a superior's slights or power or authority—that was to set the tone of life, and all else was to be sacrificed to it. “We are all equal, is it not so?” the *Manifesto of the Equals* asked rhetorically.

Well, we henceforth intend to live and to die equal, just as we were born; we want real equality or death, that is what we need. And we shall have it, this *égalité réelle*, no matter what the price. . . . Woe to anyone who would offer resistance to so keen a desire! . . . May all the arts be destroyed, if need be, as long as we have *égalité réelle*.⁷

The Babouvist dogma of immediate equality lived on in the popular French communist tradition that Buonarroti, a survivor of the conspiracy, resurrected in the eighteenth-thirties.

When the young Marx was exposed to Babouvism, he rejected it totally and unequivocally. His loathing for instant egalitarianism was a constant of his thought from his first appearance in the political arena. While he could treat more tenderly the egalitarian communistic utopians of the eighteenth century that he knew, Mably and Morelly, their identification with the consequences of their thought in the mad Babouvist uprising caused even these guileless ones to be smeared.

In the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 the Babeuf type of communism was labeled *reaktionär*. “It teaches a general asceticism and a crude leveling.”⁸ From the eighteenth-forties onward, Marx, who saw himself as coming to mankind in order to establish a communist system for a dynamic, world technological-industrial mechanism inherited from bourgeois capitalism, heaped scorn upon the eighteenth-century French founders of “optimum little republics” based on egalitarian principles and their nineteenth-century German imitators with their “Federal republics with social institutions” and vapid egalitarian slogans.⁹ The German scribblers of the Gotha Program of 1875 had fallen into the same oratorical trap, and he would have none of them. The notes that preceded Engels’ *Anti-Dühring* (whose express purpose was to distinguish authoritatively between utopian and scientific socialism) are spotted with similar sneers, witness that the two men were on the same track. “To want to establish Equality = Justice as the highest principle and the ultimate truth is absurd.” Ahistorical manifestoes like the Gotha Program were drivels for both of them. “So the concept of equality itself is a historical *Produkt* to whose working out the whole of pre-history is neces-

sary," wrote Engels, "it has not existed as truth from all eternity."¹⁰ When Engels heard talk of a sudden communist revolution against the "existing military bureaucratic state," he could only liken such political insanity to Babeuf's attempt "to jump immediately from the Directory into communism."¹¹ As late as 1885, recollecting the Babouvist influence in the secret organizations of the League of the Just and the League of Communists of the eighteen-forties, Engels continued to denounce them for their derivation of community of property from the *principle* of equality rather than seeing communism as an outgrowth of the historical process.¹²

Inequalities were inevitable in the first phase of communism as it would emerge, after long birth pangs, from capitalist society, Marx insisted in his *Critique*, and for Social Democrats promiscuously to advertise promises of equality was a base deception. Justice (he meant distributive justice), the law of a society, could not be more complete than its economic structure and the cultural level dependent upon it would permit. True equality had to await the higher stage of communism.

Intellectuals have always been ill at ease with manifestoes of absolute egalitarianism. Condorcet, last of the *philosophes*, recognized the universal force of the idea of equality and predicted in his survey of the future a growing egalitarianism among both civilized and primitive nations, France leading the way of course, and among the citizens within each nation, but immediate and absolute equality was never posed as the ideal of his dynamic, scientific utopia. He was quite prepared to settle for more or less equality, or a gradual creeping up on equal shares of material things, while the main focus of activity in the paradisaical Tenth Epoch of his sketch of universal history was the development of the unique scientific and technological abilities of men of genius and their application to those areas where they would directly and instantaneously relieve human pain, the greatest of all evils. Condorcet was still worried about the need for stimulus to keep men in progressive movement; differences in status, if not in economic rewards, were therefore preserved in his vision of the future in order to foster emulation among men, without which they might grow somnolent. Marx was no admirer of Condorcet's Girondist affiliation during the French Revolution and would have labeled his philosophy of history incorrigibly idealist. But when it came to imposing the principle of equality by a coup d'état and enforcing it by demagoguery, Marx was closer to the aristocratic ex-Permanent Secretary of the Academy of Sciences than to the populist Babeuf.

II

The idea of absolute equality, in the Babouvist sense, as a human need had become deeply rooted in certain branches of French communist thought of the eighteen-thirties and -forties, usually among the violent direct actionists such as Auguste Blanqui. But equality clashed sharply with other utopian needs as they had been set forth by two seminal utopian thinkers and their followers who had moved in a very different direction from Babeuf's: Saint-Simon and Fourier. These were men toward whom both Marx and Engels had adopted a negative attitude, which was a utopian's due. But despite their criticism, ambivalent feelings colored their treatment.¹³ All utopian

thought was inimical to scientific socialism, but some conceptions were less inimical than others. In the collected works of Marx and Engels are scores of citations dealing with Saint-Simon and Fourier and their followers, and they range from contempt to praise. The writings of these utopian socialists left an indelible stamp on the banderole of the *Critique of the Gotha Program*.

In these two greatest of nineteenth-century French utopians, Saint-Simon and Fourier, and among their disciples, the idea of equality had become identified with dread recollections of the Terror. In revulsion against the *égalité* of the *sans-culottes* and of Babeuf, they denounced absolute equality—Saint-Simon in the name of a new or refurbished organismic conception of society and the markedly *unequal* needs of human beings for self-fulfillment in different types of work and emotional expression, Fourier in the name of the unique and highly differentiated psychic needs and goals of men that were totally discordant with the ideal of equality. Viewed through the lenses of Marx and Engels in the eighteen-forties, some of these utopian ideas appeared less pernicious than the wanton egalitarian and libertarian slogans that were being hawked in the European revolutionary marketplace.

Saint-Simon and especially the Saint-Simonians had come to dwell on the differences in human needs in both professional and amorous self-actualization, and they totally reversed the Babouvist ideal of equality as the final utopian condition. On his deathbed, Saint-Simon reflected that if he had done anything for mankind, it was to proclaim the need for the free development of distinctive natural talents. "Talents" was his word and the Napoleonic overtones are patent; the Saint-Simonians later called them "capacities." Among them, fulfillment of capacities became the new formulation of the primary need in utopia. *Un capacité*, around the time of the Restoration, acquired the meaning of a man expert in some branch of activity as well as the expertise itself. (It had a scientific significance.) "*C'est un capacité*" was said of a person, of Flaubert's father, a noted doctor, for example. The final utopian goal was no longer equal access to a sufficiency of food and drink and knowledge, which, though it was hardly a reality in early nineteenth-century France, could be hypothetically assumed in any futurist vision of the development of great productive resources. What was now at issue was the realization of man's creative potential, his professional capacity, his innate talent, but with modern scientific, not Platonic, connotations. (Marx in his early period highlighted free creativity as the primary attribute of man under communism; his conception of creativity was tinged with the values of both French and German Romanticism and involved the expression of the unique inner self of each man.) A new typology of human personality formulated by the Saint-Simonians for utopian man, though it bears some intellectual resemblance to the Platonic division of golden, silver, and brass men, has very different roots. Men needed to actualize their psychic beings in at least two major areas: creative work and ideal sexual relationships. And these, it was newly appreciated, were complex and varied, not easily subsumed under egalitarian rubrics, except perhaps such coveralls as equal access to self-actualization. While Plato really aimed to keep his castes as stable as possible and controlled the guardians eugenically to prevent the birth of brass children among them (Marx was always sarcastic in his references to the purported communistic systems of the ancients, especially

those of Plato, Xenophon, and Plutarch's Lyscurgus), the Saint-Simonians would abolish inheritance and give every newborn babe an equal chance to express its natural talent and to have it developed through education.

The Saint-Simonians divided men into three fundamental physiological types—the idea originally came from the physiologist Marie-François-Xavier Bichat—those with innate scientific capacities, those with administrative or manual capacities, and those with moral-artistic-religious capacities. Around this new triad they heaped up the slogans of their utopian propaganda. When, after their internal schisms, they established a religious hierarchy, the capacity to love mankind was the talent that counted most, since the need to love and be loved was the overriding human need. The function of the Saint-Simonian priest was to help adepts find their optimum situation in the hierarchy. On the morrow of the July Revolution, the Saint-Simonian Fathers issued a proclamation abolishing inheritance and setting forth the new hierarchical principle: "Each will be placed according to his capacity and rewarded according to his works." "Each according to his capacity, to each capacity according to its works," was emblazoned on the masthead of their newly acquired newspaper, *Le Globe*. In their sermons and formal expositions of the doctrine, they testified to their recognition of varied sexual needs with "rehabilitation of the flesh" and "emancipation of woman." They introduced novelty into the political vocabulary: "The end of the exploitation of man by man; its replacement with the exploitation of nature by man," and "Performance of the function to which a man's natural calling destines him." Other battle cries were: "Each one pursuing his own capacity in order that its products may be distributed to each one according to his works"; or "To each, labor according to his calling and rewards according to his works"; or "An education and function that conform to one's natural calling and a reward that conforms to one's works."¹⁴ The Saint-Simonians were clearly adapting religious terminology—*oeuvres*, *vocation*—for their program. And in his turn Marx utilized the Saint-Simonian language. Though he could never stomach Saint-Simonian religious balderdash, the *Critique of the Gotha Program* phrase "From each according to his abilities" has an unmistakable Saint-Simonian resonance. This is not to say that Marx consciously plagiarized it; but the Saint-Simonian proclamation "Each will be placed according to his capacity and rewarded according to his works" is a pretty fair statement of Marx's expectations for the first phase of communist society.

When the Saint-Simonians became involved with the Female Messiah and made the banking system the administrative heart of their economy, Marx ridiculed them, and he derided as hypocrites the former adepts who had turned into supporters of Napoleon III and had become prosperous international financiers. Nevertheless, he and Engels continued to study the writings of Saint-Simon as they had done since their twenties. In the *German Ideology* of 1845–1846, Marx, who occasionally flaunted his pedantic scholarship, had torn to shreds *The Social Movement in France and Belgium* (Darmstadt, 1845) by Karl Grün, a leader of the "true socialists," for its misquotations of Saint-Simonian and Fourierist writings.¹⁵ After Marx's death, both Engels and, later, Lenin applied words like "genius" to Saint-Simon for some of his insights into the conflict of classes.¹⁶ Abhorrent though the Saint-Simonian principle of hierarchy was

to Marx and Engels, they could not fail to recognize the affinity between their own and the Saint-Simonian outlook for the future world—an endlessly dynamic prospect founded upon the boundless expansion of science and technology, exploitation of the inexhaustible natural resources of the globe, and the flowering of human capacities.

III

In retrospect, Charles Fourier, that lonely, pinched bachelor of early nineteenth-century Paris, has emerged as the most imaginative utopian of human needs. He poses the problem of the other half of Marx's *banderole*, "To each according to his needs," with startling originality. The older utopian ideal of Western man was shifted dramatically away from calm felicity, achieved through more or less equality, to the excitement of novelty and of rich sensation as the supreme need. As men were different, so did their needs vary. For Fourier, the objects of need were primarily sensate and sensual, though he impishly made provision in his phalansteries for the residual rationalist needs of moralist professors of natural law by letting them write parodies of their own works for comic relief. Individual needs were psycho-physical and innate. They were extraordinarily complex, comprised in each person of a wide range of sensory responses, special sexual and social demands. Fourier's utopia was comprised of phalansteries of about 1,800 persons each, because the psycho-physical needs of most humans required the presence in their proximity of that many individuals, all different, for fulfillment—we might now say optimal interaction. Individual fulfillment called for a communal society of great variety, an idea that would later reappear in its Marxist incarnation as the need of every individual to enjoy a communal existence as the precondition for personal self-realization. Through reflection in the other and in social action each man's being was realized. In the *German Ideology*, Marx wrote: "Only in a state of community with others has each individual the means to develop his predispositions in all directions; only in a state of community will personal freedom thus become possible."¹⁷ The reaffirmation of man's social nature in utopian thought may now sound banal; but in its day it had a psychological dimension that went far beyond the old saws about man as a political animal and served as a negation of a presumed bourgeois doctrine of absolute individualism.

If there was an implied hierarchy of values among the Fourierist needs, it was the rarer and more extravagant needs that were cherished above the ordinary and commonplace. Fourier had a predecessor, the Marquis de Sade, one of the few moralists he acknowledged as a progenitor, whose heroes were supermen precisely because of their abnormal capacity for the quick renewal of appetites for food and sex. The phalanstery would seek out these extraordinary specimens, cultivate them, and search, even throughout the world, for their social complements in other persons. To the extent that there was a unitary social goal in Fourier's system, it was the multiplication of sensate needs. Danger to society and the individual occurred only when desires were choked up—his word was *égorgement*—for then they tended to seek an outlet in destructive channels. Though in his published works Fourier avoided discussion of homosexual needs, his manuscripts, especially the *Nouveau monde amoureux*, ranked them along with any others. The multiplication of varied relationships and a capacity for rich and

complicated sensory experiences were highly prized, as was the talent for imparting pleasure to others through artistic creations. Work became indistinguishable from play and erotic pleasure, as every work group in the phalanstery was bound by amorous ties of one kind or another. The needs of Fourier's phalansterians were continually changing both in the course of a single day and in the various stages of the life cycle. They were not infinite in number, but were categorizable by types and manipulable with the aid of central filing systems of each man's profile of needs. Computerized pairing and selection were approximated on a manual basis.

Like all magnificent obsessions, Fourier's system provided for practically every contingency, and he developed intricate ceremonial institutions to take care of those situations where a specific desire, by definition equivalent to a need in his vocabulary, could not enjoy immediate satisfaction, such as two men wanting the same girl at the same time. Everything was arranged to mitigate the pain of a denial. For Fourier, the calm felicity of the pre-Revolutionary utopia had become the gaping boredom of the nineteenth-century French bourgeois family ruled in stolid silence by a patriarchal, though cuckolded, lord. In his utopia of endless stimulation, monotony—the bane of modern society—would be banished forever. While he would allow the vestal or celibate or monogamous state for those who chose it, he doubted whether many would opt for those impoverished forms of existence.

But Fourier's utopia of maximal dynamism in action and in sensation was too far-out to be acceptable in the nineteenth century, even in radical circles. His own disciples bowdlerized his writings. Socialist thinkers of the Victorian world, like Marx, could not endure this utopia in all its nakedness; it reeked of the brothel. Many Fourier manuscripts were not published until the nineteen-sixties, when there was a recrudescence of interest in a utopia of the free satisfaction of all psycho-physical needs because it had found contemporary parallels in such men as Wilhelm Reich, Norman Brown, and Herbert Marcuse in one of his moods.¹⁸ Marx was clearly exposed to Fourier's conception of needs and read his critical anatomy of the cheats of industrial civilization and the hypocrisy of bourgeois social values with an appreciative eye. But he was not ready to follow Fourier in his labyrinthine analysis of psycho-sexual needs, and was resentful whenever the label "communist" was attached to him. Marx's own language remained properly vague and philosophical when he depicted man's relations to the sensate world of objects, human and natural.

If in rationalist and argumentative propositions with respect to the philosophical character of communism and historical materialism Marx and Engels had no significant disagreements (*pace* those who have tried to drive a wedge between them), differences in the mode of life of the communist Dioscuri may suggest differences in their attitudes toward sex and the family. Nonetheless, when they paint the transfigured family of the future, their palette is the same. Marx was brought up and remained enclosed for all ostensible purposes within the boundaries of the Western Judeo-Christian family as it had evolved into its bourgeois form by the nineteenth century. His youthful correspondence with his father affords an inkling into the traditional love-hate relationship with which he was grappling. The early love for Jenny von Westphalen of the petty Rhenish nobility, an alien both to the religion of his two rabbinic grandfathers

and to the apostate Enlightenment lawyer who was his father, is a romantic idyll that, with occasional cloudy periods, endured the dangers of revolutionary outlawry and the gnawing dread of proletarianization in dismal London flats. The dying Marx in a hotel in Algiers, seeking alleviation of the respiratory diseases that plagued him, conjured up in a letter to his friend Engels touching images of the Jenny who has sustained him.¹⁹ (Whether or not Marx dallied with the maid or had an illegitimate son, his notion of family life was normative Victorian.)

Marx reigned over his household with the dignity of a benevolent lord. And when marriage proposals for his daughters were in the offing, his inquiries about a prospective son-in-law resembled those of any other loving, tender, yet wary, middle-class father of the period. Wherever his personal impulses may have led him, the destruction of the nuclear institution of the family was not an integral part of his utopia, and those societies that have accepted his philosophical guidance have not tampered with the family structure beyond the assertion of a measure of female equality in relationships. In the eighteen-seventies, Marx and Engels occasionally exchanged notes on the sexual customs of the medieval Welsh and passed on to each other somewhat salacious jokes about them; but in general the traditional monogamous family structure was not attacked in public. In fact, wiping out the evils of capitalism would render familial ties less constrained by economic considerations, more open, and more loving—that was a recurrent Marxist promise over the decades. In the eighteen-forties, Marx was already quoting Morelly on the deleterious psychic effects of private ownership on marital relationships. “Interest denatures the human heart and spreads bitterness over the most tender relations. These are transformed into heavy shackles that our married couples hate, and they end up hating themselves.”²⁰ One might point in contradiction to a footnote in the *German Ideology*, “That the supersession of an individualist economy cannot be divorced from the supersession of the family is self-evident”;²¹ but this was a solitary manuscript observation of the forties, part of a polemic with German ideologists who denied that the family had its origin in production relations and talked of the “concept of the family” as a timeless absolute. In the manuscripts of 1844, while Marx continued to treat of sexuality in the same abstract terminology as need, alienation, and work, there is the prospect that in the communal state sexual relations will become uniquely human, transcending animality. Nothing resembling the concreteness of Fourier’s understanding of sex is in evidence. The brilliantly mocking excursion on the abolition of the family in the *Communist Manifesto* patently refers to the bourgeois family.

Friedrich Engels, of a prosperous Barmen family of manufacturers who had a branch of their cotton mills in Manchester and whose surplus value supported Marx for decades through the agency of their aberrant son, by repute was sexually more adventuresome than his colleague. Though Engels’ relationship with an Irish working-class girl and, after her death, with her sister—the latter union was consummated in marriage—were constant enough by the Victorian canon, the impression is inescapable that he lived less conventionally and comprehended the Fourierist sexual fantasies more readily than did “Old Nick.” In his brief sketch of the history of changing forms of love and sexuality Engels could write of Anacreon, with no more than a flicker of the Victorian eyebrow, that “sexual love [*Geschlechtsliebe*] in our sense was of so little con-

cern to him, even the sex of the loved person was all one to him.”²² But when Engels inherited Marx’s notes on the anthropologist Lewis H. Morgan’s *Ancient Society* and expanded them into a full-blown work, *The Origin of the Family*, in which he spelled out the derivation of the family from production relations, he probably stated the definitive views common to both of them on the historical transformations of the family and its possible future, views that were not always acceptable to the German Social Democrats and English “socialists” among whom he lived and died. As he examined Morgan’s historical hypothesis, the outrageous Fourier’s stadial theory of the growth of civilization took on new meaning, and he wrote to Kautsky on April 26, 1884: “I must show how brilliantly Fourier anticipated Morgan in so many things. Through Morgan, Fourier’s critique of civilization appears in all its genius.”²³ But this did not imply acceptance of the bewildering multiplicity of sexual patterns prescribed by Fourier for “harmonian society.” Engels’ prognostication of the future of the family after the abolition of property was not at all Fourierist. He argued that, with female equality, optional divorce when love vanished, the end of prostitution and of covert polygamy, the marital bond would become tighter than ever, since it would be the product of free choice. *En passant*, Engels delivered himself of sententious sexological opinions in the temper of the age: “The duration of a seizure of sexual love for an individual is very different for different individuals, particularly among men,” or “Sexual love is by its very nature exclusive.”²⁴ His descriptions of the contemporary bourgeois family were in the acerbic Saint-Simonian and Fourierist spirit, but the communist future would nurture a loving, monogamous, and lasting relationship.

Neither Marx nor Engels, gentlemen from the Rhineland who spent most of their adult lives in England, was preoccupied in his writings with the complexities of sexual needs that concerned the Saint-Simonians and even more Fourier. The all-around (*allseitig*) development of man in Marx’s utopia is rather gingerly when it comes to sex. Herbert Marcuse’s emphasis on aesthetic-sexual needs as the authentic, vital needs of a new free society, which so titillated the generation of 1968, is a leap that the Victorian Marx never made. Reading into him the validation of such needs had to await twentieth-century Freudo-Marxists. Fourier’s chief innovation, the expansion of sensations and sensual capacities in all directions as superior to rational capacities, escaped Marx or repelled him. He was much more restricted in his outlook, and recognized as legitimate only reasonable, refined, and decent needs—which stopped far short of Fourier’s equation of desires with needs. Marx was still too deeply imbued with the rationalist tradition of Plato and More to allow free play to all psycho-sexual desires as authentic needs. By no means was appeasement of desire necessarily salutary: English workers could be enslaved the more readily by catering to their taste for carousing in taverns. Marx’s diagnosis of the function of drink among the English working classes is paralleled by Marcuse’s depiction of the capitalist use of sex to dull the mass of the workers and rob them of true consciousness.

Marx refused to identify work with pleasure in Fourier’s terms, and the attractiveness of labor was not bound up with erotic stimulus.²⁵ Though in most of his writings Marx did not envisage the abolition of work, he expected that it could ultimately be reduced to a minimum number of hours. Total freedom from necessity was unlikely,

though it might be possible to transcend the antithesis between free time and work time. The most famous passage on the subject appears toward the end of the third volume of *Kapital*, which Engels edited:

Just as the savage must grapple with nature in order to satisfy his needs, sustain his life, and procreate, so must civilized man, under all forms of society and all possible modes of production. With man's development, this realm of natural necessity is broadened because his needs become more extensive; but simultaneously the forces of production that satisfy these needs are increased. Freedom in this realm can be achieved only when communized man, the associated producers, regulate their material exchange with nature in a rational manner, when they bring it under their communal control, instead of being dominated by this exchange as if by a blind force, when they accomplish this with the least possible expenditure of their strength and under conditions that are the most worthy and most fitting for their human nature. But this always remains a realm of necessity. Beyond this realm begins a development of human powers that are ends in themselves, the true realm of freedom. This realm of freedom, however, can only flower on the foundation of the realm of necessity. The shortening of the working day is its fundamental prerequisite.²⁶

These phrases have led to all manner of verbal leaps from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. The United States Secretary of State in a Labor Day, 1975, address (read by Ambassador Moynihan) before the United Nations General Assembly, a number of whose member nations are on the brink of starvation, seized Marx's rhetoric and transcended it: "Throughout history, man's imagination has been limited by his circumstances—which have now fundamentally changed. We are no longer confined to what Marx called the 'realm of necessity.'"²⁷

In Phase I of Marx's communist world, work would no longer be dehumanizing because man would not be pouring his being into a fetish of his own making, a machine belonging to others, and he would be rewarded for the whole of the labor he invested without sacrificing a surplus to the capitalist. The same amount of labor that he gave to society in one form he would get back in another. This considers individuals only as workers. In Phase II, however, though performing equal labor, one individual might in fact receive more than another because as unequal individuals their needs differed. The division of physical and mental work would tend to be obliterated, the distortion of personality in highly specialized tasks would be eliminated, and the realm of freedom would be approached. There is a passage of the *German Ideology* in which the young Marx, despite his distaste for Fourier on sex, seems to cut a page out of Fourier's work plan—the liberated man will go hunting, fishing, shepherding, or engage in intellectual pursuits at will—though the digression in which Marx describes this free movement from one occupation to another in the course of a day, ending with after-dinner indulgence in criticism of the critical philosophy, is partly satirical, despite the fact that it has sometimes been read straight-faced by the more earnest Marxologists.²⁸ At points in his manuscripts, Marx is full of praise for Fourier's conception of childhood without repression and his permissive system of education. But the *Critique*, seen in its historical context of the eighteen-seventies, ignored Fourierist psycho-sexual needs and concentrated primarily on bread and butter and shelter, health insurance, and a guarantee of leisure. Marx did not have to alarm the proper Social Democrats to

whom he addressed himself with the intrusion of Fourierist thoughts on free love. What Marx implied in the *Critique* was that in the higher stages of communism the elementary needs of a man and his family for food and housing and care during illness would be met by society, irrespective of the quantity of social labor he was able to contribute. Marx recognized that there were differences in skills, hence his dictum: "From each according to his abilities"—that phrase with a Saint-Simonian ring; but the returns would be determined not by labor performance or labor value produced, but by sumptuary needs, measured by the size of a man's family and its requirements. Beyond the work economy, he unfolds a vision of abundance and self-actualization. The banderole is quite devoid, however, of more complicated Fourierist or Saint-Simonian notions on sexuality, even though the language is historically related to their conceptions.

The actual phraseology of Marx's slogan is approximated even more closely on the title page of Papa Cabet's Fourierist *Voyage en Icarie* (1840), where the formula is writ large: "To each according to his needs, from each according to his strength"; and by Louis Blanc, whose woolly doctrines are a potpourri of socialist and communist thought of the eighteen-forties. Blanc, that Lilliputian anti-hero of 1848, whom Marx despised as much as he did any revolutionary leader—and that is no thimbleful of contempt—prefigured the Marxist formula in later editions of his *Organisation du travail*, a turgid work that had a significance in both France and England in the mid-nineteenth century difficult to appreciate. Blanc pontificated that in the ultimate stages of socialism there would be true equality only when "Each man . . . will produce according to his faculties and will consume according to his needs." Quoting himself on an earlier occasion, he continued:

There are two things in man—needs and faculties [though Blanc fought the Saint-Simonians, he adopted their terminology]. Through his needs man is passive, through his faculties he is active. Through his needs he calls his fellows to his aid; through his faculties he puts himself at the service of his fellows. . . . According to the divine law written into the constitution of every man, great intelligence presumes more useful activity but not more considerable compensation. And the inequality of aptitudes could not legitimately result in anything but the inequality of duties. A hierarchy of capacities is necessary and fruitful; recompense in accordance with capacities is more than just disastrous—it is impious.²⁹

Of course, by "needs" Blanc, too, meant material needs dependent upon each man's strength and state of health, not Fourier's esoteric needs.

The anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon took a special delight in exercising his mordant wit on the "socialist" Blanc and his followers, tearing apart the slogan on capacities and needs in a perfect state of association that Marx later adapted in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*. "You say that my capacity is 100; I maintain that it is 90. You add that my need is 90; I insist that it is 100. There is a difference of 20 between us on need and capacity."³⁰ (Proudhon, who had a strangely prophetic insight into some of the inherent tendencies of Marxist thought, in 1851 was already making sport with the elements that were later combined in the banderole.) Louis Blanc's formula struck roots in the French working classes, and thirty years later, on October 7, 1882, it reap-

peared in *Le Prolétaire*, an organ of the French Socialist Revolutionary Workers' Party, as *Chacun donnant selon ses forces recevra selon ses besoins*. Marx's son-in-law Paul Lafargue was disturbed by this revival of Blanc's slogan, which carried with it a promise of instant implementation, and wrote Engels to complain. Marx, on the Isle of Wight and ailing, was silent; by this time he was approaching the end.³¹

Marx's banderole, with its proclamation "To each according to his needs," was a sibylline utterance that could mean all things to all men. In the mouth of a direct actionist it could become demagoguery, deluding the workers with false promises. To ordinary socialists it could mean eventual satisfaction of their plain wants and desires. And for intellectuals it was pregnant with philosophical connotations that evoked an ideal state. The phrase harked back to Rousseau and Kant, who had given voice to the true need of a self-aware man—the need for a society in which the moral worth of personal action did not derive from external constraint but was the expression of the inner self and had absolute value in and of itself. Even today the banderole raises an image of universal psychic harmony in which the antagonisms between the individual and society are resolved under conditions that allow for the preservation of personal identity and complete self-actualization.

IV

Isaac Newton framed no hypotheses and Karl Marx wrote no utopias; that was the official stance. But in neither case was the position in fact maintained. If one does not restrict oneself narrowly to the phraseology of the *Critique's* banderole and assimilates to it Marx's related pronouncements, the full dimensions of his utopian dream come into view. Though he never wrote dull utopian stories,³² he encapsulated his utopia in a series of succinct, memorable phrases that in our time have exerted an especial fascination over vast numbers of intellectuals. Their mere recitation over and over again is hypnotic, like certain rhythms of popular music; one begins to feel as if one were already living in that paradisaical state.

Marx came early to utopia, and the longing never abated, though the language of the utopia changed at various stages of his life. In a letter of 1837 to his father, the adolescent student first raised the curtain on his secret search for a total moral system to replace the "old gods," a pursuit that drove him to nights of relentless study and perhaps a temporary breakdown of sorts. By 1844, the manuscripts show, he had found his way out of the maze with his own economico-philosophical creed for a communist society composed of unalienated men—couched in the jargon of German Romantic philosophy. These manuscripts, prepared when Marx was twenty-six, are perhaps the most seductive of his texts for our time. The utopia achieved its clearest universal voice in the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848. What could be more in the Romantic utopian spirit of the times than the prophecy: "The old bourgeois society with its classes and its conflicts of classes gives way to an association where the free development of each individual is the condition of the free development of all."³³ In his late fifties, the sick man, writing glosses on himself and on his enemies in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*, epitomized his vision in apothegms that are still accepted as final ends for man in many

parts of the world. Marx combined the underthought of German philosophy in its Hegelian version, the rhetoric of the French utopians, which, unlike German philosophy, was easily adaptable to the styles of popular expression in any country, and the rational argumentation of English economists amended and presented as science to give solidity to the whole structure. Marxists of later generations could stress one or another of these elements, transforming the whole in accordance with the passing needs of time and place. The amalgam became as flexible and plastic as the original Christian utopia of the ancient world, and it has enjoyed a signal success for much the same reason that Christianity and barbarism once triumphed over the Romans.

Marx's utopian formulas can be garnered from a period of more than three decades in his now published manuscripts and in printed books. They always have reference to the penultimate, higher stage of communism, called Phase II in the *Critique*, after the inadequate Phase I has been left behind. What the "highest" stage, Phase III, if there is one, would be like is difficult to discover. It has been the function of modern Marxology to bind these phrases together into a system, but perhaps something of their original quality can best be communicated by presenting them in their pristine, free-floating state.

Free development of the individual. Development of personality. Self-actualization of the individual. To set in manifold motion the many-sided developed predispositions [*Anlagen*] of men. Only in community will personal freedom be possible. Men become masters of their own socialization.³⁴

Add to these the texts of freedom from necessity, the need for community as a precondition of individual self-realization, and the morality plays about the end of alienation that embarrass Adam Schaff and more sophisticated Marxologists. There are elements in this litany that are markedly Saint-Simonian and Fourierist in tone, expressive of the same Romantic temper. Other elements have counterparts and parallels in contemporary German philosophy. But whatever their source, they are now part of one composite confession of faith. A time may come when the sonorous bits of rhetoric strewn throughout the works of Marx will be fused into a unified liturgical chant whose origins are lost in obscurity.

The Saint-Simonians and even Owenite popularizers thought in terms of the progressive self-actualization of the species man, with the complete actualization of his three major capacities—scientific, emotive-moral-artistic, and manual-administrative. They avoided boxing themselves into a single capacity for each man, and provided for general education in which all three types of capacity would be nurtured until the special capacity manifested itself. Marx's *uomo universale*, too, allows for outstanding predispositions in one direction, along with the general development of all talents. And his idea of a capacity, which may be inferred from specific images and analogies in his writings, was not far removed from that of the Saint-Simonians and most other utopians of the time: Left free to himself, a man would demonstrate either artistic or scientific-rationalist excellence. The Saint-Simonians had a hierarchy of values: In the end, the moral-religious-artistic inspirational capacities were awarded primacy. Marx did not share their predilections, and surely would have excluded the religious capacities.

The Saint-Simonians would also have had an organizational hierarchy of excellence within each capacity, while Marx contented himself with perfect spontaneity of expression and bypassed hierarchy or avoided it. In this respect he has been "improved" by Marcuse, for whom hierarchy holds no terrors. But the basic conception of self-actualization of innate predispositions is about the same in Marx and in the Saint-Simonians. Though Marx nominally rejected the hierarchy of values, he clearly had a preference, which left traces in chance conversations and obiter dicta, for the human rationalizing capacity. Paul Lafargue, who first met him in 1865, describes him as constantly citing a provocative Hegelian reflection: "Even the criminal thought of a scoundrel is grander and loftier than the marvel of the heavens."³⁵ Marx himself was committed to the tireless exercise of organized thinking, and Lafargue's later exposition of the utopian "right to idleness" would hardly have enjoyed his approval. Under communism the intensity of *activity*, a later version of creativity, would increase rather than diminish.

The Saint-Simonians were strong on the potentialities of technological development, and would manipulate productive capacities so as to minimize manual labor insofar as possible. Among them there was not quite the bold fantasizing in which Marx indulged in a passage where he foresaw technological progress reaching so high a level—virtual automation—that man's relation to the machine would become purely intellectual-scientific guidance. Total technology is at the core of the Marxist utopia, its ineradicable signature.

Despite obvious differences, the Marxist slogans can be set into the Fourier-Saint-Simonian chain of filiation without violating their spirit. They are all inhabitants of the same expansive Romantic utopia of self-actualization in varied directions, a boundless drive of the individual and of mankind. There was one branch of utopian thought, however, to which Marx had a profound, abiding, and unmitigated antipathy—the ascetic tradition that runs from Babeuf to Buonarroti to Proudhon and on to Bakunin (the Bakunin of theory, not of real life). They represented the false route. Their chain of thought, based upon a severe limitation of human needs, was essentially static, opposed to the expansion associated with the machine, to great productivity, to the multiplication of goods, and to the grand advancement of science and the arts. In a word, it was reactionary, petty bourgeois. One of Marx's principal objects in writing his *Critique of the Gotha Program* was to have excised from the draft every last word of egalitarian rhetoric, associated in his mind with the French egalitarian communist and anarchist tradition. Equality now, immediate and absolute, had failed to recognize the historical need for vast technological development as a prerequisite to realizing "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." (Looked at a century later, the compromise Marx's supporters achieved in the German Social Democratic Party of 1875 after the reception of his *Critique* is ludicrous—*Jedem nach seinen vernunftgemässen Bedürfnissen* ["To each according to his reasonable needs"].)

Equality was Marx's eventual goal in Phase II of communism, but equality in the rich satisfaction of material and intellectual needs in a dynamic economy, not returns, equal in their paltriness, for labor expended in a primitive, artisan-like system à la Proudhon, not a holding-back of technology, not the anti-intellectualist asperities of

Babeuf and of Bakunin. Irrespective of the other bases of Marx's conflict with Proudhon, there was deep antagonism to his cramped, moralistic individualism, bounded by an artisan's horizon, whereas Marx in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*, as elsewhere in his work, opted for the free-flowing expansion of wealth in association. When the communist artisan Wilhelm Weitling tried to offer an example of a wild, egotistic desire appeased by a worker of the future who would have extra chits to spend in his utopia, the most self-indulgent act he could imagine was the purchase of a watch. Marx's was an expansionist vision in the spirit of the Romantic utopians, and this helps to account for its rehabilitation among the children of 1968. But then they betrayed the angelic Moor by demanding utopia now and flirting with Ludditism.

Remote in time as the alternatives of a rich Saint-Simonian-Fourierist or an ascetic Babouvist egalitarian orientation may be, they are far from irrelevant in the present-day world. They still represent different utopian choices in the contemporary revolutionary arena: absolute equality here and now at all costs, or dedication first to the expansion of productive capacities, with the hope of ultimately realizing the banderole of the *Critique of the Gotha Program* in its fullness of meaning in the distant, distant future.

V

A hundred years after the composition of the *Critique of the Gotha Program*, Marx's words are enjoying a great triumph. Close on to a half of the world's population is hovering between Phase I and Phase II of communism. And there is not a political leader east or west, north or south, so steeped in reaction he would not on appropriate occasions affirm his allegiance to the principle that all men should have their needs fulfilled and natural potentialities developed to the utmost. The Constantines of the world preside at councils where Marx's banderole is duly unfurled; and though slaughter is threatened over its interpretation, history teaches that the correct reading will ultimately prevail. If a Diogenes redivivus should point out that such casual phrases of the *Critique* as "dictatorship of the proletariat" have sometimes been translated into massacres of millions of human beings, the true believer will remind him that the historical process has always been profligate of lives. There is every reason to expect that the preaching of Marx in this classic of communist thought will bear the same relationship to communist societies of the future that the Sermon on the Mount does to Christianity.

REFERENCES

¹The original title in *Die Neue Zeit*, 9th year, No. 18 (1890-1891, Part 1), pp. 561-75, was "Zur Kritik des Sozialdemokratischen Parteiprogramms." The version in the Marx-Engels *Werke*, XIX (Berlin, 1962), 13-32, returned to the original Marx manuscript and introduced a subtitle: "Randglossen zum Programm der deutschen Arbeiterpartei." My references are to the *Werke*, and translations are mine or my revisions of traditional ones.

²*Werke*, XIX, 28.

³Friedrich Engels, *Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft*, in *Werke*, XIX, 191. This work, commonly known as the *Anti-Dühring*, first appeared in *La Revue socialiste*, Nos. 3-5, and as a separate brochure: *Socialisme utopique et socialisme scientifique* (1880). The first German edi-

tion was published in Hottingen-Zürich with the title *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (1882).

⁴Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, trans. T. E. Hulme (New York, 1941), p. 150.

⁵*Werke*, XIX, 28.

⁶*Werke*, XIX, 21.

⁷The text of the *Manifesto of the Equals* is thought to have been prepared for the secret directorate of the Conspiracy by the littérateur Pierre-Sylvain Maréchal. The quotation is from Philippe Buonarroti, *Conspiration pour l'égalité, dite de Babeuf, suivie du procès auquel elle donna lieu et des pièces justificatives*. . . (Paris, 1957), II, 94-95 (ed. p. 1828).

⁸*Werke*, IV (1959), 489.

⁹*Die moralisierende Kritik und die kritisierende Moral. Beitrag zur Deutschen Kulturgeschichte. Gegen Karl Heinzen von Karl Marx*, in *Gesamtausgabe*, I, Part 6 (Berlin, 1932), 321.

¹⁰Engels, *Materialen zum "Anti-Dühring"* (*Aus Engels' Vorarbeiten zum "Anti-Dühring"*), in *Werke*, XX (1962), 580, 581.

¹¹*Werke*, XX, 587.

¹²*Zur Geschichte des Bundes der Kommunisten*, in *Werke*, VIII (1960), 578.

¹³Engels tended to be more consistently appreciative of their originality than Marx. In 1845, he even thought of having Fourier translated into German after the excision of his cosmological nonsense. Engels planned a library of socialist thought that would also include excerpts from Morely, Robert Owen, and the Saint-Simonians. See Engels to Marx, March 17, 1845, in *Werke*, XXVII (1963), 24.

¹⁴See, for example, *Le Globe*, November 5, 1831, and a brochure by Enfantin, *A Tous. Religion Saint-Simonienne* (Paris, 1832), p. 2.

¹⁵*Die Deutsche Ideologie*, in *Werke*, III (1958), 473-518. The five parts of the *Deutsche Ideologie* are considered by the editors of the *Werke* as the joint work of Marx and Engels. My references to Marx are shorthand for the collaboration. In 1847 Engels himself recast the section on the "true socialists." The full text of the *Deutsche Ideologie* was not published until 1932.

¹⁶For a full discussion of the attitudes of Marx and Engels toward Saint-Simon, see Frank E. Manuel, *The New World of Henri Saint-Simon* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 371, n. 1. Lenin's judgment was made in *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, in *Collected Works* (New York, 1927-1942), XIX, 196.

¹⁷*Die Deutsche Ideologie*, in *Werke*, III, 74.

¹⁸*Le Nouveau monde amoureux* (Paris, 1967) includes reflections on sexual behavior, insights into human needs for which Marx and Engels showed no concern in their voluminous books and manuscripts. A present-day generation that reads its own psycho-social needs into the Marxist aphorisms mistakenly identifies its forebear. Fourier wrote of his own predilections (p. 392): "Many men, for want of self-knowledge, condemn and ridicule a mania that is their own. I have observed that, until the age of 30, I remained in ignorance of my taste for Sapphic women."

¹⁹Marx to Engels, Algiers, Hotel Pension Victoria, March 1, 1882, in *Werke*, XXXV (1967), 46: "By the by, you know that few people more averse to demonstrative Pathos; still it would be a lie [not] to confess that my thought to great part absorbed by reminiscence of my wife, such a part of my best part of Life! Tell my London daughters to write to Old Nick instead of expecting him to write himself first." (The quoted portion of the letter was written in English.) On the paternity of "Freddy" Demuth, son of Helene Demuth, who was the maid of the Marxes throughout their married life and then kept house for Engels until his death in 1895, see the letter of Louise Kautsky-Freyberger to August Bebel, London, 2/4 September, 1898, in Hans Magnus Enzensberger, *Gespräche mit Marx und Engels* (Frankfort, 1973), pp. 703-05.

²⁰*Die Deutsche Ideologie*, in *Werke*, III, 517.

²¹*Die Deutsche Ideologie*, in *Werke*, III, 29.

²²*Der Ursprung der Familie des Privateigentums und des Staats. Im Anschluss an Lewis H. Morgan's Forschungen*, in *Werke*, XXI (1962), 78. The work was first published in Hottingen-Zürich in 1884. Marx had discovered Morgan's *Ancient Society* in 1877 and had made extensive excerpts from it, seeing in Morgan's book an independent anthropological justification for the materialist conception of his-

tory; but the actual task of highlighting the communistic implications of ancient society was left to Engels. See his letter to Kautsky from London, February 16, 1884, in *Werke*, XXXVI (1967), 109-10.

²³Engels to Kautsky, London, April 26, 1884, in *Werke*, XXXVI, 143.

²⁴*Der Ursprung der Familie*, in *Werke*, XXI, 83, 82.

²⁵*Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (Rohentwurf, 1857-1858), Anhang, 1850-1859 (Frankfort, s.d.), p. 599; also, p. 505: "This does not mean that work is a mere joke, a mere amusement, as Fourier in his naïve, grisette-like manner conceives it."

²⁶*Das Kapital*, III, in *Werke*, XXV (1964), 828.

²⁷United Nations General Assembly. Seventh Special Session, *Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty-Seventh Meeting, September 1, 1975* (Provisional A/PV. 2327), p. 62.

²⁸*Die Deutsche Ideologie*, in *Werke*, III, 33.

²⁹Louis Blanc, *Organisation du travail* (9th ed., Paris, 1850), pp. 72-74. Blanc says that he is quoting verbatim his own remarks in the *Histoire de dix ans*.

³⁰Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *Idée générale de la Révolution au XIX^e siècle* (1851), in *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris, 1923), II, 174.

³¹Friedrich Engels, Paul and Laura Lafargue, *Correspondance*, ed. Emile Bottigelli (Paris, 1956), I, 92, Lafargue to Engels, November 13, 1882.

³²In the *Manifesto*, Marx referred to the *Voyage en Icarie* as "a duodecimo edition of the New Jerusalem" (*Werke*, IV, 491).

³⁴*Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844*, in *Werke*, XL, Part 1 (1968), 510-62 *passim*, is a rich source for such apothegms.

³⁵Paul Lafargue, "Karl Marx, Persönliche Erinnerungen," *Die Neue Zeit*, 9th year, No. 1 (1890-1891, Part 1), p. 14.

HEINRICH VON STADEN

Nietzsche and Marx on Greek Art and Literature: Case Studies in Reception

Der Mensch . . . wundert sich aber über sich selbst, das Vergessen nicht lernen zu können und immerfort am Vergangenen zu hängen: mag er noch so weit, noch so schnell laufen, die Kette läuft mit.

Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, II

FOR ALL THEIR TEMPERAMENTAL, philosophical, and rhetorical differences, there are striking similarities between Nietzsche and Marx. They share an emphasis on man as spontaneous creative activity, on the state as a cold monster, on the generation of consciousness, on fragmentation and reintegration. Both of them oppose two-world theories, stress the phenomenal, envision the future as largely an aesthetic event, and use a genetic approach to art and literature—although one might call Marx’s approach “materiogenetic” or “sociogenetic” whereas Nietzsche’s tends toward the pathogenetic or psychogenetic.

More important for the argument presented here than these striking parallels is the fact that they both attack the Romantics. While Marx tries to counter Romanticism by introducing a scientific, material theory of history based on the evolution of productive relations, Nietzsche tries to do so by introducing Dionysus, Zarathustra, and the will to power in opposition to the largely Apollonian aesthetic of most German Romantics, in short, by opposing the luminous, tranquil Apollonian image of the Greek artist with a febrile, agonized vision. While Marx’s imagery is that of “under”—i.e., the basis is *under* the superstructure, *A underlies B*—Nietzsche’s is essentially that of what lies “behind”; but both try to unveil harsh realities of antiquity ignored by the long tradition of German philhellenism symbolized above all by Winckelmann and Goethe. The Romantic sand castles built upon the aesthetic, human, and political idealization of antiquity, they thought, had to be conquered and abandoned; “the social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its poetry from the past but only from the future,” Marx said, and Nietzsche’s mordant criticism of those who disregarded the palpable presence of disorder, disease, and Dionysus in ancient Greece is well documented.

Few filters through which classical antiquity passed in the nineteenth century made such radical claims for conceptual revolution, and few authors tried with such conviction to slash through the mayan veil of tradition to new structures of meaning. But

how successful were their attempts to jettison and “disremember” the ballast of Romantic Hellenism? And could a scrutiny of the relation of new to old, of the displacer to the displaced, in their characterizations of Greek art and literature illuminate a perennial problem of criticism: continuity and discontinuity, tradition and originality, reception and revision? These are the main questions addressed in this paper.¹ I turn first to Marx.

I

The resonances and tensions in Marx’s view of Greek art²—i.e., *Kunst* in its comprehensive sense, including not only visual but also verbal and other fictions—become clear only if one keeps in mind the place assigned to art in general within Marx’s construction of socioeconomic “basis” and ideological “superstructure.” A classic statement about the relation of the “basis” to works of art occurs in *The German Ideology* of 1846. Arguing against the assertion of the Young Hegelian Max Stirner that the individual artistic will is autonomous and unique and that there is no economic or other determining law outside the ego, Marx and his collaborator Engels say:

If [Stirner] were to compare Raphael with Leonardo da Vinci and Titian, he would know how greatly Raphael’s work of art *depended* on the flourishing of Rome at that time, which occurred under Florentine influence, while the works of Leonardo *depended* on the state of things in Florence, and the works of Titian, at a later period, *depended* on the totally different development of Venice. Raphael as much as any other artist *was determined* by the technical advances in art made before him, by the organization of society and the division of labour in his locality, and, finally, by the division of labour in all countries with which his locality had intercourse. Whether an individual like Raphael succeeds in developing his talent *depends* wholly on demand, which in turn *depends* on the division of labour and the conditions of human culture resulting from it.³

While this is an unequivocal statement of the dependence of art on other factors and a denial of the unqualified autonomy of the creative imagination, it is important to note that the determinants of a work of art are not simply lumped together as “economic basis,” as some popularizations of Marx’s theory would have it. Instead, Marx and Engels grant that multiple factors determine works of art: 1) previous technical advances in art; 2) the organization of society; 3) the division of labor in the artist’s own locality; 4) the division of labor in other countries with which his locality has intercourse; 5) demand; 6) conditions of human education and culture (*Bildungsverhältnisse*); 7) artistic talent. Instead of a simple, mechanistic “cause-and-effect” explanation of the relation of the economic basis to works of art, a more dynamic, complex structure emerges; but, despite the multiplicity of factors mentioned, there is no question that this is an early formulation of Marx’s deterministic view of aesthetic production.

Thirteen years later, in 1859, another statement of Marx’s view was presented in his *Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*:

The changes in the economic foundation lead with greater or less speed to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to

distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, *artistic* or philosophic—in short, ideological—forms in which men become conscious of . . . conflict and fight it out.⁴

There are qualifications that rescue this passage, too, from being a simplistic statement of measurable cause and measurable effect: “greater or less speed” in the transformations of the superstructure caused by changes in the basis, and the implication of less “scientific precision” in the analysis of “ideological forms” like art and philosophy. Yet the central thrust of this explanation of the relation of *Kunst* to economic production remains deterministic. The autonomy of art, the deep revolt of the creative imagination against being determined or influenced, against being a mere pawn of external causes and laws, the artist’s wish for creative omnipotence—all of these are, in this view, delusory concepts and desires.

There is, however, as Peter Demetz⁵ and others have pointed out, evidence that Marx was acutely aware that such deterministic explanations of the relation of the aesthetic part of the superstructure to the economic foundation, even in their more dynamic and flexible formulations, do not provide clear answers to vexing questions faced by the critic. These problems include, in particular: (a) the reasons for the varying degrees of “symmetry” between works of fiction and their determinants (to which the “greater and less speed” of transformation alludes); and (b) the reasons for the suprahistorical value of some works of fiction, i.e., for their endurance in critical reception beyond the temporal boundaries of their own socioeconomic determinants. (Is not aesthetic receptivity, for example, conditioned largely by the same kinds of determinants as aesthetic productivity?)

It was not only Marx’s intense responsiveness to literature⁶ that rendered him sensitive to these critical questions and to the problems they could pose for a deterministic theory of art, but, as it seems, in particular a conviction dating back at least to his adolescence that Greek *Kunst* represents an aesthetic achievement that had not been accomplished again.

In a famous, controversial introduction he drafted—but never published—in 1857, apparently for his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* of 1859 (but now generally included in the *Grundrisse*), Marx recorded these observations:

The unequal development of material production and, e.g., that of art: the concept of progress is on the whole not to be understood in the usual abstract form. Modern art, etc. This disproportion is not as important and difficult to grasp as within concrete social relations, e.g., in education. . . .

As regards art, it is well known that *some of its peaks by no means correspond to the general development of society; nor do they therefore to the material substructure*, the skeleton as it were of its organisation. *For example the Greeks* compared with modern [nations] It is even acknowledged that certain branches of art, e.g., the epic, can no longer be produced in their epoch-making classic form after artistic production as such has begun; in other words that certain important artistic formations are only possible at an early stage in the development of art itself. . . .⁷

Although the dependence of art on material conditions is reasserted, the relation of *Kunst* to the basis is not described in symmetrical “cause-and-effect” terms. Instead of the refrain “depend . . . depend . . . depend . . .,” which we encountered in the discussion of Raphael, Marx talks candidly about “the unequal development of material production and . . . of art,” about “this disproportion,” and about the more or less autonomous laws of generic development within the sphere of art.

The varying degrees of transformational speed only alluded to in the *Critique* are therefore elaborated upon in the *Grundrisse* and, significantly, substantiated by reference to Greek art. It becomes clear in a subsequent passage that Marx’s conclusion that a temporal and qualitative gap can open up between superstructural and substructural progress was forced on him above all by his view of Greek art as normative: between the aesthetic perfection of Greek art and the relatively primitive stage of productive relations in ancient Greece, with its slave-based economy and its very inchoate accumulation of capital, there is an “unequal relation,” a “disproportion.” The concession that Greece, the Romantic citadel of harmonious symmetry and perfect proportions, is the prime paradigm of an asymmetrical relation between the development of material production and that of art is made without noticeable reluctance.

More disquieting to Marx is a different problem urged upon him by his view of Greek art: “The difficulty we are confronted with is not . . . that of understanding how Greek art and epic poetry are associated with certain forms of social development. The difficulty is that they still give us artistic pleasure and are in certain respects regarded [by us] as a *norm* and *unattainable model*” (*ibid.*).

It is striking that, in this context, he does not explore those socioeconomic conditions that gave rise to the art he regards as normative. Elsewhere he does comment at length on substructural factors in ancient Greece, but what interests Marx here is, instead, a perennial concern of critical theory: the transhistorical aesthetic value of artistic products which are themselves marked by a specifically bounded historicity. Whence the timeless value of a painting or a poem which is temporally determined? For the moment, it is important to recognize that Marx is confronted with this question (to which I return below) and with the disproportionate relation between basis and superstructure primarily because of the *normative* value he attaches to Greek *Kunst*.

Marx treats this normative quality as firm, secure knowledge. In this uncritical assumption we have a remarkable, but by no means unique, moment in the reception and perception of classical antiquity. The view of Greek antiquity as aesthetically normative—and not merely superb or magnificent—is, of course, one that was espoused in both Neoclassical and Romantic Hellenism, i.e., by the very “enemy” whom Marx wanted to “dismember and disremember” (*pace* Geoffrey Hartman).

From Winckelmann’s claim (1755) that the Greeks should be imitated because “good taste . . . first formed itself under the Greek sky,” because one “finds in the masterpieces of the Greeks not only the most beautiful nature but something more than nature, certain ideal forms of the beauty of nature,” which are marked by a “noble simplicity and quiet grandeur,”⁸ an almost unbroken thread runs to Marx’s aesthetic conceptualization of antiquity. Even the insistently skeptical Lessing says in his *Lao-*

koon (1766), which Marx had excerpted as a young student: "What the Greek artists did will teach me what artists always should do."⁹ In an earlier outline of *Laokoon*, Lessing asserts: "The Egyptians left off at the first improvements on Daedalus; the Greeks further elevated these improvements to the level of perfection."¹⁰

Many notable German Romantics joined in this aesthetic idealization of Greek antiquity (although there were significant individual nuances). Thus Marx's own teacher, August Wilhelm Schlegel, says in his *Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature* (1809): "The art and poetry of the Greeks was the expression of the perfect health of their existence. . . . In the fine arts the superiority of the Greeks is most uncontroversially recognized. . . . What the ancients had in poetry we yearn for . . ."¹¹ In an influential dialogue on aesthetics by Schiller's pupil Solger (*Erwin*, 1815), a work which Marx also read with care, we likewise are advised that "the harmony of essence and of real existence is as perfect in heroic Greece as in the world of the gods"; a pressing need of modern man who has "fallen" into disharmonious particularity is therefore to return to archaic Greek art.¹² Even Herder, with his relativistic criticism of the notion that there is an innate, invariant faculty of taste or a uniform, permanent standard of beauty, ends up affirming this normative Greek superiority: "The Greek language is the most cultivated in the world, Greek mythology the richest and most beautiful on earth, and, finally, Greek poetry perhaps the most perfect of its kind. . . ."¹³ The relativists who swam in the tidewater of Romanticism could not resist the strong undercurrents of normative Hellenism.

Marx's assumption of the aesthetic normativeness of Greek antiquity is, therefore, yet another link in a traditionalistic Grecophile chain that stretches back at least a century. It is the radical revisionist's "forgetful" assumption or "unperceiving receiving" of this traditional Romantic idealization of Greek art that dislodges him from his early, more rigidly deterministic characterization of the relation of art to the basis, and forces on him not only his more felicitous notion of the "unequal relation" between basis and aesthetic superstructure, but also what he calls "the difficulty" regarding the trans-historical aesthetic value of fictions which are determined by the "real" historical relations of a particular epoch.

The solution Marx suggests for this authentic "difficulty" is extraordinary. Again, he does not resort to a close analysis of those socioeconomic relations that condition aesthetic productivity and aesthetic receptivity in the ancient and modern epochs (although he reintroduces them briefly), but, with a Viconian twist, to the image of Greece as the childhood of humanity:

An adult cannot become a child again, or he becomes childish. But does the naïveté of the child not give him pleasure, and does not he himself endeavour to reproduce the child's veracity on a higher level? Does not the child in every epoch represent the character of the period in its natural veracity? Why should not the historical childhood of humanity, where it attained its most beautiful form, exert an eternal charm because it is a stage that will never recur? There are rude children and precocious children. Many of the ancient peoples belong to this category. The Greeks were normal children. The charm their art has for us does not conflict with the immature stage of the society in which it originated. On the contrary, its charm is a consequence of

this and is inseparably linked with the fact that the immature social conditions which gave rise, and which alone could give rise, to this art cannot recur.¹⁴

The fragile image of Greece as the eternally charming childhood of mankind bears the burden *a)* of explaining why this normative art has not recurred since the Greeks, and *b)* of accounting for the aesthetic pleasure we, the weary, aged epoch of humanity (as Rousseau and some German Romantics said), can still derive from those Greek “children” of antiquity. Some critics, sensing the strain on the image and the cries from silence (Why didn’t all “immature social conditions” give rise to normative art? Why only Greece?, etc.), have been inclined to brush aside this statement as a freakish deviation on the part of Marx. This would be wrong. Not only was it written at the time of a mature articulation of his theories, a good thirteen years after the *1844 Manuscripts*, but the image of antiquity as the childhood of mankind also recurs in other parts of the *Grundrisse*.¹⁵

In Marx’s use of this biological metaphor of childhood and adulthood, we have another remarkable moment in the reception of classical antiquity. Perhaps the most radical philosopher of the nineteenth century is here resorting to one of the more enduring Neoclassical and Romantic explanations of the “self-evident” superiority of Greek culture. The popular metaphorical inversion, which does not make the Greeks our pristine arch-fathers and us their degenerate offspring, but us the exhausted iron-age seniles and them emblematic youths of a Golden Age, perdured especially in that branch of German Hellenism which, like Schiller’s later vision of Greece and Herder’s theory of non-recurrence, emphasized the impossibility of a return to the idealized past. But the popularization of the image once more seems to go back to Winckelmann and Lessing, whose works Marx had read attentively.¹⁶ It also occurs frequently in Hegel, about whose philosophy the young Marx confessed to his father that he had become seriously ill in part “from consuming vexation at having to make an idol of a view I detest.” Thus, in Hegel’s *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, we find the *topos* put to striking use: “Greek life is a true act of youth. Achilles, the poetic youth, initiated it, and Alexander the Great, the real youth, brought it to an end.”¹⁷ In one of the more influential Romantic essays on the characteristics of ancient and modern poetry, Schiller’s *On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry* (1795), Greek poetry is also said to be the poetry of “an ingenious world of youth,” and antiquity, as in Marx’s depiction, an age of beautiful naïveté,¹⁸ of a natural, innocent veracity.¹⁸ With the very Schiller whose “philistine enthusiasm for unrealizable ideals” Engels censured,¹⁹ Marx therefore shared the view of Greek antiquity as an age of childhood, of beautiful naïveté, of innocence, of the natural, of veracity. The hateful idols have a great capacity for survival.

Not only normativeness and naïve childhood, but also Marx’s contrasting characterization of Greek and Christian art and his “neo-Greek” vision of the future provide illustrations of how conceptions and images prevalent in Romantic Hellenism resist and survive Marx’s polemical critique with enormous recalcitrance, and, as a result, loosen up the radical’s matrix to encompass dimensions of aesthetics he does not consider elsewhere. Thus Christian art is characterized by Marx, as by some (but not all) Romantics, as colossal and hypertrophic, as choking in Gothic excess and ostentatious

pomp, whereas Greek art is said to reveal a profound sense of measure, proportion, and moderation.²⁰ These aesthetic juxtapositions are also given religious, political, and humanistic overtones not uncharacteristic of Romanticism: Marx contrasts pagan Greek democracy with Christian Prussian monarchy, freely creative Greek man with dehumanized, oppressed modern man, ancient *Vollmensch* with modern *Stückmensch*, Prometheus with Christ.

Finally, it could be shown that Marx's sketchy utopian vision of the disalienated person as he or she will emerge in mature communism is, in the final analysis, a vision of a reintegrated *homo aestheticus* who, though existing with a different consciousness in new social relations, bears a remarkable resemblance to Marx's description of that early Greek man-child who is not subject to the anxious, disalienating particularity of the modern experience.²¹ Communist man, in his full efflorescence, as neo-Greek man; the *homo aestheticus* of the future as one who will have reassimilated *homo faber* to *homo ludens*: this, too, would be in essential agreement with an important aspect of the Romantic vision of reintegrated man. Marx's vision of the future seems to be inspired by his view of a pristine past, and the same relation between *visions* and *views* is prevalent in much of Romanticism. It must be stressed, however, that Marx, like many Romantics (Herder, the later Schiller, etc.), is far from espousing a theory of recurrence: the Garden is not the City, Eden is not the New Jerusalem, Arcadia is not Utopia.

Marx's radical and illuminating shift to a new socioeconomic determinism, his sharp revolt against Romantic predecessors, should therefore not obscure the tenacity and durability of more traditional Romantic conceptualizations of Greek art. Despite his resistance, Marx could not divest his own view of Greek art of colorations imparted to it by Romantic prisms through which it had passed and been refracted—and these are the “bent rays” from whose light much modern scholarship on antiquity has also not been able fully to escape. Even when left behind for cold and dead, “resisted” traditions continue to score sporadic victories over their subjugators through unperceived metaphorical, metonymic, and conceptual tyranny.

II

With Nietzsche, whose view of antiquity was dominated by the conviction that the world can only be justified as an aesthetic phenomenon, one enters into an even more subtle, paradoxical relation to the Romantic view of Greek art. As early as his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), Nietzsche attacks Schiller's notion of the beautiful naïveté of Greek art and the Hegelian-Romantic notion of a beautiful Greek “harmony with nature.” “Such a belief,” Nietzsche says mockingly, “could have been endorsed only by a period for which Rousseau's *Émile* was an artist and Homer just such an artist nurtured in the bosom of nature.”²² This anti-Romantic judgment was not an early aberration; it persisted to the end. In one of his last works, *Twilight of the Idols* (1888), Nietzsche likewise disparages Schiller as the “moral trumpeter of Säckingen,” attacks “the wretched embellishment of the Greeks into an ideal,” and, in clear allusion to the Grecophile tradition informed by Winckelmann, says: “To smell

out 'beautiful souls,' 'golden means,' and other perfections in the Greeks, or to admire their calm in greatness, their noble simplicity—the psychologist in me protected me against such 'noble simplicity,' a *niaiserie allemande* anyway. Instead, I saw their strongest instinct, the will to power."²³ In the same work, Nietzsche also points out that the concept of "Greek" developed by Winckelmann and Goethe is incompatible with the orgiastic element out of which Dionysian art grows, and then adds, in a sentence he himself underscored: "*Consequently Goethe did not understand the Greeks*"²⁴—a devastating verdict on a sanctified symbol of the Grecophile tradition.

Romanticism, Nietzsche says in that posthumously arranged selection of his notes from 1883 to 1888 now generally known as *The Will to Power*, is "a kind of piled-high desire for . . . enthusiasm, . . . a good deal of histrionics and self-deception . . ."²⁵ And in *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche tries to explain his "misguided" early embrace of Wagner and Schopenhauer by contrasting his own tragic, Dionysian, *Greek* pessimism which, he says, grows out of superabundance, with their *Romantic* form of pessimism, which grows out of impoverishment.²⁶ Again, in a letter to his lifelong friend Franz Overbeck, he complains in clear opposition to the Romantic idealization of Greece: "These Greeks have a lot on their conscience—falsification was their true trade; the whole of European psychology is sick with Greek *superficiality*. . . ."²⁷

It is clear, then, that Nietzsche firmly opposed that Romantic idealization of Greek antiquity of which we saw such strong residues in Karl Marx's view of Greek art and literature. Whereas the Neoclassics and Romantics had stressed the perfect beauty and health of antiquity—Winckelmann even suggested that the absence of venereal disease and of *die englische Krankheit* (rickets) was among the preconditions of that beautiful, normative Greek art²⁸—Nietzsche points to the agonies of Greece, to the suffering, to all the darkness, physical disease, emotional disturbance, ugliness, and horror that animated Greek life.

While many early Nietzsche critics accepted his self-characterization as the overcomer of Romanticism, a number of critics, especially more recently, have rejected this characterization and have suggested instead that Nietzsche's views on the superman, on death, on the loss of myth, on the restoration of oneness, and so on, are in fact arch-Romantic, and that his admiration for Hölderlin and a few other Romantics is a further manifestation of a fundamental affinity.²⁹

A useful way of adumbrating a resolution of this conflict between Nietzsche's self-perception and his critics' perception of him might be to examine Nietzsche's relation to the Romantics exactly at that juncture in his thought where he himself sometimes claims to be most radical and most anti-Romantic, viz, in his view of Greek *Kunst*.

Here one is at once faced with a frustrating problem: Nietzsche is a very antithetical thinker and the pervasiveness of his "on-the-one-hand . . . on-the-other" constructions would have made even Gorgias blush. In the last analysis, these constructions are intelligible as an expression of Nietzsche's profound agonistic sense—of his view of almost all process and all activity as *agon*, as contest and contestation. But a practical difficulty resulting from this is that for almost every apparently reasonable claim a critic could make about Nietzsche's views on Greek antiquity, a documented counterclaim could be produced. The battle about Nietzsche's Socrates, in which one side points to

Nietzsche's portrayal of Socrates as a perverse, decadent, despotic logician while the other can legitimately point to Nietzsche's unequivocal, admiring identification with Socrates, is one of many examples of the acute difficulties faced by the Nietzsche critic.

Given this penetrating presence of antagonistic antitheses, of ambivalence, of perspectival shift, of reversals of allegiance, I can only hope that the reader will sense the undercurrent of discomfiture—or what Nietzsche might have called “the undertone of terror”—that runs in strong torrents beneath the argumentative flow of the following part of this analysis. To have proceeded differently would have meant to choke on a flood of qualifiers. None of the brilliant modern works on Nietzsche has yet given us entirely satisfactory modes of apprehending what Joyce might have called the curve of the philosopher's emotion. And nowhere is this curve both more striking and more elusive than in Nietzsche's painful, polemical detachment from some aspects of Greece and in his agonizing involvement in others.

When one turns to the four ingredients of Karl Marx's Romantic conceptualization of Greece which I singled out for brief mention—1) normativeness; 2) naïveté and childhood; 3) the opposition of Greek and Christian; 4) the aesthetic vision of the future as neo-Greek—and examines Nietzsche's use and assessment of these same notions and views, an astounding pattern emerges. (It is admittedly somewhat arbitrary to isolate these four ingredients from Nietzsche's rich, multifaceted understanding and misunderstanding of antiquity, but it makes for an intriguing juxtaposition with Marx and provides what other probes have suggested are representative results.)

1) *Normativeness*. While Marx saw Homer's epic and the statues of Greek gods as the expression of a serene, normative beauty, as a superstructural reflection of immature social relations, Nietzsche sees these gods as a *Zauberberg*, a Magic Mountain which is simply a projection of Greek anxieties and a consolation for Greek fears, a contrivance for coping with and accepting the terrors and suffering of life. Nietzsche, in other words, takes a pathogenetic, instrumentalist view of art and hence often questions the validity of beauty as an aesthetic criterion (although he finds it difficult to complete his escape from the concept of beauty, as we shall see). Yet there can be no doubt that Nietzsche, too, in the final analysis, regarded Greek art, especially Greek tragedy, as normative.

“What suffering,” an old Athenian says at the end of *The Birth of Tragedy*, “must this race have endured in order to achieve such *beauty*.” Elsewhere in the same work Nietzsche characterizes the “deep Hellene” as “*uniquely* sensitive to the most profound and exquisite suffering”³⁰ and hence, he implies, the creator of uniquely beautiful art. In *The Gay Science*, Book V (1887), to take a later work for corroboration, Nietzsche says with reference to the truly creative person's ability to forget his tastes and judgments: “This seems to me to be almost a *norm* among fertile artists . . . and it is true . . . of the whole world of Greek art and poetry. . . .”³¹ In Book IV of the same work (1882), after a long description of perfect happiness—which is essentially seen as an aesthetic phenomenon accompanied by profound suffering—he adds: “Who would not wish that all this might be *his* possession, his state! This *was* the *happiness of Homer*.” The Greeks, whom he regarded as the exemplary chariot drivers of every subsequent

culture, are a model, and all subsequent art “lost colour and life when held against the Greek *model* and shrank to a botched copy, a caricature.”³²

Nietzsche’s perception of the pathogenesis of Greek art is new, as is his view of the duality of generative forces, viz., Apollonian “dream illusion” with its individuating “imagining” and Dionysian *Rausch* or intoxication with its dissolution back into primordial unity. (Not that the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction itself is novel, as is often assumed; it goes back to Schelling, to Nietzsche’s teacher Friedrich Ritschl, to Jakob Bernays, Bachofen, Richard Wagner, Friedrich Creuzer, and others.³³) But the final result of these new emphases and perspectives is again, as in Neoclassical and Romantic Hellenism—and as in Marx—Greek art and literature as a norm and a paradigm.

2) *Naïveté and childhood*. The Romantic metaphor of Greece as the childhood of mankind recurs in the “anti-Romantic” Nietzsche: The Greeks are “splendid and lion-hearted children” (*The Genealogy of Morals* XXIII) who “were interpreting their childhood dream into pragmatic childhood history” (*The Birth of Tragedy* X). The association of Greek paganism, now however specifically limited to pre-Platonic or pre-Socratic paganism, with the innocence and veracity of childhood likewise recurs.³⁴

Even more striking than his use of these Romantic notions is, however, Nietzsche’s use of “naïve” with reference to the Greeks. One would do well to remember (*a*) that three *topoi* of the German Grecophiles which Nietzsche particularly enjoys mocking are “noble simplicity,” “serene grandeur” (both popularized by Winckelmann), and “naïveté” (popularized by Schiller), and (*b*) that Homeric epic and archaic sculpture usually provided the German philhellenes with their primary examples of this “naïveté.” Marx, as became clear earlier, also singles out epic and sculpture as *exempla* in his discussion of Greek childhood and naïveté. The savage sarcasm Nietzsche directs against this use of naïveté cannot conceal the fact, however, that he, too, failed to break through to any other way of describing Homeric epic. Suffering now admittedly is a novel element in the genesis of epic, and Homeric epic gets devalued to the extent that tragedy, an expression of the dialectical, agonistic fusion of Apollonian and Dionysian, is now considered the highest form of art. But Homer retains paradigmatic value: on the pedestal of naïveté. Thus Nietzsche extols that “marvellous naïveté of the older Greeks—flower of an Apollonian culture blossoming over a somber abyss, in token of the victory of the Greek will over suffering,” and it is in particular “the naïveté of Homer [that] must be viewed as the complete victory of Apollonian illusion. As a superb monument to its victory over suffering stands Homer, *the naïve artist*.”³⁵

The Romantic conception of naïveté is given a modified application, but its central characteristics remain intact: Its associations remain primarily “Apollonian” and archaic, as they were in Romantic usage. The anti-Romantic is, in short, again a captive of Romantic concepts and conceptions.

3) *Greek and Christian*. The third Romantic ingredient in Marx’s treatment of Greek art and literature—the aesthetic opposition of Greek and Christian—was a recurring object of Nietzsche’s critical passion:

How one reacts to the New Testament is a test of whether one has any classical *taste* in one's bones . . . ; whoever is not revolted by the New Testament, whoever does not honestly and profoundly sense something of *foeda superstitio* in it, something from which one withdraws one's hand as if to avoid being soiled, does not know what is classical.³⁶

Another powerful formulation again draws the antithesis in aesthetic terms: A "mortal enemy" of Christianity is "Greek refinement in gesture, word, and form."³⁷ Christianity and alcohol are the two great means of corruption according to Nietzsche's *The Anti-Christ* (LX), but it is specifically Christianity that "has cheated us out of the harvest of ancient culture."³⁸ Resentment over lost treasure, directed against Christianity—this, too, is a recurrent motif in both Marx and the Romantics.

Furthermore, *Zeitkritik* is as endemic to Nietzsche's antithesis of Christian and Greek as it was to this antithesis in Romanticism and in Marx's writings: "One need only read any Christian agitator, St. Augustine, for example, to comprehend, to *smell*, what an unclean lot has come to the top," and "the nobility of instinct, the taste . . . the *will* to man's future, the great YES to all things . . ." that characterized the Greeks and Romans was "not buried overnight by a natural catastrophe, not trampled down by Teutons and other buffaloes, but ruined by cunning, stealthy, invisible, anemic vampires," i.e., by the Christians (*The Anti-Christ* XLIX). As in Marx, the myth of the Fall from Eden has been metamorphosed into the history of the Fall from Greece.

Finally, Nietzsche, like Marx, associates the disappearance of Greece and the emergence of Christianity with hypertrophy: with hypertrophic reason and with the superfetation of logic beginning with Socrates and Plato. Plato, that "instinctive anti-Hellene,"³⁹ was really a crypto-Christian and gave decadence much of its virility; and Plato, too, is a representative of that excessive faith in rationality which led to the scientific spirit—which in turn is the motor of the decline of the West according to Nietzsche.

4) *The aesthetic vision of the future as neo-Greek.* Nietzsche's early, hopeful vision of a rebirth of the Greek tragic spirit in Wagnerian music is perhaps the most famous example of this *topos* in his works, but it is also a highly problematic example since Nietzsche later disavowed this vision in a strong palinode. More representative is a passage written in 1885 and later published as part of *The Will to Power* (II.419):

One is no longer at home anywhere; at last one longs for that place in which alone one can be at home, because it is the only place in which one would want to be at home: the *Greek* world! . . . A few centuries hence, perhaps, one will judge that all German philosophy derives its real dignity from being a gradual reclamation of the soil of antiquity, and that all claims to "originality" must sound petty and ludicrous in relation to the higher claim of the Germans to have joined anew the bond that seemed to be broken, the bond with the Greeks, the hitherto highest type of man. Today we are again getting close to all those fundamental forms of world interpretation devised by the Greek spirit . . . —we are growing more Greek by the day; at first, as is only fair, in concepts and evaluations as Hellenizing ghosts, as it were: but one day, let us hope, also in our bodies! Herein lies (as has always lain) my hope for the German character!

This hope can, of course, only be described as arch-Romantic, also in its inclusion of the myth of bodily reintegration, and the same is true of another passage which merits quotation. (Nietzsche apparently regarded it as so central to his own epistemological posture and to his view of the future that he first included it in his preface to the second edition of *The Gay Science* [1887] and then again in his epilogue to *Nietzsche contra Wagner* [which he completed on Christmas Day, 1888, less than two weeks before he broke down, insane for the rest of his life].)

Oh, those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required for that is to stop courageously at the surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance, to believe in forms, tones, words, in the whole Olympus of appearance. Those Greeks were superficial—*out of profundity*. And is not this precisely what we are again coming back to, we daredevils of the spirit who have climbed the highest and most dangerous peak of present thought and looked around from up there—we who have looked *down* from there? Are we not, precisely in this respect, Greeks? Adorers of forms, of tones, of words? And therefore—*artists*?

This clarion call to a neo-Greek future is sounded often in Nietzsche's works, and not infrequently his vision of the future is expressed through metaphors used by Romantics to characterize the Greek past. In the first chapter of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, for example, it is neither the ascetic camel nor the freedom-creating lion, the blond beast, that Nietzsche embraces. Instead it is a higher, future stage in the development of the human spirit. This third state is again innocent *childhood*, and it is a childhood which, like that represented by the Greeks and Romans in a passage quoted above, will once more constitute the great YES to all things: "The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred 'Yes.' For the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred 'Yes' is needed. . . ."

Nietzsche's view of the relation of past to future is, of course, much more complex than these few passages might suggest, and one should not neglect the fact that his doctrine of eternal recurrence runs counter to the emphatic assertion of non-recurrence by Marx and many Romantics. Nor should one ignore the anti-historical thrust of many of Nietzsche's writings, such as the second essay of his *Thoughts out of Season* (an essay best known as *The Use and Abuse of History*) or his *Philosophenbuch*. But in both cases—Marx and Nietzsche—their *vision* of the future seems strongly influenced by their *view* of the Greek past, and therein lies another striking similarity to a major current within German Romanticism.

For all of Nietzsche's anti-Romantic emphasis he, too, like Marx, remains "blinded" (in the terminology of Paul de Man⁴⁰) to the discrepancy between (a) his polemics against Romanticism and (b) his own enslavement to Romantic conceptions and metaphors. Nietzsche's "ruthless forgetting," which De Man sees as a manifestation of the authentic spirit of modernity, also has its unaware, deluded, blind moments. Whether "forgotten" or "conquered," the rhetoric and constructs of the Romantic *past* remain determinants of the conceptual architectonics and of the very language of Nietzsche's *present*. The *master* of new metaphor becomes a *slave* of past metaphor; the language-conscious philosopher is himself *unconsciously* seduced by the language

he tries to de-mystify; the acute analyzer of *rhetoric* succumbs to the rhetoric he rejects; the master *amnesiac* “forgets” that he is also the captive of the powerful agitations of a restless, uncontrollable *memory*.

III

I called these two probes case studies, suggesting that they perhaps provide some exemplary insights into problems concerning “reception.” It is to some of these problems that a few concluding observations are addressed.

Strong vestigial pressures are exercised by Romantic texts on the texts of the polemical anti-Romantics, as we saw; the new revolutionaries try to demolish and disperse dominant Romantic perceptions, but these perceptions, even when discarded as obsolescent, still create complex reverberations upon other texts—and not least on the very texts that declare their invalidity. Central aspects of the critical operation of old and new sensibilities upon one another, of influence and originality, of tradition and revision, therefore surface in Nietzsche’s and Marx’s views of Greek art with what seem to be representative resonances.

I refrained above from characterizing these relations simply in terms of “influence,” since “influence” in ordinary usage still bears the semantic onus of a relatively one-sided emanational model which fails to accommodate the complex agonal dialectics inherent in intertextual relations such as those examined above. The emanational paradigm of influence, based on the idea of *stellarum influxus*, of an ethereal or astral fluid flowing (*fluere*) from the stars into (*in-*) our sublunary world and decisively affecting the actions and destinies of men, is too unilateral to describe the intricacies of reception. Too often “influence” implies an effortless, unconscious, uni-directional flow from text *x* to text *y* or simply the unintentional exertion of power by *x* over *y*. The *receptacle* of such influx or influence is therefore an essentially passive victim; the *recipient* of a *textus receptus*, by contrast, can light up any part or parts of an enormously broad responsive spectrum. Marx’s and Nietzsche’s multiple, inconsistent responses to their Romantic “influents” are characteristic of creative, agonized recipients, not of receptacles of unilateral “in-fluence.”

“Reception” is therefore perhaps less restrictive than “influence” and leaves room for multiple responses: for the rejection or acceptance of *received* texts; for conceding a central, marginal, or extraliminal locus to the *recepti*; for aggressively replacing, revising, and resisting the *given* or assimilating it through an equally inspiring embrace; for being animated either by a pessimistic or by an optimistic view of the received patriarchs; for being paralyzed by one aspect of traditional authority and being quickened by another; for either unconscious or calculating responses to the received. Most of the possible postures to precursor texts are therefore expressible as a series of disjunctive potentialities (many of them inclusive disjunctions) which have in common that they can be triggered into actuality by the act of *reception*; and in the cases of Marx and Nietzsche we saw several such representative recipient postures.

“Influence” has, however, recently been given a powerful new lease on its critical life by Harold Bloom’s brilliant, provocative redefinition of poetic influence.⁴¹ In

Bloom's psychogenetic theory "influence" is uprooted from its emanational home and redefined as misprision: all poetic influence, at least in the case of "strong" authors, is said to become intelligible as the son's misreading of the father in order to make room for his own imagination.

The two cases examined above do not refute this view of influence—nor do they refute the exciting possibility of extending this theory beyond poetry to cover other intertextual, intercultural, and even "inter-epochal" relations between "strong" individual or collective sensibilities—but they do suggest that there is more to influence or reception than just a constant replay of Laius and Oedipus at the crossroads. While allowing for the more dialectical, agonistic relation between old and new that I have stressed, the responsive spectrum Bloom's theory allows the receivers of given texts seems too narrow to be generalizable, as the complex, multiple responses of Marx and Nietzsche to received texts suggest. Bloom's theory could undoubtedly be verified for numerous texts, but whether it can be generalized on the basis of such verifications, even for "strong" authors, is another matter.

In Marx and Nietzsche, revision and tradition seem to triumph over each other in irregular alternation and in shifting, asymmetrical imbrication, in an *agon* which is not nourished only by misprisions. The new metaphors, the new words, the revaluations, are an essential condition of the incessant, often cryptic, *agon* of old and new, as are the victories of both old and new. Sometimes the son reads the received fathers accurately but rejectively, sometimes he indeed misreads them, sometimes the fathers continue being received also through their assertion of a concealed, disremembered authority. The possibilities of correct readings and of forgotten readings should therefore be juxtaposed to that of misreadings, and the responsive spectrum should be broad enough to accommodate the complex range of recipient postures mentioned above.

There is, furthermore, the possibility that the Oedipal son-and-father model of influence is another powerfully seductive metaphor, a "new" image that has been unveiling hitherto unperceived analogies and relations with epiphanic impact—but which in turn awaits its own *unveiling* as one of the great rhetorical seductions of our century, as one of those metaphors that have come to seem, in the words of Nietzsche, "firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people" (more on this *infra*).

To return to Romantic images and *topoi* used by Marx and Nietzsche: It has been pointed out more than once that even our most cherished scientific and theological systems are intrinsically metaphorical, although their central terms are often not recognized as images until new metonymies and new metaphors yield perspective into the nature of the old. This also means, however, that concepts and metaphors exist in time and are not devoid of *history*. Although there is great merit to the anti-historical emphasis on language and rhetoric at the frontiers of contemporary European and, perhaps to a lesser extent, American criticism⁴²—I sympathize with its attempts at demystification, and this essay, too, albeit in its own primitive fashion, represents an attempt to unveil "blindness" and rhetorical delusion—yet these two case studies also suggest that it is often exactly because of their *history* that there are no innocent images or concepts. In order to understand these secret motors of theories, these crypto-generators which at first appear only to give flesh or ornamental clothing to theories; in order to

unveil and “demystify” these “unseen” metaphors and concepts, it would therefore seem necessary at times to resort to the kind of “history” represented in these two case studies. That (a) the deconstruction of rhetorical mystifications and (b) historical analysis are not intrinsically inimical to each other, as some leading contemporary critics are suggesting, is therefore perhaps among the more important methodological implications of the preceding analysis. A diachronic scrutiny of textual relations, as in the preceding examination of the childhood metaphor and of the notions of normativeness, naïveté, beautiful paganism, and so on, does not necessarily entail a “flight” or “detour” from language, as some critics are arguing, especially if it does not rely on a simplistic genetic paradigm of history. Instead, a historical approach, rather than being an instance of mere “rhetorical mystification” or a mere “Romantic fallacy”—labels recently attached to some historical approaches—can itself be a tool of *demystification*, of *uncovering* unperceived relations, of *revealing* residual enemies lurking unnoticed in an author’s works, of demythologizing an author’s self-perception.

In this context, it is striking that Nietzsche himself was acutely aware not only of *rhetorical* delusion but also of its *historical* roots. As often, he has endured as his own best critic. In a famous passage in his essay *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense*, Nietzsche reveals his own epistemological posture in striking words which give expression not only to his radical skepticism but also to his strong *historical* sense:⁴³

What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations which *have been* enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which *after long use* seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has *forgotten* that this is what they are, metaphors which are *worn out* and *now* impotent to stir the senses. . . .⁴⁴

The same theme—the *historical* process whereby the fundamental errors of reason *become* petrified in language—surfaces frequently in Nietzsche’s works.⁴⁵ There is no being, no truth: only agonistic becoming, the mobile army of images, and the chain of errors and delusions by which we willy-nilly hang on to the past. “However far or fast he runs, that chain runs with him.” The skepticism manifested in this view of truth and language found its most succinct expression in Nietzsche’s famous aphorism about the suicidal nature of truth: “Truth kills—what’s more, it kills itself.”⁴⁶

In all likelihood, the same kinds of unperceived discrepancies and delusions that characterize the interplay between Marx and Nietzsche, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Romantic texts they criticize, have marked the interplay between myself and the texts of Marx and Nietzsche. The informed skepticism to which these two case studies seem to exhort one must therefore also be self-referential in order to be viable. For the critic of critics, the chances of myopia concerning those constructs and images which inform and inspire his own way of ordering his criticisms and perceptions remain high. Just as the “shape”⁴⁷ of Marx’s and Nietzsche’s time has become visible only retrospectively, so, too, the veiled “shape” of this critic’s time will probably become visible in retrospect. This is accepted—and embraced—as a necessary verdict on the method and results of this analysis.

REFERENCES

¹Earlier versions of parts of this paper were presented at Harvard University, the University of Chicago, and the Center for Hellenic Studies; I am indebted to Walter Kaiser and Glen Bowersock, Saul Bellow and David Grene, and Bernard M. W. Knox for the generous hospitality that made this possible.

²Some arguments in this section are presented in greater detail and with more extensive documentation in my article "Greek Art and Literature in Marx's Aesthetics," *Arethusa*, 8:1 (Spring, 1975), pp. 119-44.

³*The German Ideology*, selections ed. by C. J. Arthur (New York, 1970), p. 108 (italics added). Although Marx was clearly fascinated by aesthetic questions (the collections of his statements about art and literature fill hundreds of pages), it must be conceded that there is no extensive, coherent discussion of *Kunst* by Marx, and that an analysis of his views on aesthetics accordingly tends to remain a shoestring operation. Some admirable anthologies are: *Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: über Kunst und Literatur*, 2 vols., ed. Manfred Kliem (Berlin, 1967); *Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels über Kunst und Literatur*, ed. Michail Lifschitz (Berlin, 1949); *Marx and Engels on Literature and Art*, ed. Lee Baxandall and Stefan Morawski (St. Louis, Mo., 1973).

⁴*A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, transl. S. W. Ryazanskaya, ed. Maurice Dobb (New York, 1970), p. 21 (italics mine).

⁵*Marx, Engels, and the Poets*, translated by Jeffrey L. Sammons (Chicago, 1967), Chapter 3.

⁶For his poems and fragments of his plays and novels, see Marx/Engels, *Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA). I: 1. 2 (Berlin, 1929), pp. 4-89, and Marx/Engels, *Werke, Ergänzungsband*, 1 (Berlin, 1973), pp. 602-15. A fragment of his tragedy in verse, *Oulanem*, has been translated by Robert Payne, *The Unknown Marx* (New York, 1971), pp. 55-94. Cf. also Lifschitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 475-79, on his admiration for Homer, Aeschylus, Shakespeare, Dante, Cervantes, Walter Scott, Fielding, Balzac, etc.; and *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, ed. Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Gaddat (Garden City, N.Y., 1967), p. 41.

⁷Published as an Appendix to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, pp. 215-16, it is now generally treated as a part of the *Grundrisse* (italics added). Cf. *Grundrisse*, transl. Martin Nicolaus (1973), pp. 109-11. It is important to see this passage in the context of Marx's frequent warnings against oversimplifying the relation of basis to superstructure and the relation of social formations to economic formations. Cf. *Grundrisse*, pp. 100-08 for several pointed examples.

⁸*Johann Winckelmanns Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Joseph Eiselein, I (1825), pp. 7-8, 10. Wilhelm von Humboldt ("Eine *idealistische* Eigentümlichkeit des Altertums," *Werke*, VI:2, p. 148) and many other German Grecophiles also used the notion of the "ideal" to characterize Greek art and literature.

⁹*Gottbold Ephraim Lessings Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. Karl Lachmann, 3rd ed., Franz Muncker, IX (1893), p. 156 (= *Laokoon* I.xxvi). (Cf. also IV, p. 31, in Lessing's summary of Brumoi's work on comedy: "The Greeks and Romans, . . . our masters and models [*Meister und Muster*] in all offspring of taste. . . .")

¹⁰*Ibid.*, XIV, p. 422 (= *Entwürfe*, 22).

¹¹*Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Eduard Böcking, V (1846), pp. 45-47.

¹²Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger, *Erwin. Vier Gespräche über das Schöne und die Kunst*, ed. Wolfgang Henckmann (Munich, 1971), pp. 236, 326.

¹³*Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, II (Berlin/Weimar, 1965), pp. 103-04.

¹⁴*Grundrisse* (tr. Nicolaus), pp. 110 ff.

¹⁵E.g., *ibid.*, pp. 487-88.

¹⁶*Writings of the Young Marx*, p. 45: "Meanwhile I had acquired the habit of making excerpts from all the books I was reading, from Lessing's *Laokoon*, Solger's *Erwin*, Winckelmann's *History of Ancient Art*. . . ."

¹⁷Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke (Jubiläumsausgabe)*, XI, p. 296. Cf. also XI, p. 295; XII, pp. 320, 210-11; XIII, p. 409-10. But see also XIV, p. 273! Other typical examples are provided by Lessing, *op. cit.*, IX, pp. 118 f. (cf. IV, p. 3), and Herder, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 104-08, 110 ("dies Zeitalter jugendlicher Fröhlichkeit").

¹⁸*Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, 1795*, ed. Johannes Beer (Stuttgart, 1972), pp. 29, 27.

¹⁹Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie (1886) in Marx/Engels, Werke, 21 (1962), p. 281.

²⁰For details and sources see *Arethusa*, 8:1 (Spring, 1975), pp. 133-35.

²¹Further details, *ibid.*, pp. 135-37.

²²*The Birth of Tragedy* III (p. 31 in the translation by Francis Golffing [Garden City, N.Y., 1956]).

²³*The Portable Nietzsche*, transl. and ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1968), pp. 558-59. "Noble simplicity" (*edle Einfalt*) and "calm grandeur" (*stille Grösse*) were, of course, two of Winckelmann's most famous characterizations of Greek art.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 561.

²⁵*The Will to Power*, transl. by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York, 1968), I:95, p. 59.

²⁶*The Gay Science*, transl. by Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1974), V:370, pp. 327-31.

²⁷*Portable Nietzsche*, p. 455 (italics in original text).

²⁸Winckelmann. *Sämtliche Werke*, I, pp. 13-14.

²⁹A good example is the admirable work of M. H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism. Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature* (New York, 1971), esp. pp. 316-18. (But see also the review by J. Hillis Miller in *Diacritics*, II:4 (Winter, 1972), pp. 6-13.)

³⁰Section VII (italics mine). Golffing, p. 50: "... the profound Greek, so uniquely susceptible to the subtlest and deepest suffering."

³¹*The Gay Science* V:369, p. 327, Kaufmann (italics added).

³²*Birth of Tragedy* XV, p. 91, Golffing. Is this perhaps what Nietzsche in part refers to in one of his last letters? Writing to Jacob Burckhardt from Turin in early January, 1889, shortly after recovering consciousness following his breakdown: "I go everywhere in my student's coat, and here and there slap somebody on the shoulder and say, *Siamo contenti? Son dio bo fatto questa caricatura.*" (*Portable Nietzsche*, p. 687.)

³³Cf. Martin Vogel, *Apollinisch und Dionysisch: Geschichte eines genialen Irrtums* (= *Studien zur Musikgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, 6 [Regensburg, 1966]), especially pp. 95-105. This distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian, which had such a rich history before it was taken up by Nietzsche, was also not the main reason why Nietzsche's former schoolmate Wilamowitz, Nietzsche's famous teacher Friedrich Ritschl, the well-known classicist Hermann Usener, and others objected so strongly to *The Birth of Tragedy*. Cf. Karlfried Gründer, ed., *Der Streit um Nietzsches Geburt der Tragödie: Die Schriften von E. Rohde, R. Wagner, U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf* (Hildesheim, 1969). It is interesting, given the emotional intensity of the clash between Nietzsche and Wilamowitz, that both later published retractions. In a second preface to *The Birth of Tragedy*, written in 1886, Nietzsche's self-criticism is strong: "... as I look at it today, my treatise strikes me as quite impossible. It is poorly written, heavy-handed, embarrassing. The imagery is both frantic and confused. In spots it is saccharine to the point of effeminacy; the tempo is erratic; it lacks logical nicety and it is so sure of its message that it dispenses with any kind of proof. Worse than that, it suspects the very notion of proof. . . . An arrogant and extravagant book . . ." (p. 6, Golffing). And Wilamowitz, as William M. Calder III pointed out to me, expresses regret in his memoirs about the publication of his famous attack (*Zukunftsphilologie!*, Berlin, 1872-73) on Nietzsche: "My treatise [i.e., *Zukunftsphilologie!*] should not have been published. . . . I was a stupid lad, who was not conscious at all of his presumptuous conduct . . ." (*Erinnerungen, 1848-1914* [Leipzig, 1928], p. 130).

³⁴Cf. *The Will to Power* II:438 ("Moral fanaticism . . . destroyed paganism, by . . . poisoning its innocence," p. 242, Kaufmann/Hollingdale).

³⁵*Birth of Tragedy*, XVII and III, pp. 108, 32, Golffing.

³⁶*The Will to Power*, II:175, p. 107, Kaufmann/Hollingdale.

³⁷*Ibid.*, II:195, p. 115, Kaufmann/Hollingdale.

³⁸*Portable Nietzsche*, p. 652.

³⁹*The Will to Power*, II:195, p. 115, Kaufmann/Hollingdale. Here, Plato is also called an "instinctive Semite," an allusion to Plato as an ally of Christianity. Cf. *Portable Nietzsche*, p. 650: "The whole labor of the ancient world *in vain*: I have no word to express my feelings about something so tremendous."

⁴⁰*Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism* (New York, 1971), espe-

cially Chapter 7. Cf. also the review by Angus Fletcher, *Diacritics*, II:4 (Winter, 1972), pp. 14-20.

⁴¹*The Anxiety of Influence* (New York, 1973). Cf. also the important points raised in the reviews by John Hollander, *New York Times Book Review* (March 4, 1973), pp. 27-30, and by Geoffrey H. Hartman, "War in Heaven," *Diacritics*, III:1 (Spring, 1973), pp. 26-32. In a second work, *The Map of Misreading* (Oxford, 1975), which I had not seen at the time of writing, Bloom gives examples of the application of this theory.

⁴²Perhaps best exemplified in Structuralism and in the works of French critics such as Derrida. See also Paul de Man's remarks in "Genesis and Genealogy in Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*," *Diacritics*, II:4, p. 44: "Yet students of literature seem to shy away from the analysis of semantic structures and feel more at home with problems of psychology or of historiography. The reasons for this detour or flight from language . . . go far in revealing the very semiological properties that are being circumvented." It is especially the *organic* and *teleological* genetic patterns of literary history that De Man seems to view as delusory. But there is of course "history" and "history"; does one necessarily have to turn *away* from language to discover that images, metonymies, and concepts also have their histories, their tenacity *in* and *through* time?

⁴³Commenting on Nietzsche's second *Thought Out of Season* and on the question whether Nietzsche can "free his own thought from historical prerogatives," De Man recognizes that ". . . the intoxication with the history-transcending life-process is counterbalanced by a deeply pessimistic wisdom *that remains rooted in a sense of historical causality . . .*" (*Blindness and Insight*, p. 148; italics added).

⁴⁴*Portable Nietzsche*, pp. 46-47 (italics added). (I amended Kaufmann's translation slightly.) A different but very illuminating approach to Nietzsche's views on (and use of) metaphor is that of Sarah Kofman, "Nietzsche et la métaphore," *Poétique*, 5 (1971), pp. 77-98. Cf. also Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, "Le détour (Nietzsche et la rhétorique)," *ibid.*, pp. 53-76.

⁴⁵Cf., for example, *The Genealogy of Morals*, I:13, p. 45, Kaufmann. A new metaphor, a new word is a revaluation, according to Nietzsche, a new interpretation hurled against the old. But this battle of old and new is incessant. It would therefore be misleading to focus only—as some critics do—on Nietzsche's polemics against the malady of that historical sense which anesthetizes and arrests life. Even in as anti-historical an essay as *Thoughts Out of Season II*, Nietzsche firmly asserted the inevitability and necessity of the historical dimension in statements such as these: "I am the *nursling* of the *older* ages like the Greek . . ."; "we must know the right time to forget as well as the right time to remember. . . . The unhistorical and the historical are *equally* necessary to the health of an individual, a community, and a system of culture"; "*as we are merely the resultant of previous generations, we are also the resultant of their errors, passions, and crimes; it is impossible to shake off this chain. . . .* At best, it comes to a conflict between our innate, inherited nature and our knowledge, between a stern, new discipline and an ancient tradition . . ." (*Use and Abuse*, transl. by Adrian Collins [Library of Liberal Arts, 1949], pp. 4, 5, 8, 21; italics added).

⁴⁶*Philosophenbuch*, III, *Entwürfe*: "Wahrheit," 10, in *Gesammelte Werke* (Munich, 1920) = Musarion ed., VI, p. 93: "Wahrheit tötet sich selbst (insofern sie erkennt, dass ihr Fundament der Irrtum ist)."

⁴⁷"Shape" *pace* George Kubler, *The Shape of Time. Remarks on the History of Things* (New Haven-London, 1962).

J. HILLIS MILLER

Walter Pater: A Partial Portrait

WALTER PATER IS, along with Coleridge, Arnold, and Ruskin, one of the four greatest English literary critics of the nineteenth century. He is also, of the four, the most influential in the twentieth century and the most alive today, although often his influence can be found on writers who deny or are ignorant of what they owe to him. Pater is effective today as a precursor of what is most vital in contemporary criticism.

Pater may be placed in various lines or triangulated on various topographical surfaces. A slightly different perspective on him is gained through each of these various mappings, genealogies, or filiations. He is the nearest thing to Nietzsche England has, as Emerson is Nietzsche's nearest match in America. This could be put less invidiously by saying that Nietzsche is the Pater of the German-speaking world, Emerson the Pater of America. The three together form a constellation, with many consonances and dissonances among the three stars. Toward the past, Pater belongs to the line of English Romanticism, moving from the great Romantics—particularly Wordsworth and Coleridge, in this case—through Tennyson to the Pre-Raphaelites, among whom, along with Ruskin and Swinburne, Pater is a major critical voice. Another affiliation would link Pater to the English Protestant and empirical tradition going back to Locke and to the Puritan autobiographers of the seventeenth century, with their emphasis on private witnessing as the only genuine test of truth. The "aesthetic critic," in Pater's definition of him, must ask first and last, "What is this song or picture, this engaging personality presented in life or in a book, to *me*? What effect does it really produce on me?"¹ Pater is also, however, one of the most important "translators" into Victorian England of Hegelian thought and of German idealism generally. He won his fellowship at Brasenose College, Oxford, as much for his first-hand knowledge of German as for his ability as a classicist. More important than all these associations, perhaps, is the filament that connects Pater with that strand of Western tradition which has been most antithetical to Plato: Heraclitus, the atomists, Epicurus, Lucretius, Joachim of Flora, Bruno, Spinoza, and Goethe.

In the other direction, toward the future, Pater's progeny also form more than one genetic line. Pater's influence on Yeats and, less obviously, on Wallace Stevens was decisive. This influence spread to other poets and novelists of the twentieth century: Joyce, Pound, Eliot, and many others. By way of Proust and the critics of the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, Pater is one of the progenitors of modern subjectivistic, "impression-

istic," phenomenological criticism, the so-called "criticism of consciousness" of Georges Poulet and his associates. Another line, however, antithetical to that one, might be called "allegorical" criticism. This line leads from certain aspects of Ruskin through Pater and Wilde to Proust, and beyond Proust to Walter Benjamin and to the rhetorical or "deconstructive" criticism of our own moment in literary criticism. Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man, and Harold Bloom in their different ways exemplify this.

How Pater could produce such diverse "children," like a genetic pool containing potentially both blue-eyed and brown-eyed offspring, my reading of Pater will attempt to indicate. It must be remembered, however, that the figure of genetic "lines" is a trope. Like all figures it is not innocent; it begs the question it assists in raising. In literature, lines of influence go by leaps and swerves, with gaps and deviations. Sudden unpredictable mutation is the law, not the exception. That all reading is misreading is as true of the traditions of criticism as of literature itself. Influence works by opposition, so that the child is a "white" parody or travesty of the father, a mocking "double" or "second." Pater uses this figure in a curious passage at the beginning of Chapter Two of *Marius the Epicurean* (1885). The red rose, he says, came first, the white rose later, as its pale repetition. White things are "ever an after-thought, the doubles, or seconds, of real things, and themselves but half-real, half-material" (ME I, 14). The question of the relation between the uniqueness of the individual entity and the way it exists as the recurrence of elements which have already been configured in previous ones is one of Pater's pervading concerns. Pater's own work may provide his interpreter with assistance in formulating his multiple relations to those who came before and after.

The remarkable early pages of *Marius the Epicurean* are half autobiographical no doubt, but autobiography veiled, displaced. Pater's early life is translated figuratively into the life of a Roman boy of the second century after Christ. Among the first things the reader learns of Marius is that the "old country-house, half farm, half villa" (ME 5), where he passed his childhood, was famous for a "head of Medusa" (ME 21) found nearby. The head was Greek work in bronze with golden *laminae*. An emblem there? The reader also remembers the passage in the essay on Leonardo da Vinci in *The Renaissance* (1873) where Pater cites Vasari's disturbing anecdote of the Medusa "painted on a wooden shield" (R 105) which the young Leonardo prepared as a "surprise" for his father. This "childish" work was proleptic, Pater says, of the great Medusa of Leonardo's adult years:

It was not in play that he painted that other Medusa, the one great picture which he left behind him in Florence. . . . What may be called the fascination of corruption penetrates in every touch its exquisitely finished beauty. About the dainty lines of the cheek the bat flits unheeded. The delicate snakes seem literally strangling each other in terrified struggle to escape from the Medusa brain. The hue which violent death always brings with it is in the features; features singularly massive and grand, as we catch them inverted, in a dexterous foreshortening, crown foremost, like a great calm stone against which the wave of serpents breaks [R 106].

What Sigmund Freud made of the Medusa one knows from "Das Medusenhaupt," written in 1922 and first published posthumously in 1940.² The

Medusa, says Freud, is a hieroglyph for the fear of castration and for its veiling or supplementary assuaging. The Medusa head is a sign for the discovery of the absence of the maternal phallus. It also offers in the snakey locks of the Medusa frightening yet secretly reassuring proofs for the existence of that phallus. The Medusa's power to petrify, to turn a man into a column of stone, also offers frightening yet secretly reassuring proof of the spectator's masculinity. As Pater says, the Medusa of Leonardo is "the head of a corpse, exercising its powers through all the circumstances of death" (R 106). All of Pater's most characteristic "portraits," including *Marius*, are of gifted young men doomed to an early death which is also somehow a fulfillment. Was Pater "phallogocentric," frozen like Leonardo himself at a Narcissistic or adolescent homosexual stage? Or did he liberate himself, accommodate himself to the absence of the Logos, head or chief source of meaning and power? Such a Logos fathers all later power but also renders it impotent. Did Pater remain fascinated with longing for a lost completeness which can only be obtained metaleptically, replacing early with late, the lost bliss that never was with the death that he imagines over and over for his various *personae*? Is Pater's work centered or acentered, and, if centered, what is its center, its origin, ground, or end?

A cluster of motifs in the early pages of *Marius the Epicurean* reinforces the motif of the Medusa head to form a hieroglyph of Pater's own. This composite emblem gathers many of the elements that recur throughout his work. *Marius*, the reader is told, had lost his father in early childhood, as did Pater himself. *Marius's* sorrow was "crossed at times by a not unpleasant sense of liberty, as he could but confess to himself, pondering, in the actual absence of so weighty and continual a restraint, upon the arbitrary power which Roman law gave to the parent over the son" (ME 18). Alas, the sense of liberty was only a momentary illusion, for the dead father has become one of the many *genii* of the place, "a *genius* a little cold and severe" (ME 11). The dead father, along with many other local gods, is the object of a religion of fear for *Marius*. Such a religion of propitiation and superstitious awe is still alive among children today, as in the singsong of urban sidewalk taboo: "If you step on a crack you'll break your mother's back; if you step on a line you'll break your father's spine." "A sense of conscious powers external to ourselves, pleased or displeased by the right or wrong conduct of every circumstance of daily life—that *conscience*, of which the old Roman religion was a formal, habitual recognition, was become in him a powerful current of feeling and observance" (ME 5). Conscience becomes *ascêsis*, an instinctive habit of renunciation, a dainty fastidiousness, a willingness to give up, even a masochism, a pleasure in self-imposed suffering, with apotropaic motives. "Had the Romans a word for *unworldly*?" asks the narrator.

The beautiful word *umbratilis* perhaps comes nearest to it; and, with that precise sense, might describe the spirit in which [*Marius*] prepared himself for the sacerdotal function hereditary in his family—the sort of mystic enjoyment he had in the abstinence, the strenuous self-control and *ascêsis*, which such preparation involved [ME 27].

Marius's mother had devoted herself to keeping her dead husband alive in her memory, and the boy *Marius* loves her devotedly. There is an odd episode, however, at

which burn and are extinguished with our consciousness of them" (R 235). The inevitable goal of each sequence is death, a final end anticipated and rehearsed in the little death of each moment as it flies. For Pater, the imminence of death and the intensity of experience are always only two sides of the same coin, "the sense of death and the desire of beauty: the desire of beauty quickened by the sense of death" (A 227), as he puts it in the admirable essay on William Morris, "Aesthetic Poetry."

It would seem that the entire program of Pater's criticism follows from these solipsistic premises. Each man must concentrate all his attention on each moment as it passes, for that moment is all there is and all he has. He must purge by that effort of refinement or *ascēsis*, as essential in Pater's procedure as in the lives of those whose portraits he sketches, all impurities in the moment, all irrelevant associations, all false idealisms, such as those which, in Pater's understanding of Coleridge, weakened that great poet-critic's force (see "Coleridge," A 64-106). The moment in its uniqueness or the critic in his experience of it may, then, shed of all dross, burn with that "hard, gem-like flame" (R 236). Criticism is the exact recording of what Pater calls the unique "virtue" of each moment, meaning by "virtue" the power or energy specific to the elements concentrated in that moment. Virtue is "the property each [moment] has of affecting one with a special, a unique, impression of pleasure" (R ix), as Pater puts it in the Preface to *The Renaissance*, where such a strategy for criticism is most eloquently and exactly defined.

The function of aesthetic criticism is clear. The true critic has sharper impressions than others. He is more able than other people to discriminate the exact "virtue" of a given personality or work of art. He is also more gifted than others in his power of expression, as gifted, ideally, as the great writers themselves. He uses his gift of expression not to transmit the truth of his own personality, but to translate into his own language the unique virtue of the work or person he criticizes. He thereby transmits to his readers impressions they might otherwise miss, or, rather, he transmits subtly displaced repetitions of those impressions. Far from being, as is sometimes said, at liberty to make the work mean anything one likes, impressionism is rigorously bound by the work it describes. It is bound as much as the work itself by that truth of correspondence to a particular personality which Pater makes his ideal in "Style." The writer must translate accurately his inner vision. The critic must translate accurately that translation, as is done by that ideal translator of Plato who reproduces him "by an exact following, with no variation in structure, of word after word, as the pencil follows a drawing under tracing-paper" (A 11). The goal of this translation, however, is the transmission of the exact flavor or quality of the consciousness behind the work.

The focus of all Pater's writing is personality, the personalities of Botticelli, Michelangelo, Leonardo, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and others in *The Renaissance* or in *Appreciations* (1889), the personalities of fictional characters in *Marius the Epicurean*, *Imaginary Portraits* (1887), and *Gaston de Latour* (1896), the personalities of mythological figures in certain of the *Greek Studies* (1895). Subjectivity—the self—is, it seems, the beginning, the end, and the persisting basis in all Pater's writings. In Pater's work, as in one important strand of the Western tradition generally, subjectivity is the name given to the *Logos*, paternal origin, goal, and supporting ground. Subjectivity is

the measure, *ratio*, or “reason” for all the interchanges of person with person, by means of art, which Pater’s work explores. As the word itself suggests, subjectivity, the subject, is what is ‘thrown under’ and therefore underlies all the fleeting impressions which make up what is. There is, after all, a snake in the mouth of the garden god. Pater’s religious moments, for example in *Marius the Epicurean*, are an extrapolation from his positing of personality as a reassuring, ubiquitous *Logos*. His religion is “a sense of *conscious* powers external to ourselves” (*ME* 5, emphasis added).

The critic’s effort to identify precisely the unique virtue of a single impression or personality leads to an unexpected discovery. This discovery makes of Pater’s criticism something quite different from what his stress on personality would make it seem to be. The moment, it turns out, though unique, is not single. Each “impression” is in fact “infinitely divisible” (*R* 235). It is divisible because it is self-divided, an *Andersstreben*, or striving to be other than itself, as he calls it in “The School of Giorgione” (*R* 134). The moment is in battle against itself in a way that recalls the Heraclitean flux, cited as an epigraph for the Conclusion, or the Parmenidean *polemos*, cosmic warfare. Perhaps it is also to be associated with that sadomasochistic element so evident in Pater’s sense of human life and of relations between people.

The flame produced by the purification of an *ascêsis* is kindled by the bringing together of divided forces which burst into flame by their antagonistic proximity. That flame is “the focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy” (*R* 236). The first example Pater gives in the Conclusion of the intense instant of sensation is “the moment . . . of delicious recoil from the flood of water in summer heat” (*R* 233). Such a conjunction is the locus “of forces parting sooner or later on their ways” (*R* 234), as brilliancy of gifts in an individual arises from “some tragic dividing of forces on their ways” (*R* 237).

The uniqueness of each momentary impression is a result not of its singleness but of its special combination of contradictory forces. These flow into it from the past and are destined to divide again, each to go its separate way into the future. This means that the moment, which was at first seemingly so isolated, is in fact connected by multiple strands to past and future. Pater speaks of this, sometimes using a metaphor of streams meeting and dividing and sometimes of weaving and unweaving. If the moment is the meeting place of divided forces—the forces of a whole life, of an age, or of all the ages in their sequence (as in Pater’s celebrated interpretation of *La Gioconda*)—then that moment in all its sensible vividness and uniqueness can stand for the life, for the age, or for all history. It can stand for these because it contains in concentrated essence forces universally distributed in time and space, meeting and dividing and meeting again. The validity of synecdoche is based on substantial participation. This conception of the moment as both individual and representative lies behind a splendid passage from “The School of Giorgione,” anticipating both Joyce’s “epiphany” and certain passages in T. S. Eliot:

Now it is part of the ideality of the highest sort of dramatic poetry, that it presents us with a kind of profoundly significant and animated instant, a mere gesture, a look, a smile, perhaps—some

the time of her death, which occurs, as did the death of Pater's mother, while the son is still a schoolboy, the mother going away from home to die. "For it happened," says the narrator, "that through some sudden incomprehensible petulance there had been an angry childish gesture, and a slighting word, at the very moment of her departure, actually for the last time" (*ME* 45).

Fear of the dead father and a universalization of that fear in an uncanny sense of unseen powers requiring constant propitiation and love for the mother combined with some inexplicable resentment of her—these come together disguised as Marius's fear of snakes. This odd fear is described but not wholly explained. Fear of snakes is the embodiment of Marius's "sense of some unexplored evil, ever dogging his footsteps" (*ME* 25). Its primal version is in fact a primal scene: "One fierce day in early summer, as he walked along a narrow road, he had seen the snakes breeding, and ever afterwards he avoided that place and its ugly associations, for there was something in the incident which made food distasteful and his sleep uneasy for many days afterwards" (*ME* 25). The same sense of uncanny distaste recurs when, sometime later in Pisa, Marius sees "an African showman exhibiting a great reptile" (*ME* 25), and later still in Rome, "a second time," he sees "a showman with his serpents" (*ME* 26). The motif recurs once more, in case the reader has not already perceived its importance, in Marius's fear of the "great sallow-hued snakes" kept in the temple of the healing god Aesculapius (*ME* 33).

Why did Marius, or, one guesses, Pater himself, so irrationally fear snakes? And why snakes coupling? Why did this disturb his pleasure in food and sleep? The narrator's answer is oblique:

He wondered at himself indeed, trying to puzzle out the secret of that repugnance, having no particular dread of a snake's bite, like one of his companions, who had put his hand into the mouth of an old garden-god and roused there a sluggish viper. A kind of pity even mingled with his aversion, and he could hardly have killed or injured the animals, which seemed already to suffer by the very circumstances of their life, being what they were [*ME* 25-26].

The elements associated with the Medusa head recur here and are covertly interpreted. Parents coupling become snakes coupling, viewed with a combination of fascination, aversion, and pity. It is the pity of unawakened sexuality for the burden of the bestiality of sex combined with fear of the absent father and of his power of reprisal. The "unexplored" evil dogging Marius's footsteps becomes embodied in the snakes' breeding. This scene is proof that the phallus is still there, though the father is dead, as with the snakes on the Medusa's head. The phallus is there even as an attribute of the mother, for in the mouth of the old garden-god there is a sluggish viper, as there are snakes surrounding the open mouth and the dead face of the Medusa in the painting in the Uffizi. This repugnant yet somehow pleasurable discovery is displaced from Marius to "one of his companions," who, like Marius, has "no particular dread of a snake's bite." The act of impiety toward the god or of violation of the mother is not performed directly by the hero, except in that moment of petulance and in that slighting word at the time of her death. Presence and absence of an original fathering power, a paternal potency which yet must be an attribute of the mother, presence and absence both feared and

desired in the tension of a double double bind—these are the pervasive Paterian elements brought evasively and unostentatiously together in the account of the childhood of Marius.

Is such a reading of a few fragments of *Marius the Epicurean* a clue to the rest of Pater? Is this cluster a valid synecdoche for the whole, standing in the same relation to all his work as, in Pater's own criticism, a representative figure such as Leonardo or Michelangelo stands to the Renaissance as a whole? What relation might there be between this repugnance for the coupling snakes, yet pleasure in rousing the viper in the mouth of the garden god, and Pater's methods as a critic, the themes and ideas which organize his work? Is all his work oriented by the dread and desire for a proof that the lost father is not really lost? Only a reading of the whole work could tell. The complexity and suggestiveness of the bits examined so far indicate that Pater must be read not so much for what he tells the reader about the artists and works he criticizes but as a literary text demanding the same scrupulous decipherment, phrase by phrase, as the texts of Marcel Proust or of Walter Benjamin, two later writers in Pater's line who similarly require interrogation.

Pater's writing offers the same fascination to the reader as that of any major author, the fascination of a complexity which *works*, which hangs together, which may be "figured out" or resolved. His work has that consonance, those unexpected echoes of this passage with that passage, those hidden resonances and harmonies which Pater saw as the ideal of a musical form that would have absorbed all its matter into that form. Nevertheless, if, as Charles Rosen affirms, the basis of musical expression is dissonance,³ the critic must, in Pater's case, take note also of disharmonies, contradictions, omissions, hiatuses, incongruous elements which precisely do not "work." In such places the words seem to have exceeded the writer's apparent intention. Such dissonances may be the most important aspect of Pater's work, in spite of his claim in "Style" that the fire of a unified "sense of the world"⁴ will in the great writers have burned away such *surplusage* (A 16). In the something too much, the something left over, the odd detail which may not be evened in a musical form, the snake in the mouth of the garden god, the critic may find the clue and loose the thread that will unravel all that fine fabric of Pater's prose, with its decorous echo of pattern by pattern. The secret revealed by this unraveling may be not so much the hidden center of a personality as an enigma exceeding personality, a secret intrinsic to the materials Pater worked with—language and its concepts, figures, and narrative forms, myths or legends, *legenda*, "things for reading."

The apparent beginning of spiritual life for Pater is the moment, the intense and wholly individual instant of experience. As Pater says in the famous passage in the Conclusion to *The Renaissance*, each momentary experience, each "impression," is cut off by virtue of its uniqueness from all moments before and after. It is also entirely private: "Every one of those impressions is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world" (R 235). Moreover, each moment lasts but a moment, the blink of an eye, and then is gone. Time is flux, an endless stream "of impressions, unstable, flickering, inconsistent,

brief and wholly concrete moment, into which, however, all the motives, all the interest and effects of a long history, have condensed themselves, and which seem to absorb past and future in an intense consciousness of the present. . . . exquisite pauses in time, in which, arrested thus, we seem to be spectators of all the fulness of existence, and which are like some consummate extract or quintessence of life [R 150].

Pater's materialist notion of impersonal forces underlying each personality involves a specific theory of repetition. This theory denies the possibility of finding any fixed origin for any person or impression. Such denial has important consequences for criticism. It means that the critic can never find an inaugural point for any idea or for any given hieroglyph of forces. There are no fathers, each apparent father being himself, often unwittingly, the heir of forces that have come together and then separated many times in the past. Whatever the critic reaches as an apparent beginning, a solid ground on which to base an interpretation, dissolves on inspection into a repetition. It is another gathering of elements of immemorial antiquity. As in Nietzsche, so in Pater, a sense of vertigo is generated by this infinite regression into the past, each "source" having another "source" behind it, and so on ad infinitum. No doctrine, no seemingly unique collocation of elements in a personality can be said to be a beginning or to have one.

The notion that the singular personality is Pater's version of the *Logos* is, it seems, exploded by his concept of repetition. What is, is the perpetually woven and re woven anonymous elements or atoms, forces that have divided and come together for all eternity and that have an eternal future of rebirth and death. In place of the subject as *Logos*, Pater seems to put another equally traditional idea of the metaphysical ground. This idea, too, goes back to the Greeks, though more to Heraclitus, to the atomists, to Lucretius, or even to Aristotle than to Plato. The *Logos* is a ubiquitous and multiple force, energy, *energeia*. This energy is that paternal snake at the originless origin, perpetually born and reborn in the mouth of the god.

Paradoxically, it is apropos of Plato that Pater, in a splendidly eloquent passage at the beginning of *Plato and Platonism* (1893), most fully expresses his intuition of a universe without determinable origin. In such a universe, atoms are combined and recombined, world without end, in perpetual repetition in difference. "Plato's achievement," says Pater, "may well seem an absolutely fresh thing in the morning of the mind's history," but "in the history of philosophy there are no absolute beginnings" (PP 2, 1). Far from being a beginning, Plato, in Pater's view, was a decadent, or at least he lived in a decadent world. Its decadence is defined, in phrases characteristically Paterian in their weary cadence, as the presence everywhere of already used atoms of thought. There was a kind of intellectual pollution of the Greek air at the moment of its greatest cultural splendor:

Yet in truth the world Plato had entered into was already almost weary of philosophical debate, bewildered by the oppositions of sects, the claims of rival schools. Language and the processes of thought were already become sophisticated, the very air he breathed sickly with off-cast speculative atoms [PP 2].

Pater uses four different metaphors to express the way these "off-cast atoms" of thought enter into the intimate texture of Plato's language. All these figures express the

notion of tiny particles which make the, so to speak, cellular structure of Plato's thought. These are in no sense superficial borrowings which could conceivably be detached. One metaphor is of the grain of stone, another of parchment with multiple layers of writing, another of woven fabric, another of an organic body, but a similar structural image is in question in each case:

Some of the results of patient earlier thinkers, even then dead and gone, are of the structure of his philosophy. They are everywhere in it, not as the stray carved corner of some older edifice, to be found here or there amid the new, but rather like minute relics of earlier organic life in the very stone he builds with. . . . [I]n Plato, in spite of his wonderful savour of literary freshness, there is nothing absolutely new: or rather, as in many other very original productions of human genius, the seemingly new is old also, a palimpsest, a tapestry of which the actual threads have served before, or like the animal frame itself, every particle of which has already lived and died many times [PP 2,3].

This image of a repetition not exterior but woven into the genetic structure of Plato's thinking leads to a powerful vision of an infinite regression back in time and outward beyond Western culture in an ever wider and deeper unsuccessful search for the beginnings of ideas whose immemorial antiquity deny Plato any status as an origin. Plato was not the inaugurator of an Occidental civilization merely, as Whitehead said, a "footnote" to his work. He was himself already a latecomer, an afterthought. He was a belated footnote to still earlier footnotes, themselves footnotes to footnotes, with nowhere an original text as such:

The central and most intimate principles of [Plato's] teaching challenge us to go back beyond them, not merely to his own immediate, somewhat enigmatic master—to Socrates, who survives chiefly in his pages—but to various precedent schools of speculative thought, in Greece, in Ionia, in Italy; beyond these into that age of poetry, in which the first efforts of philosophic apprehension had hardly understood themselves; beyond that unconscious philosophy again, to certain constitutional tendencies, persuasions, forecasts of the intellect itself, such as had given birth, it would seem, to thoughts akin to Plato's in the older civilisations of India and of Egypt, as they still exercise their authority over ourselves [PP 2-3].

No element in Plato is new, not one speculative atom. What is new is the way of putting these elements together. In Pater's doctrine of recurrence, repetition is always with a difference. The difference lies in the way old forces are brought together once more in a slightly changed way and under new conditions. Pater's term for this novel way of assembling new materials is "form." Plato's originality lies in his brilliant novelty of form:

Nothing but the life-giving principle of cohesion is new; the new perspective, the resultant complexion, the expressiveness which familiar thoughts attain by novel juxtaposition. In other words, the *form* is new. But then, in the creation of philosophical literature, as in all other products of art, *form*, in the full signification of that word, is everything, and the mere matter is nothing [PP 4-5].

Form is everything, matter nothing. Here is another point of overlapping with Nietzsche, who in the preface of 1886 to the second edition of *Die fröhliche Wissen-*

schaft (1882) praises the Greeks for stopping at the surface (*bei der Oberfläche*) and for believing in forms, tones, words (*an Formen, an Töne, an Worte*).⁵ What is Pater's concept of form? What is his critic to make of the abundance of metaphors which are essential to his expression of his thought—threads, forces, writing, and so on? What is the exact status of these figures, and why does he need more than one to express the "same" idea? In "Style," Pater attempts to deny insofar as it is possible the figurative basis of language. He wants language to be the transparent reflection of a personal thought which preceded it and which could, or so it seems, exist without it. He wants the word to be identical with its meaning or with the thought it transmits. In *The Renaissance*, he several times praises the subjects of his essays for creating images that are saturated with their meaning, so that there is no discernible difference between sign and referent, word and meaning. In Greek art, for example, "[t]he mind begins and ends with the finite image, yet loses no part of the spiritual motive. That motive is not lightly and loosely attached to the sensuous form, as its meaning to an allegory, but saturates and is identical with it" (R 205-06). The material basis of spiritual meaning is wholly sublimated in that meaning.

Nevertheless, the full exploration of Pater's concept of form will deconstruct once more the apparent end point reached in the interpretation of his work. Such an exploration puts in question both the notion that for Pater subjectivity is the *Logos* and the notion that for him material energy is the *Logos*. Alongside those ideas, overlapping them, folded inextricably into them, contradicting them, and yet necessary to their expression is a notion that is properly literary or semiotic. This incipient theory of signs is a thread which will unravel all the fastidiously patterned fabric of Pater's thought. It can hardly be called a fully developed "theory." It is more an implicit assumption in all Pater's practice with words. This "theory" in all its dimensions involves the categories of difference and discontinuity.

Meaning or significance in a personality, in a gem, a song, a painting, a piece of music is always defined by Pater as a force, as the power to make an impression. This power is not single, nor is it a harmonious collocation of energies making a unity. A "virtue" always results from antagonistic forces, sweetness against strength in the case of Michelangelo, strangeness against the desire for beauty in Leonardo, and so on. The meaning is in neither of the two forces separately, nor in their sum. It arises in the space between them, out of the economy of their difference.

The sign thus constituted by two enemy forces does not draw its meaning solely from its own internal differentiation. It also carries within itself the echo, across the gap of a further difference, of earlier similar gatherings of forces. These lateral resonances form that "chain of secret influences" of which Pater speaks in the essay on Leonardo (R 116). Each virtue is an assemblage of divided energies, and it draws its meaning from its reference to other virtues of which it is the rebirth. The present moment, which, in the Conclusion to *The Renaissance*, seems, in its evanescence, to be all there is, carries "a sense in it, a relic more or less fleeting, of such moments gone by" (R 236). The vestige in the present sign of past signs, as the passage quoted from *Plato and Platonism* confirms, is intrinsic to the form of the present sign. The past is an inextricable part of the meaning of the present. The rejection of fixed origin is a necessary

component of this insight. The past moment of which the present moment contains the relics was itself a system of differentiated traces referring back to a still earlier moment of division, and so on.

Another discontinuity in each sign or virtue is the relation of meaning to its material embodiment. Pater always insists, correctly enough, on the necessity of a material carrier for artistic meaning. "All art," he says, "has a sensuous element, colour, form, sound" (R 209). In spite of his desire to have this material basis saturated with its meaning, Pater recognizes a perpetual residue of non-saturation in the sign. There is always a margin of incongruity between the meaning and its sensuous embodiment.

This distance reveals itself in various ways in Pater's work. It is present in his occasionally explicit recognition of figure, as in the assertion in "Style" that each word carries its weight of metaphor and so is a displaced expression of its meaning. "A lover of words for their own sake," says Pater,

to whom nothing about them is unimportant, a minute and constant observer of their physiognomy, [the writer] will be on the alert not only for obviously mixed metaphors of course, but for the metaphor that is mixed in all our speech, though a rapid use may involve no cognition of it. Currently recognising the incident, the colour, the physical elements or particles in words like *absorb*, *consider*, *extract*, to take the first that occur, he will avail himself of them, as further adding to the resources of expression [A 17].

A word has a virtue, and like any such power it is made of antagonistic particles in combination. These minute forces make up "all that latent figurative texture in speech" (A 17). This *Andersstreben* means that we cannot say what we mean without being in danger of saying something else implicit in the elementary particles or self-contained tropes in the words we use. Pater's own writing is heavily dependent on figures which are obviously figures: the images of the gemlike flame, of woven fabric, of the relics of long-dead minute organic life in stone, and so on. In all such cases, Pater's "literal" meaning is some linguistic or artistic expression, not fire, cloth, or stone at all. In a similar way, all his work depends on the problematic validity of the trope of synecdoche, a momentary confluence of "forces" in Pico, for example, standing for the whole *Zeitgeist* of the Renaissance. Pico is only in figure a "quintessence." Even the apparently objective word "force" is a figure, since there is no energy as such in the innocent black marks on a page of Wordsworth or Hugo.

The discrepancy between embodiment and meaning is also present in Pater's notion that each form of art attempts to transcend itself, to sublimate the matter in which it is forced to work by that striving to be other than itself whereby each form of art borrows from others, "a partial alienation from its limitations, through which the arts are able, not indeed to supply the place of each other, but reciprocally to lend each other new forces" (R 133-34). It is through this effort that all art, in Pater's famous phrase, "constantly aspires towards the condition of music" (R 135). The condition of music is pure form, the spiritualization of the material substratum so that no referential dimension is left. In music the meaning arises entirely out of the differential relation between note and note, element and element, force and force. In the condition of music, matter has become form, or the form *is* the matter:

That the mere matter of a poem, for instance, its subject, namely, its given incidents or situation—that the mere matter of a picture, the actual circumstances of an event, the actual topography of a landscape—should be nothing without the form, the spirit, of the handling, that this form, this mode of handling, should become an end in itself, should penetrate every part of the matter: this is what all art constantly strives after, and achieves in different degrees [R 135].

Nevertheless, insofar as this *Andersstreben* remains an aspiration, not an achievement, as Pater implies it always does, some element of unspiritualized matter remains.

This discrepancy between incarnation and meaning is, finally, present in all those imaginary portraits of men born out of their time, an Apollo or a Dionysus in Christian Europe, as in “Apollo in Picardy” or “Denys l’Auxerrois,” a presage of the Enlightenment in still half-barbaric Germany, as in “Duke Carl of Rosenmold.” The tragedy of all these figures is in the incompatibility between the meanings they carry and the material conditions within which they are forced to embody them. This incompatibility, as much as the tragic division of forces within themselves, destines them to obscurity and early death. Their triumph is that they do reenact the old pattern, for the gods in exile are gods still, and the story works itself out anew in the changed conditions. Even so, Pater’s portraits are always of those who do not wholly embody their meaning. They are gods born out of their time. This incongruity dramatizes a universal condition of artistic expression in Pater’s view of it.

A remnant of non-saturation is always present, a part of the body left over, some matter not wholly absorbed into form. Its existence leads to the recognition that art for Pater is generated only in the interval between forces. This is not that other kind of Logocentrism which sees the Logos as energy rather than as subject. It involves a different notion, more difficult to grasp, in fact ungraspable. It is the ungraspable as such, an ungraspable which for Pater, with his sense for nuance, is essential to literature and to art generally. This notion is ungraspable because it cannot be thematized or conceptualized. It can only be glimpsed fleetingly, out of the corner of the eye, in the interplay between images. This non-conceptual insight, perpetually in flight, is the notion of meaning constituted by difference. Such meaning is not a correlate of force, whether that force is subjective or objective, self or matter. Such meaning is always in excess of the material substratum which embodies it. It appears momentarily in the openings between, and it is always in league with death. Such a notion might be called the uncanny, but it is not the uncanny as the occult presence of some *ur*-force which has differentiated itself and works as fate. It is the uncanny as the absence of origin. It is the mouth of the garden god with no snake in it.

Is this not that idea of “the disembodied spirit,” rather than some more conventional notion of immortality, which Pater formulates in a splendid passage about Michelangelo’s “predilection” for those who die young and for all the imagery of death? Here the absence of any definable origin becomes transferred, in a metalepsis, to the absence of any fixable image for that future which is created by life but which lies beyond death. The relation of a dead body to the meaning it contains by not containing it is the most extreme form of that discrepancy between the material image and its meaning which governs all Pater’s insight into artistic signs. Here for once Pater is ori-

ented not toward the past but toward the future, though the structure of material signs creating something which exceeds them, a “new body,” body not body yet possible only in relation to some body, remains the same. To call Michelangelo’s four famous sculptured figures *Night*, *Day*, *The Twilight*, and *The Dawn*, says Pater, is far too definite for them. Rather they “concentrate and express,”

less by way of definite conceptions than by the touches, the promptings of a piece of music, all those vague fancies, misgivings, presentiments, which shift and mix and are defined and fade again, whenever the thoughts try to fix themselves with sincerity on the conditions and surroundings of the disembodied spirit [R 95].

Then follows an extraordinary description of the “range of sentiment” in relation to death, of which, says Pater, Michelangelo is “the poet still alive, and in possession of our inmost thoughts” (R 95-96), as if Michelangelo’s “new body” were, by some kind of transmigration, our own:

—dumb inquiry over the relapse after death into the formlessness which preceded life, the change, the revolt from that change, then the correcting, hallowing, consoling rush of pity; at last, far off, thin and vague, yet not more vague than the most definite thoughts men have had through three centuries on a matter that has been so near their hearts, the new body—a passing light, a mere intangible, external effect, over those too rigid, or too formless faces; a dream that lingers a moment, retreating in the dawn, incomplete, aimless, helpless; a thing with faint hearing, faint memory, faint power of touch; a breath, a flame in the doorway, a feather in the wind [R 95-96].

The most fully conceptualized expression of this third aspect of Pater’s work, implicit denial and deconstruction of the other two, is a passage in the key essay of *Greek Studies*, “The Myth of Demeter and Persephone.” This essay was written in 1875, in the poise between euhemeristic, cosmological, and linguistic theories of myth, in such scholars as Max Müller, and the appearance in 1890 of the first two volumes of Frazer’s *The Golden Bough*. Pater’s essay is almost exactly contemporary with Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872). Like Nietzsche’s essay it has both a particular interest in relation to the thought of its author and a more general importance as the expression and exemplification of a theory of interpretation. The passage also, by way of its reference to Giotto’s frescoes in Padua depicting Virtues and Vices, links itself to a “chain of secret influences” that binds together a series of crucial texts. This series extends from the places where Ruskin discusses those paintings by Giotto through Pater to a passage in Proust, which echoes Ruskin, to critical essays by Walter Benjamin and Paul de Man on Proust.⁶

Pater begins by distinguishing between the abstract personification by modern artists of such entities as “wealth” or “commerce” and the “profoundly poetical and impressive” personifications of Giotto and other early masters. The reader may expect that Pater is going to discriminate between modern concoctions in which there is no intrinsic relation between the meaning and its embodiment, “mere transparent allegory, or figure of speech” (GS 98), and, on the other hand, genuine symbolism, in which the meaning saturates its material vehicle. Matters are not so simple in this pas-

sage. Giotto, or other artists like him in the modern period, Blake or Burne-Jones, or that old artist who designed the stained glass of the Apocalypse at Bourges, produce “something more than mere symbolism” (GS 98). This is achieved by “some peculiarly sympathetic penetration, on the part of the artist, into the subjects he intended to depict” (GS 98). The word “subject” here has an odd and unexpected meaning. It refers not to the “ethical” or “allegorical” theme of the work but to the material carrier of that theme. The artist’s sympathetic penetration is into that embodiment in its peculiar relation to its ethical meaning. This carrier is presented literally, with full mimetic specificity. It is pictured as “realistically” as a Victorian novelist copies, with scrupulous fidelity, the details of daily life:

Symbolism as intense as this is the creation of special temper, in which a certain simplicity, taking all things literally, *au pied de la lettre*, is united to a vivid pre-occupation with the aesthetic beauty of the image itself, the *figured* side of figurative expression, the *form* of the metaphor. When it is said, “Out of his mouth goeth a sharp sword,”⁷ that temper is ready to deal directly and boldly with that difficult image, like that old designer of the fourteenth century, who has depicted this, and other images of the Apocalypse, in a coloured window at Bourges. Such symbolism cares a great deal for the hair of Temperance, discreetly bound, for some subtler likeness to the colour of the sky in the girdle of *Hope*, for the inwoven flames in the red garment of *Charity* [GS 98-99].

This admirable passage, like the similar passages in Ruskin, in Proust, in Benjamin, and in De Man, calls attention to the paradoxical self-canceling effects of such literalism in allegorical representation. On the one hand, as Proust observes, the intense literalism of such allegory greatly increases the “aesthetic beauty” of the work of art which employs it.

[P]lus tard j’ai compris [says Marcel] que l’étrangéité saisissante, la beauté spéciale de ces fresques tenait à la grande place que le symbole y occupait, et que le fait qu’il fût représenté non comme un symbole puisque la pensée symbolisée n’était pas exprimée, mais comme réel, comme effectivement subi ou matériellement manié, donnait à la signification de l’oeuvre quelque chose de plus littéral et de plus précis.⁸

On the other hand, an exactly opposite effect is produced by taking literally what is after all “only” a figure of speech, so that a sword literally goes out of the mouth of the Christ of the Apocalypse or, in the curiously parallel example Proust gives, Giotto represents Envy with a swollen protruding tongue like an illustration in a medical text for some ghastly disease. Whether or not the parallel here would support a claim that Proust had read the passage in Pater has little importance, but the examples both give are similar cases of a grotesque literalism incongruous with its abstract significance. Both examples involve the organ of speech, that snake in the mouth of gods and men which is the father of lies, that is, of “figurative expression.” In both examples, the realism with which the figured side of the figure is represented only intensifies the incompatibility between tenor and vehicle in the metaphor. It calls attention to the fictive or verbal aspect of the expression, even to its absurdity. There is no substantial similarity between the abstraction and its material embodiment, though they may seem plausibly enough connected in the purely linguistic expression. The embodiment can be

represented. The more vividly and literally it is pictured, the more beautiful the work of art. Nevertheless, the more literally it is represented, the more it brings into the open the fact that the "ethical" meaning—Temperance, Hope, or whatever—has, as Proust observes, not been represented at all. It has only been indirectly named in a metaphor. This metaphor confesses in its intense literalism to its inability to be anything but itself, a mouth with a sharp sword going out of it, flames, the blue of the sky, the hair of a discreet woman, neatly bound. At best the painter can translate into visual images the equivalents of verbal metaphor, painting flames on the garment of Charity, the blue of the sky on the girdle of Hope. The allegorical meaning vanishes in the realism with which its vehicle is represented. That meaning is shown to exist only as names, as an interplay of displaced words which are the basis of the visual representation.

Even so, Pater returns at the end of the paragraph to the idea of a people for whom the powers governing the universe were seen as real persons. For such a people the false equations of metaphor were literally true. When they talked of the return of Kore to Demeter, for example, they were "yielding to a real illusion; to which the voice of man 'was really a stream, beauty an effluence, death a mist' " (GS 100).⁹ Pater's mode of expression here, however, to turn back to the other side once more, demystifies such ways of seeing and returns them to the verbal figures which they take literally. To a vision of such a temper the "illusion" was "real," hence not an illusion. To Pater it is an illusion, a voice not a stream, beauty not an effluence, death only figuratively a mist.

Back and forth between these various contradictory readings of the passage its reader is forced to go. Each reading depends on others which contradict it and it contradicts the others in its turn. The passage, in its insistence that only a "special temper" is capable of the "real illusion" of allegory *au pied de la lettre*, can be taken as reaffirming Pater's subjectivism. In its suggestion that the stratum below the play of allegorical representation is material forces, flame or sky, the passage may be seen as congruent with Pater's objectivism, his materialism of "inwoven" forces. In its recognition that both of these notions are generated by a play of language, the passage may be taken as congruent with the third reading of Pater I have proposed. The god's mouth is empty or is filled only with that uncanny simulacrum of a snake born and dying and born anew in the interaction of the signs men make. In this third interpretation, the reader is seen as intervening actively in any interpretation. Meaning is produced in an act of deciphering which can never reach the original or intrinsic meaning of any text. An "impression" is as much an act as a passion. It is the stamping of crisscrossing forces with a momentary stillness in one reading. Another critic of another "temper" will produce a different reading of the same text. No judge will be able to arbitrate between them, since the text is "undecidable," incapable of being encompassed in a single total reading.

All three of these readings, and other variations on them, are present not only in this paragraph from "The Myth of Demeter and Persephone" but also intertwined throughout Pater's work as a whole. The last reading sees the subject of Pater's writing as ultimately, whatever its ostensible theme, writing and reading themselves. Reading is a further writing, and all writing is a palimpsest. The critic produces an additional inscription over an earlier inscription in the flesh, that necessary material basis of all

art, though art always exceeds its fleshly incarnations. This fact, however, may only be experienced in the flesh, in a literalism which defeats itself. The critic is, like Leonardo da Vinci, *homo minister et interpres naturae* (R 98), but the minister and the interpreter are perpetually caught in a dance of antagonism, each denying the other and yet dependent on him. Pater's writings, like those of other major authors in the Occidental tradition, are at once open to interpretation and ultimately indecipherable, unreadable. His texts lead the critic deeper and deeper into a labyrinth until he confronts a final aporia. This does not mean, however, that the reader must give up from the beginning the attempt to understand Pater. Only by going all the way into the labyrinth, following the thread of a given clue, can the critic reach the blind alley, vacant of any Minotaur, that impasse which is the end point of interpretation.

Pater's work, then, is heterogeneous, dialogical, or antilogical. Dialogical and antilogical come, in fact, to the same thing, since the doubling of the Logos is a sign of its absence. Each reading in the interchange of overlapping voices may be worked out with full cogency, though it is impossible to have all at once. All three cannot be simultaneously "true." Moreover, they may not be related to one another dialectically or in some kind of hierarchy. My necessarily narrative or sequential development falsifies their implications upon one another, just as the apparent historical development in Pater's theory of myth makes, as Pater himself says, a fictitious narrative of what are in fact simultaneous members of a single system. In all its dimensions, in Pater's interest in the impressions made or felt by the "unique" personality, in his art of portraiture, in his essays on sculpture, in his studies of mythical figures and of an allegorical art that is "more than mere symbolism," Pater's work can be defined as an exploration and deconstruction of the problematic trope of personification, that turn of language or art which gathers impersonal forces under a human figure. Is subjectivity a fixed point of origin from which all else follows, or is personality a fragile receptacle within which impersonal energies are momentarily brought together, or are both the person and the forces gathered within it linguistic fictions generated by the interchange of sign with sign in the productive workings of art or literature?

My three readings of Pater's use of the trope of personification may not be reconciled in any way. They form a bewildering oscillation in which each reading will lead to the others if it is followed far enough, though the others contradict and cancel it out, while at the same time being necessary to its expression. To put this in Pater's terms: If the magical appearance of unity to which we give the name "person" is always produced differentially, by the division or combat of contradictory forces, and yet exceeds anything which may be identified as in those forces, as the "new body" exceeds the dead body, then the momentary poise in a personification will always be divided against itself, folded, manifold, dialogical rather than monological. It will always be open, like all the master tropes of the great texts in the Western tradition, to multiple contradictory readings in a perpetual fleeing away from any fixed sense.

REFERENCES

¹Walter Pater, *The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry* (London, 1922), p. viii. Hereafter this will be cited as R. The following editions of other works by Pater have been cited in this essay: *Marius the*

Epicurean (ME), 2 vols. (London, 1892); *Appreciations* (A) (London, 1889); *Plato and Platonism* (PP) (London, 1893); *Greek Studies* (GS) (London, 1895).

²*Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse Imago*, XXV (1940), 106. For an English translation, see Sigmund Freud, *Collected Papers* (New York, 1959), V, 105-06. Freud discusses in *Eine Kindheits-erinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci* (1910) neither Vasari's anecdote nor the Medusa in the Uffizi. The latter, by the way, though taken as Leonardo's by Pater, is in fact a "white" double, a seventeenth-century painting, apparently not even a copy of the lost Medusa but rather of a detail from the *Fight for the Standard*. See Ludwig Goldscheider, *Leonardo* (London, 1969), pp. 13-14, for an annotated translation of the passages from Vasari.

³Charles Rosen, "Schoenberg and Atonality," *The Georgia Review*, XXIX:2 (Summer, 1975), 298.

⁴Wallace Stevens' phrase almost exists already in Pater. In "Style," Pater speaks of "the transcribing, not of the world, not of mere fact, but of [the writer's] sense of it" (A 6).

⁵Friedrich Nietzsche, *Werke in drei Bänden*, ed. Karl Schlechta (Munich, 1966), II, 15.

⁶The primary passage in Ruskin is in *Fors Clavigera*, in *The Works of John Ruskin*, ed. E. T. Cook and A. Wedderburn (London, 1902-1912), XXVII, 130, though the frescoes by Giotto are also discussed by Ruskin in *Mornings in Florence*, ed. cit., XXIII, 388, and in *Giotto and His Works in Padua*, ed. cit., XXIV, 118. The passage in Proust is in "Du côté de chez Swann," *À la Recherche du temps perdu*, éd. de la Pléiade (Paris, 1954), I, 80-83. See, in addition, Walter Benjamin, "Zum Bilde Prousts," *Illuminationen* (Frankfurt a. M., 1969), pp. 355-69, Eng. trans. by Harry Zohn in *Illuminations* (New York, 1969), pp. 201-15, and Paul de Man, "Proust et l'allégorie de la lecture," *Mouvements premiers* (Paris, 1972), pp. 231-50. De Man's essay discusses Proust's use of Giotto and his filiation with Ruskin. The passage in Proust is also discussed by Samuel M. Weber in "The Madrepore," *Modern Language Notes*, LXXXVII:7 (December, 1972), 954-61.

⁷From the description of "The Word of God," or Christ, in Revelation 19:15.

⁸Proust, *op. cit.*, p. 82: "Later on I understood that the haunting strangeness, the special beauty of these frescoes depended on the large role which the symbol played in them, and that the fact that it was represented not as a symbol, since the symbolized thought was not expressed, but as real, as effectively undergone or materially handled, gave the meaning of the work something more literal and more precise."

⁹I have been unable to find the source of Pater's quotation here.

PEARL K. BELL

Edmund Wilson's *Axel's Castle*

A SORRY FATE IS OVERTAKING the reputation of Edmund Wilson. Since his death in 1972 at the age of seventy-seven and especially since the recent publication of *The Twenties*—the first book in a vast ten-volume posthumous project edited by Leon Edel—there has been an increasing tendency to portray Wilson as the Grand Cham of American letters, a venerable sage whose most impromptu and trivial scribbles must be embalmed in print and enshrined for all eternity. Ironically, Wilson had himself initiated this reverential salvage operation with the publication of *A Prelude*, in 1967; it began with the precocious diary, “My Trip Abroad,” written when he was thirteen years old, and moved through the “landscapes, characters and conversations from the earlier years of my life” recorded in his day-to-day journal through the end of his military service in the First World War. He was preparing *The Twenties* for publication at the time of his death.

As a young man of letters, Wilson had been scornful of such indiscriminate sanctimony toward the scratch-pad detritus of great writers, whose notes, he wrote in his journal, “may have been merely mechanical and meaningless jottings, the products of an instinct to write in its most rudimentary habitual twitchings, like the instinctive defensive or predatory gestures of the lowest forms of life.” If the future volumes of Edmund Wilson’s journal prove to be as dull as *A Prelude* and *The Twenties*, as tediously embarrassing about the sexual floundering of a primly articulate and inhibited young man from a suppressively genteel background, it will become more and more difficult to retain a just and accurate sense of Wilson’s singular importance as a literary journalist and critical historian in twentieth-century America. And because his unique achievement seems in danger of suffocating under an avalanche of posthumous piety concerned more with the life of Edmund Wilson than with the intellectual value of his work, it is now urgent to take a conscientious backward glance at his important book, *Axel’s Castle*, in which he explored the influence of the French Symbolist poets on such revolutionary modern texts as *Ulysses* and *The Waste Land*, and also at the state of criticism in America in the early decades of this century, which he helped to transform.

In the nineteen-twenties, when Wilson was contributing weekly reviews to *The New Republic*, working on the staff of *Vanity Fair* (and briefly being a press agent for

the Swedish Ballet!), he already displayed that habit, or necessity, of mind that raised him far above the rank of journalist, though he rather dryly liked to call himself just that throughout his career. This bent he described years later as the need

to load solid matter into notices of ephemeral happenings; you have to develop a resourcefulness at pursuing a line of thought through pieces on miscellaneous and more or less fortuitous subjects; and you have to acquire a technique of slipping over on the routine of editors the deeper independent work which their over-anxious intentness on the fashions of the month or the week have conditioned them automatically to reject. . . .

Thus, even as a young writer still carving a place for himself in the New York hurly-burly, he often turned his attention away from the pressing abundance of new books, flash-in-the-pan literary fashions, and evanescent fireworks in order to make some wider, more deeply probing comments, more often than not exasperated, on the state of American culture.

What gave Wilson's "solid matter" his characteristic tone of heightened, personally committed intensity was his candid pedagogical—even evangelical—aim of correcting the puerile attitudes and extending the provincial horizons that tainted the prevailing American taste in literature. In 1926, in a broad evaluation of contemporary authors that he jazzily titled "The All-Star Literary Vaudeville," Wilson gave due credit to such iconoclastic critics as H. L. Mencken and George Jean Nathan for their dedication to "the cause of an American national literature in independence of English literature," yet he was appalled at the neglect of critical standards that had become inseparable from that valiant crusade. Unmoved by the mere "Americanism" of Dreiser, Lewis, Sandburg, Masters, *et al.*, he aimed his fiercely scrupulous literary judgments with such merciless accuracy that one bruised poet, Maxwell Bodenheim, denounced Wilson as "a fatuous policeman, menacingly swinging his club." What was lacking in the United States, Wilson complained again in 1928, in "The Critic Who Does Not Exist," was *serious* literary criticism: "In spite of our floods of literary journalism . . . the literary atmosphere [of America] is a non-conductor of criticism." Those writers who could benefit most from the cultivated admonitory intelligence of first-rate, full-time literary critics remained stunted in their immaturity.

In his wide-ranging reviews of the prevailing literary culture, Wilson contributed his unique gift of free-spirited ludicity to the mournful but combative sociological theme announced by Van Wyck Brooks more than a decade earlier, before the First World War, in *America's Coming of Age* (1915) and *The Wine of the Puritans* (1908): that the insularity of the American temper, at once crude and genteel, having cut itself off from the disturbing alien realities of urban and immigrant life in the United States and the cultural traditions of Europe, had resulted in the congenital intellectual isolation of American writers from appreciative readers and from each other at least as far back as Edgar Allan Poe. Wilson, writing of this historical isolation in the twenties, noted that the best talents of America were fleeing to Europe for breathing space, and he carried Brooks's valetudinarian diagnosis an important step beyond the symptoms of America's spiritual impoverishment to argue that the paucity of critical intelligence was an incalculable detriment to imaginative writers, who too often

found themselves, after an auspicious beginning, “stalled, bewildered, out of date almost as soon as they were famous.”

Indeed, Wilson had a lifelong irrepressible urge to pass along the good news of literature to anyone still ignorant of its wonders. As he endearingly admitted in a memoir of a boozy visit with the Fitzgeralds in 1928, “There are few things I enjoy so much as talking to people about books which I have read but they haven’t, and making them wish they had—preferably a book that is hard to get or in a language that they do not know.” And what preoccupied him particularly at this time was the aesthetic fineness of challenging literary achievements. From his deeply rooted dedication to excellence, Wilson passionately strove to demonstrate the practical working interdependence of criticism and creative art. So total was Wilson’s commitment to the intrinsic aesthetic quality of specific works of literature that he attacked Van Wyck Brooks’s *The Pilgrimage of Henry James*, in 1925, for projecting a simple-minded and obsessively social image of James as one of Brooks’s archetypal sensitive Americans who found their native nineteenth-century ground “too barren and too crude for them” and fled to the more nourishing milieu of Europe. Wilson argued that Brooks, in limiting his view to this romantic image of James as cultural refugee, plainly failed “to recognize the real nature and development of James’s art.” In subordinating the novelist to the social and historical emblem, Brooks committed the deadly sin, in Wilson’s eyes, of ignoring “distinctions among some thirty volumes of fiction of widely differing character and merit.”

For Wilson, most prominently in the nineteen-twenties, the work itself was the one valid critical object—its images, internal ideas, literary technique, and tone—as against the woolly sociologism of Brooks and the moralism of the New Humanists led by Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, at that time the suzerains of elite-university literature departments. The intransigent ukases of Babbitt and More, Wilson declared, “strike us with a chill even more mortal than that of reason.” Puritanical and bigoted, More “would, if he could, get out an injunction against all experimentation in the arts.” Wilson’s gorge rose when More contemptuously—and falsely—characterized Joyce’s characters in *Ulysses* as amoral, “merely a medium through which passes an endless, unchecked, meaningless flux of sensations and memories and emotions and impulses.” For Wilson, the New Humanists’ censorious rejection of the Symbolist poets of fin-de-siècle France, because they lacked “the controlling force of moral decision,” was a disgrace of sensibility and an offense to the creative spirit.

Wilson had been introduced to the shimmering and elusive complexities of Symbolist poetry at Princeton by his great teacher, Christian Gauss, who had drunk deep at the source of aestheticism in Paris in the eighteen-nineties, without becoming irreparably intoxicated with the precious doctrine of art-for-art’s-sake. Though Gauss had impressed upon Wilson the importance of “fidelity to a kind of truth that is rendered by the discipline of aesthetic form,” he had also extended the scope of literary inquiry to be, as Wilson wrote in dedicating *Axel’s Castle* to his mentor, “a history of man’s ideas and imaginings in the setting of the conditions which have shaped them.” To dismiss *les précieux*, in the New Humanist fashion, as decadent was to overlook the denigration of art and the artist by nineteenth-century industrial society which had produced their unregenerate self-importance—what aroused Wilson’s admiration for the aesthetes was their moral qualities of “heroic endurance and self-denial.”

It was in this inhospitable critical atmosphere, then—dominated at the one extreme by Brooks, at the other by Babbitt and More, with a tiresome gaggle of philistine reviewers in between, incapable of any response to a new book that was more subtle than “letting out a whoop” or throwing the book at the wall—that Wilson published *Axel's Castle* in 1931. He made his intentions very clear: “to trace the origins of certain tendencies in contemporary literature and to show their development in the work of six contemporary writers”—Yeats, Eliot, Joyce, Valéry, Gertrude Stein, and Proust. Less than a decade had passed since that banner year of 1922, when *Ulysses* and *The Waste Land* had been published and Proust had died, leaving the last three volumes of his monumental *À la Recherche du temps perdu* still to be published. The work of this extraordinary generation of French, Irish, and American writers that assaulted the rigidly entrenched complacencies of the literary establishment in the first three decades of the twentieth century was, in 1931, still an impenetrable jungle of capricious, idiosyncratic obscurity even to cultivated readers of the time. But Wilson had set out with unruffled assurance to guide the interested public through these treacherously uncharted shoals and reefs of literary modernism.

For Wilson, the work of these still unacknowledged giants, creating a new kind of poetry and novel, could not be understood—would, indeed, remain stubbornly inaccessible—without a firm and sympathetic view of the revolutionary conception of art and experience promulgated by their direct predecessors, the Symbolists. He therefore begins with a number of theoretical formulations about Symbolism, Classicism, Naturalism, and Romanticism; but because theory was never Wilson's forte—his mind was incurably concrete—this is perhaps the weakest part of *Axel's Castle*. To elucidate the Symbolists' attack on the Naturalism of Flaubert, Ibsen, Zola, and Taine, Wilson misreads the implications of the thought of Whitehead and Einstein, which he dubiously describes as affirming the organic unity of man and nature, the symbiotic connections between the individual imagination and the inanimate universe. More accurately, as the preponderance of modern art would seem to demonstrate as well, Whitehead and Einstein stressed the disjunctive nature of reality, the terrifying absence of fixed reference points—in contrast to the older nineteenth-century idea of a mechanistic and predictable reality. Certainly Wilson's later discussion of the techniques of dissociation used by Joyce and Proust would bear out a different view of modern philosophy than Wilson offers. And it is astounding that he fails to mention William James's concept of perceptual flux.

Nor is Wilson on much firmer ground when he attempts to define such literary rubrics as Romanticism and Classicism. He attributes to the Romantic poet a clarity of vision into “things as they really are” that is scarcely defensible. His remarks about Swift as exemplar of the eighteenth-century Classical ideal of objectivity are, as Irvin Ehrenpreis has recently charged, “crude and false.” Exactly how Symbolism is an “elaboration of Romanticism” and at the same time “a counterpart to it” remains vague in Wilson's formulation. His argument that such matters as the nature of language, human psychology, and the precise definition of reason, emotion, and sensation are in the philosophers'—not the critics'—bailiwick is complacently evasive.

But Wilson moves on to more fertile ground when he describes the Symbolist doc-

trine itself, rather than its theoretical and philosophical antecedents: The incessantly changeable movement of feeling and sensation within the poet's imagination and the uniqueness of each poet's personality make it "impossible to render our sensations as we actually experience them through the conventional and universal language of ordinary literature." Each poet must find his own language to express his singularity, and this language uses symbols in order to *suggest* the poet's subjective vision, which cannot be flatly stated or simply described. Hence, as Mallarmé wrote in the sonnet "Le Tombeau d'Edgar Poe," honoring an important precursor of Symbolist thought, the Symbolists' concern to *donner un sens plus pur aux mots de la tribu*, to sunder metaphor from object, to strive for a poetry with the indefiniteness of music, to search for words that do not merely transcribe but, rather, represent the emotions and sensations filtered through the poet's imagination, and to project a view of human experience as inescapably and even tragically relative and fragmented.

If Wilson's theoretical formulations are untenably simplistic and often wrong, his superbly dramatic gift for evoking the *mise-en-scène* of intellectual and aesthetic adventure provides this generally unsatisfactory initial chapter with its finest passage. Writing of the Symbolist leader, Stéphane Mallarmé, Wilson deftly sets the scene:

Yet, ridiculed and denounced by the public, who reiterated that his poetry was nonsense, he exercised, from his little Paris apartment, where he held Tuesday receptions, an influence curiously far-reaching over the young writers . . . of the end of the century. There in the sitting-room which was also the dining-room on the fourth floor in the Rue de Rome, where the whistle of locomotives came in through the windows to mingle with the literary conversation, Mallarmé, with his shining pensive gaze from under his long lashes and always smoking a cigarette "to put some smoke," as he used to say, "between the world and himself," would talk about the theory of poetry in a "mild, musical and unforgettable voice." . . . He always reflected before he spoke and always put what he said in the form of a question. His wife sat beside him embroidering; his daughter answered the door.

The dazzling clarity and sharply placed detail of this little tableau—the locomotives and long lashes, the cigarettes and embroidery—evoke a perfectly seen, even redolent domestic setting for the hermetic personality of the self-consciously obscure poet, flawlessly constructed by Wilson's resourcefully observant eye, his keen sense of the material fitness and necessity of ordinary things and recognizable human faces looming out of the mists of abstract exposition. Wilson of course went on to use this extraordinary predilection for what can be pictorially described and humanly represented even more fruitfully in his psychoanalytic interpretations of Dickens and Kipling in *The Wound and the Bow*, and in the dramatically incisive counterpoint of the personalities and ideas of revolutionary socialism in *To the Finland Station*.

For it is precisely Wilson's gift for writing novelistic literary history and criticism with all the variety and expressive richness of a work of art—visually exact, unerring in his choice of illustrative detail and quotation—that makes the chapters on Proust and Joyce in *Axel's Castle* so much more profoundly satisfying than those on the poets Yeats, Valéry, and Eliot. Though Wilson wrote his share of limp verse in his youth, he in time became obstinately certain that verse was "a dying technique," and repeatedly marshaled specious historical arguments to support this silly position while he cav-

alierly ignored the formidably abundant evidence that poetry was neither dead nor dying nor even remotely obsolete. Despite his close and appreciative reading of a few poems of Yeats in *Axel's Castle*, he seems to breathe more comfortably when he turns to Yeats's prose, with its "exceptionally wide information and exceptional intellectual curiosity"—important qualities for Edmund Wilson—which was more accessible to his critical method. He thus devotes far more space to Yeats's autobiographical writings and the fanciful astrological system of *A Vision* than he does to the poetry.

Similarly, when writing of Valéry he is obviously less stimulated by any of the poems than he is by Valéry's theoretical work, or by Valéry's quasi-mythological figure, the crabbed M. Teste, whom he created during his twenty-year abstinence from poetry, or by the piquant fact that Valéry eventually married that same daughter of Mallarmé who answered the door. The dutifully admiring tone Wilson takes in writing of Valéry's poetry, which stands so magisterially at the boundary line between Symbolism and modernism, is gratefully abandoned when he recounts the shocking episode of Valéry's brutally condescending attack on Anatole France when he succeeded to France's chair in the Académie Française. Plainly Wilson finds Valéry repellent, icy, and overbearingly pompous—a novelistic personality it pleases us to hate—and this detestable man, rather than the poetic originality of "La Cimetière Marin" and "La Jaune Parque," is what one remembers most vividly from Wilson's portrait.

Eliot is a far less distasteful challenge; for Wilson, on a more personal, more "American," level of judgment, can fully acknowledge and demonstrate Eliot's innovatory greatness as a poet who brought a "new personal rhythm into the language" and who, writing his finest poems out of an unvarying mood that mingles elegant despair with impotent regret, seduced an entire generation and turned all the impressionable young readers of "Prufrock," "Gerontion," and *The Waste Land* into a faintly comic swarm of aged eagles wearily spreading their feeble wings. Yet Wilson also deplores Eliot's morbid fastidiousness and his sterile fear of the vulgar present, and he takes sharp issue with Eliot's critical dogmatism, which with exquisite pedantry prefers a "pure and rare aesthetic essence" unsoiled by worldly and human values. At his best, Wilson is extraordinarily discerning about Eliot's newly found (in 1931) religious emotion—severely and joylessly rooted, Wilson notes, in the burden of original sin passed on by the poet's New England ancestors.

Yet it is only in the two towering chapters of *Axel's Castle*—the discussions of Proust and Joyce—that the exceptionally practical nature of Wilson's critical intelligence can be most fully appreciated. The eloquent clarity and even hypnotic readability of Wilson's prose, distinguished by the "lucidity, force and ease" he had acquired from a strongly influential teacher at preparatory school, are in his hands a wonderfully versatile tool for explicating the mysterious design and texture of the modernist classics, *À la Recherche du temps perdu* and *Ulysses*, and for unraveling, with deceptively effortless assurance, the hypertrophic layers of symbolic suggestion and comment that at first reading render the narrative line all but invisible. Wilson's detractors (the most venomous and least disinterested was Stanley Edgar Hyman, who unleashed his savagely intemperate attack in *The Armed Vision* in 1948, but omitted it from the paperback edition) have dismissed his exegeses of Proust and Joyce as mere

plot-synopsis, or "translation" within the same language, willfully ignoring, as Harry Levin reminds us, "how much decoding and unriddling had been involved." Through his cunningly intelligible rendering of the narrative continuity in novels that are, in any conventional sense, uneventful, Wilson betrayed no sign of the prodigious labor demanded by a wholly new, painstakingly "disordered" revolution in literature, full of booby traps for the uninitiated reader; the nimble persistence that had preceded his radiant grasp of their thorny intricacies.

Before Wilson, no critic writing in English had perceived that Proust, in all his bewilderingly disjointed prolixity, had taken the "shifting images of the Symbolist poet, with their 'multiplied associations,' and converted them into characters, situations, places, vivid moments, obsessive emotions, recurrent patterns of behavior." Wilson does end the chapter on Proust with a rather too convenient emphasis on the novelist's moral censure of his decadent society, whose *arrivistes*, homosexuals, corrupt aristocrats, blood-sucking bourgeois, and defeated artists (the composer Vinteuil, the novelist Bergotte) are all, in Wilson's famous phrase, "sick with some form of the ideal." But not until he has carefully disclosed what is packed into each layer of Proust's architectonics of transfiguration, memory, and decay does Wilson undertake the organ-tone coda, the most poignantly brilliant passage of *Axel's Castle*, in which he apotheosizes Marcel Proust as "perhaps the last great historian of the loves, the society, the intelligence, the diplomacy, the literature and the art of the Heartbreak House of capitalist culture." But Wilson characteristically ends the tribute to Proust not with this string of abstractions but with the dramatic image of "the little man with the sad appealing voice, the metaphysician's mind, the Saracen's beak, the ill-fitting dress-shirt and the great eyes that seem to see all about him like the many-faceted eyes of a fly. . . ."

Some of the analogies that Wilson made with Proust now seem far-fetched or merely dubious—Dickens' caricatures of greedy social climbers are equally contemptuous but finally less Draconian; and Proust's Jewish mother was at the same time too French to account, as Wilson romantically contends, for her son's "apocalyptic moral indignation of the classical Jewish prophet" envisioning the imminent damnation of an evil world. Wilson's commonsensical American impatience with Proust's cork-lined hypochondria can seem maddeningly notional, as can his naïve indignation, in a 1971 review of Solzhenitsyn's *The First Circle*, over that book's shocking disclosures: "Such a state of things, feels the Anglo-Saxon reader [about the tyrannical imprisonment of millions during Stalin's regime], should not be allowed to exist!"

Only in the discussion of James Joyce does one sense a willing suspension of Wilson's odd American crotchets and irritated dissent, for his powerful excitement over *Ulysses* is derived in large part from Joyce's unprecedented exploitation, "as no writer had thought to do before," of the technical and intellectual resources of both Symbolism *and* Naturalism. Joyce, unlike the other masters of *Axel's Castle*, seemed to Wilson entirely untainted by the decadent self-obsession of the Symbolist heritage. Rather, as Wilson demonstrates, Joyce insisted on rendering "as exhaustively, as precisely and directly as it is possible in words to do, what our participation in life is like." And the supremely practical American realist in Wilson can respond unequivocally to

Molly Bloom's ecstatic "rhapsody of the flesh" in the concluding monologue of *Ulysses*, where Wilson is overcome by the pulsing "body of humanity . . . laboring to throw up some knowledge and beauty by which it may transcend itself."

In his superb elucidation of *Ulysses*, which by no stretch of rational meaning can be called a "plot synopsis," Wilson, opening the convoluted structure of the novel to plain view, reveals exactly how the "fabulous artificer" has organized the minutiae of quotidian existence in *Ulysses* around the Homeric frame to make it, as it were, the definitive poem "of a new phase of human consciousness." In this poem the three principal strands—Stephen Dedalus, Leopold Bloom, and Bloom's wife Molly—are images out of the collective unconscious that simultaneously project an almost pedantically faithful picture of the everyday familiar world. Among the modernist writers only Joyce, in Wilson's view, was entirely successful in fabricating some form of the universalizing mythology that was also sought, though in very different ways, by Yeats and Eliot.

Wilson's passionate assent to the life-affirming genius of *Ulysses*, following his tribute to the moral courage Proust had summoned up to write his enormous book in order to fulfill an obligation to the world he had previously rejected, now seems a fit end to the literary design of *Axel's Castle*. (A short and laboriously dutiful chapter on Gertrude Stein has become largely irrelevant; not even Wilson could convincingly place her in such masterly company.) But, in 1930, Wilson was strongly drawn to the putative social idealism of the Communist Party and Soviet Russia, and he could not in good conscience allow his superb interpretative achievement to stand on its own. And so he added a concluding chapter on Axel and Rimbaud which not only provided the book's seductive title but exposed a surprising confusion in Wilson's mind, as Malcolm Cowley was one of the first to point out, between Symbolism as a literary technique and Symbolism as a way men choose to live.

As a style of life, the Symbolist rejection of the world reached its *reductio ad absurdum* in Villiers de l'Isle Adam's preposterous poetic drama *Axel*, published in 1890, in which the supersensitive hero immures himself in an isolated castle to devote his time solely to reflection and imagination. Except for Wilson's title, all that is now remembered of *Axel* and its grand-opera absurdities is the Noel Cowardly line: "Live? our servants will do that for us." Yeats claimed to have read this hokum as if it were "a sacred book," but in retrospect its appeal to Wilson as an extreme manifestation of the Symbolist retreat from reality is bewildering. Certainly none of the modernist writers he chose to discuss bears the faintest resemblance to Villiers de l'Isle Adam's *précieux* or, at the opposite extreme of rejection, to Rimbaud, who at the age of nineteen, after writing his masterpiece, *Un Saison en Enfer* flung poetry away like rubbish. The Symbolists and their modernist successors, despite their revulsion toward the bourgeois world, nonetheless remained in it, as Wilson writes, "by excreting, like patient molluscs, iridescent shells of literature." But Rimbaud, calling himself "the supreme outlaw," abandoned Europe and the refinements of civilization altogether, acting out in his life in primitive Africa what Joyce had only expressed in words: "History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake." Indeed Wilson, stirred at this time by the Marxist dream of action, felt a tonic force in the gusts of uncompromised energy blow-

ing out of Rimbaud's tempestuous life. Yet Wilson's summation today in terms of Axel and Rimbaud seems a capricious disclaimer of the powerful aesthetic experience he had illuminated in the main body of his book. *Axel's Castle*, begun in opposition to the narrowness of Brooks and More, and written in defense of the aesthetic achievement of modernist literature, ends in ambiguous retreat from the inherent exaltations of art.

Not only does Wilson's muddled counterpoise of Axel and Rimbaud now seem more metaphor than soberly considered idea, but it flouts exactly what *Axel's Castle* so perceptively and painstakingly demonstrates: that the creation of a work of art is, incontrovertibly, one of the most demanding and perdurable forms of human action. (Surely this is what Wilson is saying very clearly in pointing to Proust's novel as the fulfillment of a moral obligation.) Rimbaud's descent into barbarous Africa now strikes us as too singularly deranged and pathologically defiant to support any but the most cautious generalizations about its cultural significance.

One must, of course, remember that Wilson was writing the final chapter of *Axel's Castle* at the beginning of the Depression, when Marxism was at its most seductive. It snared Wilson, along with most intellectuals, and the emphatically *literary* historian that he was, was torn between his commitment to the bold aesthetic dazzle of modernist literature and the sociological need to confront brute actuality in a world that was undeniably gross, compared to art, but inescapable. The shopworn but still largely unchallenged charge of Wilson's detractors has been—to use Stanley Edgar Hyman's version—that *Axel's Castle* “was meant as an attack on the post-symbolist writers as a literary dead end and [Wilson] dismisses them all in the last chapter in favor of a new socially responsible writing.”

If one reads Wilson's conclusion with an unjaundiced eye, however, this indictment simply does not hold up. Wilson does linger on the impasse that Symbolism had reached by the early thirties (the death of modernism would continue to run like a mournful litany through the work of such later historians of the avant-garde as Renato Poggioli, Octavio Paz, Irving Howe, and Harold Rosenberg), and he cautiously suggests that the time has come to move beyond solipsistic introspection and the Symbolist disengagement from the world in order to face the question “whether it is possible to make a practical success of human society.” But Wilson exaggerates the modernists' indifference to politics—Yeats, Eliot, and Pound became more aggressively reactionary between the two World Wars and, in a particularly ironic coming of the wheel full circle, the ultra-Symbolists of the Dada movement, recalling that Rimbaud had fought for the Commune and that Lautréamont had been murdered by the police of Napoleon III, ended up as Communists. Wilson's naïve declaration toward the end of *Axel's Castle* that Russia is “a country where a central social-political idealism has been able to use and to inspire the artist as well as the engineer” proved to be an extremely short-lived aberration in Wilson's political development. After all, how many intellectuals in America knew better than this in 1931? *Eheu fugaces!*

In our own time, more than four decades after its appearance, the dominant note of *Axel's Castle* is not the rallying cry of “social responsibility” but Wilson's incorruptible belief in “the untried, unsuspected possibilities of human thought and art.” By now the peaks of literary modernism, which Wilson elucidated so brilliantly in 1931, have long

been enshrined among the dusty academic monuments, part of an ancient past relegated to the drab archeology of uninspired academic commentators. Because this drastic shift in attitude occurred so rapidly, it is now easy to forget what a pioneering labor Wilson performed in unlocking the mysteries of modernist writing for the common reader, in Virginia Woolf's sense of that much-abused phrase. In 1944, in the essay "Thoughts on Being Bibliographed," Wilson lamented the passing of those "blood-heating crises" that erupted in his and the century's youth, when *Ulysses* and *The Waste Land* were greeted with bewilderment and outrage. Gone were the "howls of denunciation, defiant applause and defense, final vindication and triumph," Wilson complained. When *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce's monstrously more baffling successor to *Ulysses*, appeared in 1939, "it went straight from the hands of Joyce into the hands of the college professors, and is today not a literary issue but a subject of academic research."

Yet this is by no means all that happened to modernism in the decades after *Axel's Castle*. Having acknowledged our enormous debt to Wilson's superb exegeses, we can also mention the most significant weakness of the book, which is not a simple matter of the Marxist message imposed on aesthetic appreciation. Wilson was primarily an intellectual and a journalist, not a scholar, and this meant that he began, as novelists used to do, with the immediate and concrete concerns thrown up by the storm of ideas. At worst, like many intellectuals of his and our time, he became infatuated with the *Zeitgeist* and turned in its wind. Yet his real and very different strength was the critical intelligence that led him to pay meticulous attention to the aesthetic text. This allowed him, in the nineteen-twenties, to discard the superficial sociologizing of Van Wyck Brooks and the rigid moralism of the New Humanists. Yet, by the very nature of being an intellectual and a journalist, Wilson was drawn to the social and political concerns of the day—to his reportage of the Depression (in *The American Jitters*), to his study of the prophets of Marxism (in *To the Finland Station*)—and, instead of becoming an exponent of the New Criticism, to which the aesthetic logic of *Axel's Castle* seemed to lead, he became, as he put it, an "incurably history-minded" critic who felt it urgent to place the literary experimentation of modernism against the moral and political context of the times.

What is curious, however, is that he did not, either in *Axel's Castle* or in his later books, deal with some fascinating conundrums that lurked along the way, mainly the relation between aesthetic experimentation (which More denounced as amoral) and political radicalism. After World War II, and most melodramatically in the nineteen-sixties, it was assumed that there was an indissoluble unity between cultural radicalism and political radicalism. Yet Joyce and Proust were fundamentally apolitical, Yeats was nationalist and reactionary, Pound was a money crank, anti-Semitic and pro-fascist, and Eliot described himself as a classicist in literature, an Anglo-Catholic in religion, and a royalist in politics. If Wilson was attempting, in his final chapter on Axel and Rimbaud, to deal with the larger cultural implications of Symbolism and modernism, he evaded these contradictions and took refuge in a fuzzy amalgam of metaphor and biography.

Even today, the partisans of the modernist movement, lamenting its untimely death and eagerly eulogizing its literary innovations, the bold assault of the free creative spirit—what Lionel Trilling has called “the adversary culture”—on the stifling and obsolete conventions of civilized respectability, have hesitated to pursue their uneasiness at the complex political attitudes of the modernist masters. They cannot bring themselves to ask what price has been paid by civilized society for the subversive modernist credo, as Nietzsche expressed it in *The Birth of Tragedy*, that “art rather than ethics constitutes the essential metaphysical activity of man.” If we remain, as we must, eternally in Wilson’s debt for guiding us with unequalled perception and integrity through the labyrinthine literary glories of modernism, we must look elsewhere for an awareness of its profound anomalies and dangers.

Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth

FRANTZ FANON'S *The Wretched of the Earth*, first published in 1961,¹ is probably the most widely read of the books to emerge from the Third World upheaval of the post-war period; it has been translated into sixteen languages and has reached an international audience. Initially, it was widely hailed as the most passionate and brilliant analysis of the process of decolonization. Rereading the book today, one realizes how much the world has changed in the interval: we now see the extent to which Fanon was a man of his times and the extent to which he was a throwback to the Romantic nationalists of the nineteenth century. Far from having been the Marx of the African revolution (and there were some who mistook him for that), Fanon now emerges more clearly as having been its Mazzini. For the strength of *The Wretched of the Earth* rests less on the incisiveness of its analysis than on the violence and inspiration of its rhetoric. It is a call to arms, not a scholarly autopsy. In the end, it seems more appropriate to apply to it the methods of literary criticism than those of political science. Despite its many contradictions and excesses, *The Wretched of the Earth* remains a remarkable achievement. The universalism of Fanon's imagination and the forcefulness of his language have given the work an appeal that has already made it a modern classic.

In some ways, what one makes of the book depends on what one makes of Fanon himself.² By the details of his biography, Frantz Fanon was a kind of black Everyman, a marginal man who was nonetheless able to transcend his marginality. He was born in 1925 into a middle-class black family in Martinique in the French West Indies. Intensely conscious of his race, but also irrevocably within the orbit of French society by virtue of his education and class position, he found himself unable unambiguously to throw in his lot with either. Like others of his background, Fanon fell under the influence of Aimé Césaire, the Martiniquean poet and politician, and of the movement of *négritude* of which Césaire was a leader. He was to remain deeply marked by this early encounter, although *négritude* came increasingly to seem shallow and parochial to him as time went on. His first book, *Black Skin, White Masks*, published in 1952, publicly revealed this ambiguous break with Césaire.³ It also shows something else—the manner in which Fanon was able to use this ambivalent position among cultures and races to develop a series of penetrating insights into the psychology of racism and colonial domination. His continual preoccupation with these themes was later to give rise to some of the most incandescent passages in *The Wretched of the Earth*.

The life of Frantz Fanon contains a number of additional paradoxes for our reflection. Outwardly, he was the very model of the successful young professional, a psychiatrist of undoubted talents and ambition. He completed his medical degree in 1953 and soon thereafter was posted to the mental hospital at Blida, a small city near Algiers, with the position of *chef de service*. When the revolution broke out at the end of 1954, he was initially slow to take sides. But by 1956 his growing involvement with the rebels led him to resign his position and openly to join the revolution. Even after he became an editor of *El Moudjahid*, the F.L.N. newspaper in Tunis in 1957, however, he continued to practice medicine.

The fact that Fanon was a psychiatrist was to have a major impact on his analysis of the Third World revolution. On the one hand, it was to make him more sensitive than most to the sufferings of individuals in the grip of the colonial system and of the ambivalences of colonizers and colonized. On the other hand, it was to lead him to underestimate the importance of social and economic structures and, consequently, to overrate the possibilities of change. Fanon remained a deeply committed partisan of the cause of Algerian independence until his death.⁴ His duties for the F.L.N. brought him into continual contact with the leaders of the independence movements in black Africa, and he was thus able to renew his commitment to the Pan-African dream and to black liberation. In 1960, he served for a time as F.L.N. representative to the All-African People's Conference in Accra, Ghana.⁵ In the end, of course, Frantz Fanon was neither an Algerian nor an African. This fact gave his treatment of both movements a curious ambivalence, at once the sympathetic supporter and the clear-sighted critic. Like Albert Memmi, whose *Colonizer and Colonized*⁶ presents an analysis of French colonialism which in important ways parallels his own, Fanon was the perpetual outsider. Unlike Memmi, he was able to transcend his marginality to take part in the struggle. *The Wretched of the Earth* can be seen as a kind of synthesis of his life's experience.

The favorable reception of *The Wretched of the Earth* needs to be understood in terms of the movements of decolonization in the postwar world. The steady, ineluctable retreat of European colonialism evoked a feeling of excitement and expectancy throughout Asia and Africa. For a time all things were believed possible; it was the dawn of a new age, of a new chance for humanity. It was at the apogee of this wave of enthusiasm that *The Wretched of the Earth* was published. The forcefulness of its language, its condemnation of colonialism and justification of armed resistance elicited an immediate response throughout the Third World. The book echoed the hopes and fears of its times, and it did so with an idealism that is hard to imagine being expressed today.

The Wretched of the Earth needs also to be situated within the political and intellectual context of postwar France. French intellectuals, already bitterly divided over the Cold War and Stalinism, found themselves in the early nineteen-fifties at odds over decolonization as well. The Algerian war further intensified this conflict. On the Left, the battle was joined between the supporters of the F.L.N. and the French Communist Party. As a leading F.L.N. publicist, Fanon wanted to widen the base of support in French left-wing circles for the insurgents, and *The Wretched of the Earth* was the political manifesto by which he sought to accomplish this task.

The book is the product of an intellectual milieu, as well as a political debate—the cafés of Saint-Germain-des-Prés and postwar Marxism and Existentialism are never far from its pages. The influence of Jean-Paul Sartre, one of the few leading French intellectuals to display an active sympathy for the aspirations of Third World peoples, is especially to be noted. Fanon frequented Sartre's circle in the early nineteen-fifties, and, as has been shown by Irene Gendzier, Sartre's essay *Anti-Semite and Jew* exercised a considerable influence upon Fanon's approach to racism and colonial domination.⁷ It was therefore especially fitting that the first edition of *The Wretched of the Earth* should contain a preface by Sartre.

Tracing intellectual influences on Fanon is a frustrating game, for he freely appropriated concepts which appealed to him, frequently without fully understanding them. His Sartreanism is of this sort, and so is his Marxism. Fanon cannot be described as an orthodox Marxist, although he utilizes Marxist categories and his thought tends to be dialectical. His analysis is indeed impregnated with a kind of folk Marxism which appears to have struck an immediate chord with many of his readers. One suspects that it was less the originality of *The Wretched of the Earth* which assured its success than the way in which it stated what was already widely believed by those for whom it was written.

Another reason for the book's appeal is that, like other classics, it permits a wide range of interpretation. The list of those who claim to have been influenced by it includes (among others) African nationalists, Palestinian commandos, and the Bangladesh guerrillas of 1971-72. It enjoyed particular success among black militants in the United States. For a time it was regarded by the Black Panthers as their "Bible."⁸ Third World groups found in it a sympathy for their sufferings, justification for their struggles, and encouragement to persist in overcoming all obstacles. In a sense, the book is a kind of mirror; one sees in it who one is. The quasi-literate militant is carried along by the flow of the language and never led to take the analysis very seriously. Others, with more education and experience, are encouraged to meditate on the pitfalls of bourgeois nationalism, but miss the section on national culture. The liberal critic is horrified by the passages on violence, which he takes as confirmation of his fears of Third World nationalism. Armchair theorists of revolution disparage the book as pre-political. Its heart is in the right place, but its analysis is hopelessly soft-headed, if not dangerously voluntarist. In this way, everyone can have the Fanon he chooses. Somewhere, presumably, Fanon himself is smiling.

It is important to realize that *The Wretched of the Earth* was written by a man who knew that he had but a few short months to live. The greater part of the book was written over a ten-week period in the spring of 1961. Previously, Fanon had planned to write a book that would show the relevance of the Algerian revolution to black Africa. Stricken with leukemia toward the end of 1960, he abandoned that earlier project to address himself to a far more ambitious task, a general study of the Third World upheaval. *The Wretched of the Earth* is thus, in effect, Fanon's revolutionary will and testament, a final personal exorcism of the demons which haunted his life. The first chapter, "On Violence," already contains in embryo the main themes that would be developed subsequently. It is almost as if, fearing that he would never be able to complete the manuscript, Fanon sought to disgorge it all in these first few pages. The

argument is extremely difficult to follow, as it is presented in an abrupt, violent, and convulsive fashion that eludes all but the most careful of readings. The writing is here at its most searing, an extraordinary outpouring of white-hot emotion—sarcasm, anger, and contempt.

It is clear that Fanon had a very personal sense of language, and this has a great deal to do with the impact the book has had on its readers. Fanon had little patience with most of what passes for intellectual discourse. As he wrote to the French editor of his first book, *Black Skin, White Masks*, in response to a request for clarification on a point in the text, "I cannot explain that phrase more fully. I try, when I write such things, to touch the nerves of my reader. . . . That's to say irrationally, almost sensually."⁹ It seems to me that his style had its roots in the popular culture of Martinique. It is as if *The Wretched of the Earth* were written more to be declaimed like some enormous and terrifying prose poem than it was to be read. No one who has ever encountered the book has come away unmoved.

One key to what the book is about is contained in the final chapter. Here, we are given a vision of the future of mankind, of a new golden age. The chapter begins with some corrosive remarks on the decadence of Western civilization:

When I search for Man in the technique and the style of Europe, I see only a succession of negations of man, and an avalanche of murders.

The human condition, plans for mankind, and collaboration between men in those tasks which increase the sum total of humanity are new problems, which demand true inventions.

Then there follows a series of exhortations:

Let us decide not to imitate Europe; let us combine our muscles and our brains in a new direction. Let us try to create the whole man, whom Europe has been incapable of bringing to triumphant birth.

Two centuries ago, a former European colony decided to catch up with Europe. It succeeded so well that the United States of America became a monster, in which the taints, the sickness, and the inhumanity of Europe have grown to appalling dimensions.

Comrades, have we not other work to do than to create a third Europe? The West saw itself as a spiritual adventure. It is in the name of the spirit, in the name of the spirit of Europe, that Europe has made her encroachments, that she has justified her crimes and legitimized the slavery in which she holds the four-fifths of humanity.

Finally, there come the visions of the future:

It is a question of the Third World starting a new history of Man, a history which will have regard to the sometimes prodigious theses which Europe has put forward, but which will also not forget Europe's crimes, of which the most horrible was committed in the heart of man, and consisted of the pathological tearing apart of his functions and the crumbling away of his unity.

. . . For Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man.¹⁰

The notions that the confrontation between European civilization and the societies of the Third World would produce a new man and a new chance for humanity were

commonplaces of African writings in French at the time. In Fanon, they become part of a new golden age which would be attained through the success of the Third World revolution. In this sense, *The Wretched of the Earth* is a utopian work, a mighty hymn to the advent of the new man, freed from colonialism, racism, national chauvinism, and class oppression. If we view the work as a whole, rather than taking individual sections out of context (the better to criticize them), it is here that we must start.

The Black Panthers were more correct than they knew when they regarded Fanon's book as their "Bible." I would insist on the biblical metaphor. Even though Fanon was not a Christian, the work is permeated with salvationism, albeit of a secular kind. Indeed, I would go even further and suggest that to read the book in its entirety is, in a sense, to undergo a conversion. The argument is not always easy to follow; each succeeding chapter negates and supplants the main points in the one that comes before. By this method, one progresses from the crippling Manicheism of the colonial experience to the pitfalls of national consciousness and finally to the vision of the new man. The individual who conscientiously follows this path achieves a kind of secular salvation or, in Fanon's terms, he becomes politically educated. The book is thus a spiritual guide for an unspiritual age on how to achieve revolutionary beatitude. Like a sermon in a Southern Baptist church, *The Wretched of the Earth* shows us the fires of hell and the glories of the world to come, warns us of the dangers along the way, and encourages us to lend our energies to the work of the Lord. We emerge from the experience transformed, no longer the same men and women.

Like most such experiences, however, there is the letdown of the morning after—the realization that our faults and those of society are not so easily corrected. Given Fanon's suspicions of fancy words and high-flown phrases (by which the bourgeois nationalist leaders deceive the people), there is a chilling irony here. How to warn the people of the intoxication brought by words, when one is intoxicated by them oneself? In the end, one begins to doubt that Fanon has managed to escape from his own rhetorical trap.

The Wretched of the Earth is filled with ideas which flow in many different, often contradictory, directions. Despite the rhetoric, there is an orderly progression to the argument, although it is difficult to perceive at first, so dazzling are its individual passages. If the purpose of the book is didactic—what Fanon calls (following Césaire) the inventing of souls—its structure rests on four interwoven levels of analysis, which are successively introduced in the first four chapters. The levels progress from the psychological (the analysis of colonialism), to the societal (the study of spontaneity), to the political (the unreliability of the national bourgeoisie), to the cultural (the call for a national culture). Allied to this is a parallel temporal progression, in which we are led from the colonial system, to armed struggle, to independence (with its disappointments), to an authentically national culture (which can only arise from the revolution). The fifth chapter documents (using Fanon's case notes) the violence of the colonizer, thereby reinforcing the original diagnosis. Finally the conclusion, with its visions of the new man, provides an inspiring *envoi*.

There is little doubt that *The Wretched of the Earth* will in the end prove far more important for the myths it has helped generate than for the quality of its analysis.

Chief among these myths is the liberating force of violence in the anti-colonial struggle, which, taken out of context, has been used by a variety of groups to justify programs based solely on killing. Is violence psychologically liberating to the native? The question is never directly posed, but the answer Fanon gives seems to be affirmative. But is it? To deal with what Fanon in fact says requires confronting the structure of his argument as well as his own personal ambivalences.

The section on violence comes toward the end of the first chapter and follows the discussion of the colonial system. The colonial world, we learn, is a Manichean world, a dualistic world, in which the settler stands for all that is good and the native for all that is evil. It is also a world built on violence—first on the bayonets of the conquering armies, then on the psychological violence inflicted on the native to keep him in his place by convincing him of his unworthiness. The impact of the colonial system leads to the disintegration of native society and with it the personality of the native. The argument thus far is built around a series of oppositions: colonizer/colonized, West/non-West, settler/native, disintegrated/integrated. At first these cancel each other out; they are equally false, as Fanon remarks in one place. Then the argument shifts so that these dichotomies become the thesis and antithesis of a dialectic. A synthesis is therefore possible; it represents an escape from the colonial stalemate. The way out is through violence. Because the system was established and perpetuated through violence, it must be destroyed through violence. Fanon even makes the point that the more settlers there are, the more violence there will be. Only in this way can the native reintegrate his personality and the synthesis of the dialectic be achieved. The need for violence thus derives from the logical structure of Fanon's argument. Violence is (in his theory) good therapy; it is also the best guarantee that the people will remain immune to the mystification of their leaders.

The subject of violence is resumed in the next chapter, but treated from a slightly different angle. There, we learn that violence, while it may be an understandable response to colonial domination, is far from being an adequate one. The phase of spontaneous violence must be quickly superseded. For a war of national liberation to be successful, violence must be disciplined to its needs; it cannot be left uncontrolled. Fanon, as a psychiatrist, was well aware of the destructive impact that violence can have on its perpetrators as well as on its victims. He presents the case histories of a number of torture victims and of their torturers. The former are Algerians, the latter are French. Both suffer lasting psychological damage. He begins his discussion of the psychological impact of torture with the case of an African nationalist who, during the independence struggle, planted a bomb which took the lives of a number of Europeans. Years later, he was still tormented by anxiety and suicidal impulses on the anniversary of the deed. Even in a just cause, we learn, violence is not liberating.

A second myth to emerge from *The Wretched of the Earth* is that of the peasantry as the primary revolutionary force in the colonial world. Based on a misreading of the wider relevance of the Algerian revolutionary experience, Fanon's analysis on this point appears to have led astray more than one would-be guerrilla leader. Why does Fanon select the peasantry? The answer is clear when we examine the text more closely; the logical imperatives of his argument require it. The peasants, as opposed to the

bourgeois leadership of the nationalist movement and the urban working classes (both of which have lost contact with the old ways and are therefore the most inclined to individualistic behavior), are the most integrated and thus the best disciplined group. They are therefore most suited to be in the vanguard of the revolution. The original argument of the liberating qualities of violence has been transformed, but the interplay of opposites continues here: integrated/disintegrated, rural/urban, bourgeois/peasant. Fanon's assertion of the primacy of the peasantry in wars of national liberation thus stems from a logical rather than a sociological analysis of the colonial situation.

It is now all but forgotten that Fanon's views of the peasantry were received with ridicule and disbelief. French Communists stoutly condemned the heretical notion that the peasantry, and not the working class, would produce the revolution. Western liberal analysts systematically discounted the rural populations, placing their bets instead on the development of political parties in the cities. Only later, as knowledge of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions began to spread and the Cuban revolution came to power through the mobilization of the rural masses, did this consensus begin to change. Algeria was clearly a case of a peasant-based revolutionary movement, and Fanon sought to underscore this fact in his analysis, the better to make some polemical points.

Given Fanon's commitment to the cause of Algerian independence, it was not surprising that he tended to use the Algerian model in his views on the decolonization of the rest of Africa. This has earned him a great deal of adverse criticism, for conditions in Algeria were in important ways quite different from those that pertained in most of black Africa. Juridically part of France, Algeria had almost a million European settlers in 1954 (and some nine million Muslims). The European impact on native society was vastly greater than elsewhere in Africa, and the regime was far more discriminatory and repressive. The prospects for a peasant uprising on anything like the Algerian scale were minimal in other parts of Africa. It is even possible to question Fanon's understanding of the Algerian situation, for his knowledge of Arabic was rudimentary at best and his grasp of the intricacies of Algerian Arab-Islamic culture seems on some points to have been rather precarious. Given Fanon's intentions and the level of generalization on which *The Wretched of the Earth* is written, these are not crippling weaknesses, but they do lessen confidence in his judgment.

One of the most prescient parts of the book is the analysis of the national bourgeoisie. Most of French Africa had been independent for only a few years when Fanon wrote his scathing denunciation of the nationalist elite who had come to power there: the new leaders of Africa are notable chiefly for their ability to manipulate slogans, the better to profit from their office. The people, when they realize that their leaders are primarily interested in filling their pockets, cry treason. But, says Fanon, the treason is not national, it is social. From this, he draws two conclusions. The first of them is that one does not have to be white to be an exploiter, the second, that nationalism is not in itself a sufficient program. Fanon's penetrating criticism of bourgeois nationalism is one of the great achievements of the book. But while we credit Fanon with uncommon foresight in his analysis of the bourgeoisie, we must also recognize that he seriously underestimated its power. According to his analysis, the national bourgeoisie occupied

no productive function in the life of the nation and was thus simply an ersatz class whose early disappearance could be anticipated. Time has not borne this out. Today Lumumba is dead, and it is Mobutu who rules Zaire in a grisly parody of the authentic revolution.

One of Fanon's greatest weaknesses lay in his impatience with the study of social and economic structures. This led him to underestimate the staying power of the national bourgeoisie, in particular its connections with the army and its access to external sources of support against domestic rivals. At a time when three quarters of Africa is ruled by military men, it seems in retrospect remarkable how little Fanon has to say on the role of the army in his new Africa. In all fairness, however, others writing at the time were not notably more perceptive. The first of what was to become an avalanche of military coups did not take place until 1963 in Togo.

Fanon had some proposals about how a country might hope to avoid domination by its national bourgeoisie and pursue a different political path. Basically, Fanon's suggestions are unremarkable. They are the standard ones proposed by theorists of revolution. Having first demonstrated the inadequacies of spontaneous violence, he then indicates how the bourgeois nationalist, by virtue of his class interests, will be unable to address the real problem—namely, social inequality. In order to bring about a more just socio-political system, Fanon suggests, first, that a trustworthy political party be formed, one that will genuinely represent the people (and not merely one that claims, like the bourgeois parties, to represent them); second, that the party's decision-making apparatus be decentralized insofar as possible, in order to place power in the hands of the people; third, that the intellectuals come into close contact with the people, but in such a way that the people still feel that they are in charge; and fourth, that political education be undertaken. Fanon states, "The purpose of political education is to invent souls." The phrase is borrowed from Césaire. Here, the argument shifts abruptly. The party now becomes nothing less than the mechanism that will create the new man; his appearance will mark a new beginning in the history of mankind. This new man—political man—is the creation of the intellectuals. Is it totally an accident that just where Fanon is being the most straightforwardly descriptive, we suddenly find ourselves plunged into his utopian dream of the revolution?

It is characteristic of Fanon's thought that in the end he should opt for culture rather than material conditions as the crucial factor in bringing about the revolution. This is made clear in the chapter "On National Culture." It has been a source of debate among Marxists. It is perhaps a reflection of Fanon's consciousness of the fragility of political order in the new Africa that for him the crucial problem is that of legitimacy. If the political legitimacy of the government of national liberation is not to be called into question, then it must be supported by an authentic national culture. Fanon takes great pains to distinguish between the kind of revolutionary culture he is speaking of and the pseudo-national cultures most African states have contented themselves with: folklore, *négritude*, a truncated and self-interested version of the national past. The revolution, if it is not to lose itself in chauvinism, racism, or other errors, must seek to evolve a national consciousness which can transcend narrow nationalism. Only thus, Fanon argues, will it be possible to attain a new humanism. Unlike those

who view the struggle in strictly political terms, he sees the revolution above all as a cultural phenomenon, a position approaching that of Mao Tse-tung, or perhaps more appropriately here, the Guinean President Sékou Touré. It is Fanon at his most theoretical, but also at his most universalist and humanitarian.

The Wretched of the Earth is a book of a particular moment in history, but also of a stage of development of political consciousness in the Third World. With the liberation of most of Africa, its popularity is in decline and its utopian vision no longer seems convincing. The two major myths to which the book gave rise, that of the liberating qualities of violence and that of the primacy of the peasantry in the liberation struggle, still have their adherents, but they lack persuasive force in the harsher political environment of the mid-seventies. Yet while the book has reduced appeal, its language still has a capacity to startle and capture the attention of new discoverers. The upheaval in the Third World and among American domestic minorities persists, although new forms of struggle have emerged. It seems safe to predict that Fanonist ideas will continue to find supporters among the desperate and the downtrodden. To a remarkable degree, *The Wretched of the Earth* can still put us in touch with the hopes and fears of an age and with its lost illusions. In its pages that springtime of the nations, the nineteen-fifties and early -sixties, lives again. Because of its rhetorical brilliance, but also its universalism, *The Wretched of the Earth* will continue to be read long after other more parochial writings from this period and perspective have been forgotten.

REFERENCES

¹*Les Damnés de la Terre* (Paris, 1961), English translation by Constance Farrington (New York, 1968). The reader should be warned that the translation does not convey the full impact of the French original and is not always reliable. The title is taken from the *Internationale*, but may perhaps also contain an echo of a poem by the Haitian writer Jacques Roumain.

²In the section which follows, I have drawn on the two principal biographies of Frantz Fanon: Peter Geismar, *Fanon the Revolutionary as Prophet* (New York, 1969) and Irene L. Gendzier, *Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study* (New York, 1973).

³Original French edition, *Peau noire, masques blancs* (Paris, 1952). English translation by Charles L. Markmann (New York, 1967).

⁴In 1957, drawing upon his Algerian experiences, Fanon published *L'An V de la révolution algérienne* (Paris, 1957). It has been translated into English by Haakon Chevalier as *Studies in a Dying Colonialism* (New York, 1965).

⁵A posthumous volume of Fanon's speeches and editorials was published as *Pour la révolution africaine* (Paris, 1964). English translation by Haakon Chevalier, published under the title *For the African Revolution* (New York, 1967).

⁶Albert Memmi, *Portrait du colonisé précédé du portrait du colonisateur* (Paris, 1957). English translation, 1965.

⁷Gendzier, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–35.

⁸Eldridge Cleaver, *Post-Prison Writings and Speeches* (New York, 1969), p. 18. Cited by Gendzier, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

⁹Quoted by Geismar, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹⁰*The Wretched of the Earth* (Grove Press edition), pp. 312–16.

ERNEST GELLNER

The Sociology of Robert Montagne (1893-1954)

THE MODERN STATE—territorial, national, secular, centralized—is taken for granted by its citizens. If they theorize about it at all, they are generally concerned about the precise extent of its proper powers and responsibilities, rather than about its basic nature or existence. That the maintenance of order should be the responsibility of specialized agencies, acting under the law and not in pursuit of private ends, and that it should recruit its personnel from the governed population and remain culturally continuous with it—all this seems *so* self-evident that to spell it out in ordinary discussion appears pedantic. Liberals add the right to associate with a view to reforming society; socialists insist on the need to prevent economic oppression; egalitarians, on the need to ensure equality. But the traits we have specified stand outside most current debates and seem axiomatic. If people find themselves obliged to redress wrongs by private use of violence, if their rulers belong to a quite different community, are culturally alien, and run the state machine openly for their own private advantage—then we are, by our contemporary standards, in the presence of some blatant aberration, a veritable political *scandale*.

Such is the conventional wisdom of the day. But, whatever authority it may have, it can hardly spring from some statistical normality. A survey of the forms of political association found throughout human history would hardly bear out the view that the effectively centralized, “national” (culturally homogeneous) state is so prevalent that any deviation from it must be considered pathological. Quite the reverse.

Our tacit and self-evident norms may indeed be good ones, but their authority cannot be rooted in some near-universal pervasiveness of what they enjoin. To understand them, we should know their specific social roots and preconditions; and to do that, we need to know a little about those social forms that *differ* from them. Here we are somewhat hampered by the seeming self-evidence of our own assumptions. More specifically, we are hampered by the lack of any good typology of social and political forms.

Our failure to acquire a good, useful classification of types of society is both conspicuous and strange. We possess a shared and reasonably illuminating terminology for categorizing architectural styles or painting, not to mention plants or insects. Neither the existence of borderline cases nor the fact that important principles of classification (e.g., origin and structure) cut across one another really hampers the taxonomical enterprise in other fields. But when it comes to what concerns us most—human

societies—both our ingenuity and our drive seem to desert us. The classifications we use tend to be either crude (industrial/pre-industrial), or ad hoc and unsystematic, or tied to archaic theories we no longer hold and to questions we no longer ask. No doubt there are various reasons for this failure, but they can hardly be diagnosed, let alone remedied, in an article.

However, if someone should attempt this task, he will need to use one book that appeared in French in 1930 and that has never been translated, Robert Montagne's *Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc. Essai sur la transformation politique des Berbères sédentaires (groupe Chleuh)*, published in Paris by the Librairie Félix Alcan. While it deserves to be known as a classic, in fact, outside the ranks of North African specialists, it is virtually unknown. One can easily see the reasons why. The title is unfortunate and misleading, and hardly calculated to whet the curiosity of someone browsing through a library or a catalogue. It mentions a mysterious and unidentified entity, the *Makhzen*, and it appears to be about the relationship of this entity, whatever it may be, to one particular region, the south, of one particular country in Africa. The matter becomes even worse if one looks at the subtitle. It suggests that the book is concerned with a sub-group of tribes, the Chleuh, whoever they might be and however that word might be pronounced. Clearly a book for specialists. Perhaps it contains fascinating information for someone interested in sedentary tribesmen in the south of one particular country, but for the rest of us, whose human sympathy and curiosity extend impartially to tribesmen and townsmen, nomad and sedentary, east, west, and north as well as south, clearly this book of over four hundred pages has little to offer. Perhaps a summary of its findings. . . ?

Anyone arguing in this manner on the basis of the title would be committing a complete, albeit a natural, mistake. The book in fact contains a superb analysis of an important and widely diffused *type* of society, one which for lack of a better name (and without prejudice) one could call the Muslim or the Ibn-Khaldunian type: the kind of society in which a weak state coexists with strong tribes, in which the tribes have what might be called a "segmentary" structure, and in which the lack of political cohesion is accompanied by a striking degree of cultural continuity and economic interaction. This kind of society is especially common within Islam—although this is not to say that necessarily all Muslim countries exemplify this syndrome or that no non-Muslim country does. But the type extends far beyond the southern Moroccan case studies which inspired Montagne's book, and indeed Montagne draws on a far wider range of material than the title suggests. The book has remarkable sociological breadth and historical depth.

Apart from the misleading title, there may perhaps be another reason for Montagne's neglect. Robert Montagne was a liberal rightist, in the sense that he was not opposed to the colonial system as such, nor to the French presence in North Africa, however sensitive and perceptive his understanding of the indigenous society might have been. From a historical viewpoint this is hardly important. His claim to our attention rests on the fact that he represented the high point of French colonial ethnography, and not on his direct participation in events; the dilemmas of French policy are reflected and illuminated in his work, though his ideas do not explain French policy. But his political position does explain the kind of reception his work received.

To a very considerable extent, French sociological and ethnographic work in North Africa was carried out by military officers and administrative officials. It accompanied conquest, it was a kind of reconnaissance in depth, and it was the handmaiden of government. In consequence, there was surprisingly little interaction between the French university and North African research. Émile Durkheim's and Marx's and Engels' views on primitive society were influenced by Algerian Berber material. But, as time progressed, the North African world of colon and officer became increasingly separate from the mainstream of French and European intellectual life. Notwithstanding the facts that one outstanding French historian of North Africa, Ch.-André Julien, was an early friend of the nationalists and that an outstanding human geographer was a Communist, by and large the world of research into North African tribal societies was a closed one, with rightist and military associations ignoring and ignored by the wider world of scholarship. Montagne's own masterpiece is inspired by ideas drawn from his knowledge of classical Greek politics, by the rejection of the medieval analogy, by a good knowledge of Ibn Khaldun and North African history, and by another unjustly forgotten French scholar, E. Masqueray, who in 1886 published a study which attempted to do a kind of Fustel de Coulanges for North Africa, by tracing the evolutionary pattern of its social forms. But he seems to draw little inspiration from the main currents of sociological and anthropological thought. Conversely, when, for instance, Lévi-Strauss deploys his extraordinary erudition and lists the societies that exhibit binary or moiety organization, he ignores Montagne, despite Montagne's almost excessive preoccupation with moieties among the Berbers.

So long as North Africa was dominated by France, interest in its tribal populations tended to be a preserve of military or civilian servants of French authorities, and an interest in the apparently archaic aspects of these societies seemed suspect to other scholars. With independence, the old right lost interest, scholarly or other, in North Africa; while the left, rediscovering this world, had little inclination to dig up the works of a naval officer assigned to political intelligence in the interests of establishing a colonial protectorate. In this it was mistaken. The sociological importance of Montagne's work, which is enormous, is quite independent of whatever assessment one might make either of colonialism in general or of the French record in North Africa in particular.

Montagne was born in 1893 and entered naval college in 1911. He came to Morocco as a naval officer after the First World War, and apparently some of his spare-time sociological inquiries attracted the attention of the great French proconsul, Marshal Lyautey. The major problem facing the French, who had established a protectorate over the monarchy in 1912, was the highly effective resistance, not yet either of the elite or of the towns, but of the unsubdued tribal populations, both in the Rif and in the Atlas mountains. Montagne later wrote:

France was . . . able, after thirty-two years' endeavour and thanks to the efforts of our own military and political personnel and to the cooperation of the tribes that submitted to our rule, to achieve the political unification of Morocco, probably for the first time in history. She was determined, at the same time, to integrate the defeated tribes into the Sherifian Empire that the Protectorate had restored and reorganised.

Montagne was assigned to ethnographic work, which was in practice inseparable from political intelligence. He did not return to the sea. In the French empire, the army had developed under Gallieni and Lyautey a tradition of conquest and administration by political rather than military means through an understanding and utilization of indigenous institutions. This was in many ways parallel to the ideas of “indirect rule” developed by the British. But there was a difference: On the whole, the British did not simultaneously deal with princes *and* with dissident tribesmen. It tended to be one or the other. The peculiarity of the Moroccan situation was that the indirect rulers were simultaneously utilizing native institutions at quite different levels—a theocratic, nominally absolutist but effectively enfeebled sultanate and anarchic but militarily effective tribesmen, with petty local tyrants emerging in between. The result, in Montagne’s work, was to be a remarkable portrait of a total and highly complex society, a study combining anthropological detail with historical sweep. The academic fruits of his labors led eventually to a professorship at the Collège de France. When the new proletariat of the shantytowns replaced the tribes as the main political problem for the rulers, Montagne’s sociological interests reflected the change, and he was thus also the author of one of the first studies of the new Moroccan working class. He died in 1954.

So, in colonial days, his work tended to be the property of a closed circle of soldiers and administrators concerned with its practical application rather than its wider circulation, while in the days of independence and the age of the Third World, it seemed part of a repudiated past. But the time is ripe for rediscovering it.

Through Montagne’s work, we can come to understand a certain type of non-Western state, very unlike that national centralized state which we so much take for granted. The misleading title of his masterpiece already singles out the main *dramatis personae* in this political structure; the *Makhzen* is the traditional North African term for the central power, and the Berbers are paradigmatic *tribesmen*. The type of political formation with which he was concerned is above all characterized by the coexistence of these two main elements: a central authority, nominally if not effectively recognized by an entire society, which thereby acquires a kind of moral unity, and the tribes. The circumstances of the French conquest of Morocco, which took place in the early decades of this century, were such that neither of these elements could possibly be ignored. This was not so, for instance, in neighboring Algeria: When the French arrived there in 1830, they dismantled the central structure, which had indeed been a very elegant and economic one, and thereafter found themselves facing in the main a chaotic patchwork, or, under Abd el Kader, a new formation. In Morocco, this could not be so: the international treaties and horse-dealing that allowed the French entry into Morocco obliged the French to treat it as a “protectorate”—to be there as protectors and renovators of the central power—so they could not ignore it. Commenting on these dilemmas, a French general, P. J. André, who took part in the conquest of Morocco, reminisces (*Confréries Religieuses Musulmanes* [Algiers, 1956], p. 346):

The author of these lines remembers particularly Marshal Lyautey’s first visit to Taza, recently occupied by our troupes. . . . His attention was drawn to the distinctiveness of the local Berber chiefs, of the tribes, of the local religious orders, who claimed to accept French authority but refused their submission to the Makhzen. One of the officers present was not too afraid to say:

"This is the moment to establish in Taza a Berber republic which will be loyalist to us. . . ." The Marshal replied: "No doubt you are right, but I am in Morocco for the purpose of restoring the authority of the Sultan throughout the land, and I can do no other."

At the same time, the only effective military opposition the French encountered came from tribesmen. It was not a trivial opposition. In the nineteen-twenties, tribesmen from the Rif decisively defeated one European power, Spain, and very nearly defeated France herself. In central Morocco, small mountain tribes defied France for decades.

The relationship between a weak, town-based, religiously charismatic dynasty, respected but not obeyed, and tribes which were remarkably cohesive and militarily effective, yet often devoid of any centralized permanent leadership—this relationship could not, in these circumstances, fail to be at the very center of interest and attention. Thus the circumstances of the French conquest of Morocco virtually imposed a certain highly illuminating sociological perspective on its political intelligence officers, of whom Montagne was one.

It was also a perspective that other students of Oriental state formations generally missed. One can only speculate why there is so relatively little scholarly work on this topic. Oriental societies are the subject matter of Oriental studies; but the Orientalist's definition of reality is whatever is attested by a text, and texts are generally written by scribes at courts with a view to pleasing rulers, and rulers do not normally relish being reminded of insolent tribesmen who defy their authority. Moreover, the European vision of the Oriental state may inevitably have been overly influenced by the Ottoman empire, untypical in that it had an unusually strong state structure, based on a rather special principle of organization and cohesion. In Africa and in the South Seas, it is true, scholars and anthropologists did look directly at tribes; but sub-Saharan tribes, when not stateless, generally had tribal states, i.e., political structures emerging from within the ethnic group rather than superimposed on it or opposed to it. In brief, anthropologists tended to look at tribes that were more or less islands unto themselves, rather than unrefined members of a literate civilization, while Orientalists tended to look at literate civilizations through the eyes of their texts. In neither case were they led to consider the relationship between tribal groups and an urban-based central power. If, as I suspect, this is the heart of the matter, it follows that they tended to miss the main theme of at least one important type of non-Western polity.

Of course, it would not be true to say that there are no studies of this topic. Owen Lattimore's work on the relationship between the centralized Chinese state and the nomads of the Asian steppes is a good example and is strictly parallel to Montagne's work; the two should stand side by side on the shelves. Still, it is remarkable how little is available on this subject. British India might have been expected to provide a stimulus for research in this direction. Perhaps the Mogul state was too decrepit by the time Western scholarship looked at India; perhaps the key theme in India was the relationship of state to peasant and caste rather than to tribe; the "tribal" populations surviving in the subcontinent were either far too marginal to the system, or, where they constituted a political threat, as on the northwestern frontier, belonged to a different cultural tradition altogether. Or again, the emirates of northern Nigeria might have stimulated interest in this topic; but in northern Nigeria the British dealt with the

Fulani or Hausa emirs and not with the humble tribesmen, and again one element in the picture was lacking.

Here we come to a further crucial feature of the Moroccan political situation at the time of the French conquest which was favorable to the correct phrasing of the socio-logical question: the *dramatis personae* on the scene were not merely the Sultan and the tribes. There were also the tyrants, *les grands caids*. Or to put it another way, the French encountered two radically different forms of political organization in the tribal highlands. Some tribes were ruled by fairly egalitarian tribal assemblies, composed of heads of households, and in fact organized in whole hierarchies of such assemblies for tribal groups of diverse sizes, the larger incorporating the smaller units. Others were ruled arbitrarily by autocratic robber-baron figures, tyrannizing over their subjects from romantic-looking mountain castles.

The grip of the republican or anarchic tradition is not so strong that there do not constantly emerge in North Africa, within several of the five or six thousand little elementary states which cover the mountain regions of the Maghreb, ambitious and energetic men capable of setting themselves above the councils of notables. These leaders establish states of varying sizes, by violence or by political manoeuvring; and there are even those who manage to build chiefdoms, kingdoms and empires. . . . We observe also that the decline of the states that they found is often as swift as their emergence is sudden.

The French conquerors and administrators of Morocco could not conceivably remain insensitive to these striking differences, for their concrete policies had to take note of these diverse elements, and indeed they made use of them in diverse ways. In fact, French policy in Morocco invoked a variety of contradictory principles:

- 1) The French presence in Morocco was based on a treaty with the Sultan, and the promise to provide protection to the central government and to strengthen it.
- 2) At the same time, the French formed alliances with the great robber-barons of the south, notably the famous Glawi, Pasha of Marrakesh, and some others. Sometimes they created tribal rulers, *caids*, where none had previously existed, or had only existed in embryonic form.
- 3) As a means both of securing, if possible, the submission of the tribes and of facilitating their subsequent administration, they underwrote tribal custom, allowing the tribes to retain their assemblies and to govern themselves by tribal customary law.

Each of these elements may have been essential for the attainment of French ends—the first legitimated French entry, the second secured powerful allies, notably in the south, and the third neutralized or diminished opposition in the largest and most intractable block of tribal lands in central Morocco, where the High Atlas and the Middle Atlas meet each other and also join the nomadic area of the borderlands. Logically and sociologically, however, there was an inevitable tension between these policies.

Nominally, the Sultan was an absolute ruler; hence, the toleration or support of *de facto* independent principalities on his territory was, in theory, in conflict with the protecting power's obligation to sustain his authority. At the same time, he was also the religious leader of the country, obliged *qua* Muslim ruler to promote good and suppress evil—good and evil being delimited by Koranic Law and in the keeping of the

scribes who interpreted the Koran and perpetuated the traditions of the Prophet and his companions. But the customary law of the tribes deviated from holy law; hence to underwrite it was to underwrite heresy and schism. (It was this particular conflict that provided the first issue for modern nationalism.) Thus, there was also a conflict between obligation to the Sultan and commitment to the tribesmen. Finally, there was, of course, also a conflict between baron and tribesmen. The baron stands for local order and tyranny; the tribal assembly, for anarchy and freedom.

The dilemmas of French colonial policy in Morocco arose from efforts to satisfy diverse allies and appease potential enemies. (In due course, a settler lobby was to complicate the game further.) The ultimate importance of Robert Montagne lies in the fact that he was both a great sociological theoretician and a superb ethnographic observer. But he is also of interest as a historical document, through whom we can gain insight into the French options in the Morocco of that time. Was one to support the Sultan and his court—archaic, Oriental, ineffectual, corrupt, but with a great hold on the symbols of ultimate legitimacy? Was one to support the robber barons, effective, brutal, repulsive, yet possessed of a certain barbarous splendor and capable of providing military backing? Or was one to support the tribal republics, attractive in their Swiss-style participatory democracy, but also archaic in their own way, intractable, prone to feuds, addicted to anarchy, procrastination, fission? Reading Robert Montagne, there is no doubt in my mind where his deepest sympathies lay—with the tribal republics.

... one is tempted in one's heart of hearts to take the side of the Berber republics. It seems as though all the goodness and right is on their side. Why, then, are we so deeply associated with the qajids? Is this proof of a Machiavellian conspiracy on the part of the Makhzen and of the French authorities? In fact the rationale behind this collaboration ... is quite simple. It is that it is practically impossible to deal with a Berber republic. ... It requires years of patience to get a council to take a decision about such things as the reorganisation of a region, the building of roads, the payment of taxes and the exercise of justice. All the time one would be held up by continual discussion and countless insignificant complaints. There is no place for the ordered anarchy of the Berber cantons in a modern state.

Montagne saw lucidly the social forces which also favored the other, rival participants. The emotional and policy dilemmas faced by administrators and policy-makers were reflected in his work. It is sociology's gain that the choices highlighted exactly those elements that need to be singled out if we are to understand this type of polity.

What does his work tell us about these elements and their interrelations? There are, in fact, several connected themes to be found:

- 1) the internal organization of the tribesmen in what may be called their normal political condition;
- 2) their alternative organization when subjected to the tyrants, and the highly important thesis of the tendency of such tribal societies to oscillate between a republican and a tyrannical constitution; and
- 3) the relationship of both forms of organization to the central state and a theory of state formation.

At each of these points, Montagne combines brilliant abstract theory with fascinating and detailed description. He had his material all about him: the man who wan-

dered around the western High Atlas and saw the great baronies of the Glawi, Gountafi, and Mtouggi knew how power could occasionally crystallize in a tribe; a man involved in the Rif war could see, through the great adventure of Abd el Krim, the man who defied two European states at a time when colonialism was still triumphant and seemed invincible, just what the process of state formation was in a tribal world. The man involved in the slow and finally uncompleted French conquest of central Morocco also knew how egalitarian tribal republics functioned and the manner in which assemblies and religion combined to maintain order where no sovereign kept the peace. Montagne had a certain advantage over the British functionalist anthropologists who were, at about the same time, transforming anthropology by their thorough and sustained field work. He felt no obligation whatever to be ahistorical. On the contrary, while much of his material was underfoot, he made, at the same time, remarkable use of history. North Africa may be (or may have been until very recently) a tribal world, but it is not one without well-documented history. In addition Montagne had the fourteenth-century scholar Ibn Khaldun—a superb historian-sociologist, who had both documented and schematized the medieval period of the region—as a predecessor. One of Montagne's conclusions was precisely a kind of continuity thesis: the medieval political dramas of the Almoravides and the Almohades and the contemporary politics of Abd el Krim, or of the Pashas of Marrakesh, or the petty chiefs of the Middle Atlas, were variations on the same themes and moved within the same structure.

What were his specific conclusions? One may usefully begin with a negative conclusion about the great “robber barons”: this was *not* a form of feudalism.

The term ‘feudal’ has sometimes been used to refer to this form of political system created by Berber leaders in the Atlas. . . . [But] we do not find in Morocco that hierarchic power structure which characterises European feudalism . . . nor is there any equivalent of the feudal courts . . . there is nothing like the bonds which tied subjects to the land . . . the precarious nature of this system of domination should rule out the use of the term ‘feudal’ which in the West at least refers to a very stable form. . . . In Berber society the tribal rebellion is rarely long delayed and the absolute power of the rulers never lasts for more than two or three generations. In fact the only term which really could be applied to this form is . . . ‘the despotic regime.’ It drains the life from a region and is not able, because of its own fragility, to establish lasting institutions.

The superb, romantic, crag-topped, crenellated castles, the violence, squalor, *corvées*, ethos of honor, the tangled intrigues of the barons with one another and with their nominal overlords, the brutality, the household servants, the complex households, the medieval-style Jews—all these immediately suggest a return to the European High Middle Ages. Over and above this, there is the regrettable tendency, springing perhaps from Marxism but now part of daily French political terminology as well, of using the expression *les fëodaux* for any strong rural power-holders with a local, rather than a centrally ordained, power base. This is the appearance; the conventional political wisdom confirms it, and literature consecrates it by speaking of *les seigneurs de l'Atlas*, ‘the Lords of the Atlas.’

So much for appearance. Reality is different. This is no feudalism. There is no stability in the system. There is no separate estate of warriors and fief-holders, endeavor-

ing to monopolize military and political functions. There is no code of reciprocal obligations.

Montagne prefers to compare the great chiefs, such as those who dominated much of the western High Atlas during the early part of this century, to the tyrants of ancient Greek cities, tyrants in the original sense of usurpers who succeeded in emerging from the complex political struggles of an oligarchic republic and who precariously and brutally hung on to their power—though not for very long.

... the Berber *amghar* must not be confused with the king or chief in other primitive societies. The social relations that he has with the tribe and the mechanics of his rise place him rather with the 'tyrant' of Greek society in the eighth century B.C., before the cities had developed their political constitution.

They emerge from a triangular struggle, in which the other participants are both local rivals and the central power. A significant step in the emergence of the greatest of the southern barons occurred when the rising chief permitted a royal progress of the Sultan's peripatetic court and dubious army to cross his mountain passes, and was rewarded with a Krupp cannon, which the royal retinue was with great difficulty lugging across the mountain fastnesses. With this, it was much easier to reduce the collective storehouse forts, the *agadirs* and *ighirmen*, of recalcitrant tribesmen. Less distinguished chiefs could, on their own account, owe their position to no more than having been the first local lineage to own a fast-loading rifle.

Thus, in Montagne's view, the seeming feudalism of the Moroccan south of the early twentieth century was not a stable social form. It was not even *a* social form at all, in a certain sense; it was one *stage* in an oscillating social form.

This is one of Montagne's main theses about Berber politics: it oscillates between two inherently unstable forms. The precarious balance of power in the tribal republics occasionally allows an ambitious leader of one segment to assert his supremacy and expand his power. But the tyranny that emerges is at least as unstable as the one before, and after a time it disintegrates again and the original near-egalitarian system reappears. This thesis has a striking resemblance to the one quite independently proposed by Edmund Leach for Highland Burma over two decades later (cf. *Political Systems of Highland Burma*, 1954). The mechanisms and the details of the analysis were not the same: Leach's account was linked to a subtle theory of the relationship of mind to society derived from Durkheim and to a dissection of the tensions within the Burmese hill tribes' principles of kinship, whereas Montagne on the whole remained within the bounds of political anthropology.

This brings one to Montagne's account of the internal mechanics of the alternative condition of this unstable, oscillating tribal world. Here the relevant point of comparison is the work of the great British social anthropologist, the late Edward Evans-Pritchard, and above all his work on the Nilotic tribe of the Nuer. Each faced the same theoretical problem, the nature of politics in seemingly anarchic tribal conditions. Westerners tend to hold two opposed and equally mistaken views of tribal politics: one, that in the absence of an effective sovereign, it consists of a Hobbesian war of all against all, and the other, that the benighted savage, with his closed tribal mind reinforced by

an abject fear of the supernatural, slavishly conforms to social requirements, barely able to conceive of defying them, let alone summoning courage to do so. Whatever their merits as ideal types for use in political philosophy, these visions have little applicability to concrete ethnography. In tribal societies, social control is neither absent nor automatically enforced through mental rigidity and superstition.

The circumstances in which the two men worked were both similar and different in equally interesting ways. The internal mechanics of Nuer and Berber politics are very similar. In fact, I believe that the principles discovered at work among the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard apply with greater purity to the Berbers than they do to the Nuer themselves. On the other hand, the various Nilotic tribes whom Evans-Pritchard studied in the southern Sudan lived beyond the pale of the Muslim Arab civilization to the north of them. They were raided or attacked by the Arabs, but they were not Muslims and had not become part of the same civilization (a fact destined to be full of grave consequences for the post-colonial Sudanese republic). The British had destroyed, rather than protected, the relatively centralized Mahdist state in the Sudan. The Berbers of the Atlas, on the other hand, combined dissident and turbulent independence with a wholehearted, unambiguous internalization of Islam, in terms of which the central state was legitimated. The French had not dismantled that state, but were acting, at least officially, in its name.

So much for the background of the two studies. There were also differences in the conclusions. These two great students of tribal politics agreed on one central point: The order which *was* there to be found in an anarchic, ungoverned social environment was produced by balanced opposition, by a balance of power. But beyond this shared point, their analyses begin to diverge, and I happen to believe Evans-Pritchard's to be the better one. Evans-Pritchard concentrated on the fact that in this kind of society units of different size are, as it were, nested in each other; the tribe divides into clans, clans into sub-clans and so on. Montagne was in error when he sought *the* crucial unit in Berber society, overruling its own and fully appropriate habit of using the same term for units at diverse levels and of diverse sizes. He even invented a name—canton—for it. No particular level of size is in fact very much more important than any other. At each and every level, there is opposition between groups of that particular scale, and the rivalry and opposition of two sub-clans, which keeps each of them internally cohesive, does not preclude cooperation as fellow-units of the full clan, and so forth. Balanced opposition can only be something like an adequate explanation of the maintenance of order, if units do indeed exist at every level of size at which conflict is liable to arise.

Montagne did not hit upon this theory (though I believe it to be valid for traditional Berber society), notwithstanding the fact that its conceptual preconditions had been prepared by the classical French sociologist Émile Durkheim on the basis of Algerian Berber ethnographic documentation with which Montagne was familiar and which, through Masqueray's work, had greatly influenced him. Instead, he stressed one particular form of balanced opposition, namely, that manifested in a kind of tribal two-party system, the opposition of two great tribal leagues to each other in a given territory, known as *leffs* in Morocco and as *souffs* in parts of Algeria. In the western High Atlas and elsewhere, he maintained, such opposed leagues were arranged along neat

chessboard principles, with neighboring tribal units belonging to opposed leagues. One's neighbor was of the opposing party, but one's neighbor-but-one belonged to one's own league.

When a canton enters into a state of war with one of its neighbors,

it receives assistance from the next canton but one, and step by step there develops a sort of vast political chequer-board in two colours. These blocs are very stable and it is considered a great dishonour if a canton changes allegiance.

Maps are found in Montagne's work tracing such checkerboard patterns.

This part of Montagne's theory is open to criticism on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Jacques Berque, a successor of Montagne at the Collège de France and an outstanding specialist of North African and Berber societies, investigated—and administered—the Seksawa, a tribe at the very heart of the region which Montagne had known best, and he did not find that the *leff* theory applied (cf. *Structures Sociales du Haut Atlas*, 1954). Also, although Berber tribes are segmented and subsegmented into constituent parts, the divisions are not always binary. At a theoretical level, one can apply the following criticism: Suppose that these *ilfuf* (plural of *leff*) do indeed exist. This then provides an explanation—i.e., the balance of power—for why some degree of order exists, notwithstanding the absence of any specialized order-enforcing agencies, *at the level of size in terms of which these leagues are articulated*. Suppose, for instance, that the units which join these leagues are valley-sized. This then helps to explain why one *valley* will not attack another valley, when a temporary weakness of that neighbor offers a good chance of, say, seizing an upland pasture; the temporary advantage will not be seized for fear of activating the entire system of alliances.

So far so good. But how about conflicts *within* the valley, concerning, say, the division of the pastures it already possesses, or the allocation of water to the irrigation ditches? For there is no sovereign to impose his will *inside* the valley, between its constituent villages or clans, any more than there is one *between* valleys or groups of valleys.

Conflict occurs at every level: about a garden inside a village, about a couple of sheep between two neighboring hamlets, about a forest between two clans, about a huge upland-plateau summer pasture between two large tribal confederations. A theory of order-maintenance that invokes leagues whose members are, say, villages, can only explain the preservation of peace at that level, i.e., between villages, but not at any larger or smaller level. Evans-Pritchard's theory succeeds at this very point—in fact, it succeeds *particularly* at this point and highlights the crucial difference between modern society and segmentary tribal ones. In our world, one particular level of organization—the national state—is crucial for the purpose of order-enforcement and, indeed, in the words of the famous Weberian definition of the state, monopolizes legitimate violence. In a segmentary society, on the other hand, the various nested levels are of roughly equal importance and violence is equally legitimate throughout.

It is also possible to criticize the theory of binary leagues from the opposite viewpoint, by an argument which, if valid (I do not hold that it is) strikes at it and at the "segmentary" theory equally. It is possible to say that either theory is far too neat, that

both endow social reality with an orderly logic which it does not really possess. Situations are far more varied and are far more opportunistic for their alignments to follow such tidy lines. The idiom of either binary leagues or of segmentary organization is indeed only an idiom, in terms of which the participants speak and perhaps even think, rather than act, and which covers a far more complex and fluid reality. Ian Cunison, studying the nomadic Arabs, the Baggara, wandering in the northeast Sahara, found them using segmentary terminology, while their actual organization was far less tidy and clear-cut. Clifford Geertz, turning toward North African Islam after his previous work on Indonesia, seems inclined to think that the segmentary idea is imposed by the observer rather than rooted in things. The question is interesting. Those who (like myself) hold the segmentary theory to be true (even if perhaps not the whole truth) are inclined to suspect that some of the fluidity noted by later observers is due to the more effective centralization of recent decades. When the state at last does take over the task of maintaining order, the mechanisms and units that had previously performed this role as best they could tend to atrophy; they then survive as a terminology rather than as a reality.

This is an interesting question, but one which need not be answered for the purpose of assessing the intellectual significance of Montagne. If he was not quite the equal of Evans-Pritchard in the account of the inner mechanisms of tribal life, he had an advantage over him when it came to tribal relations with the central state. The advantage sprang, as we have already indicated, from the context of his work. In general, the European conquest of the colonial world was, so to speak, sociologically inelegant: Sometimes the Europeans dealt with monarchs and spurned the tribes, sometimes they destroyed the monarchy and looked at the tribes in isolation, and sometimes, of course, *they dealt with tribes that had in any case been isolated in their prior condition*. Morocco was an exception. Here, for once, the conqueror employed a scalpel which exhibited the anatomy or morphology of the society in its entirety, for it wanted at the same time to preserve the monarchy and to make use of the tribes. The dissection was not even lethal; the monarchy is still there, and so are the tribes.

This brings us to Montagne's third theme, the relationship of tribes to the state and to state formation. It is here that he is closest to his great predecessor in North African sociology, Ibn Khaldun. It is here also that the description and the theory in his work merge into each other most closely. There is perhaps no way in which one can theorize and sum up in one formula the inevitably tortuous path by which some mountain *marabout* or elective tribal leader slowly worms his way up to great power, first in his own segment, then in its rival segments as well, and who finally, with luck, astuteness, opportunity, and ruthlessness, manages to expand and make absolute his authority. But when he does succeed, it is still kinship that provides him with the principles of organization and cohesion.

... let us set out clearly ... the simple mechanism by which [a tyrant's] emergence and rise to power take place. In a canton the aspiring amghar gains control thanks to the support of a loyal faction based on his own patriarchal family. ... In a tribe he triumphs because of the strength of his leff. ... In a larger field still, the great caid subdues tribes ... with troupes provided by his

tribe. He gives the remunerative task of collecting taxes from remote tribes to fellow members of his canton and tribe. It is essentially the exploitation of a whole area by a single tribe.

This concentric structure of the Berber state founded by force explains the facility with which it is established and organised, but it also explains, at the same time, the speed of its disintegration.

When the authority of Abd el Krim snowballed in the Rif after his great victory over the Spaniards, in deference to the spirit of the times he called his state a republic and his government a cabinet—but this cabinet was still composed of his longstanding village companions. The state is only a successful, conquering tribe, and it owes its ephemeral cohesion to its tribal roots. Montagne derives evident satisfaction from tracing the underlying similarities of medieval dynasties and the successful political adventurers of twentieth-century Morocco. It is in this area that his debt to Ibn Khaldun is greatest: cohesion and civilization are seen as antithetical. Cohesion is the fruit of the hardships of tribal life; hence tribes can on occasion form major political units, but they do so only in the image of their previous tribal existence. In so doing, they lose their cohesion in the end, and the unit disintegrates. Thus all political centralization is unstable and ephemeral.

This pessimistic political sociology is not universally applicable, even within Islam. There is at least one other model, one brought to its highest level of perfection by the Ottomans: a model in which a ruling elite is recruited not *en bloc* from a successful conquering tribe by, as it were, human bulk purchase but, on the contrary, is brought or conscripted one by one, on the slave markets of the Black Sea or as a tax levy on Balkan peasants. In such a society, kinship appears not as the sole (albeit fragile) source of cohesion, but as an obstacle to it. Where rulers elsewhere recruited their administrative and executive officers from priests or eunuchs, this society achieves similar ends by taking them from what is technically a class of slaves. Lack of ancestry in a mamluk, bought, or brought in as tax revenue, can be almost as good an inducement to administrative loyalty and effectiveness as the lack of hope of progeny (real or avowable) in a eunuch or priest. Anyway, this is a different model, and one not so typical of North Africa, even though the Turks brought elements of it to Algeria and Tunisia. The model which is illuminated by Montagne's work is the one in which government is primarily a matter of tribes which support the dynasty governing or containing the rest.

This is an important type, well represented among the traditional polities of Africa and Asia, and present as a partial or regional element even in states such as the Ottoman Empire that also exemplify other principles. For the understanding of this model, Montagne remains an important—perhaps the best—source. He constitutes an invaluable corrective to the more popular models of “feudal” or “Oriental” society. This last in particular has been overrated of late for various reasons: It may have applied in some cases; it may be a useful parable on Stalinism; it may receive confirmation from what the scribes wrote, if one ignores the fact that they often wrote what the ruler wished for rather than what was in fact the case. But reality was generally more fragile and unstable, and the nature of that precariousness was perhaps best seized, thanks both to the highly specific circumstances of his time and to his own particular genius, by Robert Montagne.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

To my knowledge, only two of Robert Montagne's works are available in English. The first is his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, delivered in 1948, which was published as "The 'Modern State' in Africa and Asia" in the *Cambridge Journal*, July, 1952, translated by Elie and Sylvia Kedourie. This is interesting, though now perhaps dated; the flood of work on the Third World since it was published has made many of its general points familiar. The second is *The Berbers. Their Social and Political Organisation*, which was translated with an introduction by David Seddon (London, 1973), 93 pp. This translation of *La Vie Sociale et la Vie Politique des Berbères* (1931) was based on a later and previously unpublished manuscript of 1947. All otherwise uncited quotations in the present article are taken from this translation by Seddon. This is a brilliant and succinct summary of his work on Berber political sociology, though it should not be allowed to stand between the reader and Montagne's untranslated masterpiece, *Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc* (Paris, 1930). Other works by Montagne include: *La Civilisation du Désert* (Paris, 1947); *Naissance du Prolétariat Marocain* (Paris, 1951), and *Révolution au Maroc* (Paris, 1953). His most important predecessors in his field were Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), best accessible in English in the translation by F. Rosenthal of *The Muqaddimah* (abridged edition, London, 1967), and the sadly unobtainable E. Masqueray, *Le Formation des Cités chez les Populations Sédentaires de l'Algérie* (Paris, 1886).

The narrower topic of Montagne's work, the tyrannies of the western Atlas, is explored in a journalistic manner in G. Maxwell, *Lords of the Atlas* (1970). This book is inaccurate in its details but gives a good overall impression. The setting of Montagne's work is explored in *Arabs and Berbers*, eds. E. Gellner and Ch. Micaud (1973), a volume which in particular contains a discussion of French ethnography in North Africa by E. Burke. The subsequent work in English on relevant themes includes John Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful* (1970), and *North for the Trade* (1973); Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed* (1968); Ernest Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas* (Chicago, 1970); E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer* (1940); Edmund Leach, *Political Systems of Highland Burma* (1954, 1965); Vanessa Maher, *Women and Property in Morocco* (1974); Amal Rassam Vinogradov, *The Ait Ndbir of Morocco* (1974); Paul Rabinow, *Symbolic Domination* (1975); William Zartman, *Morocco: Problems of New Power* (New York, 1964); Clement Henry Moore, *North Africa* (1970); Elbaki Hermassi, *Leadership and National Development in North Africa* (1972).

EDWARD W. SAID

Raymond Schwab and the Romance of Ideas

... de bouger indéfiniment en ne variant jamais, de s'échapper toujours en restant à l'intérieur d'un méandre. . . .

POET, BIOGRAPHER, MAN OF LETTERS, novelist, editor, translator, and scholar, Raymond Schwab is neither known (to most of the standard Anglo-American authorities on the Romantic movement, for example) nor has any of his work been translated into English. For a man whose interests observed no national boundaries and whose capacities were deeply transnational, this is a depressing irony. He was born in Nancy in 1884 and died in Paris in 1956. The little that is easily discovered about his life and personality comes from three issues of the *Mercure de France*,¹ where some of his hitherto unpublished poetry and his memoirs appeared, along with reminiscences about him written by his friends. He seems to have been a quiet and rather modest man who spent most of his life in the service of letters. For a few years (1936-40), he edited a journal devoted to poetry with Guy Lavaud, which was called *Yggdrasill*; its catholicity of interests and openness to currents in poetry other than those either European or fashionable were noteworthy. Schwab leaves behind him the impression that he had the tastes of a fastidious man and that he was intensely meditative by nature and withdrawn in his habits, with a kind of powerful, yet muted, religious sense that would cause him to translate the Psalms or write an epic poem on Nimrod without his necessarily having been committed to an organized faith.

In many ways, Schwab resembles Borges, if not also a character in one of Borges' *Ficciones*. When he dealt with literature, he would produce books about little-known figures such as Elémir Bourges; when asked to write a preface to a French translation of the *Thousand and One Nights*, he would write instead a three-hundred-page work on Antoine Galland, a late seventeenth-century personality who was the *Nights*'s first French translator. We are reminded of Borges' interest in such odd figures as John Wilkins and Chesterton, who benefited from the rather surprising seriousness displayed in his studies of them, since unknown books and shadowy writers do not often command this kind of attention. Both Schwab and Borges reveal a fundamental personal reticence married to an almost Mallarméan idea of The Book—the quest for it, its life, the gentleness and calm heroism to be found in it despite the almost unthinkable effort expended on its behalf. One always has a sense in Schwab, as, of course, in Borges, of a

sort of library of humanity slowly being discovered, walked into, and described, but valued less for its ponderous classics than for its surprising eccentrics.

Endless detail is the mark of Schwab's major scholarly work, of which *La Renaissance orientale*² is the greatest achievement. The underlying theme of this work is the European experience of the Orient, which is in turn based on the human need for absorbing the "foreign" and "different." To his description of this experience, Schwab brings a rare gift for dealing with very concentrated and meticulously gathered detail. In Schwab's view, the Orient, however *outré* and different it may at first seem, is a complement to the Occident, and vice versa. The vision, as one admirer of Schwab has put it, is that of an integral humanism.³ Its style—that is, its verbal idiom as well as its angle of vision—is both subtle and difficult, since Schwab manages always to depict a phenomenon as it is in itself and (often more interesting) as something that affected many lives over a long period of time. He is up to the painstaking effort required to document the cultural interchanges between Orient and Occident; but he can also create fascinating nooks, sheltered from the gross outline of his large theme, in which new, often intimate spaces appear.

Two examples will suffice here: First, in describing the complex series of events just prior to Galland's leaving Paris for Turkey, Schwab also manages to reveal how these events are alluded to by Molière in *Le Bourgeois gentilhomme*.⁴ Then, in *La Renaissance orientale*, Schwab demonstrates not only the curious symbiosis between the biological sciences and Indo-European linguistics, but also the interplay of these forces in Cuvier's work, as well as its social effect in Parisian salons of the period (*LRO* 321-27). Whether it is a batch of seemingly transparent phrases spoken by M. Jourdain or Cuvier's presence in salons frequented by Balzac, Schwab unlocks an impressive range of allusions proving, for example, that parvenu chitchat conceals references to a crisis in relations between Louis XIV and the Turkish court, or that Balzac's understanding of Cuvier's scientific achievements was an aspect of cultural diffusion peculiar to Paris in the eighteen-twenties and -thirties.

The detail in such instances is the detail of influence—how one writer, or event, bears on another writer—a topic recently of interest to advanced theoretical criticism in literary studies. Like Erich Auerbach, however, Schwab is stingy about giving a theoretical explanation for what he does; like Auerbach discussing in *Mimesis* the classical notion of high and low literary styles, he is content to take on an almost ingenuously obvious motif, the influence of the Orient in the West, and to let the imprints of that motif appear in myriad places in a vast body of later literature. Indeed the analogy with Auerbach and an even more compelling one with the German literary historian Ernst Robert Curtius press home Schwab's *philological* learning, especially its capacity for revealing how enormous unities (the Latin cultural *imperium*, or the Orient) inform, live, and take textual body in consequent ages and cultures. For, to a very great extent, Schwab, like Auerbach, Curtius, and Borges, is possessed by the image of the text as a locus of human effort, a "text-ile" fertility gathering in cultural identity (indeed, making it possible), *disseminating* human life everywhere in time and space as a result. The importance to Schwab of the Oriental Renaissance (the phrase is taken from Edgar Quinet's unduly neglected work of 1832, *Le Génie des religions*) is that,

whereas the classical Renaissance immured European man within the confines of a self-sufficient Greco-Latin terrain, this later Renaissance deposited the *whole* world before him. The second Renaissance, as Schwab put it in one of the compact generalities with which his work abounds, combined India with the Middle Ages and thereby displaced the centuries of Augustus and Louis XIV (*LRO* 20). The job of displacement was apportioned to the great capitals: Calcutta provided, London distributed, Paris filtered and generalized (*LRO* 133).

So profound and beneficent does Schwab think the Orient is that one is doubtless more accurate in describing him as an *orienteur* rather than an *orientaliste*, a man more interested in a generous awareness than in detached classification.⁵ Insofar as European awareness of the Orient can be said to have had an effect, Schwab believes it was a productive one, since Oriental influences in pre-Romantic and Romantic cultures are everywhere to be found. Yet two recent scholars of the Romantic period, Harold Bloom and W. J. Bate, have advanced the opposite thesis that *all* influence produced anxiety and a sense of inferiority and belatedness in the writers of the time for whom an uninfluenced originality was the highest (and least possible) goal. Schwab takes the position that Romanticism welcomed the Orient as an influence benefiting poetry, prose, science, and philosophy. So here already is one major theoretical and scholarly contribution of Schwab's work: influence in Romantic literature as enrichment and useful persistence, rather than as diminishment and worrying presence. But again it is detail that Schwab so plentifully sees and provides to back up the generalization. He seems to be saying that if so much work—which he chronicles with vertiginous minuteness—went *willingly* and *consciously* into the discovery of the Orient, then we must regard influence finally as supplying something that would otherwise be felt as burdensome absence. What results is not that violent contest among writers for time and space sketched by Bloom with such urgency, but rather an endlessly performed accommodation similar to the one Schwab sees in the Asian temperament, which does not contrast novelty with latecoming, but instead sees all time as the poet's possession.

Il répète sans fin les mêmes modèles d'entrelacs, non pour gagner de temps, mais parce qu'il a tellement de temps sous la main qu'il ne risque jamais rien à le dépenser dans de petites choses forcément provisoires. [He repeats the same interwoven patterns endlessly, not to save time, but, on the contrary, precisely because he has so much time at his disposal that there is no danger of his using it up in necessarily transient little details.]⁶

Schwab's, then, is a criticism of sympathetic, rather than antithetic, cast. Dualities, opposition, polarities—as between Orient and Occident, one writer and another, one time and another—are converted in his writing into lines (elements) that are crisscrossing, it is true, but also weaving a vast human portrait. A year before his death, he mused that what was needed was a "History of Universal Poetry," yet unfortunately he had not written it. For his part, he had attempted a physiognomy of literature as a step in that direction.⁷ Always, the human image dominates in Schwab's criticism, but what provokes its interest for us is that, when we perceive it, such an image is the writer's achievement, never his given. There are the details of human effort, then their

organization, finally their total portrait. In its attempt to appropriate and reproduce the subject of its study, Schwab's criticism belongs with that of Georges Poulet, Albert Beguin, Albert Thibaudet, Jean Starobinski, and others like them, whose patient and engaged imagination dominates the business of industrious fact-gathering. Unlike all of them, however, except perhaps for the Starobinski of *L'Invention de la liberté*, Schwab is continually guided by events, privileged historical moments, and large movements of ideas. For him, consciousness is a cultural affair, heavily laden with empirical experience in and of the world. Whether he is describing the rise of linguistics attendant upon the numerous discoveries made in Zend, Sanskrit, Semitic, or Indo-European, or the fabulously rich interlacing of Oriental themes in English, French, German, and American writing, or even the precise data involved in scientific or artistic activity during the years between 1771 and roughly 1860, his work is always literally a treasure of insight and information. Most of all, it deepens our appreciation for a particular and extremely rare type of unhurried *scholarship*, whose role, I feel, is too infrequently examined by theorists of either criticism or literature.

Appearances notwithstanding, Schwab is no Taine or Lanson. Historical criticism for him is not science, even though facts must of course command respect. But man's history gets its impulses from the *desire* for truth, not simply from its establishment:

Elle [l'histoire] montre qu'il importe beaucoup moins d'établir que de faire désirer une vérité; et quel grand inventeur atteignit une vérité nouvelle sans la chercher du côté de l'erreur? [It (history) teaches us that establishing truth is less important than making a particular truth desirable. What great inventor has ever found a new truth without first looking for it in the wrong place?]⁸

Schwab wrote this about the early Orientalists, but it applies as well to his own work. The tremendous cultural drama with which all his scholarship was concerned is the struggle between either acquired or felt *certainities* (and not facts) that takes place both within a culture and between cultures. Reinforced by his own background, the Judeo-Christian component in Western culture is seen by Schwab as being forced to submit to the discovery of an earlier civilization; thus Indo-European linguistics rival the primacy of Hebraic society in the European mind. Later that mind will accommodate the discovery, making the world into a whole again. But the gripping drama of Orientalism, as Schwab puts it in the superb first thirty pages of *La Renaissance orientale*, is the debate it initiates about the meaning of "the primitive," how different worlds are seen as claimants to originality and genius, how the notions of civilization and savagery, beginning and end, ontology and teleology, undergo marked transformation in the years between 1770 and 1850:

Juste au moment où une soif de discordance se répand sur l'Europe comme une crise solidaire des révolutions politiques, la masse des orientalismes, où tient la dissonance fondamentale de l'Occident, fait son irruption. [At precisely the time when a craving for disagreement spread throughout Europe in a single crisis which arose from the wave of political revolutions, those countless Orientalisms which made up the fundamental dissonance in the West burst upon the scene (*LRO* 31)].

His task therefore is to study the progress by which the West's image of the Orient passes from primitive to actual, that is, from disruptive *éblouissement incrédule* to *vénération condescendante* (LRO 32). There is a saddening impoverishment, obviously, from one image to the other. Yet so judicious and modulated is the rendering and so encyclopedic the scale that we feel the impoverishment less as sentiment than as a law of cultural change. From being a *bibliothèque . . . privé de départements* (LRO 30), the Orient becomes a scholarly or ideological province, thus *les révélations glissent à la spécialité* (LRO 131). Before 1800, Europe possessed *le monde du classé*, with Homer its first and final classical perfection; after 1800, a new secular world intrudes, *c'est "le dissident"* (LRO 30). Gone is the dependence of fables, traditions, classics. Instead texts, sources, sciences reposing upon difficult, tiring, and worrying work thrust a strange new reality upon the mind. How this occurs and how quickly even the novelty is transformed into orthodoxy are what occupy Schwab.

A peculiar feature of Schwab's scholarship, however, is that he does not take explicit note of the sheer folly and derangement stirred up by the Orient in Europe. For, as a subject, the Oriental Renaissance is no less bizarre a current in the Romantic imagination than those currents of which the historian is Mario Praz, and Schwab is no less equipped than Praz to comment on them. Yet, he does not, even when he is recording in detail, for instance, the madness of most of Anquetil-Duperron's life, as he trekked through steamy jungles, enduring impossible physical hardships, unrecognized even as a scholar until his very last years. *L'abnégation des érudits* is only partly useful as an explanation for such men. What they saw and felt about the Orient in many cases literally took their minds, but Schwab is too concerned with demonstrating the humanistic symmetry between this Renaissance and the earlier one to care much for the crazy enthusiasms that could produce a Beckford, an Anquetil, a Renan, or a Rückert. And conversely, Schwab's Oriental Renaissance, while it avoids the disorienting aspects of the European experience in the East, also shuns the other great Romantic appetites for nature, for the macabre, for heightened consciousness, for folk culture.

La Renaissance orientale is in fact the apogee of Schwab's scholarly career, although chronologically it stands more or less at its center. Just as its subject matter is the preparation for, then the encounter with, then the absorption of the Orient by the West, so, too, it is already suggested by Schwab's earlier work as well as assumed by his later. I shall speak briefly here of a circle of historical and scholarly books and monographs surrounding *La Renaissance orientale*, a circle that must, alas, exclude the substantial body of his poetry, fiction, and translation. We must keep in mind Schwab's alternation between linear, or genealogical, fidelity to his subject and his encompassing structural ambitions to show prefiguration, latency, refraction, metalepsis despite linear history—in short the alternation in his method between filiation and affiliation as modes of perceiving and conducting cultural history.

Schwab's first book was the *Vie d'Anquetil-Duperron* (1934), a strict biography of the French scholar, theoretician of egalitarianism, ecumenist of beliefs (Jansenist, Catholic, and Brahman), who between 1759 and 1761 transcribed, and later translated, the *Zend Evesta* while in Surat. This event, for Schwab, prefigures the spate of trans-

lated documents that would appear in the West during the Oriental Renaissance. Aside from an uncritical analysis of Anquetil's strange follies and enthusiasms, we find in the book an adumbration of most of Schwab's later motifs. First among them is *l'abnégation des érudits*, that selflessness during the quest for a manuscript, that total commitment to the cause of learning: *Ce que nous appellerions des calamités, c'est à ses yeux une chance de plus de bien s'instruire* ("What we would regard as calamities were in his eyes just one more chance to learn something").⁹ Second is Schwab's penchant for the telling detail, as when he describes the real conditions of shipboard life in the eighteenth century, or when he chronicles Anquetil's attitudes toward and relations with Grimm, Diderot, William Jones, Herder, and others. Third is Schwab's attention to the contest in the European mind between Oriental priority and Biblical "history." Both Anquetil and Voltaire were interested in India and the Bible, but *l'un pour rendre la Bible plus indiscutable, l'autre pour la rendre encore plus incroyable* ("the one to make the Bible more indisputable, the other to make it more unbelievable").¹⁰ Schwab's epigrammatic flair will strengthen in his later work into passages of extraordinary poetic beauty.

Yet the motif to which Schwab's imagination is mostly dedicated is the life of images and forms in the human consciousness, which is always located existentially in a specific historical context and is never left to float freely here and there. Cultural history is drama because the ideas that derive from archetypal images, on the one hand, cause men to struggle in their behalf or, on the other, induce in men a kind of entranced passivity or even, as in Anquetil's case, a disconcerting appetite for all ideas or faiths, regardless of contradiction. Images are historical, quasi-natural artifacts created out of the interaction of *nous à tous*. Moreover, they are limited in number, so economic is the imagination and so powerful their range: Orient, Occident, community, the human, the Origin, the Divine. Among themselves they form a matrix that generates cultural romance and adventure, expressed as ideas in conflict—or in concert—with each other. Although idea and image seem to move freely, they are first the product of men and the texts men make, then they become the focal points of institutions, societies, periods, and cultures. For images are constants in human experience; the ideas they legitimate take different forms and varying values. Here, in a passage from the *Vie*, Schwab illustrates the interplay that will hitherto dominate his writing:

Il va réclamer à l'Asie une preuve scientifique de la primauté de Peuple Elu et des généalogies de la Bible: seulement il se trouve que ses investigations ouvrent brusquement la voie à une critique des livres admis pour révélés, que bientôt l'assyriologie rendra irréparable. [He goes to find in Asia a scientific proof for the primacy of the Chosen People and for the genealogies of the Bible: instead it happened that his investigations soon led to criticism of the very texts which had hitherto been considered as revealed, a process which Assyriology would subsequently prove irreversible.]¹¹

These ideas of necessity have a *physical* dimension, which conveys not only the alternation in culture between the limited and the limitless (as when Schwab talks of pre-Anquetil Orientalism: *l'exotisme sort du bibelot*¹²) but also the metamorphoses of notions of distance, time, relationship, memory, society, language, and individual life effort:

Anquetil, en 1759, achève à Surate sa translation de *L'Avesta*, à Paris, en 1786, celle des *Upanishads*,—il a percé un isthme entre les hémisphères du génie humain, débloquent le vieil humanisme du bassin de la Méditerranée; il n'y a pas cinquante ans que ses compatriotes demandaient comment on peut être Persan, lorsqu'il leur apprend à comparer les monuments des Perses à ceux des Grecs. Avant lui on ne réclame de renseignements sur le haut passé de la planète qu'aux écrivains latins, grecs, juifs, arabes. La Bible apparaît comme un bloc isolé, un aérolithe. L'univers de l'écriture tient dans la main; à peine si l'on y soupçonne l'immensité de terres inconnues. Par sa traduction de *L'Avesta* commence la perception, devenue maintenant vertigineuse avec les exhumations de l'Asie centrale, des parlers qui foisonnèrent après Babel. Dans nos écoles, jusque-là fermées orgueilleusement sur l'étroit héritage de Renaissance greco-latine, il lance une vision de civilisations innombrables et immémorables, d'un infini des littératures; désormais quelques cantons européens ne sont plus seuls dans l'histoire à laisser des noms gravés, "le bon sens de l'univers" cesse d'être "fixé entre le nord de l'Espagne et le nord du Danemark, d'un côté, et, de l'autre, l'Angleterre et les limites occidentales de la Turquie." [In 1759, Anquetil finished his translation of the *Avesta* at Surat; in 1786 that of the *Upanishads* in Paris—he had dug a channel between the hemispheres of human genius, freeing the old humanism of the Mediterranean basin. Less than fifty years earlier, his compatriots were asking how one could be Persian, when he taught them how to compare the monuments of the Persians to those of the Greeks. Before him, one looked for information on the remote past of our planet exclusively among the great Latin, Greek, Jewish, and Arabic writers. The Bible was regarded as a lonely rock, an aerolite. A universe in writing was available, but scarcely anyone seemed to suspect the immensity of these unknown lands. The realization began with his translation of the *Avesta*, and reached dizzying heights owing to the exploration in Central Asia of the languages that multiplied after Babel. Into our schools, up to that time limited to the narrow Greco-Latin heritage of the Renaissance, he interjected a vision of innumerable civilizations from ages past, of an infinity of literatures; moreover, the few European provinces were not the only places to have left their mark in history, "the right direction of the universe" ceased to be "fixed between northern Spain and northern Denmark in one direction and England and the borders of western Turkey in the other."]¹³

Schwab's portrait of Anquetil goes very far in attempting to dispel *l'obscurité [qui] couvre toujours les commencements des découvertes* ("the obscurity that always hides the beginnings of discoveries").¹⁴ Ultimately Schwab locates the beginning in a change of focus generated by a mysterious fragment of Zend that appears in Oxford; whereas *les savants ont regardé le fameux fragment d'Oxford et sont rentrés dans leur cabinet; Anquetil le voit, il va aux Indes* ("the scholars looked at the famous fragment of Oxford and then returned to their studies; Anquetil looked, and went to India").¹⁵

Although in the end Schwab was to voice some misgivings about the fetishized Western biographical mode, his next work, *La Vie d'Elémir Bourges*,¹⁶ is governed by the life-and-works framework. Bourges's dates are 1852 to 1925, and even though he was admired by a number of authors—among them Edmond Jaloux and Henri de Régnier—he will remain, I think, an obscure and minor writer. The book on Bourges is the least distinguished of Schwab's output; one wonders why—except for the undeveloped personal connections hinted at between Bourges and Schwab—he had taken on this particular chore for his *thèse complémentaire* at the Sorbonne. Occasionally we get glimpses of the authentic Schwab, notably in his analyses of Bourges's eclecticism, as well as in his capacity for spiritual renovation within an otherwise episodic life. Nor should we overlook the fact that Schwab was in his early sixties when he undertook a formal petitioning for the doctorate; like the subject of one of his own studies, he trans-

formed himself from a man of letters into an academic scholar. The *méandre* of Schwab's work—that attractive expanding sweep within which occurred the very alchemy of ideas he was so expert at describing—allowed him the maximum of self-transformation with the maximum of coherence and intelligibility. Consequently it is hard to believe that the inward-tending intensity of Bourges's life is not really Schwab's own, rendered with comradely loyalty by Schwab as belonging to Bourges.

The contrast with *La Renaissance orientale*, which was to follow two years later in 1950, is immediately obvious. Its itemized subtitle reads like an encyclopedia, if not also like a doctoral program in East-West literatures (incidentally, the book was the *thèse principale* for Schwab's *Doctorat-ès-lettres*): *La découverte du sanscrit—le siècle des écritures déchiffrées—l'avènement de l'humanisme intégral—grandes figures d'orientalistes—philosophies de l'histoire et des religions—sciences linguistiques et biologiques—l'hypothèse aryenne—l'inde dans la littérature occidentale—l'asie et le romantisme—Hindouisme et Christianité*. It was followed in turn by two works, both of them logically outcomes from it. One, a two-hundred-page portion of the Pléiade *Histoire des Littératures*, was entitled "Domaine Oriental" and modestly subtitled "Le Porche oriental." As we shall see in a moment, Schwab here turned his attention to all that material whose *effects* he had so assiduously recorded earlier. It was as if Mallarmé had finally decided to write about the object whose *absence* had previously engaged him (for, of course, *La Renaissance orientale* is a work of scholarship written from a *symbolic* standpoint). Then posthumously, in 1964, *L'Auteur des Mille et une Nuits: Vie d'Antoine Galland* appeared. A less exciting work than the Anquetil-Duperron, it nevertheless complemented the earlier book, as well as rounding out Schwab's career, by treating the phenomenon of pre-Orientalism as style and literature at a moment before the Orient succumbed to Western science.¹⁷

A principal feature of all of Schwab's mature work is his interest in what he calls *le secondaire*, the smaller figures—the translators, the compilers, the scholars, whose unflagging effort make possible the major work of the Goethes, Hugos, and Schopenhauers. Thus, the major cultural renaissance called "Oriental" by Schwab is inaugurated by the translations made by two practically forgotten men, Anquetil and Galland—the one opening the road to linguistic and scientific revolution in Europe, the other initiating the stylistic, literary exoticism associated in Europe with Orientalism.¹⁸ What clearly fascinates Schwab in such men is that they have none of the finish of the major literary or cultural figures, no easily discernible shape to their careers, no fully appreciated role in the larger movements of ideas they serve. Rather they are like fragments contributing, Schwab once said, to an imaginary manuscript whose will they obey¹⁹ and whose totality resembles what Michel Foucault would call the "archive" of a particular period.²⁰ Moreover, their abnegation exerts a sort of inverse reaction in the contemporary scholar, who will not allow their modesty to disappear behind the major works or figures to which they have so obviously contributed. One of Schwab's successful restorations of justice occurs when he demonstrates how Galland's style, more than being a dumb transcription of an Arabic original, in fact creates the ambiance within which the achievements of the *Princesse de Clèves* are made.

There is another aspect to Schwab's interest in the "secondary," namely, his

appreciation, evident throughout the “*Domaine Orientale*,” for the anonymity of Asiatic literature and the comparative disregard for strong ego-individuality it displays. How much this appreciation derives from Schwab’s impressions of the literature he discusses and how much it is a real factor in it (since one is disappointed—though perhaps the expectation was totally unwarranted—to discover that Schwab knows Oriental literature mainly through translations), I cannot tell. I suspect, however, that as he grew older he was searching for—and in his own way finding—other means of communicating cultural history, new unities sought by the exacting and original scholar, more effective generalizations. For his work starts the process that will bridge the gap between the polymathic historians—formalists all of them—such as Élie Faure, Henri Focillon, and André Malraux and, to their left, the systematic verbal and institutional materialism of Foucault’s archeological investigations. There is, of course, a political meaning to this type of work, although Schwab himself rarely makes it explicit. Early in the “*Domaine Oriental*” he does say, however, that Europe, or Western culture, needs to be reminded that it, its achievements, and its heroes are at most a particular case in the transcendental generality of human culture at large.²¹

The avoidance of ethno- and anthropocentric attitudes dictates an interest in Oriental literature for its own sake. And the “*Domaine Oriental*,” within the limits I indicated above, is a marvelous prose-poetical meditation. At times the difficulty of Schwab’s autumnal style is as demanding as that of R. P. Blackmur. An example:

De même que l’interminable des rhapsodes nécessite des accommodements avec la cheville et le bouche-trou, le fulgurant des moralistes a pour postérité le formel des verroteries. C’est que les routines qui vont venir trouvent des lits tout faits dans ces gaines indéformables dont nous faisons honneur aux bonnes mnémotechniques: car, par sa force même, cette rigide armature deviendra une cause d’affaïssement et d’avilissement; la mémoire encourage l’imagination au moindre effort, les vertus de la répétition aboutissent à des excès: littératures de centons et de marqueteries dans l’Inde, en Perse, en Arabie; littératures de citations, d’allusions, d’anthologie, en Chine, au Japon, en Judée. [Just as the endlessness of the rhapsodes required compromises with useless words and stop-gap aids, so the fulminations of the moralists appears to posterity as partly worthless. This is because those things that become tradition are found in rigid forms which we then honor by turning into mnemotechnical devices; then by its very strength, this rigid armature becomes a source of weakness and degradation; memory discourages imagination, the virtues of repetition result in excess: the literature of the centos and the miscellanies in India, Persia, Arabia; the literature of citations, allusions, anthologies in China, Japan, and Judea.]²²

A much worked-over prose such as this moves from large generalizations about Asiatic literature to nuanced instances of its variety. And, indeed, one of that literature’s characteristics continuously asserted by Schwab is its exemplification of unity combined with infinite variations. The Bachelardian side of the “*Domaine Oriental*” then demonstrates, for instance, how certain figures—shepherds, laborers, trees, voyagers, riders, and walkers—give Asiatic literature its strong anchor in actuality. But it is in his consideration of aesthetic and verbal means that Schwab is most impressive. Starting from the notion that Oriental literatures view historical reality as something to be transformed into “mythical parabolas” by transgression, he investigates the predomi-

nance of the nominative mode in Oriental artistic grammar, the typology of rhythmic accent, the poetics of length, time as a meditative category, the use of *mot-germes* in the structure of rhythmically obsessive poetry, the interplay between infinite particularity and infinite generality, and the frequently employed festival mood in what he calls Oriental oceanic epics. All this, with a wide range of illustration, is subordinated to the proposition that Western literature attempts to turn all the means at its disposal into verbliness and articulation, whereas Oriental literature seeks to transform everything, including words, into musicality.

The comparative rarefaction of the "Domaine Oriental" is a function of limitations imposed on Schwab by the collective general work to which he was contributing and by the unimaginable scope of the subject he was attempting to treat. No such limitations exist for him, however, in *La Renaissance orientale*. In it he disposes of enormous amounts of detailed information, all of which is obviously treated at first hand. Read as both a prefiguration of and an important complement to Foucault's *Le Mots et les choses*, the book is of inestimable importance for the understanding of that great transformation in culture and learning that took place at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. But where Foucault is rather ambiguous, that is, in assigning a particular set of causes to the change, Schwab is uncompromising and, it must be added even by an admirer of Foucault's work,²³ more unstinting with information supporting his case for the Orient-as-cause. Yet both men see how it was that the acquisition of knowledge, its institutions ("discourse" in Foucault's terminology), and its currency determine not only cultural praxis generally, but aesthetic praxis as well. For neither of these scholars is the hagiolatrous view of the "poet" sufficient for understanding literary production; nor is it their view that literary works can be studied in unheeding isolation from those conditions of verbal production and textual revolution that were more or less commanding all types of verbal activity during a given period. Schwab gives flesh to such of Foucault's statements as are unquestionably true—for instance, that near the beginning of the nineteenth century we have a period in which philology as well as biology was invented. And still more, Schwab demonstrates with inexhaustible patience what it means in Foucault's sense (formulated nineteen years after *La Renaissance orientale* in *L'Archéologie du savoir*) literally for an archive to be formed.

The agents and the heroes of cultural change and formation are scholars according to Schwab, since cultural transformations take place because of men's appetites first to know and then to organize new things. The formula is perhaps simple, but it encompasses in *La Renaissance orientale* the reeducation of one continent by another. The work is divided into six main sections with dozens of smaller subdivisions and a conclusion. Just as its subject matter seems to have operated by dilation and contraction so, too, does *La Renaissance orientale*. Book One identifies and asserts the phenomenon of the European awareness of the Orient—how geographical discovery, the prestige of Egyptology, and the various colonial missions to India fortified the Oriental challenge and the predisposition for dealing with it systematically in European society. Book Two details the movement of integration by which Europe received the Orient into the body of its scientific, institutional, and imaginative structures. This section includes the

wave of Sanskrit studies that swept the Continent, with a base in Paris primarily, and the enthusiasm which, in Schwab's happy phrase, multiplied the world. In Book Three, Schwab doubles back over the first two sections in order to show the active changes that take place in knowledge of the Orient. Central here is the metamorphosis in knowledge about language from being a religious issue to being a linguistic, scientific, and even a racial one after Bopp, Burnouf, and others. Accompanying this change is the one by which India acquired a whole figurative dimension in Western literature, from the pre-Orientalism of Milton and Dryden, through the Lake poets, to Emerson, Whitman, the Transcendentalists, Richter, Novalis, Schelling, Rückert, Heine, Goethe, and, of course, Friedrich Schlegel.

Book Four is an elaborately constructed mosaic of "case histories," items of personal witness drawn from forty or so lives—mostly erudite lives—of Oriental effect. Schwab's interest is to give an intimate as well as a panoramic vision of reorientations in the work of scholars, scientists, critics, philosophers, and historians. Each portrait multiplies the complexity of Orientalism as a phenomenon of reception and transmission. The treatment of subject matter is scenic, which is to say that whether he examines Balzac, Cuvier, Jules Mohl, Sylvestre de Stacy, Ampère, Ozanam, Fauriel, or many others, Schwab represents the changing conceptions of time and space brought forward by each as well. Concurrently Schwab's antennae fetch out shifts both in informal relations among people affected by the Orient (salons, paraoccult leagues, gossip factories) and among disciplines (linguistics, geology, biology, for instance). His investigations of discursive formations can show, for example, that the library, the museum, and the laboratory underwent internal modifications of paramount importance. Dotting Schwab's web are countless dates, names, journals, works, exhibitions, and events (for instance, the Nineveh exposition of 1846 in Paris) that give his narrative its gripping immediacy.

In a sense, Books Five and Six lift all the myriad details of Orientalism from the plane of schools, scholars, academies, sciences, salons, and ideologies into the more discriminating dramas enacted within the careers of major imaginative writers. Book Five concerns French writers wrestling with the travail of creation as erudition impinges upon it: Lamartine, Hugo, Vigny, Richelet, Leconte de Lisle, and Baudelaire. In addition, there is a section on what Schwab calls the "external Orient," the exotic East so influential in the work of Nerval, Gautier, and Flaubert. There are some especially fine *aperçus* on Flaubert's *roman archéologique* whose matter is adopted from Quinet but whose tone contradicts him flatly. Book Six, entitled "Détournements et Prolongements," focuses for the most part on German (among them Nietzsche, Wagner, and Schopenhauer) and Russian writers later in the century. Gobineau's presence also circulates throughout these pages, and with it the doctrine of the inequality of races. For, as his study nears its end, Schwab attends to the often pernicious divisions (Iran vs. India, Aryans vs. Semites, East vs. West) that filter through the gigantic cultural mass created, during almost a century of "comparatism," by the Orientalist consciousness. These divisions are all traceable to the two *techniques spirituelles* facing each other from West to East. Thus:

Au cours des *xix^e-xx^e* siècles, trois tendances divergentes se développent: des strictes écoles de techniciens, philologues et philosophes, poursuivent des définitions rigoureuses qui éloignent les adeptes hâtifs; des cercles d'idéologues ou d'initiés font du produit étranger des expériences de greffe locale; chez des théologiens reparait l'ancien esprit missionnaire aboutissant à un scrupule double de science et de conscience. Ce triple intérêt explique que jamais clientèles si nombreuses et incessantes ne soient venues d'une civilisation à une autre. [In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, three divergent tendencies developed: the strict school of the technicians—the philologists and philosophers—pursued their rigorous definitions and this served to eliminate the amateurs; the circle of ideologists and initiates grafted foreign influences onto local experience; and among the theologians the old missionary zeal reappeared, resulting in conflicting doubts between science and conscience. These three considerations explain the numerous and incessant contacts that grew up as never before among the different cultures (LRO 475)].

A concluding section, written in a complex and compact style, affirms that the Oriental Renaissance was fundamentally a phenomenon of difference, generating comparative techniques, whereas the first Renaissance was essentially assimilative in that it flattered Europe without disturbing Europe's self-affirming cultural centrality. Thus the second Renaissance multiplied, rather than decreased, the points of comparison (and the techniques) available to Western culture and its "invisible interlocutor," the more so—as Schwab explains brilliantly—because the later Renaissance was a verbal event, not a verbal and plastic one as the earlier one had been. Orientalism made possible a *premier tour du monde parlé*, which in turn initiated a linguistic theory of constantly receding (and impossible) origins. Standing between history and faith, such a theory was an event

... de conséquence: les linguistes avaient cru tenir le grand remède à Babel, les poètes attendaient le retour à Eden: l'appétit des origines remonte du cœur des hommes à chaque fouille archéologique, un peu comme, à chaque synthèse des chimistes, l'illusion qu'on va fabriquer de la vie: le postulat d'une langue mère, c'avait été la parthénogenèse de la linguistique. Or, la notion de primitif ne fut confirmée qu'en se dénaturant: elle n'affirme plus un point zéro de l'histoire, mais désigne seulement une gradation toujours plus basse de l'échelle. C'est un mobile, et il met en jeu des idées de déplacement; l'histoire ne promet plus un mur des âges, partout on abandonne la promesse d'un fond. En même temps, canon esthétique et théorie scientifique renoncent à un acquis pour toujours; chaque ouvrier de ce qui fut antiques certitudes croira trahir s'il poursuit ou procure du stable. Esthétique romantique du mouvement, dogme biologique d'évolution, imperialism du langage dans les empires intellectuels, voilà bien des concordances inédites et graves. De nos jours, héritiers des poètes de la mobilité, des metaphysiciens de l'inconscient, et de médecins du mythe, les plus révolutionnaires usagers du langage et de la littérature parlent de "mots en liberté" comme d'une "expérience spirituelle,"—ils réalisent à leur insu la formule de Burnouf: *Nomina numina*. [... of consequence: the linguists believed they had found the answer to Babel, the poets expected the return of Eden; a passion for origins rose up in the hearts of men with each new archeological excavation, a little as if, with each new formula produced by a chemist came the allusion that he had created new life: the postulate of a mother tongue produced linguistics by parthenogenesis. But the notion of the primitive could be confirmed only by distorting it; it could no longer be regarded as the starting point of history, but only as an increasingly lower point on its scale. It was movable and it therefore brought into play notions about change; history no longer provided a bulwark for all time, and certainly it could not provide a foundation. At the same time, both aesthetic canons and scientific theories renounced their claims to permanence; each worker in what had been the ancient verities felt that he had been betrayed if he pursued or acquired anything durable. The

Romantic aesthetic of movement, the biological dogma of evolution, the imperialism of language in the intellectual empires, these were now the new and important things that one could agree upon. In our days, the heirs of the poets of instability, the metaphysicians of the unconscious, and the doctors of myth, the most revolutionary manipulators of language and literature speak of "free words" as a "spiritual experience"—they are confirming without knowing it Burnouf's formula: *Nomina numina* (LRO 497-98)].

The coincidence of the advent of Romanticism and Orientalism in the West, as Schwab so carefully portrays it, gave the former its complex dimensions and led it to the reformulation of human limits—indeed, to that frontier where the unconscious and even the monstrous can claim the *titre de naturel*. Governing the coincidence are two laws: one, the *chance des époques*, two, the *mission des générations* (LRO 502). Therefore Schwab's conception of cultural history in *La Renaissance orientale* is cosmological, because he sees himself as mediating between the two laws and their claims upon historical understanding.

In part systolic, in part diastolic (the images are Schwab's own), *La Renaissance orientale* is a virtual education in the meaning of intellectual adventure, a species of vital detective work²⁴ that neglects neither the material clues nor the higher speculations involved in formulating general observations. Schwab's monumentality lies in never letting us doubt that philology, as employed by him in the large, Nietzschean sense and as studied by him in the history of philological archeology through which Oriental texts were brought into European knowledge and consciousness, is the study of texts as constantly worked-upon monuments, arranging and re-arranging the culture's sense of its identity. Recent studies of Romantic literature—for example, the work of M. H. Abrams, Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman, Paul de Man—would find their inescapable underpinning in Schwab; for, as Romantic writing seems best understood as a prolonged investigation of language and poetic form constructing and deconstructing planes of meaning, Schwab's textual odyssey furnishes the necessary first material. If, after reading Schwab, there is not always an orderly, or at least a clear, path to be seen from words to forms, or from linguistic discovery to linguistic and aesthetic performance, the difficulty is that as students of literature we have not yet mastered the relationship between language *in* history and *as* art. Schwab argues that the relationship is crucial, but his method reposes (as I said above) upon the dramatization, presented complexly and encyclopedically, of a cultural encounter, one whose driving force originates in the love of words, the web of textuality, the society of learning and of cultural appropriation. Thus, rather than to read Schwab as a failed theorist, one would do best, I think, to appreciate his great scholarly achievement as providing an occasion for theoretical orientation and self-examination.

Except allusively, what Schwab seems uninterested in are the economic, social, and political forces at work during the periods he studies. He is an expert at giving us the *circumstances* of the period, and these may include economic and social details; but the circumstantiality of his details is far from adding up to a dynamics of shaping, or shaped, forces acting within history. Thus he mentions that the first British Orientalists were medical men with a religious-missionary vocation. In addition, they were asso-

ciated with commercial enterprise in the Indian colonies. Yet nowhere does he try to fuse these disparate circumstances into a political interpretation of British Orientalism. Similarly he remarks here and there that the great Sanskrit wave and the epidemic of Sanskrit professorships throughout Europe were connected to a very rapidly developing colonial trade and that the privileged status of Egyptology was derived from the Napoleonic adventure in the Middle East. Never does he coherently put forward a thesis about Orientalism as a science, attitude, or institution for the European military, political, and economic control of Eastern colonies.

The disparity that exists between what Schwab knows in the way of awesome detail and what he concludes from that detail strikes one forcibly. It is not only that there are political conclusions he will not draw about the European ravaging of the Orient, but also that he chooses to see the East-West relationship as basically an equal one—whereas in fact, of course, it was no such thing. Sanskrit was a language that stood for a very high cultural value in Europe, but it was as a dead language, far removed from the backwardness of modern Indians, that its value accrued. The romantic imagination of European writers and scholars was impregnated with Orientalism, but their Orientalism was gained at the expense of any sympathy they might have felt for the benighted natives they ruled. One of the faint lines of thought running through early nineteenth-century Orientalist scholarship—in the work of Abel Remusat, for example—is that Orientalist enthusiasm is often fueled by apathetic ignorance not only of the ancient Orient, but especially of the modern Oriental. Read Schwab and you will not remember that Conrad's Mr. Kurtz is one of the chief products of Orientalism, or that race theory, scholarly anti-Semitism, and proto-Fascism are literal products of nineteenth-century Oriental philology. At the same time that Friedrich Schlegel, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and Ernest Renan were making their distinction between organic, lively, wonderful Indo-European and inorganic, agglutinative, uninteresting Semitic, they were also constructing the doxology of twentieth-century anti-Arab and anti-Jewish Orientalist scholarship. And all this was possible not because, as Schwab seems to have it, of a desire to know, but because of a desire to possess and control.

That this is not merely an academic issue can be proved easily enough in the case of a topical instance. The contemporary academic Orientalist is the direct heir of the nineteenth-century Oriental philologist I referred to above. On questions of immediate political moment he is looked to for perspective, information, and help as United States policy, say, toward the Middle East, is being formulated. Yet because Orientalism is a political phenomenon that cannot be dissociated from European (white) colonialism, its modern progeny bear that ugly past on their back and in their work: they take the Oriental to be an essentially backward, primitive human in need of civilizing control. Their views as Orientalists, no matter how sophisticated the form in which they are put, are consequently debased in the extreme. The October, 1973, war in particular produced a whole mass of analyses, having for their background some almost incredibly atavistic pieties about the Arab mind, the Islamic mentality, Arab society, and so forth, all of them resting upon a wickedly simplified *colonial* view—openly racist in its more honest expressions—of the Oriental personality.

We should, then, not simply say that what is missing in Schwab is Foucault's sense of the material and political control exemplified in such systems of discourse as Orientalism; nor ought we to say exclusively that Schwab fails to take into account the socio-political aspect of ethnocentrism as it is represented by Orientalism. Rather we should draw attention to the problem of any encyclopedically conceived work like *La Renaissance orientale* whose virtues of scope and author's devoted intimacy with circumstantial detail make it shy of tendentious political generalities. What Schwab's ambition principally entailed was the wish to assert the presence and the importance of an Oriental Renaissance, and to do so with as much fidelity to the inner dynamics of the movement as possible. Despite Schwab's dialectic reconciliation of states through which the movement passed, he seems unwilling to have admitted that Orientalism had a *problematic* that everywhere touched strictly and systematically upon socio-political attitudes and actualities.²⁵ Consequently, he raises in our minds the question of how one can write the best sort of scholarly cultural history and at the same time take account of power, money, and colonial conquest. Clearly neither a vulgar teleology nor a vulgar theory of immediate reflection answers the question. Too carefully engineered an avoidance, however, will not do either.

It seems often to be believed of rigorous scholarship in the humanities generally, and literature particularly, that scope and detail are achieved by staying clear of *Tendenz*-mongering. The converse is no less true: that brilliant theorizing comes without heed for circumstance, depth of knowledge, or range of concrete illustration. Perhaps it is in the nature of scholarship and of contemporary intellectual discipline to imagine work as doing one kind of specialized thing or another, to see a rational task as involving the circumstances either of the theorist or of the historian-scholar, or—to cite a very modern case—of the popular journalist. The theorist sees himself as answering to his own circumstances: as Marxist, as structuralist, as New Critic, as phenomenologist, and so forth. For the historian, what matters is the past “as it really was,” in detail and in depth. One will object and say that no intellectual still works according to such unsubtle schema, but in practice these distinctions rigidly obtain. For there is very little thought or time given over to understanding the dialectics of pressure and response to pressure in intellectual work, circumambient and impinging circumstantiality as it bears on the production of the critical, or theoretical, or historical work, or, finally, the way in which one might manage to write *accurately* while also writing with some sense of the acute political matters which, as is the case with Orientalism, are relevant.

This is not the place to deal with these issues. Schwab's scholarship, by virtue of its excellence and interest, brings them to mind, as it does also the predicament of any scholar who does not feel it to be imperative to take an explicit political position toward what work he does or toward things in general. But then we come to the difficult problem of deciding what scholarly or even theoretical subject matter *does* (or does not) require an explicit political attitude or position in order for the subject to be dealt with fairly and accurately. As I have argued elsewhere, Orientalism as a subject fairly screams out for an open understanding of its unpleasant ethnocentric and colonialist background. Yet I must say in all candor that I would prefer Schwab's apolitical schol-

arship to a noisy and correct but less historically thorough analysis of Orientalism—but obviously that is not the only alternative. Probably it is true to say that in work like Schwab's, aside from its documentary richness, one can at least point to, and perhaps later supply, the aspects of reality that are missing, whereas in less impressive scholarship there are mainly attitudes (that often dissolve history) which one can support or attack and little else. My polarities are too reductive of course, and there are many other alternatives I have not cited; still, my gist will be clear.

But I am trying to be precise about how some scholarship, even as it excludes material, demonstrates the complexity both of what it includes and of what it does not include. There is no surgical way of prescribing just how much complexity and richness will suffice, and how much will not. Exemplary instances, such as *La Renaissance orientale*, help, although they cannot be used as originals to be copied slavishly. We return, thus, to such matters as patience, affection, enthusiasm; they seem to express themselves infectiously and implicitly in a scholar's work, however much his learning is formidable and impartial. If one sometimes chafes at the overwhelming simplicity in such phrases as "the Asiatic mind" (in "Domaine Oriental"), one is nonetheless always aware that Schwab's intention in generalizing is sympathetic, and not aggressive or hostile. In short, Schwab's work, as much in its subject matter as in its method, *multiplies* the opportunities for study and learning; it does not restrict them, even though Schwab's political quietism prevents him from making a stern judgment of Orientalism's cultural rapacity. That we can make the judgment, or thereafter study Romanticism, or investigate the influence of academies upon nineteenth-century intellectual life, or analyze the relationship between philology and ideology—or all of those things and then many more—is why Schwab's romance of ideas itself deserves serious attention. To mention, in addition, the sheer pleasure of its learning will further enhance its unique status.

But "pleasure" used so blithely to characterize "learning" does not imply an idle enjoyment on the reader's part. In Schwab, there is never art analyzed or intellectual achievement limned without some corresponding sense of actual involvement in the world. Thus what his historical research discovers for him, and causes his readers actively to enjoy, is the real underpinning of cultural life, which is that a culture is not mere collection, or *incorporation* by triumphant egos here and there, but rather that it is work performed by human agents—of society, social bonds, generational place, history. Here I employ the vocabulary used by Quentin Anderson to contrast two opposing views of literary culture and literary study.²⁶ Schwab is no believer in the efficacy of imperial selves. The point to make about him is that for all the aesthetic, civilizing, transforming import of the cultural event he describes, and for all its political thinness as he renders it, he never assumes work to be the result of the ego's linear appetite to remake the world as simply as one makes a bookshelf. Culture for Schwab is less a pantheon than a lyceum, and a bustling one at that. To the contemporary critic, still uselessly transfixed by pure form and often gullibly enraptured with an un-circumstanced structural poetics, Schwab must be the antidote. He urges the network over the isolated cell. By no other perspective can cultures be understood as the systems

they really are, systems over whose activity the individual intellectual historian holds the bridles of an educated, vigilant, historical understanding and a moral judgment.

REFERENCES

¹The three issues of *Mercure de France* are as follows: No. 1115 (July, 1956), 560-61; No. 1120 (December, 1956), 637-91 ("Hommage à Raymond Schwab"); No. 1134 (February, 1958), 242-309 ("Inédits de Raymond Schwab").

²Schwab, *La Renaissance orientale* (Paris, 1950). Hereafter quotations from this work will be identified in the text with the initials LRO, followed by a page number.

³See André Rousseaux, "Raymond Schwab et l'humanisme intégrale," *Mercure de France*, No. 1120 (December, 1956), 663-71.

⁴Schwab, *L'Auteur des Milles et une Nuits: Vie d'Antoine Galland* (Paris, 1964), pp. 48-51.

⁵Rousseaux, "Raymond Schwab et l'humanisme intégrale," p. 665.

⁶Schwab, "Domaine Oriental," in *Encyclopédie de la Pleiade: Histoire des Littératures*. Volume I: *Littératures Anciennes, orientales, et orales*, ed. Raymond Queneau (Paris, 1955), p. 213.

⁷Schwab, "Au moins des coïncidences," *Mercure de France*, No. 1134 (February, 1958), p. 299.

⁸Schwab, *Vie d'Anquetil-Duperron suivie des Usages Civils et religieux des Parses par Anquetil-Duperron* (Paris, 1934), p. 3.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 96.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁶Schwab, *La Vie d'Elémir Bourges* (Paris, 1948).

¹⁷Schwab, *L'Auteur des Milles et une Nuits*, p. 17.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹⁹Schwab, "Au moins des coïncidences," p. 298.

²⁰See Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge* (New York, 1972).

²¹Schwab, "Domaine Oriental," p. 108.

²²*Ibid.*, pp. 182-83.

²³See my essay on Foucault's *Archeology*, "An Ethics of Language," *Diacritics*, IV:2 (Summer, 1974), pp. 28-37; also the pages on him in my *Beginnings: Intention and Method* (New York, 1975).

²⁴Schwab, "Domaine Oriental," p. 152.

²⁵I discuss this problematic at length in my *Orientalism* (forthcoming).

²⁶Quentin Anderson, *The Imperial Self* (New York, 1971).

KURT W. FORSTER

Aby Warburg's History of Art: Collective Memory and the Social Mediation of Images

A RESEARCH INSTITUTE of international stature and its renowned publication series both carry the name of Aby Warburg (1866–1929), but his scholarly achievement remains rather obscure despite a recent “intellectual biography” by Sir Ernst Gombrich.¹ His reputation as an art historian is overshadowed by his fame as the founder of the *kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek* in Hamburg, which became the nucleus of the library at the Warburg Institute after its transfer to London in 1933.

The eldest son of a Hamburg banker, Warburg studied art history—then a methodologically immature field only recently admitted to university faculties—but decided against a university career. Not until his last years did he teach, and then only as a *Honorarprofessor*, after devoting his entire life to the study of art. His few succinct publications appear as only the torso of a potentially gigantic lifework in the proportions of nineteenth-century scholarship. He concerned himself almost exclusively with basic problems of cultural history, and he hoped to prepare the way for new and comprehensive investigations, yet his entire published work fits easily into the 438 pages of the Italian edition, index and all.² The original German edition of 1932 was virtually deprived of impact by the Nazi takeover, and, with one peripheral exception, Warburg's writings still remain unavailable in English some forty years after the transfer of his research library to London. What little is generally known of Warburg's work today is almost totally indirect and frequently distorted.

Several of Warburg's topics and some of his methodological queries were pursued by Fritz Saxl and Erwin Panofsky, who are widely considered to have been the exponents of a supposedly Warburgian iconology in England and in the United States.³ Some of Warburg's focal themes, such as Renaissance and Antiquity in their historical dialectic, the mediation of figural traditions, Netherlandish painting, Dürer, and astrological and speculative imagery, received extended treatment by both scholars, particularly Panofsky. However, while Panofsky's approach is often catholic and synthetic, Warburg's has an altogether different cast. Comprehensive in concept and critical in its evaluation of evidence, his questions aim at the role of collective memory and the social functions of art.

Warburg's scholarly ideas reflect uncannily the conditions of his personal life. Far from blunting the relevance of his achievement, these personal circumstances illuminate fundamental issues of historical scholarship. Detachment from the consuming

force of events was his aim and virtually his definition of higher forms of social organization, but he could not remain aloof from the historical events and the psychological turmoil of his lifetime. He shared with the great historians of his time a heightened experience of evolution, of a tremendous thrust of forces. His sense of the significance of records in Western culture made every artifact appear as a solidified moment in the flux of historical life. Warburg's devoted interest in seemingly random records, ephemera, and trivia led to a form of voracious collecting that bordered on obsession. As an indefatigable gatherer of anthropological data, Warburg was as much the prey as the hunter: he wanted to discover the motor forces of historical life, but he could only perceive them in terms of the psychological conflicts that drove him on.

The establishment of his library assumed such significance in Warburg's thinking and the extraordinary labor he invested in its development overreached the mere usefulness of a scholar's hand-library to such a degree that we may well ask why he should have devoted so much of his life's energy to it. In 1900, he wrote to his brother, pleading for a more generous allotment of family funds for his library, that "in the last analysis we are all *rentiers*, and terribly interest-minded. . . . I would not hesitate for a moment to enter my library as a financial asset in the accounts of the firm."⁴ There was only one real return from the tremendous investment of the library: his research, a book, which in turn would be reinvested into the gigantic capital of knowledge. Warburg plainly recognized the financial and social conditions of his own scholarship when he insisted that "we should demonstrate by our example that capitalism also makes the labor of thinking possible on the broadest basis, as only capitalism is able to provide it."⁵ Warburg intended to approach the study of history and of artifacts on the "broadest basis" indeed. The first condition for his work was to be met by a systematic collection of vast information, the second by a carefully guarded distance both from the object of historical investigation and from the onrushing life around him.

Warburg recapitulated in the story of his scholarly research and in the growth and transformation of his library one of the crucial chapters in the changing conditions of intellectual work. In forming his library he returned almost to the conditions of the early nineteenth century, to the private scholar who, like Alexander von Humboldt or the Grimm brothers, furnished his intellectual workshop with books and manuscripts as the skilled artisan equipped himself with tools and materials. But precisely the work of Humboldt and the Grimms had done much to establish the industries of knowledge, the nineteenth-century universities, where material and staff resources escalated into a scholarly production beyond the individual's scope. For personal reasons, Warburg was reluctant to take up a university post, and he was also dissatisfied with the working conditions in institutional libraries. As a pioneering entrepreneur and private investor, he created his own firm, an intellectual *officina* which, in the end, went "public" as a consequence of the political and financial havoc brought on by the Third Reich. Yet, these obvious circumstances tell only half the story, the other half is as impersonal as the first is private.

Warburg's stance of the totally committed private scholar recalls the Enlightenment, just as his preference for books over art objects signals his emancipation from the values of his high patrician class. The most important aspect of his research library

lies perhaps in the contradictory nature of its role and purpose in Warburg's work. The potentially limitless scope of written information and graphic representation contained for Warburg the historical reality of human development and creation. Consequently, his library took on the function of a vastly enlarged memory. Warburg considered man, in body and mind, the living evidence of his own development. Human products, most compellingly aesthetic creations, told and retold the functioning of personal and social memory. The fixed and hidden layers of human development, he found, would be recalled spontaneously and consciously by civilized man. Human expression in its most encompassing definition, and hence as an anthropological category, became the central focus of his studies and the true subject category of his library:

Therefore [he explained in 1923] I envisage as a description of the aims of my library the formulation: a collection of documents relating to the psychology of human expression. The question is: how did verbal and pictorial expressions originate; what are the feelings or points of view, conscious or unconscious, under which they are stored in the archives of memory? Are there laws to govern their formation or reemergence?⁶

Why did the long history and wide scope of human expression hold such fundamental significance for Warburg's analysis of works of art, precisely at a time when the history of art began to acquire status as an independent academic field with a certain autonomy of approach? True, its autonomy was largely one of arrogant exclusion, based on rigid canons of appreciation and an ultimately financial test of value. One name, that of Bernard Berenson, jumps to mind to contrast with Warburg's at the time. One could easily draw a network of inverse correspondences between the two men, but only those that matter in a discussion of Warburg are worth mentioning here. Significantly, both Warburg and Berenson bequeathed institutes to their profession which were intensely personal instruments as well as symbolic headquarters for scholarly camp-followers. Whereas Warburg spent his means to create an instrument of scholarship, Berenson used his scholarship to become a man of means. At the identical stage in the development of an art historical discipline, Berenson made a fortune in authenticating works of art, while Warburg spent his in a demonstration of the collective human origins of every authentic image. Berenson recreated primitive fetishes of experience in a commercial world, of which, in Warburg's view, photographic snapshots, postage stamps, and posters seemed to be some of the most pregnant images.

In the context of a searching assessment of art historical approaches, Warburg considered the likes of Bode, Morelli, Venturi, and Berenson to be "hero-worshippers, but in their ultimate derivations they are only inspired by the temperament of a gourmand. The neutrally cool form of estimation happens to be the original form of enthusiasm peculiar to the propertied classes, the collector and his circle."⁷ Warburg not only associated ownership of art with luxury; he also considered it an obstacle to a proper analytical grasp of artifacts. The collector, as much possessed by his treasures as he is their owner, regresses to the "primitive values" of physical possession.⁸ This is more than aversion to the milieu of his family, though aversion it was, too, as Warburg confessed in retrospect: "Opposition against property [ownership] and elegance *à la française*, Alsterufer."⁹ The Alsterufer, Hamburg's most fashionable patrician address,

stood symbolically for a society that had use for works of art only as investment and as tokens of social status. For Warburg, however, the individual work of art has value above all as a record, as a highly complex and productive response of human memory to a particular situation. The peculiar quality of artifacts lies in their socially mediated functions (as memory and response), for Warburg learned,

... in the years of work among the Florentine records, ... to understand the work of art as the outcome of a situation which involved the patron no less than the artist. It is in focusing on a given commission, and on the solution that emerges from conflicting possibilities which the historical situation presented, that Warburg's approach achieved its greatest triumph.⁴⁰

In a series of analytical steps, like concentrically expanding rings around the artifact, Warburg attempted to reconstitute its original context through historical research. His models were less the contemporary art historians in their prejudiced and partial examination of historical records than the great historians of his day, Heinrich Brockhaus and especially Robert Davidsohn. In Jakob Burckhardt he criticized the often parallel but unconnected treatment of history and of art, and, with major publications of the early nineteen-hundreds, took up where Burckhardt left off with his *Beiträge zur Kunstgeschichte von Italien* (published posthumously in 1898). Burckhardt had compiled a useful but rather mechanical account of the portrait genre during the Renaissance to which Warburg responded with a concise essay on *Portraiture and the Florentine Bourgeoisie* (1902). He set the prominent appearance of local patricians among the saintly actors in the frescoes of Florentine chapels in connection with the almost totally forgotten practice of placing life-size wax figures as votive images in churches. In these conflicting traditions—pagan dedication of images, on the one hand, and the devotional context of Christian imagery, on the other—Warburg recognized fundamental contradictions of a particular historical moment and place; contradictions, moreover, he felt to be so essential to the dynamics of the Renaissance and of recent times that he explored them in a series of further essays on *Francesco Sassetti's Last Will and Testament* (1907) and on the cultural exchanges between North and South. Of all of these studies may be said what Warburg recognized as the unfulfilled promise of Burckhardt's own research, namely, that the historian “did not avoid the labor of investigating the individual work of art in its direct connection with the background of its time in order to interpret the ideal or practical exigences of real life as its ‘causality.’”⁴¹ The driving question of why a work of art resulted in its particular form and quality demanded an answer. Memory, as the abstract sum total of human history, gave an ever changing response to different situations. With the concept of response Warburg sacrificed one of the most cherished notions of academic art history in his time, the concept of autonomy for both aesthetic values and artists. Theories of an independent formal development of art—typified by Wölfflin's *Renaissance and Baroque* of 1888—and narrow explanations of formal qualities as a mechanical result of conventions, material properties, or preferences of taste came under close scrutiny. By contrast, a true history of artistic production needed to recognize both the full spectrum of artifacts—and Warburg rarely tired of inveighing against the arbitrary selection of objects according to traditional aesthetic categories—and their instrumentality

within a cultural context. Without its cultural context the work of art is homeless, stranded in an alien setting or in a neutral repository.

Warburg's brand of *Kulturwissenschaft* was not satisfied with an explanation of works of art as mechanical derivations from the material basis, nor with their distillation into a pure history of ideas. In both he criticized the fabrication of false continuities and the arbitrary identification of causes. A proper *kulturwissenschaftlicher* approach would need to take account of the fact that culture is generated from material bases and that it produces ideas, but this production of culture is, for him, determined neither by material processes nor by ideas. He felt that the entire economy of culture came down on a psychic balance sheet with the total biological heritage, the social liabilities and expressive expenditures of man oscillating around a precarious equilibrium.

It dawned on Warburg that historical thinking involves a dual reflection: the penetration of its object from the past, and the recognition of the historian's own time and contingency. He realized that, as a historian, he reproduced the object of his study from a temporal and cultural distance, a distance which translates itself into a difference of stage and process within the continuum of history. If this process is taken seriously, then any meaning that artifacts may hold must be defined from the fundamental duality of historical knowledge—that is to say, artifacts either carry meanings that are reconstructed within the context of the society which produced them, or they acquire significance in the thinking of the historian and in the experiences of his contemporaries. These two meanings are separable, though they are always connected in the historian's recognition of their difference. Warburg confessed in the last year of his life (1929) that "often, it appears to me, as if I derived [meaning] from the realm of images in an autobiographical reflex as a psychohistorian of the Occident."¹²

Today, we may have difficulties with Warburg's view of vast historical processes as a kind of *psychomachia*, but there is no denying that he sought to render these conflicts of human experience and history in highly specific and amply documented instances. Art historical analysis, as Warburg envisaged it, would restore to the frozen and isolated images of the past the dynamics of the very process that generated them. He hoped to comprehend them as the witnesses to an otherwise irretrievable phase of human development. In the course of history, he argued, man developed instruments of defense against an aboriginal angst. By means of external control he made his way toward an internal emancipation from his fears and beliefs. As a student of Darwin, Warburg considered the acquisition of culture a very gradual process, but doubted that the territory of freedom and mental control was a permanent gain. His Enlightenment view of scientific advance was tempered by a profoundly pessimistic evaluation of the dialectics of human progress.

The constitutive characteristic of culture in Warburg's view, a sense of distance and control, faintly recalls the aloof social tone of the Hamburg patriciate. For Warburg, critical detachment was a personal necessity, not simply a legacy of his class. Human detachment from the real and threatening power of natural and political forces was in constant peril, and the rapidly growing technology of his day rekindled ancient fears in Warburg's mind. In 1895-96, during a trip across the United States, Warburg paid

special attention to two peculiar aspects of American culture: popular magazines and the tenaciously surviving culture of Indian tribes. In his study of Pueblo ritual in New Mexico, he detected "the essential character of the conception of causality among the 'primitives,' . . . the 'corporalization' of the sense impression."¹³ The modern historian of Warburg's persuasion, on the other hand, would comprehend historical causality in a "de-corporalized," analytically distanced reading of symbolic representation.

The coexistence of two totally different cultures on the American continent, a primitive and an ultramodern one, alerted Warburg to a potential loss of detachment and distance that threatened to throw man back to a newly "primitive" state. This "dialectic of Enlightenment"¹⁴ froze in Warburg's memory into the following confrontation on a snapshot he took in 1896:

I was able to catch with my camera in the streets of San Francisco the conqueror of the serpent cult and of the fear of lightning, the heir to the aboriginal inhabitants, the gold-seeking intruder into the land of the Indians. It is Uncle Sam with the top hat proudly striding along the road in front of an imitation classical rotunda. High above his top hat there stretches the electric wire. By means of Edison's copper serpent he has wrested the thunderbolt from nature. The American has no fear of the rattlesnake. He kills and exterminates it but certainly does not worship it. . . . Lightning imprisoned in the wire, captive electricity, has created a civilization that does away with paganism. What does it put in its stead? The forces of nature are no longer conceived as anthropomorphic or biomorphic shapes but rather as infinite waves obeying the pressure of the human hand. By this means the civilization of the machine age destroys what science, emerging from myth, had painfully conquered, the zone of contemplation that became the zone of reasoning. The modern Prometheus and the modern Icarus, Franklin and the Wright Brothers who invented the dirigible aircraft, are the fateful destroyers of that sense of distance who threaten to lead the globe back into chaos.¹⁵

If these words have a strangely anachronistic ring and, at first sight, the appearance of doubtful logic, they become terribly real if we think of the technicized warfare of 1914-18, of the holocaust of the Second World War, and of the threat of total annihilation through atomic warfare. Modern technology permits greater control and distance—in Warburg's words a more spacious zone for thought—but it has also abolished all escape from the threat of total destruction.

It is tragically fitting that the advance of the First World War and the collapse of Germany cost Warburg his sanity. As the war spread, he abandoned virtually all scholarly work in a desperate effort to cope with the course of events on the level of information, that is, at a distance. His friend and pupil Carl Georg Heise recalled that Warburg daily "concentrated all his energy on gathering clippings from the seven most important newspapers, foreign ones among them as long as he managed to obtain them, and to jot down . . . brief but telling comments" on the events.¹⁶ In its futility, Warburg's "insane" effort reflects the utter incomprehensibility of events, and in its desperate persistence, the necessity to cope with them in the hope of discovering their causality. If an explanation could be found, then an element of logic would render in terms of the mind what defied human comprehension.

In 1923, after Warburg had regained his mental balance and recovered his ability to do research, he embarked upon another gigantic project, long prepared by many earlier efforts and curiously reminiscent of his compulsive gathering of information

during the war years. He attempted no less than an atlas of expressive human gestures through pictorial and diagrammatic records extending to the most recent news photographs and including ancient and medieval reliefs, Renaissance paintings, and even postage stamps. Far from merely compiling similar human gestures through their historical transformation in pictorial records, Warburg was keenly responsive to ambiguities and even reversals in their function and meaning. He was too much a historian of material culture to fall into the trap of the iconographers. Even in its physical format, the preparation for the *Atlas of Memory* abandons the customary linear discourse of the book. Warburg arranged photographs and reproductions on large screens in order to establish the historical recurrence of key figures and gestures in polythematic patterns. He recovered on the large scale of history the small and seemingly ephemeral vocabulary of human expression. In a rather surprising analogy to financial notions, he explained his ideas on collective memory to members of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce:

He spoke of the gold reserves of suffering of which our civilization disposes and compared the ancient heritage to a mint or "savings bank" whose issues were backed by the archaic passions of which they bore the stamp.¹⁷

The sheer quantity and constant flood of images in modern times may aptly parallel the financial consequences of inflation. If Warburg had listed photography—a form of vastly expanded memory storage—among the instances of qualitative advance in modern scholarship,¹⁸ he may have realized, a quarter of a century later when embarking upon the *Mnemosyne Atlas*, that the dialectics of progress had optimized his means of mapping the historical development of mimetic language, while the increasing uniformity and inflation of images threatened to wipe out large expanses of collective memory. In a very immediate way Warburg attempted a scholarly salvage operation of European culture. Like Marcel Proust, who in his *recherche du temps perdu* documented at a distance a world which was subjectively lost before it was actually destroyed, Warburg recovered, in the face of imminent collective amnesia and vast future destructions, the history of human emancipation in his own "psychohistory." Mimetic and gestural language he considered the very medium of historical continuity. As he put it, in 1903, in distinguishing his own approach from that of other art historians, "the conditions and limitations which are rooted in the mimetic nature of man"¹⁹ were to be the subject of his analysis. The plastic arts constitute the only concrete record of man's mimetic activity outside his own collective memory. Warburg sought to do no less than break the code of his cultural heritage at a time when much of that heritage had paled and fractured, and, with the world wars, was to be physically shattered and perverted.

With the *Atlas of Memory*, Warburg responded to his urgent experiences of the fragmentation of culture and, through his intense work in Rome (1928/29), he sought to counteract his profound sense of loss. In organizing the material for the *Atlas*, his conceptual means, and to an extent his graphic arrangement of images, were similar to those of Schwitters' collages, his scope and interpretative goal nothing short of Proust's or Robert Musil's, but any individual's inadequacy to such a task tragically illuminates

the unfulfilled social mediation of that very culture. The personal effort of the historian recalls, once again, the dual reflection of historical thought: He and his ideas are as contingent as the object of his study. Only to the extent that he perceives his own conditions will he be able to develop a critical understanding of the true conditions of past life. With the abortive project for the *Atlas of Memory*, Warburg may have realized that both the culture of his class and his own single-handed salvage operation were historically doomed. In the very subject of his study—the social mediation of expressive human communication and the transformation of its language—he seized upon the failures and achievements of collective memory in history. It would be difficult, indeed, to define a more comprehensive theme for the study of cultural history in the twentieth century.

REFERENCES

¹*Aby Warburg, An Intellectual Biography (With a Memoir on the History of the Library by F. Saxl)*, (London, 1970), hereafter cited as Gombrich, *Warburg*.

²Aby Warburg, *La rinascita del paganesimo antico . . .*, ed. by Gertrud Bing (Florence, 1966), hereafter quoted as Warburg, *Rinascita*.

³While salient traits of Panofsky's scholarly physiognomy betray the stamp of Warburg's work, his basic substitution of a history of themes for the earlier history of styles has yielded less and less in terms of actual historical understanding. After a long interval, art historians are now returning to a critical historical analysis of the circumstances and conditions of artists and, hence, to the historical mediation of aesthetic values. The development of modern historiography pivots around ideas of change as a result of forces at work within society itself. By expansion of the concept of process and production, the modern historian recognizes anything a civilization has brought forth as a product rather than as a dense and self-contained object. As he reproduces that object in his thought, he aims to recover the motives for its creation. These arguments necessarily embed the artifact in a context and thereby restore to it a condition of historical understanding. Being mainly concerned with ostensibly dense and self-contained objects, art historians have been slow in abandoning the notion of artistic autonomy (cf. my "Critical History of Art, or Transfiguration of Values?", *New Literary History*, III [1972], pp. 459-70).

⁴Gombrich, *Warburg*, pp. 129f.

⁵Gombrich, *Warburg*, p. 130. Gombrich's translation of Warburg's German appears not entirely accurate in its rendition of *Denkarbeit*—a significant term—as 'intellectual achievement.'

⁶Gombrich, *Warburg*, p. 222 (with a slight variation in the English translation).

⁷Gombrich, *Warburg*, p. 143.

⁸See Gombrich's discussion of Warburg's distinction between physical and conceptual grasp (*greifen* and *begreifen*) in *Warburg*, p. 252: "It was by refraining from grasping in order to contemplate that man became truly human. This necessitated a mastery of the immediate impulse. An interval for reflection had to be interposed between the stimulus and its natural response."

⁹Gombrich, *Aby Warburg zum Gedächtnis (Hamburger Universitätsreden, No. 34)*, (1966), pp. 25f.

¹⁰Gombrich, *Warburg*, p. 315.

¹¹Warburg, *Rinascita*, p. 112.

¹²Gombrich, *Warburg zum Gedächtnis*, p. 34.

¹³Gombrich, *Warburg*, pp. 90f.

¹⁴Cf. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Amsterdam, 1947).

¹⁵Gombrich, *Warburg*, p. 225.

¹⁶Carl Georg Heise in *Hamburger Universitätsreden, No. 34* (1966), p. 43.

¹⁷Gombrich, *Warburg*, p. 250.

¹⁸Warburg, *Rinascita*, p. 112.

¹⁹Gombrich, *Warburg*, p. 114.

HENRI ZERNER

Aloïs Riegl: Art, Value, and Historicism

ANY HISTORICAL VIEW OF ART poses an immediate problem for the evaluation of individual works; the development of early Romantic art theory, which is still the basis of modern criticism, shows this clearly. Once the problem is posed, the rapid progression of thought from Herder to Novalis appears inevitable: For Herder, each work of art could only be judged according to the standards of the culture and civilization in which it was produced; for Novalis, every work of art had a value for someone at some time in some place—consequently, there were no bad works of art, only limited ones. In the nineteenth century, this problem of evaluation was reinforced and exacerbated by the scientific pretensions of the gradually developing history of art, with its goal of an objectivity which could not be abandoned without destroying the standards of the profession. It is in the work of Aloïs Riegl¹ that these related problems became most acute, and where a possibility of their solution was interestingly if not altogether satisfactorily adumbrated.

Riegl was perhaps the most influential art historian of the beginning of this century. His writings, often invoked like Sibylline texts, had an enormous impact not only on the major Viennese art historians, but on others as well, such as Erwin Panofsky and Edgar Wind, and even on Richard Krautheimer, although he later abjured the faith. Riegl's fame also went beyond the confines of art history; Walter Benjamin has recalled the decisive impression he received from reading *Die spätrömische Kunstindustrie*. For a time it even became fashionable to belong to Riegl's cult. Bernard Berenson, for instance, kept the great book on a lecturn and expressed his reverence for the Viennese master.

Outside the German-speaking countries, however, Riegl did not make much of a mark (the exception was Italy, where Bianchi-Bandinelli and Ragghianti were particularly aware of his importance). His writings have never been translated into English, except for a short piece that recently appeared in an anthology.² With the advent of professionalism and specialization in art history, his popularity faded altogether. Wölfflin, whose writings are regularly assigned to American undergraduates, had a much more enduring fame, because his pairs of opposing concepts (linear/painterly; plane/recession, etc.) could be readily exploited for purposes of analysis and stylistic description independently of their role in the author's theory. Riegl's ideas did not lend themselves to such use. Nevertheless, his name has remained at least vaguely on the

list of great theorists, thanks to occasional reminders such as that provided by Meyer Schapiro's celebrated article on style.³ Today, with rising dissatisfaction over art historical "professionalism," Riegl has regained in some quarters his reputation as holy prophet, and it may in fact be that his was the grandest effort ever made to give coherence to the discipline and to integrate it satisfactorily into the more general field of the social sciences. In spite of certain shortcomings and even some distasteful traits in his work, he clearly merits serious reexamination.

Born in 1858, Riegl belonged to a generation of great historians of art that included Heinrich Wölfflin, Aby Warburg, and Émile Mâle, and he was a contemporary in Vienna of Freud and Klimt. He first studied law, then dropped it for philosophy and history. Trained at the Institut für Geschichtsforschungen, a school modeled on the École des Chartes, where paleography and diplomatics were highly developed, Riegl specialized in the study of art and took a position in the museum of decorative arts where he prepared a series of studies on textiles, especially on Oriental rugs. In 1893, the year the Neoclassical sculptor Adolf von Hildebrand published *Das Problem der Form*,⁴ which had an enormous influence on art history and on Riegl in particular, Riegl published *Stilfragen (Problems of Style)*, a book in which he sketches the history of ornament in Europe and the Near East from its origins to Islam. This book was a polemical work with a provocative thesis. It was directed against the architect and theorist Gottfried Semper or, more particularly, against Semper's disciples who had twisted his ideas into a sort of "materialistic" evolutionism. According to them, style was determined by three factors: material, technique, and purpose; to this Riegl opposed the independence of aesthetic choice from material conditions, claiming that the latter had only a negative and not a formative influence. He also expounded the thesis of the historical continuity of art—in this case of ornamental art from the ancient Near East (Egypt) to Byzantium and Islam. Whether the appearance is more naturalistic or more abstract, the ornaments always present stylistic variations on the same enduring patterns.

In 1897, Riegl left the museum for the University of Vienna. Out of his lectures came a number of publications, the most famous of which was *Spätromische Kunstindustrie*, in which he studied the art of late antiquity. Where his predecessors had seen in that period only the decadence of classical art, Riegl observed in it the emergence of new values. Furthermore, he attacked the standard explanation for the radical change of style during the Early Christian period in terms of the barbarian invasions, and saw instead in this change an organic transformation inside the Latin world itself.⁵ Against the view that this period was "decadent," a term that he entirely rejected, Riegl opposed a philosophy of history that recognized only constant and irreversible progress.

Riegl also gave lectures on the formation and development of the Baroque,⁶ another period that was generally regarded as decadent, and published his monumental work on Dutch group portraits of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (1902). With this work, Riegl abandoned those fields of research where the individual artist can rarely be identified, and turned to post-Renaissance painting, the most traditional domain of the history of art. But it was not the contribution of individual artists that

interested him in this long series of masterly, penetrating, and sometimes overly fastidious analyses; nor was he concerned with the problem of patronage, so important when dealing with the Dutch portraits. He attempted, through an examination of the works themselves, to define the artistic projection of that society, of which the masterpieces of Hals and Rembrandt, particularly the *Syndics of the Cloth-Drapers' Guild*, are the most complete realization. Riegl died in 1905, leaving behind a collection of ideas without a completely systematic order and bequeathing to later generations a number of radical and often puzzling texts.

The writings of Riegl span a great variety of subjects, and, on the whole, they remain remarkably solid both in their research and in their general historical views. Riegl shows himself a brilliant master of the detailed analysis of particular works of art. It is, however, in the field of theory that his contribution was the most decisive and in which he found followers. His contribution can be defined most readily in terms of the various approaches he opposed: factual positivistic history which archeologists practice and which represented his own training; an iconographic point of view that stresses the subject matter of a work of art; biographical criticism, which interprets the work in the light of the artist's life; the primacy of the individual artist's consciousness and will; the "materialistic" or mechanistic explanation of stylistic evolution; any aesthetic theory that severs art from history; any normative system that attempts to reach a definitive interpretation or judgment; the hierarchical distinction between the applied or decorative arts, on the one hand, and the higher arts (painting, sculpture, and architecture), on the other, where the latter alone are considered to be art in the strict sense of the word. In brief, Riegl attacked all the fundamental convictions of traditional art history. These convictions have by no means disappeared today. They are not, it is true, very comfortably held, but neither have they been replaced by what one might call a new paradigm. Riegl's monumental effort to confront all these issues remains unmatched today and continues to demand consideration.

An account of Riegl's contribution is harder to give in positive terms, especially if one makes an attempt at systematization—an attempt that is, however, not necessarily advisable. One can begin by making two points. The first is generally recognized as an accomplishment: Riegl completely reopened the field of art history. The idea that artistic value was relative had certainly been entertained during the Romantic period, but it always had to be accommodated to the contending notion that some periods—classical antiquity, the High Renaissance, or the French thirteenth century—had attained artistic supremacy. Riegl's plea for equal treatment for all historical periods, if it is by no means easy to realize, seems nevertheless at least theoretically acceptable to many people today, and there are signs that the situation is progressing further in this direction: little in the Western tradition remains to be discovered, while a serious effort to deal with the art of primitive peoples is apparent.

The second point is more difficult to accept: Riegl's effort to overthrow the supremacy of the individual creator as central to the significance of the work in favor of a higher communal point of view reflects a decidedly subversive Hegelian inheritance and undermines our whole aesthetic tradition. It is, nonetheless, a necessary corollary to the first point if we are not to impose our post-Renaissance Western view on the art of remote cultures.

Let us go a little more specifically into the tenets of Riegl's convictions. One—his irreducible historicism—comes out strongly and persistently. Nothing escapes history. Riegl is not so much concerned with the conditions at the historical moment when the work appears—these conditions are important, but only as limiting factors of resistance. The scholar, however, must confront the whole of art history. It is as a link in the chain of artistic events that he must understand each individual work. Its place in this historical chain elucidates the aesthetic tendency of the work, which is for Riegl the major object of art historical investigation. When he studies a particular genre, whether it is Empire furniture, Roman fibulae, or Dutch group portraits, Riegl always places it within a much larger development. He sees art evolving in one great movement that goes from a tactile (*baptisch*) vision of the world toward a more and more optical one. In his later years, with *Das holländische Gruppenporträt*, he turned to the fundamental analytical tools of Romanticism and talked of an evolution from an objective to an increasingly subjective vision. The tactile-optical alternative is taken over, of course, from Hildebrand's influential *Problem of Form*, and rests on a theory of perception which, as Sedlmayr⁷ pointed out, had already become obsolete during Riegl's lifetime. The objective-subjective polarity neither overlaps the previous one exactly nor entirely replaces it; some works can be "optical" but not subjective.⁸ Furthermore, the general evolution is articulated in several cycles in which one may observe apparent regressions. The loss of deep space at the end of antiquity is a case in point; it is an apparent regression, but also a necessary advance. Riegl claimed that it would have been impossible to progress directly from the inconsistent and discontinuous perspective of antiquity to the continuity of Renaissance space. While Riegl has been admired for acceding to an elevated point of view from which he could envisage such long-range artistic developments, he has also been accused of reducing art history to a simplistic mechanism and of submitting it to a dangerous teleology. In fact, his thought is more complex.

Riegl's ideas crystallized around one concept or, perhaps one should say more prudently, around one term: *Kunstwollen*.⁹ The problem lies in determining exactly what Riegl meant by the word, a point on which his followers were never able to agree. Around 1925, when his ideas were being most actively discussed, two interpretations of its meaning could be distinguished: One, most brilliantly articulated by Panofsky,¹⁰ is Neo-Kantian. It sought to avoid any concept of the *Kunstwollen* as a metaphysical entity—it seemed too unscientific, an attempt to explain art historical change as phlogiston explained heat. Wind, Panofsky, and others interpreted the *Kunstwollen* as a content or objective immanent meaning—each work, by its style, involves the whole of the culture from which it comes; the task of the art historian is to explore and reveal this virtuality of the work of art as fully as possible. The other, powerfully expressed by Sedlmayr in his introduction to Riegl's collected essays, is Hegelian. According to it, the *Kunstwollen* is a central and informing principle, a truly creative force;¹¹ it then appears as what we might call a "deep structure." This school of Riegl's followers called its method *Strukturanalyse*; according to it, the historian first has to discover this informing principle, which will then make it possible for him to understand the surface phenomena.

Both interpretations can be defended by quoting Riegl's writings. The meaning of the word *Kunstwollen* is elusive because it seems to vary with its context. Otto Pächt has explained this by saying that the meaning of *Kunstwollen* developed during the ten years of Riegl's theoretical reflection. His writings exhibit a searching mind in constant motion and, moreover, were produced during a particularly active decade of European thought. Another reason for our difficulty in pinning down what Riegl meant by the term is the varied, not to say disparate, character of the intellectual and philosophical equipment of the author. Riegl, having invested the term *Kunstwollen* with all the versatility of his mind, presents us with residues of various borrowings that do not always fit comfortably together. His use of the term *Kunstwollen* changes not only as the years go by, but at the same time within the same text.

These fluctuations of the meaning of *Kunstwollen* are not, however, simply the result of incoherence that we can explain away in order to regularize the system; they play a more positive role. An understanding of the necessary and fruitful ambiguity of the term will enable us to define Riegl's peculiar place in the formalist study of art—in the general tendency, that is, to study art as a closed system. We must note first that in Riegl's writing the term *Kunstwollen* replaces the word 'style.' Like Morelli before him, Riegl avoids using the word 'style.' Curiously enough, even in *Stilfragen*, he hardly uses it except when paraphrasing someone else's ideas. Thus *Kunstwollen* is loaded with all the ambiguities that usually affect the concept of style. The change of word obviously betrays an effort to rethink the fundamental notions of art history. This is why, although the word *Kunstwollen* has fallen almost entirely out of use, we will have to retain it in our discussion of Riegl in order to conserve the distance that he wished to keep between traditional ideas and his own.

In principle, there is no doubt that Riegl wanted to establish art history as a science and to define its autonomy. His attitude, however, was ambivalent. On the one hand, he aspired to what he called a "positivism." His "positivism" consisted largely in avoiding any metaphysical question, in renouncing the study of the first causes (or the teleological determination) of artistic development. "As for what determines the aesthetic urge to see natural objects represented in works of art by stressing or repressing the features that isolate them or conversely unify them, one can only indulge in metaphysical conjectures that an art historian must absolutely refuse to make."¹²

Riegl did not entertain the possibility of a Rankean positivism, the reconstruction of the past by the establishment through historical criticism of a succession of facts or events. Very early, and much more clearly than Riegl, the young Wölfflin had envisioned two opposite conceptions of science and had decidedly made his choice:

A history that would only register things that have happened one after another cannot be defended; it would deceive itself if it believed it had thereby become an exact science. One can only work scientifically when one can catch the flux of phenomena in strong models. Mechanics, for example, provides these models for physics. The social sciences still lack this foundation; we can only look for it in Psychology.¹³

Riegl cannot pose such a clear-cut alternative between two views of science because he is not prepared to give up empirical positivism. His solution is bold, somewhat sur-

prising, and put forth perhaps not without irony. It is the very *Kunstwollen*, this most elusive entity, that makes his approach scientific: "There remains the *Kunstwollen* as the only secure datum."¹⁴

Riegl reconciles his empirical conviction and the German idealist tradition by accepting as data not, as one would expect, the results of sensual perception, but our global comprehension of the work of art. This bizarre and apparently willful intellectual act may seem simply to be a subterfuge. Riegl, however, probably felt it was justified insofar as the *Kunstwollen* is strictly a formal principle: it only exists as "color and outline, on the plane or in space."¹⁵ This comes out clearly at the end of "Naturwerk und Kunstwerk":

All these non-artistic domains of culture constantly play a part in the history of art insofar as they supply the work of art (which is never without an outside purpose) with its exterior impulsion, its content. It is clear, however, that the art historian will not be able correctly to assess the subject of a particular work of art and the way this subject is conceived until he has understood in what way the will [*Wollen*] that has given the impulse to such a theme is identical with the will that has formed the corresponding figure in outline and color this way and no other.¹⁶

Clearly, the latter "will" or *Wollen* is precisely the *Kunstwollen*, it can only appear as giving form *nach Umriß und Farbe so und nicht anders*; it only exists as the specific domain of the visual.

It should be remarked that Riegl who untiringly repeats his favorite formula—*Umriß und Farbe in Ebene oder Raum*—in full has here reduced it to contour and color and has left out plane and space. Is this simply an economy of words? It may also be that Riegl experienced the difficulty that affects all formalist criticism. This kind of criticism, in an attempt to confine itself to what is specifically artistic, tries to restrict its activity to "form" as opposed to content. But the exact distribution between the two, or, in other words, a definition of form beyond its opposition to content, is by no means easy.

Within the complete formula itself, we must take note of a shift. Color and contour can be understood strictly as pictorial devices in the sense of Maurice Denis's famous definition of a picture as "a flat surface covered with colors assembled in a certain order." Space, however, introduces an incongruous element, because we are not dealing with actual space but with fictional or imaginary space (since Riegl uses the complete formula for painting in *Das holländische Gruppenporträt, passim*). For Riegl, but also for Wölfflin and in all formal criticism that followed, space played a central part precisely because it occupies an ambiguous place midway between a device of representation and the thing represented. The introduction of space keeps the study of artistic "forms" from being narrowed down to a sterile analysis of configurations. It broadens this kind of criticism by including the analysis of a rich visual structure—a complex system of relations—but an *imaginary* structure. In his book on Dutch group portraits, Riegl extends the domain of specifically artistic analysis to the psychological relations among the figures, and between the figures and the spectator, as expressed by the direction of the glance. This is treated as a formal element, just as space is, and in relation to it. For instance, the artist can give the picture its unity through the inter-

mediary of the spectator who creates an indirect link between himself and the depicted characters whose glances are turned toward him; this, according to Riegl, is how the quality of attentiveness (*Aufmerksamkeit*) essential for sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Dutch art is expressed.

Insofar as all this is part of the *Kunstwollen*, one can understand how Panofsky could have understood the *Kunstwollen* as an immanent artistic significance. Indeed, his interpretation has been very fruitful and has brought out something hinted by Riegl and neglected by his Hegelian followers: the whole complex of cultural connotations suggested by the individual work of art. But to reduce the term to the equivalent of a meaning is decidedly to ruin the hope for a science of art history such as Riegl had entertained. If the *Kunstwollen* is a meaning which is the result of an interpretation, it becomes impossible to accept it as a datum. Riegl's strategy is to "formalize" meaning. His study of the glance, for example, treats the psychology of the depicted characters and their relation to the spectator—to us—as vectors. The data of art history are what we can see, and Riegl, rather than restrict them to our perception of color and line as others have attempted to do, adds our perception of volume and space evoked in the work of art and, in general, all aspects of representation as well. This is justified insofar as we do, indeed, *see* a table or a lemon in a picture, while it is only through an artificial intellectual effort, after a process of decoding, that we can see it as a yellow patch, the shading of which suggests volume, and the whole thing resembling the appearance of a lemon. This unexpected conception of data as the foundation of an empiricism, a conception that is only apparently naïve, allows Riegl an extraordinary freedom of action in his analysis of art.

The peculiar ambivalence of the *Kunstwollen* concept determines the nature of Riegl's formalism. At this point, in order more exactly to understand the role of the *Kunstwollen* in Riegl's thought and what I would call his relative formalism, we must turn to his implicit philosophical positions. Basically his thought is Hegelian. Art is a primary activity, man is by nature a maker of art as he is by nature a speaker. This gives art an autonomy which, in Riegl's thought, is probably strengthened by the influence of Konrad Fiedler, whose post-Kantian critical philosophy makes art an independent, global, and non-conceptualized instrument of knowledge through the development of perception, and of visual perception in particular.¹⁷ Insofar as art is a specific and independent activity, the study of art is an autonomous domain of science and its aim is precisely to bring out the specificity of art and the organic principles of its history. These are the bases of true formalism.

On the other hand, history is the history of the spirit (*Weltgeist*)—of man in the world—the progressive realization of the Idea. The history of art can only exist as one aspect of this history—outside which there is nothing. The *Kunstwollen*, therefore, can only be one manifestation among others of the spirit and, more specifically, it necessarily coincides with the other domains of culture.

If we take into consideration not only the arts, but any of the other large domains of human civilization—state, religion, science—we shall come to the conclusion that, in this domain as well, we are dealing with a relation between individual unity and collective unity. Should we, how-

ever, follow the direction of the will [*Wollen*] that particular people at a given time has followed in these various domains of civilization, it will necessarily turn out that this tendency is, in the last analysis, completely identical to that of the *Kunstwollen* in the same people at the same time.¹⁸

Although Riegl seems to present this exact historical parallelism of the various domains of culture as being the result of observation and deduction, one can see in it an article of faith or a postulate.¹⁹ It is, in any case, a far-reaching proposition and an uncomfortable one. Riegl himself felt obliged to qualify it immediately with the phrase *im letzten Grunde* ("in the last analysis"). What does this mean? We must, I believe, read two things in this reservation. The first concerns the relative autonomy of the various cultural domains insofar as they are specific activities (we have already noted how this applies to art). The phenomena in the various fields cannot be compared directly, but only at the end of an analytical and interpretive process. Riegl envisages an analysis that would reach one or several very general and fundamental principles such as the "relation between individual unity and collective unity." In other words, one must investigate structures at a level sufficiently "deep" to eliminate particular cultural expressions.

The other aspect of Riegl's reservation has to do with the way we should understand the phrase "at a given time." Are we to understand that on a given day at a given hour all cultural manifestations have reached the same point in their evolution? This image of the arts marching like a well-disciplined army and obeying superior orders may seem strikingly absurd; nevertheless, one must probably accept it as an abstract assumption. In reality, however, this instant has no existence; the different *Wollen* and the various branches of culture have to be compared within a certain length of time that, at least from some point of view, can be considered as a synchronic unit, as a "state of civilization." At the same time, the size and type of human group chosen for consideration can vary extensively. It is hard to say to what extent Riegl meant a "nation" by the word *Volk*, but, not surprisingly, the significant social unit for study can vary from a small group or a city to a whole race.

The time limits must obviously be chosen in relation to the social segment under consideration. In *Kunstindustrie*, Riegl examines a transitional period, the emergence of a new *Kunstwollen* in the entire expanse of the Roman empire. In the study of the Dutch group portraits, he examines the Dutch *Kunstwollen* of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and he carefully describes the progressive realization of this *Kunstwollen*. The parallelism of cultural domains, the basic intentional unity of a social group, has to be investigated within such a time unit, while the limits of that unit will have to be adjusted according to the results obtained in the parallel disciplines (the social sciences). The ideas of Riegl on cultural unity are effective only when we deal with basic mental structures changing at long range, at the level of what Fernand Braudel has called *la longue durée*, and not at the level of rapid surface movements, although the historian has necessarily to reach the deeper structures through the meticulous investigation and analysis of these epiphenomena.

Riegl's formalism, therefore, is very different from Wölfflin's. For the latter, the "double root of art" implies a truly autonomous development and completely distinct

organic laws ruling the history of style. With Riegl, the separation of art from other human activities appears essentially as a methodological tactic. It ensures the proper interrogation of the specific works, the respect for art as a special domain of understanding, and, in the end, the contribution of art history to the social sciences as a particular branch of a more general *Geisteswissenschaft*. Riegl's theory of art history is interesting mostly in relation to his method. The practice inflects the theory, enriches it, and disturbs a system that would otherwise run the risk of functioning too smoothly regardless of observed data. This explains why a purely theoretical essay like *Naturwerk und Kunstwerk* is not entirely satisfactory.

The practice of art criticism in *Spätromische Kunstindustrie* and even more in *Das holländische Gruppenporträt* has theoretical and methodological implications that are not covered by Riegl's more abstract statements. Riegl is most interesting today largely because of this interplay between practice and theory. The initial formalist conviction ensures the rigorous internal analysis of the work of art, and makes it possible to avoid the pitfall of explaining the work by imposing an exterior interpretation—whether biographic, socioeconomic, religious, or other. The practice breaks open too narrow a notion of artistic form and shows us a way to escape from the dangers of a reductionist criticism.

One of the most crucial problems raised by Riegl's work is that surrounding the concept of value. It is a particularly pressing problem today, as many have come to feel that the art historian's function is not to pass judgment on a work of art, and yet such judgments are inevitable. Riegl's radical historicism—his total rejection of normative aesthetics and of any fixed standard of artistic accomplishment—seems to preclude any value judgment at all. As Pächt has put it: "If we accept the deterministic assumptions without qualification, we would really have no right to talk about artistic failures; it would be impossible to explain any features as due to lack of skill; we would have only successful works of art—which seems contrary to common sense."²⁰

In most of his works Riegl dealt with the problem in a pragmatic way through his choice of subject, the unequal attention he gave to different examples, his implied or sometimes outspoken admiration for particular works of art such as Rembrandt's *Cloth-Drapers' Guild*. There are signs that he was groping for a more systematic solution, but even in *Das holländische Gruppenporträt* his thoughts on the subject were by no means fully worked out.

Insofar as one considers that the task of art history is not to seek in the work of art what corresponds to modern taste, but to decipher in it the *Kunstwollen* that has produced it and shaped it exactly as it is, it will immediately be realized that group portraits are the most likely of all genres to reveal the essential character of the Dutch *Kunstwollen*.²¹

In other words, the very disparity between the original popularity and importance of the group portraits and the little appeal they have for us today makes them a privileged object for historical investigation: a sound and strongly expressed consequence of historicism, but not one that clears much ground.

At the end of his life, Riegl was put in charge of organizing a government commission for the preservation and restoration of monuments. Faced with practical problems,

he thought more closely about the different factors involved in our interest in the remains of the past and in the way we handle them. Should one simply make the monuments as attractive as possible for our own taste? Should one try and restore them to their original condition? Or ought one, on the contrary, to respect the mark of time and the alterations that they have suffered at the hands of passing generations? These questions are always relevant as we can see, for instance, from the controversy excited by the London National Gallery's cleaning of its Titians.

Riegl's thoughts on the subject are presented in a long paper on "The Modern Cult of Monuments, Its Nature and Development."²² He distinguishes a whole range of nuances in value: value as monument (*Denkmalswert*), artistic value (*Kunstwert*), value as commemoration or remembrance (*Erinnerungswert*), historical value (*historisches Wert*), art historical value (*kunsthistorisches Wert*), present-day value (*Gegenwartigswert*), antique value (*Alterswert*), value of newness (*Neubeitswert*), functional or use value (*Gebrauchswert*). Why do we need all this? At first glance, things would seem rather clear-cut. Any monument, any man-made object, has two aspects or values: On the one hand, it is a record and it has historical significance; on the other hand, it has value as art. The former—historical—value is objective and stable; the latter—entirely dependent on the taste of the day (and of the individual observer)—is consequently subjective and variable.

In actuality, however, the situation is more complicated, and, as in the rest of Riegl's thought, the distinction between what is artistic and what is not is only provisional and restricted to certain levels of analysis. Looking more closely, Riegl recognizes that there is always an aesthetic side to our historical interest, but there is an art historical value as well, which considers the object specifically as an irreplaceable link in the development of art. This value is a historical value, the object being considered as a record, but as a record of art, its aesthetic value comes to the fore. The two aspects of the object, which were originally so sharply set apart, end by being very closely related.

Characteristically, Riegl envisages the problem in a historical perspective. Values are not permanent categories but historical occurrences. The nuances he distinguishes correspond to stages in a history of values. This history follows a pattern which clearly relates to Riegl's more general views, although he does not spell this out. It moves from the objective to the subjective. More specifically, it moves from an insistence on present-day values, where the completeness and autonomy of the object are valued almost to the exclusion of everything else, to an increasing sense of historical distance. For Riegl, the primitive aesthetic urge, which, however, never disappears, is the taste for the new and shiny; historical appreciation develops only later. In Riegl's view, nineteenth-century positivist history was still concerned with a reconstruction of the past as present, with the evocation of historical stages in their original perfection. One may recall here the many nineteenth-century attempts to restore medieval churches to their supposed pristine state, as well as Louis Dimier's sarcastic remark in front of the Carcassonne fortress after its restoration by Viollet-le-Duc: *C'est flamant neuf, et prêt à servir* ("It is spick-and-span-new and ready for use").

The last historical acquisition is the *Alterswert*, the value of the old as such. It has had a long development, but for Riegl its full consequences were to be found only in the

twentieth century. It is the taste for the alterations that nature and time have inflicted on the perfection of the man-made object; an appreciation of what Walter Benjamin has since described as the *aura*. It introduces a sense of distance, of the accretion of time that surrounds the work of art, making us conscious of our own somewhat remote relation to it. It corresponds, therefore, in Riegl's system exactly to the most advanced "optical" stages of art where the subject's way of seeing is made increasingly important at the expense of the "palpable" reality of the object. It is true that the twentieth century has indeed placed great value on the sense of historical distance and that in the practical domain, which was the immediate subject of Riegl's reflection, the notion of conservation has largely replaced that of restoration. Today, we often prefer to keep the works of the past with all the marks of the time they have lived through rather than impoverish them in favor of a rejuvenation we no longer believe in.

Riegl's analytical and historical investigations exploded the notion of value into fragments. This, curiously, makes the problem much easier to deal with and dispels some of the apparent paradox between history and criticism. The history of art becomes not merely the history of artistic production, but also the history of values.

Riegl still does not directly deal with the question of what makes one work of art better than another. His answer, however, is implicit. The art historian is not the man who can be called to account for the value judgments he pronounces. He certainly makes such judgments, but when he makes them he is no more free of his aesthetic preferences than the artist who made the art. The historian must, however, deliberately and even self-consciously strive to overcome his taste. He needs neither to suppress nor to impose his judgment, but he has to make himself aware of the value placed on the work of art as part of his data. This value is not, however, a simple given fact. It is complex, comprising not only his own reaction grounded in his modern artistic sensibility (today's *Kunstwollen*), but also the different ways the work has been received from the moment of its creation. This forms an aggregate which has both historical significance and a relative stability, but which also constantly grows and alters its appearance according to the moment and the individual. The history of art, therefore, cannot be written once and for all: it is a continuous process.*

*A shorter, French version of this paper appeared in the September, 1975, issue of *Critique*.

REFERENCES

¹A bibliography of the works of A. Riegl can be found in the volume of his collected essays entitled *Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Augsburg-Vienna, 1929), pp. xxxv-xxxix. The principal works are *Stilfragen* (Berlin, 1893, 2nd ed., 1923); *Spätromische Kunstindustrie* (Vienna, 1901, 2nd ed., 1927, reprinted in 1964); *Das bollandische Gruppenporträt*, originally published as an article in *Jahrbuch der kunsthistorischen Sammlungen des allerhöchsten Kaiserhauses*, 1902, pp. 71-278, then as a separate volume (Vienna, 1931). There is an admirable general presentation of Riegl's ideas by Otto Pächt, "Art Historians and Art Critics, VI: Aloïs Riegl," *Burlington Magazine*, May, 1963, pp. 188-93.

²W. Eugene Kleinbauer, *Modern Perspectives in Western Art History* (New York, 1971), pp. 124-38. This is an important passage taken out of *Das bollandische Gruppenporträt*.

³Meyer Schapiro, "Style," *Anthropology Today*, ed. by A. L. Kroeber (Chicago, 1953).

⁴Adolf Hildebrand, *Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst* (Strasbourg, 1893); English trans., *The Problem of Form in Painting and Sculpture* (New York, 1907).

⁵This thesis was attacked by G. Baldwin Brown, in *The Arts and Crafts of Our Teutonic Forefathers*

(London and Edinburgh, 1910). Meyer Schapiro has called my attention to this early isolated reaction to Riegl in England.

⁶His notes were published posthumously in *Die Entstehung der Barockkunst in Rom* (Vienna, 1903).

⁷Hans Sedlmayr, "Die Quintessenz der Lehren Riegls," introduction to Riegl's *Gesammelte Aufsätze*.

⁸"Zur kunsthistorischen Stellung der Becher von Vafio," in *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, pp. 71–90.

⁹I shall keep the German word throughout this paper because there is no satisfactory translation. 'Artistic will' or 'intention' is not exact. Otto Pächt (*art. cit.*) has pointed out that Riegl does not use *Kunstwille* as one would rather expect. In a recent article "Alois Riegl und die Entstehung der autonomen Kunstgeschichte am 'Fin de siècle,'" Willibald Sauerländer has brought out the vitalist connotations of the term.

¹⁰Erwin Panofsky, "Der Begriff des Kunstwollens" in *Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XIV (1920).

¹¹See, in particular, Sedlmayr's introduction to the *Gesammelte Aufsätze*.

¹²"Naturwerk und Kunstwerk," in *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, p. 63. In *Spätromische Kunstindustrie*, however, he does not hide his teleological point of view. "In opposition to this mechanistic conception of the nature of the work of art, I have—for the first time, I believe—proposed a teleological one in the *Stilfragen* where I perceived in the work of art the result of a definite *Kunstwollen* conscious of its ends, which comes through in a fight against purpose, matter, and technique" (p. 9).

¹³"Prolegomena zu einer Psychologie der Architektur," reprinted in *Kleine Schriften* (Basel, 1946), p. 45. This dissertation was first published in 1886.

¹⁴*Gesammelte Aufsätze*, p. 60.

¹⁵"Umrisse und Farbe in Ebene oder Raum" is Riegl's favorite formula to express the "visual" autonomy of art. Sauerländer has compared it to Maurice Denis's "Remember that a picture—before it is a battle horse, a nude woman, or some story or other—is essentially a flat surface covered with colors assembled in a certain order."

¹⁶*Gesammelte Aufsätze*, p. 64.

¹⁷There would be much to say about Riegl's philosophical *bricolage*. Hildebrand, who was not a philosopher, is the only strictly theoretical author whom he names and whose ideas he openly discusses. It is obvious, however, that he has read a great deal and retained fragments from various sources. The relation between the *Kunstwollen* and Schopenhauer's terminology has already been pointed out. The relation to Fiedler deserves special study. Riegl knew Herbartian formalism independently since he had studied with Zimmermann. But it is hard to believe that he was not interested in Fiedler's much more sophisticated art theory. Although that theory is antihistorical in regard to the essence of art, Riegl's historicism may have fed on such formulas as "It is well known what many different roles have been assigned to art, in accordance with the different ways in which human perfection has been conceived." *On Judging Works of Art* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949), p. 24. Furthermore, Riegl's conception of strictly artistic value as a present-day value, a point to which I shall return later, is surely partly based on an effort to reconcile historicism with Fiedler's theory. On the origins and connections of Riegl's thought, the most recent contribution is Sauerländer's article cited above. He discusses the connection with *fin de siècle* aestheticism, and considers Riegl's philosophy of art to be a synthesis of vitalism and philosophical models of universal history.

¹⁸*Gesammelte Aufsätze*, p. 63.

¹⁹Elsewhere Riegl writes: "I am convinced that this assumed unity exists absolutely, although it is often questioned by pedants. In my opinion, it is even the unconscious hypothesis of our whole historical thinking. The only question is whether this unity, for instance between art and religion, can be established today with scientific evidence. I should not like to answer this question without reservation, but what is sure is that the proof has not yet been produced by anybody." *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, p. 49.

²⁰*Art. cit.*, p. 193.

²¹*Das holländische Gruppenporträt* (1902), p. 73.

²²"Der moderne Denkmalkultus, sein Wesen und seine Entstehung," reprinted in *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, pp. 144–93, originally published in 1903.

Architecture, You and Him: The Mark of Sigfried Giedion

Nothing is more embarrassing today than when small-minded people, taking advantage of the fact that they have been born later in time, venture to criticize those who first opened up paths along which we are now treading.

Architecture, You and Me (1958)

THESE WORDS, written by Sigfried Giedion in defense of Aloïs Riegl's proscriptive view of architectural space at the turn of the century, are seasonable for critics of Giedion's own contribution to the history of architecture. His productive life was long. The first book he wrote, the doctoral thesis for Heinrich Wölfflin on late Baroque and Romantic Classicism, came out in 1922. The last, dealing largely with the built world of ancient Rome, was issued posthumously in 1971. This final book, *Architecture and the Phenomena of Transition*, was the third volume in a series on the architecture of antiquity that occupied Giedion's later years. The first two volumes in the series were devoted to prehistoric art and the architecture of Egypt and Mesopotamia.

Now from Schinkel and Klenze backward to Rabirius, Senmut, and the cave at Lascaux is a mighty distance. And it is not in chronological spread alone that Giedion's output is remarkable. The artifacts he chose to study ranged in size from the vast canvas of the Western city at one end to the hammock and the Yale lock at the other. To do justice to this various subject matter, Giedion assumed professional roles that included the critic and historian of architecture, the cultural historian, the journalist, social anthropologist, industrial archaeologist, and psychologist. He held degrees in mechanical engineering as well as in art history. For twenty years he was at the forefront of a campaign to uphold and disseminate the principles of the Modern Movement in architecture, a task he performed, with the ardent enthusiasm of the organizer and propagandist, as secretary of the *Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne* (CIAM). It takes a unique gift, surely, to tread at once the paths of Le Corbusier and Wölfflin.

We have no right to expect that the thought of fifty years stretching over millennia of history and several distinct fields should stand unchallenged in all its detail, especially since Giedion rejected the relative safety of positivist research for a plucky historical activism that championed as universal verities matters of variable interpretation. It would be small-minded indeed to belittle the achievement of so protean a spirit for its flaws. But to understand the unusual, one has to describe it first, and the description of

ideas presumes their criticism. We cannot deny the impact of Giedion on the history of man-made things. How many books of history, after all, have had the phenomenal circulation of *Space, Time and Architecture*? In order to take the measure of that impact, however, we must go beyond the devotion of *Hommage à Giedion* (Basel and Stuttgart, 1971). We must try, in Giedion's own phraseology, to separate the "constituent facts" of his work from the merely "transitory." This essay is meant as a step toward that end.

As Giedion tells it, the path from *Spätbarocker und romantischer Klassizismus* to *Phenomena of Transition* is not aberrant, any more than is his multidisciplinary approach. It was simply a matter of answering some insistent questions—that and a point of view. The point of view, as distinct from his method, was indebted neither to his technical training in Vienna nor to his later art historical studies with Wölfflin. It derived, rather, from the revolutionary artists of his youth who shattered the static, monodirectional conception of space prevalent till then. "The decisive impetus for my work," to quote Giedion, "has been given by contemporary artists, who, by conceiving a new interpretation of space [i.e., Cubism], broadened the history of optical perception. Taking the present time as my starting point, I have traced this history."¹ One might think of Giedion, then, as the propounder of the Cubist view of man-made environment.

The questions, starting with the modern period as their canvas and working backward, had to do with simultaneity, with origins, with constancy and change. The subject of the first book was less important in itself than for what it could demonstrate—that the Wölfflinian opposites of Classicism and Baroque, rather than being sequential, could coexist within one epoch, and that, concomitantly, one of them could span a historical frame that embraced two divergent epochs. The later eighteenth century, and especially the Louis XVI style, contained late Baroque tendencies within a Classical structure. The early nineteenth century in Germany used Classicism to temper its romantic flare. "I questioned how it had been possible for Classicism to take two different forms."² His answer was that "Classicism is not a style; Classicism is a coloring."³

Equipped with the discovery that Wölfflinian formalism was of surface value only, that architecture resided deeper than binding conventions of form, Giedion could recognize the fallacy of the modern battle to find suitable modes of design for the post-Industrial world. The dominant historicism of the nineteenth century had squandered energy on frills. The essence of the struggle lay elsewhere. A handful of his own contemporaries were now leading the way in that direction. The Bauhaus under Walter Gropius had been revolutionizing design education since 1919. The premise of the Bauhaus method was precisely the unlearning of historical styles, the forging of a modern idiom out of the union of art and industry. Le Corbusier's *Vers une architecture* appeared in 1923. The following year Giedion visited him in Paris. The *enfant terrible* of French architecture "showed me his Pavillion de l'Esprit Nouveau which he had built on the outermost fringe of the International Exhibition of Arts and Crafts. . . . [It] had more vitality than anything else in the exhibition."⁴ Le Corbusier also impressed upon Giedion that the sources of the new language of design typified by the Pavillion

were to be found in “the iron architecture of the nineteenth century which came most strongly to the fore in the great world’s fairs.”⁵ This view Giedion now sought to document, first in a book that surveyed French experiments with industrial materials, with iron and ferroconcrete (*Bauen in Frankreich, Bauen in Eisen, Bauen in Eisenbeton, 1800 bis 1927* [Leipzig, 1928]), and then in the Charles Eliot Norton lectures, which he was invited to deliver at Harvard in 1937-1938. These famous lectures, published in 1941 as *Space, Time and Architecture*, enlarged upon the theme by seeking the conceptual background of the new architecture beyond the nineteenth century. There was indeed a development from Brunelleschi to Gropius and Le Corbusier, but this development could not be traced through the traditional grand sequence of styles which culminated in the confused eclecticism of the last one hundred years. The nineteenth century was the Great Divide. Thinking of form as fashion, it had managed for the first time in history to sever the two ingredients of a wholesome culture, feeling and reality—or, to phrase it in architectural terms, form and structure, expression and construction, art and industry. It was this rift that the Modern Movement was now trying to heal. One important aspect of the problem was mechanization, and in the next major book Giedion set out to chronicle how handicraft yielded to the machine, by focusing on such diverse headings as agriculture, breadmaking, meat production, furniture, household management, and the bath (*Mechanization Takes Command* [Oxford and New York, 1948]).

What, despite this near fatal rift, were the stabilizing elements that put us back on the road to recovery? “The foremost question was the relation between constancy and change. Constancy does not imply mere continuation, but rather the ability of the human mind suddenly to bring to life things that have been left slumbering through long ages.”⁶ Architects such as Le Corbusier sought the inspiration of basic abstract truths in the built environment of the past, “constituent facts” that went beyond the barren tyranny of the styles; just as contemporary artists, leaping further back, recalled in their images the symbols of primeval man. History is a single entity where past, present, and future are intermingled. The past is now and the present is eternal. To grasp the meaning of the twentieth century, one has to go back to the beginning.

So Giedion now directed his attention to what he called the Eternal Present. His study began with the conceptual world of the Old Stone Age (*The Beginnings of Art* [New York, 1962]). Having established that cave art can never be considered naturalistic, he went on to demonstrate the similarities in method between the abstraction of the prehistoric artist and that of twentieth-century masters such as Picasso, Paul Klee, and Miró. Transparency and the superimposition of bodies were common to both visions because they shared the motivating concept of “simultaneity in time.” The visual disembodiment of Lascaux, which is not yet bound by a dimensional construct of vertical and horizontal coordinates, Giedion termed “pre-architectural.” He followed this book with an assessment of architectural space proper, as it was first developed by the earliest high civilizations, Egypt and Sumer (*The Beginnings of Architecture* [New York, 1964]). Whatever the individual differences between these two literate cultures, they both built within the same space conception, the first of three that were to govern the entire history of architecture. Buildings in the first space conception are seen as

sculptural volumes, space-emanating rather than space-containing. Greece, too, for all its discreteness in political and social outlook, was bound by this same space conception.

The change into the second space conception, the shaping of interior space, came under imperial Rome. That is what the final book, *Architecture and the Phenomena of Transition*, is about—the Roman preoccupation with the possibilities of architectural enclosure. This was to remain the principal concern of Western architecture until the eclectic jumble of the nineteenth century. And then, firmly and courageously, a new coherent vision emerged, the third and final space conception of the Modern Movement. The book concludes with a recapitulation of that achievement as it was first outlined in *Space, Time and Architecture* thirty years earlier—the brave new architecture of Mies van der Rohe, Gropius, Le Corbusier, and their precursors and followers, which combined mid-space volumes with prodigies of contained space. So the historian's work was completed, the past and present made one, the circle closed.

From Giedion's corner there is logic and coherence to this personal progress through history. Looking back, it is all stitched together by one paramount concern, that "the all-embracing quality of any art is how man experiences space: space conception."⁷ His history of architecture, then, is primarily a history of space. The other major emphasis in his work, problems of engineering and the machine, is correlative: a suitable technology is needed to realize a new space conception, such as the Romans had for their vaulted interiors and the twentieth century for its skyscrapers and soaring shells.

From the outside, Giedion's progress may seem less orderly, his contribution eclectic and derivative more than original. The links among his various books are not particularly strong. There is, in the first phase of his career, a good art historical study of a specific period, Romantic Classicism. Then begins the long apologia for the Modern Movement and its self-avowed debt to the metal-and-glass architecture of the nineteenth century—first expounded for the English-speaking world in *Space, Time and Architecture*, and subsequently updated in the several revised editions of that popular book and in the collection of essays entitled *Architecture, You and Me* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958). *Mechanization Takes Command* is basically an independent piece of research, a selective account of machines and mechanized procedures motivated as much by a fascination with this "anonymous history" as by the dictates of the stated theme: "to discern how far mechanization corresponds with and to what extent it contradicts the unalterable laws of human nature."⁸ The final phase consists of a free-wheeling interpretation of the art and architecture of antiquity with dutiful, but not for that matter always convincing, hookups with the present.

Giedion's approach toward all this disparate material owes much to his early training as engineer and art historian and to the German art historical establishment which controlled the field both before and after World War I. The attention paid to structural matters, the affinity with the engineers of the nineteenth century—these can be traced back to the years at the Technische Hochschule of Vienna as well as to the call of *Vers une architecture*. The leitmotif of space, however galvanized by the example of Cubism, allies Giedion with a central line of German art history—with Riegl and Schmarzow and Paul Frankl. Riegl's voice in *Spätromische Kunstindustrie* can be heard

behind the argument of *Mechanization*, that culture registers through humble, everyday things as readily as it does through monuments—"The sun is mirrored even in a coffee spoon."⁹ The history of types propounded in that same book ("The history of styles follows its theme along a horizontal direction; the history of types along a vertical one. . . . We are interested in following the growth of phenomena, or if one will, in reading their line of fate, over wide spans of time."¹⁰) is clearly akin to Panofskian iconology. Tracing the career of the common lock from late Gothic times to Linus Yale, Jr., to take but one example, corresponds in intention to the charted lineage of Father Time or Pandora's Box. And, finally, Wölfflin hovers over everything Giedion wrote, as is evident not least of all in the general use of critically juxtaposed visual images.

There are, according to this external view, two personae behind Giedion's work: the critic as propagandist of the Modern Movement and philosopher of the modern way of life, and a historian with an uncommon reach and a syncretistic process. If the two are not entirely separable, each may be said to suffer, as much as benefit, from this association. History is paraded as the great justifier of the new architecture, as if history could not be called upon to justify any movement of the past or present. And the less topical subjects of research are permeated with gratuitous value judgments that spring, independently of the cultural context of the specific period under study, from Giedion's own beliefs about what is essential and what ephemeral in the human enterprise.

Which of these two views is right? Is Giedion's work an engaging potpourri, or a cohesive and original system? The answer lies, in the end, in the attitude one takes toward the shape and purpose of history. If by "system" one understands a dispassionate, carefully thought-out structure for the ordering of human artifacts, Giedion cannot compare with his teacher Wölfflin, Frankl and his formidable *System der Kunstwissenschaft* (1938), or other peers in art history like Foçillon or Panofsky. But within Giedion's own concept of what history is and what it does, his behavior is intelligible, indeed, logical.

History, for Giedion, is "insight into a moving process of life."¹¹ It is akin to biology in that it is concerned with the problem of growth and development, but not with Progress as the nineteenth century understood the word. There is nothing predictable or systematic about this growth. It cannot be documented by the accumulation of facts, but must be sought in the living forces and spiritual attitudes which shaped the various periods. Sometimes the prime evidence is not what is most apparent; it lies buried beneath the surface. Historians must know where to look and how. They must learn to distinguish between constituent facts, that is, "those tendencies which, when they are suppressed, inevitably reappear,"¹² and transitory facts, which are only of passing value, however pervasive and brilliant they may seem for a while. Transitory facts do not represent "the innermost depths of a period," its "inner vigor."¹³ Style itself can be a transitory fact; to be concerned with styles exclusively, to compare their similarities and differences, is not sufficient and may, as in the case of the nineteenth century, be extremely misleading.

To tell the two of them apart is not easy; that is where the historian's judgment must come in. In making the choice between transitory and constituent facts, the histo-

rian must be guided by two interlinked aims: to extricate those “trends which are more likely to produce a solution to the real problems of the age,”¹⁴ and to say something significant about our contemporary dilemmas. To put it another way, the historian should be interested primarily “in those problems of bygone civilizations which reveal a deep affinity with the present-day situation.”¹⁵ The task of history is to explain the present and, to the extent possible, predict the future. To be able to do this, the historian must be thoroughly imbued with the spirit of his own time, for only then will he be able to ask of the past such questions as had been overlooked by his more “detached” colleagues. Without this commitment to elucidate the present, “only dead chronologies and limited special studies will be produced.”¹⁶ History is not above the fray. The historian must force himself “from his academic chair occasionally and made to participate in the common struggles of the moment.”¹⁷ The parallel is with the modern painter. To believe that history is objective, its perspective fixed and unchanging, its findings true for all time, is to adopt the Renaissance view of the individual spectator and the unique vantage point. “The painters of our period have formulated a different attitude: *lo spettatore nel centro del quadro*. The observer must be placed in the middle of the painting, not at some isolated observation point outside.” Likewise the historian must recognize that “observation and what is observed form one complex situation—to observe something is to act upon and alter it.”¹⁸

It is clear, then, that the historian cannot study indiscriminately the material evidence of the past. He cannot believe all he sees. In architecture, “a sedulously careful selection of buildings is necessary to bring out those values which are worthy of forming a part of the history of the development of architecture.”¹⁹ Thoroughness is of no account. Since it is not evolutionary progress but an erratic and organic growth one is documenting, obedience to strict chronology has no particular merit. Connections must be made when they are valid regardless of the intervening period of time. “The meaning of history arises in the uncovering of relationships.”²⁰ History creates constellations from far-flung fragments in space and time. A few of them explained in detail will form a pattern which the reader can then act upon and enhance through new and manifold links that spring to his mind. Whether the fragments selected for scrutiny are formal monuments, utilitarian structures, or everyday artifacts does not in itself matter, any more than it matters in painting whether the subject is a grand historical tableau, a genre scene, or a still life.

Now most of these pronouncements are anathema to the standard art historian. They resurrect precisely the attitudes which the founding fathers sought to overcome as they set about re-creating the field along “scientific” lines at the turn of the century. Architectural history had traditionally been the bedfellow of design. Its study figured prominently within the architectural curriculum because it was believed to have direct bearing on the activity at the drafting table. The cozy involvement of the makers and interpreters of architecture had been the primary reason why leaders of the Modern Movement including Gropius denounced history as the single most reactionary force against the flowering of a modern design attuned to the mood and reality of the post-Industrial world. History had nurtured nineteenth-century historicism; it had drowned free imagination, and it had justified the long string of revivals that had confounded all attempts to break out of the past toward a contemporary architectural idiom.

If, for Gropius and the Bauhaus, historical perspective had to be rejected outright to liberate contemporary thought, for the historian, too, an affirmation of independence seemed appropriate in order to evaluate the past, free of the onus of blatantly propping up the present. Art history had been the accomplice of the nineteenth-century search for a new style, a renaissance of form. It had been made to bless or condemn the stylistic whimsies of the practitioner. To declare their autonomy, historians now engaged in a two-pronged reform. A theoretical basis was slowly developed so that the critical analysis of art and architecture could be undertaken within a rational, consistent framework of principles. At that same time, historians tried to put some respectable distance between themselves and the present by electing to study historical phenomena for their own sake, with no morals drawn for the contemporary situation. Jakob Burckhardt was hailed by Giedion's generation as the great pioneer; his book on the *Civilization of the Renaissance* published in 1860 "aimed at an objective ordering of factual material."²¹ Soon there was the second generation of the Wölfflins and Riegls and Schmarzows, of Heinrich von Geymüller and Cornelius Gurlitt. By the time the young Frankl, with whom Giedion took a seminar in Munich, was writing his *Principles of Architectural History* in 1914, he could state definitively that:

The history of architecture was separated from artistic development and became an historical discipline. It was no longer pursued in order to find new prototypes and to recommend certain styles. It now had its own importance as part of humanistic scholarship; it led to the understanding of all styles in their limitations and development and, in addition, showed the impossibility of a Renaissance in the literal sense.²²

Frankl was not unaware of the dawn of the Modern Movement. "Today . . . we stand expectantly at the beginning of a new development. Despite the revelations of the past, we cannot know what lies in the future. But we do know that we have made a new start. . . ."²³ His position as a professional historian, however, was clear. His discipline could not presume to deal with the Modern Movement: first, because it was too recent to assess, and second, because it was by self-description ahistorical. It followed upon the four phases of architectural style between 1420 and 1900 which Frankl had classified and analyzed in *Principles* and "their inevitable end as a revelation of human history."²⁴ The Movement was a virgin birth which the historian had no way of handling. The new architecture was, as Gropius explained, not "a branch of an old tree" but a fresh growth that sprang directly from scientific teamwork (as opposed to aesthetics of design) and the realities of industrial standardization and materials. Such things were outside the province of architectural history.

Giedion's iconoclasm consists in questioning the premises of this new architectural history, or rather, in trying to bring this nascent discipline closer to the premises of the new architecture. In his doctoral thesis he had already enlarged the permissible scope of architectural history by including urban schemes in his treatment, along with single monuments and their interiors. The mutuality of architecture and city planning—the urban responsibility of single architectural acts—became one of the leitmotifs of Giedion's work: it was also an underlying tenet of the new architecture. Through his active championship of the Modern Movement, beginning with the 1923 piece for *Werk* on the Bauhaus, Giedion the historian was now challenging several other restrictions of

his field. The history of architecture did not have to stop with 1900 because the historical styles seemed to have spent themselves by then. There was more to this history than the succession of styles. The new architecture was not ahistorical, merely astylar; therefore, the history of the Modern Movement could be written. The admitted inspiration for the modern idiom came from industrial materials, mass production, and the mechanized procedures of assemblage. Now these phenomena did have a history that could be traced at least as far back as 1800. The research was bound to concentrate on functional buildings, ordinarily outside the scope of architectural history—buildings such as bridges, train sheds, warehouses, hangars, and markets. It would uncover the contribution of engineers in the built environment of the post-Industrial era. This area of investigation was ignored by architectural historians because they accepted that dichotomy between architecture as an art and “mere building” promulgated by the architectural establishment of the nineteenth century. Frankl, in his *Principles*, went so far as to blame the difficulties the nineteenth century had in creating a decisive architectural language, at least in part, on the rise of utilitarian building types. But the leaders of the Modern Movement no longer recognized their profession as a high art at the exclusive disposition of the ruling classes. They saw in the utilitarian viewpoint the only genuinely creative impulse of the nineteenth century. Gropius spoke of teamwork and serving the people; Le Corbusier extolled “the engineer’s esthetic.” If one wished to write the history of the Modern Movement, one could not but associate oneself with this revised definition of architecture.

Bauen in Frankreich was written with these considerations in mind. The dates of the period covered are 1800-1927. Rather than stop short of the modernist experiments, the whole object of the book is to lead up to them, to put them in a historical context, to give them roots. The buildings selected for this purpose are machine-age products representative of a functional vernacular. This other side of the nineteenth century is looked at positively, as the background of modern architecture in France, through carefully staged visual comparisons: the ground story of Labrousse’s Bibliothèque Ste.-Geneviève and Le Corbusier’s Maison Cook; Jules Saulnier’s chocolate factory in Noisiel-sur-Marne of 1871-72, and Mies van der Rohe’s housing scheme for the Stuttgart Werkbund of 1927; the main entrance hall for the Paris exhibition of 1878 by Gustave Eiffel, and Gropius’ Bauhaus at Dessau. The last part of the book collects images of the new architecture in the twentieth century: Tony Garnier’s Cité industrielle, Le Corbusier, Mallet-Stevens, Henry Sauvage, André Lurcat. This French corpus was extended to include Germany and Holland in a small book of photographs published the following year (*Befreites Wohnen* [Zurich and Leipzig, 1929]). In the same years, Giedion also emerged as spokesman for modern architecture in another capacity: as advocate journalist and initiator of the *Congrès internationaux d’architecture moderne* (CIAM), the first of which was held at Chateau de la Sarraz, Switzerland, in June of 1928. Thus, Giedion effectively denied the asserted independence of history from practice.

This vigorous two-front defense launched Giedion as the official historian of the Modern Movement. Whatever their antipathy toward architectural history as it was being written, the modern masters did not want to be left out of history permanently.

Like some present-day radicals who reject society as it is but still insist on their full rights of citizenship, including vindication in the courts, they chose to rebel against historicism without being denied the benefits of history. They sought to shape their own special pedigree. Le Corbusier, more than any other, set down the rules of this exclusive relationship with the past. In *Vers une architecture*, historical styles are repeatedly decried. "Architecture has nothing to do with the various 'styles.' The styles of Louis XIV, XV, XVI, or Gothic, are to architecture what a feather is on a woman's head; it is sometimes pretty, though not always, and never anything more."²⁵ Besides examples of the engineer's aesthetic which are selected for praise, the book freely admires a number of past monuments for what they represent that is elemental to architecture. With no attention to their styles, a "Hindoo temple," Hagia Sophia, the Petit Trianon, the Parthenon are admiringly illustrated and made to demonstrate general principles such as rhythm of volumes in space, the interdependence of plan and elevation, regulating lines, and, in the case of the Parthenon, austerity, a high level of mind reached through "nobility of aim and the sacrifice of all that is accidental in Art."²⁶

This same attitude Giedion assumed and refined in *Space, Time and Architecture*, his next major step in the historical rehabilitation of the Modern Movement. The establishment of categories within which architecture could be analyzed had been common practice among the new historians. Frankl, for example, settled on four such categories in his *Principles* for the analysis of his phases of architectural style: spatial form, corporeal form, visible form, and purposive intention. Giedion's approach differed from the critical convenience of constituent elements such as these and the similar abstractions of Le Corbusier. His own constituent facts were more specific in terms of architectural experience, at the same time that they were astylar in application. Three examples should suffice. One of them is the interweaving of horizontal and vertical planes, a recurrent feature of the progressive design of the twentieth century. Giedion can link a drawing by Theo van Doesburg of *ca.* 1920 that demonstrates this modern tendency with Giuseppe Valadier's scheme for the Piazza del Popolo in Rome where different levels are brought into the same composition. Or again, Le Corbusier's scheme for Algiers in 1931 could be related backward in time to the Lansdowne Crescent at Bath in terms of two constituent facts: the undulating wall, which goes back to Borromini, and the setting of a great residential complex in direct contact with nature, a revolutionary concept of man-made environment first encountered at Versailles.

Such fundamental comparisons of their work with paragons of history were acceptable to the leaders of the Modern Movement. The main thing was Giedion's disavowal of the official architecture of the nineteenth century, against which they had pitched their battle. This established his credentials with them. He was openly sympathetic to their goals and receptive of their arguments. And yet, unlike them, he was impartial in the sense that he did not himself make buildings and, therefore, presumably had no vested interest in his championship of the new architecture other than historical justice. The association was satisfactory to both parties. The modern masters had gained an authoritative spokesman who would ease them into history, and Giedion had found a way to make history an active participant in a continuing revolution. As for the scholarly establishment, it could not ignore or dismiss Giedion as a mere jour-

nalist or pamphleteer. His credentials in that sphere were also solid. He had been trained within the establishment and had demonstrated his ability to be counted among the foremost students of Wölfflin. He never rejected outright Wölfflinian principles, and he spoke as warmly of him and Burckhardt as his mentors as he did of his spiritual affinity to the avant-garde artists of his youth.

Space, Time and Architecture seems, then, at one level, to strike a balance between tradition and innovation, between the perspective of the historian and the passionate loyalty of the advocate. It was of enormous help for the acceptance and popularization of the modern idiom. We are familiar with the fact that the implications of the new architecture drew upon it the wrath of totalitarian regimes in the thirties, but we tend to forget what intense hostility there was toward it in this country at the time of the Norton lectures. A young friend of mine, whose parents had built a modern house in New England about then, told me of the harassment they endured daily, as though they were an undesirable element that had moved into the neighborhood. Giedion's treatise and his work as secretary of the CIAM were also crucial in holding together and reconciling the disparate personalities of the Movement itself. "He was a secretary of genius," as E. Maxwell Fry has expressed it, "because his genius as an historian was employed upon the subject matter of the revolution he superintended."²⁷ And Giedion's book was important in one other sphere: the methodology of architectural history. We have already noted his all-embracing focus on man-made environment, from furniture to the cityscape, a historical attitude which corresponded purposely to the "total architecture" that Gropius talked about. This democracy of environmental outlook, so new to professional historians, was enhanced by the inclusion in it of a host of significant, practical building types, opened up to history through Giedion's rejection of the formalist line of his own teachers.

As crucial as the broadening of the historian's scope was Giedion's concern with the historian's humanity. The extraordinary comprehensiveness and precision of the historical systems before World War I had gone a long way toward objectifying the creative experience. It was Giedion who reminded us that buildings are not entirely quantifiable objects, that architecture responds to the emotional needs of a culture, and that, therefore, the history of architecture is as much a matter of the sympathetic understanding of human motives as it is an ordering of visible properties.

Giedion's concern with the "spirit" of architecture had little to do with the determinism of *Zeitgeist* theories or Dvořák's "*Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte*." Sometimes, as in the nineteenth century, a period may miss the call of its own conscience. The choice is there for it to build truly, in accordance with its genuine impulses, or to build through false or superficial motivation—and it chooses wrongly. There is no total consistency in the spirit of an age, such as Dvořák believed to be the case. Similarly, there is no total accounting of architecture in sociological or economic terms. Architecture exists at two different levels. It is, on the one hand, the product of topical factors—social, economic, technical, ethnological. But "once it appears it constitutes an organism in itself, with its own character and its own continuing life."²⁸ Whereas the origin of an architectural idea may be described in terms of the external conditions of the age, its *value* cannot. It is therefore possible to view architecture out of

its historical context, as an organism in its own right; to recognize that it “can reach out beyond the period of its birth, beyond the social class that called it into being, beyond the style to which it belongs.”²⁹ Modern architecture is thus rooted both in the realities of its own age and in trends that reach toward it from various stages of past history.

But, for all its positive virtue, *Space, Time and Architecture* is not a balanced book. We can see in hindsight how often the advocate led the historian astray, and we are forced to conclude that there is after all something to be said for the detachment of history, its place *aux dessus de la mêlée*. The evangelism of the modern masters found in Giedion’s thought total and uncritical acceptance. Revolutions have need of straw-men to knock down: they cannot be expected to be level-headed or fair about the order they are overturning. The historian presumably steers revolutionary hyperbole to calmer levels of discourse. The bitter and unremitting condemnation of nineteenth-century official architecture, a matter of course for Gropius and Le Corbusier, is disruptive history. Giedion was obviously less concerned with explaining what did happen then and why than in positing what ought to have happened. The nineteenth century was “eternally uncertain, eternally doubtful.”³⁰ Its art was “more shameless than anything previously known in history”;³¹ its ornament, “sickly and debased”;³² its architecture, pseudomonumental and guilty of spatial disintegration. Truly creative voices in vain spoke against the fakery and deceit of the ruling taste. “As snails destroy a fresh green sprout, the smear of the press and the attitude of the public destroyed any new architectonic beginning.”³³ And so on. Nowhere in *Space, Time and Architecture*, or in the books that follow it, is there a sense of the emotional basis of revivalism, its associative force, the earnest search for cultural identity which it represented. To view the revivals as mindless imitation is wilfully to ignore the fevered reevaluation of the past they illustrate at every turn. Giedion’s own assessment of what history should do is plainly applicable to what historicism did do. “To turn backward to a past age is not just to inspect it. . . . The backward look transforms its object: every spectator at every period—at every moment indeed—inevitably transforms the past according to his own nature.”³⁴ Styles, in the abstract, may indeed be no more than the feather on a woman’s head; but to take the nineteenth-century parade of styles at face value, not to see in them the instrument of a great cultural dialectic, amounts to a mischievous obfuscation of the essence of style. If style is made to correspond to the sum total of certain visual conventions, the Modern Movement was itself a style, despite Giedion’s vehement denial that this was ever the case. Indeed, the 1932 exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in New York organized by Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson properly identified the visual coherence of the new architecture and labeled it the International Style, a label which Giedion never forgave. And, if style is taken to be more than form, or rather if it is recognized that cultural, social, and even psychological assumptions underlie formal conventions, then the nineteenth-century “battle of the styles” deserves far greater attention than that of a historical fashion show, and indeed it has been getting it in the last thirty years from less polemical historians. In the same way, salon painting, which Giedion considered permanently banished to the basement of history, is now enjoying a serious reassessment.

Style is a bad word for Giedion, that much is clear; but it is not easy to find out

what he understands the term to mean. He does not himself attempt a new definition beyond saying that it came into general use in the nineteenth century to characterize specific historical periods "according to a materialistic description of details of form."³⁵ This, of course, is a drastic reduction of one of the most intricate concepts of art history. The contrast it would seem is with the essential form beneath the details, the frame beneath the style, what Kaschnitz-Weinberg called *Struktur*. This is really the basis of Giedion's constituent facts, such as the interpenetration of horizontal and vertical planes common to Van Doesburg and Valadier, or the undulating wall that links Borromini with the Lansdowne Crescent and Le Corbusier's Algiers. But the point is that the same *Struktur-Analyse* applied impartially to the official architecture of the nineteenth century would undoubtedly reveal substantive bonds between exponents of historicism and the architects of the Modern Movement. A good instance of this approach is Philip Johnson's pairing of Schinkel and Mies van der Rohe.³⁶

What is more, the qualities which according to Giedion would not allow us to think of the Modern Movement as a style are themselves both ambivalent and undistinctive. There is, first, the New Regionalism. It boils down to the fact that different countries had different ways of expressing the general principles of the Modern Movement. "Now that we are separated by several decades from the birth period of the early twenties," Giedion wrote in 1954, "we are able to discern that certain regional habits and regional traditions lay concealed within the germinal nuclei of the various contemporary movements."³⁷ But regionalism has been recognized from the start as a basic condition of international styles. We talk of English Gothic and German Baroque, and even for the nineteenth century succinct discriminations have been made among the regional uses of the Greek Revival or the Art Nouveau.

There is, secondly, the matter of structure. "The architect of today refuses to consider himself a mere *confiseur* employed to attach some trimmings within and without after the structure has been delivered to him by the engineer. No, the architect himself must conceive it [the edifice] as an integrated whole."³⁸ This is, of course, the prime charge against the nineteenth century: the Great Divide. It is also a grossly overdrawn simplicism that distorts the accomplishment of both centuries. The nineteenth-century divorce of structure from design was by no means as final as Giedion painted it for his own purposes. This is a big subject, obviously outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to demonstrate that nineteenth-century architects were quite aware of the new technology and availed themselves of it when it suited their intentions; their clothing of it in traditional curtains had to do with a critique of form that should be as closely heeded by the historian of the modern period as are the declarations of Le Corbusier and Gropius. The engineers, on the other side of the coin, were not always content with exploring the naked prospects of their technology but often aspired to historically valid form. We need only point out the efforts of James Bogardus, an obscure inventor canonized by Giedion, to style his cast-iron fronts and render them architecturally respectable. And if the schism is exaggerated for the nineteenth century, the wholeness of the twentieth is not itself a clear-cut case. There is much informed sentiment for considering such designers as Pier Luigi Nervi, Buckminster Fuller, and Felix Candela to be structural engineers more than architects; and

the structural inadequacies of some modern buildings designed by well-known architects are notorious.

There is, finally, the red herring of morality. The modern architect, like the scientist, is supposed to feel responsible for the consequences of his imagination. "The architect of today regards himself not merely as the builder of an edifice, but also a builder of contemporary life."³⁹ Well, so did Pugin. Actually, the notion of the architect as reformer of society is not only much older than the Modern Movement, but by now it is also in partial disrepute. To a younger generation of professionals today it is distasteful to think of the architect as form-giver. Giedion's claim that the architect, "like all real artists, has to realize in advance the emotional needs of his fellow citizens before they themselves are aware of them"⁴⁰ reveals the kind of low opinion for the client that sounds reactionary in this age of community projects and participatory design. It is, in fact, a major contradiction both of the International Style and of its historian laureate that the populism of its aims is apparently achieved with consummately elitist means. The true architecture of an age is supposed to spring, in Giedionesque thought, from an inner energy, the innermost depths of society. This has the call of democracy about it, and Giedion's respect for everyday things and "anonymous" masters would seem to sustain such a reading. But soon grass-roots sentiment is overpowered by his extravagant reverence for the architect as hero. The people, it turns out, are ignorant of their own inner resources. They are easily fooled, as they were in the nineteenth century when they followed the ruling taste of the rich, of government officials, and of the artistic establishment that was willing to pander to this upper crust. The people are enjoined to obey instead the "truly great," who are apparently self-appointed and self-anointed. In the words of Baudelaire quoted approvingly by Giedion, these are individuals of whom "each . . . has a banner to his crown and the words inscribed on that banner are clear for all the world to read. Not one of their number has doubts of his monarchy and it is in this unshakeable conviction that their glory resides."⁴¹

These and similar criticisms of *Space, Time and Architecture* may already constitute flogging a dead horse. The contentions of modernist dogma have become a little blurred in time, and will, in a while longer, doubtless blend with the rest of modern history. We have slowly been born to the truth that the history of nineteenth-century architecture cannot be written without the revivals, or the history of the twentieth century without the *other* international style of the twenties and thirties that shaped Berlin and Moscow, Rome, Madrid, and Washington. "The present," Giedion himself wrote toward the end of his life, "is coming to be seen more and more as a mere link between yesterday and tomorrow."⁴² The present always does.

In the end, the main ingredient of Giedion's vast popularity, his spirited defense of the Modern Movement, may prove of minor consequence for his standing as a historian. It is very likely that we shall remember him for the nature of his search, rather than for its specific content or its willfulness. That search is bound up with Giedion's special brand of humanism, a basic, hard-core belief in the stability of the human frame as against the unremitting changeableness of the environment, natural and man-made, that contains its activities.

There is [as he puts it] no static equilibrium between man and his environment, between inner and outer reality. We cannot prove in a direct way how action and reaction operate here. We can no more lay tangible hold on these processes than we can grasp the nucleus of an atom. We simply experience them by means of the several ways in which they crystallize.⁴³

That has been Giedion's abiding worth, to chart the intangible estate between inner and outer reality. In the earlier phase of his work, he sought to understand the impact of the machine upon our unchanging humanity: what happened when industrial production came up against our traditional ways of building and the organic processes that sustain life—the growing of crops, the making of bread, the slaughtering of animals. In *Mechanization Takes Command*, the two aspects of Giedion's genius, when relieved of polemics, are evident: meticulous, imaginative research, on the one hand, and the ability to generalize from it on the unfading questions of life and death, on the other. It is a surprising experience to read in a scholarly book culminating remarks such as these that end the chapter on the mechanization of agriculture.

Can what is taking place in the farmer be a projection of something that is going on throughout? Does the transformation into wandering unemployment of people who for centuries had tilled the soil correspond to what is happening in each of us? In this process, has movement, the basic concept of our world-image, been transposed, in distorted form, into human destiny? During and after the Second World War the violent uprooting of millions has become a coolly accepted practice.⁴⁴

And again, a masterful account of the development of mechanized meat production, from the slaughterhouse of La Villette to Gustavus F. Swift's refrigerated car, is brought to a close with these observations:

How far the question is justified we do not know, nevertheless, it may be asked: Has this neutrality toward death had any further effect upon us? . . . This neutrality toward death may be lodged deep in the roots of our time. It did not bare itself on a large scale until the War, when whole populations, as defenseless as the animals hooked head downwards on the traveling chain, were obliterated with trained neutrality.⁴⁵

It is this Giedion, not embarrassed to ask answerless questions of his finite research, whom we see again in the diptych of the *Eternal Present*.⁴⁶ He turns now from the confrontation of man and the machine to that much earlier and elemental confrontation of man and nature, the very first steps of the reordering of the natural environment he has been born to. In setting out to put our imprint upon the face of the earth, Giedion wants to know, what fears and hopes did we wish to immortalize, how did we come to coordinate our social space? The scope of this query is so vast, the material relics so chary of yielding up their secrets, that specialists in half a dozen fields selectively tapped by Giedion in the course of his discussion can readily find fault with this or that remark, this or that instance of historical license. I submit that we should not read the *Eternal Present* for a careful assessment of present-day research on pre-history and the early high cultures, any more than we read Henry Adams' *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres* today for its scholarly accuracy. Giedion comes through, in

these final books, as what he wanted to be all along, a philosopher of human things and places, who started by trying to understand and justify his own immediate time and ended up in the dark, deep recesses of Pech-Merle and Altamira and Lascaux to show us where it all began.

REFERENCES

NB. For a complete bibliography of S. Giedion and biographical information, the reader is referred to *Hommage à Giedion, Profile seiner Persönlichkeit* (Basel and Stuttgart, 1971).

¹*Architecture and the Phenomena of Transition* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971) p. 1.

²*Ibid.*

³*Mechanization Takes Command* (Oxford and New York, 1948), p. 336.

⁴*Phenomena of Transition*, p. 1.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷*The Beginnings of Art*, p. 6.

⁸*Mechanization*, p. v.

⁹*Mechanization*, p. 3.

¹⁰*Mechanization*, p. 10.

¹¹*Space, Time and Architecture* (1st edition, 1941), p. v. All further references are to this edition.

¹²*Space, Time and Architecture*, p. 18.

¹³*Architecture, You and Me*, pp. 3, 6.

¹⁴*Space, Time and Architecture*, p. 19.

¹⁵*Architecture, You and Me*, p. 103.

¹⁶*Space, Time and Architecture*, p. 6.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Space, Time and Architecture*, pp. 5-6.

¹⁹*Architecture, You and Me*, p. 19.

²⁰*Mechanization*, p. 2.

²¹*Space, Time and Architecture*, p. 4.

²²P. Frankl, *Principles of Architectural History, The Four Phases of Architectural Style 1420-1900*, trans. J. F. O'Gorman (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 194.

²³*Principles*, p. 195.

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵*Towards a New Architecture* (London and New York, 1946), trans. F. Etchells, pp. 27, 37.

²⁶*Towards a New Architecture*, p. 188.

²⁷*Architectural Review*, July, 1968, p. 71.

²⁸*Space, Time and Architecture*, p. 20.

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰*Architecture, You and Me*, p. 11.

³¹*Architecture, You and Me*, p. 4.

³²*Mechanization*, p. 353.

³³*Architecture, You and Me*, p. v.

³⁴*Space, Time and Architecture*, p. 5.

³⁵*Architecture, You and Me*, p. 138.

³⁶P. Johnson, *Karl Friedrich Schinkel im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert* (Schriftenreihe des Architekten- und Ingenieur-Vereins zu Berlin, 13 [1961]).

³⁷*Architecture, You and Me*, p. 145.

³⁸*Architecture, You and Me*, p. 139.

³⁹*Ibid.*

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹*Architecture, You and Me*, p. 18.

⁴²*The Beginnings of Art*, p. xix.

⁴³*The Beginnings of Art*, pp. xviii-xix.

⁴⁴*Mechanization*, p. 168.

⁴⁵*Mechanization*, p. 246.

⁴⁶For a sympathetic appreciation of the two volumes, see J. Rykwert, "Giedion and Prehistoric Art," *The Listener*, 78 (1967), 494-96.

Notes on Contributors

PEARL K. BELL, born in 1922 in Brooklyn, New York, is book critic for *The New Leader*.

EDMUND BURKE III, born in 1940 in Washington, D.C., is associate professor of history and fellow of Merrill College, University of California at Santa Cruz. He is the author of the forthcoming *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco, 1860-1912: Patterns in Pre-Colonial Protest and Resistance*, and is currently working on a book on French sociology and the colonial encounter in North Africa.

BERNARD CAZES, born in 1927 in Hanoi, North Vietnam, is chief of the long-term studies division, Commissariat Général du Plan, Paris. He is the author of *La Planification en France et le IV^e Plan* (1962), *La Vie Economique* (1972), and, with Georgette Cazes, *D'Holbach Portatif* (1967).

KURT W. FORSTER, born in 1935 in Zurich, is professor of the history of art and architecture at Stanford University, and director of the Swiss Institute in Rome. He is the author of monographs on *Pontormo* (1966) and *Gottfried Honegger* (1972), and of numerous articles on Italian Renaissance art, architecture, and urban history.

ERNEST GELLNER, born in 1925 in Paris, is professor at the London School of Economics, University of London. His most recent works include *Cause and Meaning in the Social Sciences* (1973), *Contemporary Thought and Politics* (1974), *The Devil in Modern Philosophy* (1974), and *Legitimation of Belief* (1975).

SPIRO KOSTOF, born in 1936 in Istanbul, Turkey, is professor of architectural history, University of California at Berkeley, and the president of the Society of Architectural Historians. Among his publications are *The Orthodox Baptistery of Ravenna* (1965), *Caves of God* (1972), and *The Third Rome 1870-1950: Traffic and Glory* (1973).

SHIRLEY ROBIN LETWIN, born in 1924, is the author of *The Pursuit of Certainty: Hume, Bentham, J. S. Mill, B. Webb* (1965), and is currently completing a book entitled *Trollope's Gentleman: A Modern Morality*.

FRANK E. MANUEL, born in 1910 in Boston, is Kenan Professor of History at New York University. He is the author of numerous books in the early modern and modern periods, most recently *Freedom from History and Other Untimely Essays* (1971), and *The Religion of Isaac Newton* (in press).

J. HILLIS MILLER, born in 1928 in Newport News, Virginia, is Gray Professor of Rhetoric at Yale University, and currently holder of a senior fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities. His published works include *The Form of Victorian Fiction* (1968), *Thomas Hardy: Distance and Desire* (1970), and he is now working on a book to be called "Fiction and Repetition."

EDWARD W. SAID, born in 1935 in Jerusalem, Palestine, is professor of English and comparative literature at Columbia University, and currently a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. He is the author of *Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography* (1966), *Beginnings: Intention and Method* (1975), and *Orientalism, a Polemic and a Counter-Proposal* (forthcoming), as well as numerous essays in comparative literature, literary theory, and contemporary Middle Eastern literature and politics.

TONY TANNER, born in 1935 in Richmond, England, is a fellow of King's College and a lecturer of Cambridge University. His publications include *Conrad's Lord Jim* (1963), *The Reign of Wonder* (1965), *Saul Bellow* (1965), and *City of Words* (1971).

HEINRICH VON STADEN, born in 1939, is associate professor of classics at Yale University. He is the author of several articles in classics and philosophy, and of the forthcoming *Aisthesis*.

HENRI ZERNER, born in 1939 in France, is curator of prints at the Fogg Art Museum and professor of fine arts at Harvard University. His publications include *The School of Fontainebleau: Etchings and Engravings* (1969).

ISSUES OF *DAEDALUS* IN PRINT

These may be ordered from the *Daedalus* Subscription Office, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 165 Allandale Street, Jamaica Plain Station, Boston, Massachusetts 02130.

THE OIL CRISIS: IN PERSPECTIVE (*Fall 1975*)

ARMS, DEFENSE POLICY, AND ARMS CONTROL (*Summer 1975*)

WISDOM, REVELATION, AND DOUBT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FIRST MILLENNIUM B.C. (*Spring 1975*)

AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: TOWARD AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE. VOLUME II (*Winter 1975*)

AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: TOWARD AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE. VOLUME I (*Fall 1974*)

SCIENCE AND ITS PUBLIC: THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP (*Summer 1974*)

SLAVERY, COLONIALISM, AND RACISM (*Spring 1974*)

TWENTIETH-CENTURY CLASSICS REVISITED (*Winter 1974*)

THE NO-GROWTH SOCIETY (*Fall 1973*)

LANGUAGE AS A HUMAN PROBLEM (*Summer 1973*)

THE SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE (*Spring 1973*)

POST-TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES (*Winter 1973*)

HOW OTHERS SEE THE UNITED STATES (*Fall 1972*)

INTELLECTUALS AND CHANGE (*Summer 1972*)

INTELLECTUALS AND TRADITION (*Spring 1972*)

MYTH, SYMBOL, AND CULTURE (*Winter 1972*)

TWELVE TO SIXTEEN: EARLY ADOLESCENCE (*Fall 1971*)

THE FUTURE OF THE BLACK COLLEGES (*Summer 1971*)

THE HISTORIAN AND THE WORLD OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (*Spring 1971*)

HISTORICAL STUDIES TODAY (*Winter 1971*)

THE MAKING OF MODERN SCIENCE: BIOGRAPHICAL STUDIES (*Fall 1970*)

RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: THE UNIVERSITY'S DILEMMA (*Summer 1970*)

THEORY IN HUMANISTIC STUDIES (*Spring 1970*)

Continued